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The quality of financial report depends on its reliability, comparability, 
accuracy and relevance that could guide investors make an informed investment 
decision.The objective of this study among others is to investigate the 
moderating effect of leverage on the relationship between board, and audit 
committee characteristics and  financial reporting quality in the context of 
Nigerian non-financial listed firms. The study also examines the impact of 
changes in Nigeria’s Code of Corporate Governance, 2011 on the quality of 
financial reporting between 2010 and 2014. Using multiple regression 
technique, the study utilised McNichols (2002) measure of earnings quality 
using pooled panel data, with 101 sample and 505 firm-year observations. The 
results reveal that the relationship between leverage, audit committee share 
ownership, board gender diversity and audit committee financial expertise are 
negative and statistically significantly associated with earnings management at 
5% level. This indicates that the long-term debt has a monitoring ability in 
mitigating earnings management practices, thus, enhancing financial reporting 
quality of Nigerian non-financial  listed firms. This study also finds that the 
revised Nigerian Securities and Exchange Commission Code of Corporate 
Governance, 2011 has brought about new regulatory changes that effectively 
enhance the quality of financial reporting. The practical and the theoretical 
contribution of this study indicates that the agency theory and resource 
dependence theory are important theories when explaining corporate 
governance practices in Nigeria. However, further studies might extend the data 
collection to financial institutions, family controlled and private companies. 
Again, to clearly understand the inner workings of the audit committee in 
Nigeria, a more detail qualitative and case studies could be carried out.  
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Kualiti laporan kewangan bergantung kepada kebolehpercayaan, kesesuaian, 
ketepatan dan kaitan hubungan yang boleh memberikan keputusan berkenaan 
pelaburan kepada pelabur. Objektif kajian ni antara lain adalah untuk 
menyelidik kesan pengantara keumpilan (leverage) ke atas hubungan antara 
lembaga pengarah (board), ciri-ciri jawatankuasa audit dan kualiti pelaporan 
kewangan syarikat bukan kewangan yang tersenarai di Nigeria. Kajian ini juga 
menyelidik kesan perubahan dalam Kod Tadbir Urus Korporat di Nigeria 
terhadap kualiti laporan kewangan di antara tahun 2010 dan 2014. Penyelidikan 
dijalankan menggunakan pengukuran kualiti pelaporan kewangan McNichols 
(2002) dengan menggunakan data panel terkumpul yang diambil daripada 101 
sampel dengan 505 pemerhatian di firma-tahun. Dapatan kajian menunjukkan 
bahawa hubungan antara keumpilan, jawatankuasa audit pemilikan saham, 
kepelbagaian jantina lembaga pengarah dan kepakaran kewangan jawatankuasa 
audit adalah negatif dan dari segi statistiknya berkait secara signifikan dengan 
pengurusan perolehan sebanyak 5%. Ini menunjukkan bahawa hutang jangka 
panjang mampu menangani amalan pengurusan pendapatan, sekali gus 
meningkatkan kualiti pelaporan kewangan syarikat bukan kewangan yang 
tersenarai di Nigeria. Selanjutnya, hubungan antara saiz lembaga pengarah dan 
ketidakbergantungan jawatankuasa audit adalah negatif dan  berkait secara 
signifikan dengan pengurusan perolehan. Kajian ini juga mendapati bahawa  
Kod Tadbir Urus Korporat Nigeria 2011 yang telah disemak semula membawa 
perubahan peraturan baharu dalam meningkatkan kualiti pelaporan kewangan 
secara berkesan. Hasil dapatan kajian secara praktikal dan teori  mendapati teori 
agensi dan teori kebergantungan sumber adalah teori-teori yang penting dalam 
menerangkan pelaksanaan tadbir urus korporat di Nigeria.Walau 
bagaimanapun, kajian akan datang boleh mempertimbangkan pengumpulan 
data bagi institusi kewangan, firma kawalan keluarga dan perniagaan 
persendirian. Seterusnya, bagi memahami perjalanan kerja di dalam 
jawatankuasa audit di Nigeria, kajian yang lebih teliti dari segi kualitatif dan 
kajian kes perlu dilaksanakan.  
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1.1  Background of the Study  
Financial information users mostly rely on financial information provided by 
companies in their annual reports for decision-making. The information is 
contained in a financial report prepared by the managers and is subjected to 
audit by professionally qualified auditors that add to its credibility, reliability, 
relevance and acceptability. Financial information serves as an important 
communication link between users and management of corporations. It also 
serves as a means of assessing the results of operations and financial position of 
the firm.  
 
Therefore, the financial report should provide complete, timely, transparent and 
reliable financial information that is not deliberately prepared to mislead users. 
Also, “the objective of financial reporting is to provide information about the 
reporting entity that is useful to investors. Equally, it should guide investors and 
creditors in making informed decisions. Information that is decision-useful to 
capital providers may also be useful to other users of the financial report who 
are not capital providers” (Alzoubi, 2012, p.368). Despite its importance, 
financial information may not always be credible and reliable because it may 
contain errors, deliberate manipulation of accounting numbers, as well as a 





Nigeria has established institutions to regulate public entities, in the preparation 
and reporting of financial information such as Security and Exchange 
Commission Code of Corporate Governance (SEC, CCG), Financial Reporting 
Council of Nigeria (FRCN), Central Bank of Nigeria Code of Corporate 
Governance (CBN, CCG), National Insurance Commission Code of Corporate 
Governance (NIC, CCG). These institutions are set to regulate and ensure 
quality financial information are provided to users.  
 
In some cases, the multiplicity of these institutions contribute towards non-
compliance and circumvention of specific rules or codes. Sometimes, 
companies  adopt industry based code provisions that contradict the SEC Code 
adjudged to be the   unifying Code and is expected to be observed by all public 
companies. This may lead to low quality of financial information released to 
stakeholders. Thus, Ball, Robin and Wu (2003) argue that inadequate or 
multiple regulation results in low quality of financial reporting.  On the other 
hand, the auditor is required to provide a high quality audit that would guide 
users to make an informed decision based on the financial report released to 
them.  
 
In this respect, external audit plays a significant role in reducing agency costs 
by reducing information asymmetry in financial reporting (Piot & Janin, 2007). 
The recognition of external audit as a monitoring mechanism by the agency 




As such, a high quality audit can reduce manager’s ability to engage in activities 
that promote their opportunistic behaviour at the detriment of owners. On the 
other hand, Sloan (2001) opines that management produces financial accounting 
information as an input to the governance process.  
 
Proponents of agency theory argue that the control and ownership separation 
lead to the problems of moral hazard, where agents act to obtain personal 
benefits at the expense of shareholders. To curtail such behaviour, effective 
control by the board would greatly help. However, the effectiveness of the board 
monitoring depends on board composition, board structure, board activity and 
other sub-committees of the board (He & Yang, 2014). Also, scholars and 
investors suggested the need to develop and regulate the behaviour of corporate 
managers and firm’s performance that weaken public confidence (Merino et al., 
2010).  
 
Accordingly, Chan, Liu and Sun (2013) argue that the existence of corporate 
governance (CG) is to provide checks and balances between shareholders and 
management and help in resolving agency problems. He further argues that with 
better governance quality, firms should suffer fewer agency conflicts. Similarly, 
Dechow, Ge, and Schrand (2010) stated that the ability to adequately supervise 
the managerial activities and constrain opportunistically managed earnings lies 
with effective internal CG mechanisms such as the Board of Directors. Also, 




independence, its audit committee (AC), and their financial expertise were 
found to affect the level of managers’ discretionary accruals leading to earnings 
management (EM) practices. 
 
Consequently, prior studies have found that good governance minimises the 
adverse effects of creative financial reporting and EM (Beasley, 1996; 
McMullen & Raghunandan, 1996; Musa, Olurontoba & Oba, 2014). As such, 
enhanced CG practices should be able to reduce EM practices. The global 
financial crises that engulfed Asian and European countries as well as the USA 
affected capital markets and its CG which described their weaknesses that led 
to agitation for more efficient CG practices (Mitton, 2002). Following this, CG 
reforms have become a global concern that motivated several countries to issue 
or modify Codes of Best Practices in CG. The aims are to address the 
governance issues of board characteristics, efficient ACs and enhancing the 
quality of financial reports (SEC, 2011b). A former US SEC Chairman stated 
that an active capital market strongly relies on quality information. He argued 
that efficient markets would cease to exist without quality financial information. 
Hence, for an enhanced quality financial report; CG mechanisms should be 
established or enhanced (Levitt, 1998). 
 
Also, an increase in debt financing effectively reduces equity capital and a 
company’s equity base, hence increasing the proportion of equity ownership by 




increase managers’ motivation to decrease their perquisites (privileges, 
incentives, bonuses or advantages) due to the debt employed and increase their 
efficiency (Grossman, & Hart, 1982). The obligation of interest payments 
resulting from the use of debt would restrict the use of cash flows at the 
discretions of managers optimally. However, where debts are employed, cash 
flows would now be limited to debt servicing (principal & interest) payments. 
Thus, this would help resolve the free cash flow problem (Jensen, 1986). 
 
Since the leverage (long-term debt) imposes constraints on managerial 
discretion, agency theory suggests that managers may be motivated to adopt less 
leverage that does not maximise shareholders' wealth (Chang, 2013). 
Furthermore, the extent to which managers can take on less leverage depend on 
the strength of CG since CG is designed to combat agency conflict (Jiraporn, 
Kim, Kim, & Kitsabunnarat, 2012). Jiraporn et al. (2012) further argue that 
firms with weak governance are significantly more levered. Since leverage as a 
monitoring mechanism performs similar functions just like CG, it could serve 
as a substitute for each other in alleviating agency conflicts. Nonetheless, this 
does not mean poor governance quality leads to higher leverage (Jiraporn et al., 
2012).  
 
On the other hand, Adegbite (2015) stressed that institutional perspective 
provides insights into the complexity of CG structures and practices with 




become more important when drawing a comparison between strong and weak 
institutional contexts (Nigeria). As a result, this study is peculiar to Nigerian 
non-financial listed firms characterised by the weak governance structure 
(World Bank, 2012). 
 
Several corporate scandals in the past decade and the limited success of 
regulatory reforms further demand quality reporting that would decrease fraud, 
misstatements of accounts and EM. Thus, improving the effectiveness of the 
AC would enhance the financial reporting quality (FRQ). Public liability 
companies in Nigeria are expected to prepare and publish their audited financial 
reports annually. In preparing the reports, they are required to comply with the 
requirements of the Companies and Allied Matters Act (CAMA) Cap. 20, Law 
of the Federation of Nigeria (LFN) 2004: Securities and Exchange Commission 
Code of Corporate Governance (SEC, 2011). 
 
Further, Statement of Accounting Standards (SAS) and other provisions 
relevant to the industry in which the company operates form part of the 
compliance requirement. The SAS issued by the Financial Reporting Council 
of Nigeria serves as a guide for the preparation of reports that assist users of 
financial statement in making financial decisions. The preparations of reports 
by public liability companies in Nigeria in line with such standards has created 
comparability problems, difficulties in accessing funds internationally and 




convergence to the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) was 
prepared in 2010. Henceforth,  public liability companies are required to prepare 
their accounts in line with the IFRS effective from January 2012. The adoption 
of IFRS in Nigeria would enhance global comparability for investors, improve 
the quality of reporting and lower the cost of capital for companies adopting 
IFRS.  
 
It is not the presentation, compliance and disclosure of financial information to 
the regulatory authorities that matter. Rather, investors consider the value-
relevance of such information that would enable sound investment decision and 
returns of their investments. Thus, financial statements across the globe, 
including Nigeria, are generated from a variety of inputs, specifically legal, 
regulatory, industry and firm-specific components (Ragab & Omran, 2006). 
Due to the importance of financial statements in conveying firm’s information 
to shareholders and the public, the issue of value-relevance becomes an 
important factor that is worth examining.  
 
Thus, value-relevance of financial information has been described as the ability 
of financial data to summarise firm value or to reflect information that affects 
stock market measures. One of the principles of good corporate governance is 
the requirement for full disclosure of all facts to stakeholders that explain 
whether corporate governance has any influence whatsoever on the value-




resources largely depends on the available financial information contained in 
the financial reports.  
 
Empirical evidence supports that the value-relevance of accounting information 
for firms depends on good governance structures (Vafeas, 2000; Habib & Azim, 
2008). Accordingly, Dimitropoulos, Asteriou and Koumanakos, (2010) 
documented that the size of the board has no relationship with how informative 
the earnings information is, However, it is positively related to the number of 
independent non-executive directors on the board. They further argue that firms 
with a higher percentage of independent non-executive directors report higher 
earnings quality compared to companies with a lower proportion of independent 
non-executive directors.  
 
Conversely, Hashim and Devi (2008) argue that board independence and 
managerial share ownership have no value-relevance for Malaysian companies 
although the study found evidence of family ownership of some Malaysian 
businesses. In contrast, Vafeas (2000) found board composition has no value-
relevance of accounting information, although it was found that board size to be 
value-relevant. Therefore, empirical data indicates that although corporate 
governance is a crucial factor for the value relevance of accounting information, 
specific governance variables can improve the quality of financial reporting 




1.2  Motivation for the Study 
 Before the global financial crises, financial institutions in Nigeria collapsed 
while others were rescued with the support of public funds by the government. 
For instance, from 1994 to 2006, 45 commercial banks were liquidated, while 
nine (9) banks were declared distressed in 2008 but rescued from total collapse 
by the Government with a financial aid worth N6.2 billion (Adeyemi, 2011). 
Therefore, the failure of Nigerian firms is not different from corporate failures 
across the world, particularly in the financial institutions. Failure of these 
institutions were the result of poor corporate governance practices, ineffective 
oversight functions of the Board, self-serving and fraudulent practices among 
board members and senior management as well as undue influence of the 
MD/CEO or Chairman are some of the factors responsible for their failures 
(CBN, CCG, 2006).  
 
Furthermore, weak internal controls and non-compliance with specified internal 
controls and operation procedures, also to ignorance of and inability to comply 
with rules, laws and regulations guiding the banking business had contributed 
to the collapse and liquidation of those banks (CBN, CCG, 2006). The Financial 
Reporting Council of Nigeria’s suspension of Stanbic IBTC Bank’s Chairman 
and two directors for providing stakeholders with misleading financial 
statements for 2013 and 2014 provided further evidence on the quality of 
financial reporting in Nigeria (Olowokure, Tanko, & Nyor, 2016). The actions 




monitor their boards and management actions in providing adequate financial 
informations to the owners (principals) and other stakeholders. This creates 
information asymmetry leading to adverse selection according to the agency 
theory. 
 
Similarly, observations were made by the World Bank (2012) that some banks 
exploit loopholes in the Nigerian accounting and auditing standards and weak 
capacity of the regulatory bodies and its enforcement. Employment of creative 
accounting to boost their balance sheets were associated with weak and 
constrained good corporate governance practices in Nigeria. The weaknesses in 
financial reporting and auditing led to the Nigeria’s banking sector crisis (World 
Bank, 2012). Thus, the World Bank report characterises the nature and practices 
of low quality financial reporting and weaknesses in the governance of public 
companies in Nigeria. In order to safeguard investors’ interest against financial 
malpractices and restore their confidence, SEC had reviewed its CCG which 
focuses on enhancing board of directors’ independence and the effectiveness of 
ACs.  
 
Therefore, due to the absence of a similar regulatory body to oversee the 
activities of non-financial institutions such as CBN and NDIC, coupled with 
SEC’s weakness in supervision and observance of its code (World Bank, 2004; 
2012), studies on CG and FRQ in the non-financial sector of Nigeria are current 




understand the nature and quality of reported earnings of listed non-financial 
firms in Nigeria, thus enhancing the confidence of the capital market operators 
(investors).  
 
In the same vein, manager’s involvement in managing earnings without 
adequate monitoring could encourage deceptive and fraudulent behaviour that 
may lead to low quality financial reporting. Furthermore “fraudulent and self-
serving practices among members of the board, management, and staff pose a 
significant challenge to the effectiveness of the CG Code in Nigeria (CBN, CG, 
Sec.2.3, 2006, p.4 )”. Fama and Jensen (1983) posit that one of the essential 
components of the decision control system is the role of the AC for internal 
monitoring of management activities. Besides, the audit committee which 
comprises of directors and shareholders that are expected to provide adequate 
control in enhancing the quality of financial reports, is composed of people who 
are not knowledgeable in accounting and financial issues, thereby making it less 
effective  (CBN, CCG, 2006).  
 
Accordingly, practices such as falsification of records, and adoption of unethical 
practices spread across the banking sector in Nigeria due to the desire to boost 
income as a result of intense competition. Similarly, false reporting of returns 
to the regulatory authorities and concealment of information from CBN 
examiners prevent detection of abnormal situations in the banks as a result of 




of material issues compromised sound corporate governance and affect the 
quality of financial information,  making it less reliable. As a result, Nigerian 
SEC Code of Corporate Governance, 2011 was reviewed to reduce the adverse 
effects of creative financial reporting.  
 
Diversity in the context of corporate governance refers to the Board composition 
and combination of qualities, characteristics and expertise of members in the 
areas of board processes and decision making (Ingley & Walt, 2003). Therefore, 
the gender of board members is one of the features of diversity which is the 
most distinct demographic feature as compared to age, nationality, education or 
cultural background. Evidence exists in the literature from developed countries 
on the active participation of women in public life which supports the notion 
that presence of women on corporate boards improves performance as well as 
enhances monitoring. The cultural/traditional and religious settings of African 
countries place many restrictions on women participation in public activities. 
As a result, women in the African continent are now pushing for an active role 
in the management and governance process (Obanya & Mordi, 2014).  
 
Geographically, Nigeria is divided into three regions with sectoral variations 
and diverse cultures with over 186 million people and 368 ethinic groups. 
Women participation in active politics, trade unions and associations’ activities 
could be found in the southern and eastern parts of Nigeria. While in the north, 




underlie the enduring disadvantage faced by women in the region (Council, 
2012). In addition, Western education is less pursued amongst women in the 
north who are predominantly Muslims. Women in the north do not associate 
freely with their male counterparts in social and economic endeavours, which 
makes their presence low compared with the women from the Western and 
Eastern (predominantly Christians) parts of the country. Furthermore, the 
gender report in Nigeria (2012) reported that there are more women in the 
formal sector in the South than in the Northern part and the rate of female 
entrepreneurship is lower in the States of the North (23%) than in the South 
(36%). 
 
However, there is no law restricting women participation in all spheres of public 
life in Nigeria. The struggle for a fair share of women in political offices began 
a long time ago. It is only in 1985 that Nigeria ratified the 1979 Convention on 
the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) after several 
efforts of implementing it locally have failed. Besides other protocal 
agreements, Nigeria adopted the 1995 Beijing Platform for Action and signed 
the Protocol on the Rights of Women in Africa (The Maputo Protocol). Yet, 
implementation remained weak. The dominance of men can be seen in all 
spheres of women’s lives as it is clearly reflected in women's representation in 
politics and governance. Although the Nigerian Gender Programme has set a 
target of 35% as a benchmark towards gender equality in Nigeria, much is 




made, more needs to be done to achieve the gender equality benchmark. Thus, 
Nigeria needs to meet at least a 20 percentage point gap (Council, 2012). As a 
result, the set target focuses mainly on appointments in political offices with 
less emphasis on participation in economic activities such as women climbing 
up the ladder to the top echelon of the corporate board positions. Therefore, 
rather than focusing on political positions, this study examines the presence of 
women on corporate boards in the Nigerian non-financial listed companies and 
how their presence impacted the quality of earnings of such companies. 
 
Consequently, regulators and researchers developed an interest in the issue of 
quality of financial reporting based on its importance in providing financial 
information to users. It also provides opportunities of assessing the firm’s 
economic performance and management actions that help them in making 
decisions (Fodio, Ibikunle, & Oba, 2013). Furthermore, evidence has shown 
that studies conducted on CG and FRQ are few in Nigeria (Hassan, 2011; 
Hassan, 2013; Sama'ila, 2012) and focused more on banks with emphasis on 
board characteristics of independence, board size, meetings and external audit 
attributes of audit firm size. Again, the studies used few samples with a focus 
on specific industries. Given the inadequacy of studies on other relevant 
governance variables such as gender diversity, leverage and other audit 
committee financial expertise, the AC share ownership which was among the 
SEC CCG, 2011, incorporated changes introduced as a CG variable that may 




scope, by incorporating all non-financial listed firms. In addition, the study 
examines the impact of board and audit committee characteristics on earnings 
management.  
 
Accordingly, capital structure (CS) decision is an important decision in CG. It 
involves decisions on the appropriate financing mix of debt and equity that aims 
to increase shareholder's wealth, firm value and firm performance. Jiraporn et 
al. (2012) argue that CS decisions affect some governance mechanisms such as 
board structure (Harford, Li, & Zhao, 2008), executive compensation (Berger, 
Ofek, & Yermack, 1997) as well as anti-takeover status and provisions (Garvey 
& Hanka, 1999; Jiraporn & Gleason, 2007; John & Litov, 2010).  
 
Further, Kochhar (1997) argues that where CS decisions are weak, there is the 
likelihood of decline or loss in firm value derived from strategic assets. 
Therefore, decisions on the appropriate financing debt-equity mix are crucial 
for effective and efficient firm performance. In a similar study, Singh (1997) 
argues that differences in the financial environment were found to contribute to 
different ways of financing in developing countries. Singh (1997), maintained 
that developing countries do not observe pecking order theorem in the financing 
decisions where most companies depend so much on external financing through 
short-term finance. Similarly, Salawu (2007) reported that 60 percent of 
companies’ CS were financed by short-term debt in Nigeria. The findings were 




that a majority of  Nigerian firms are financed by equity capital or a mix of 
equity capital and short-term financing. Given the changes in the growth of the 
Nigerian economy, the differences in the previous studies in long versus short-
term debt financing of listed companies need to be further explored, particularly 
in the non-financial companies. Thus, long-term debt is less employed in 
companies’ capital structure resulting in the lack of study of its impact in 
monitoring and control of the financial reporting process.  
 
Further, bond holders are not members of the board  and do not participate in 
the governance of Nigerian companies creating information asymmetry 
between bond holders, boards and the management. Consequently, this study 
examines the impact of long-term debt (leverage) as a moderating variable 
between some governance mechanisms and FRQ. In support of this study, the 
agency theory has given sufficient evidence in the use of leverage to reduce 
asymmetric information and subsequently decrease agency cost. Theoretically, 
based on the agency theory and resource dependency theories, leverage could 
serve as a moderator between some selected CG variables and  earnings 
management.  
 
Furthermore, there are various views globally in respect to a firm’s 
characteristics and quality of financial reporting. Prior studies (Wallace et al., 
1994; Chen & Jaggi, 2007; Hassan, 2012) argue that a firm’s structure plays a 




numbers compared to monitoring or performance variables measures. In 
addition, oversight mechanisms are better in controlling management 
opportunistic behaviour in the preparation of financial statements. Besides, in 
the institutional context of Nigeria, corruption occurs in almost all public 
activities. The 2011 review of SEC regulatory rules that provides a number of 
changes in the corporate governance code is aimed to enhance governance 
mechanisms of public companies. However, studies on these changes are very 
limited and particularly neglected the non-financial sector of the economy. 
Hence, a comprehensive study on the new provisions introduced by SEC Code 
2011 on board and audit committee characteristics is required, and that would 
be of interest to regulators and practitioners. Furthermore, this study will be of 
interest to investors since the level of prevalence of earnings management and 
associated board’s and audit committee characteristics can help investors to 
assess the overall informativeness of the report. 
1.3  Problem Statement  
Corporate governance (CG) plays a major role in firms' commitment and 
adoption of ethical practices within the organisational structure and 
relationships with employees, customers, creditors, shareholders, and 
regulators. Managers use earnings management to influence (increase/ 
decrease) the reported earnings using different techniques. The aim is to meet 
the target, i.e., to avoid reporting losses (Cohen & Zarowin, 2010). Similarly, 




reporting have poor governance, low earnings quality, and busy outside 
directors. Consequently, fraudulent financial reporting has an adverse effect on 
the shareholders which lead to bankruptcy, capital shortage and fraud.  
Therefore, effective monitoring of management activities and legal compliance 
facilitates the prevention of unlawful and improper behaviour.  Also, regulators 
across the globe emphasise the need for firms’ compliance with the CG Code 
of best practices to control and monitor improper behaviour (Blue Ribbon 
Report, 1999; Bebchuk, Cohen, & Ferrell, 2009).  
 
Adegbite (2010) opined that poor CG is a major factor that has given rise to 
distress in the Nigeria banking sector. For instance, in 2009 the CBN reported 
nine (9) insolvent banks (Afribank, Finbank, Intercontinental Bank, Oceanic 
Bank, Union Bank, BankPHB, Equitorial Trust Bank, Spring Bank and Wema 
Bank) which were declared bankrupt because of their audit tests failure due to 
capital shortage.  
 
Nevertheless, a year before (2008) the Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE) declared 
the majority of these banks as the listed firms with the highest market 
capitalisation (Foyeke, Olajide, Oluku, & Kolade, 2016). The fact that 
immediately after appearing as the most capitalised companies in the previous 
financial year, then suddenly being declared bankrupt and collapsed signify 
information asymmetry between owners and managers which are agency issues 




information presented to the stakeholders by these companies might not be their 
true financial positions. Furthermore, reported cases of African Petroleum, 
Lever Brothers and Cadbury Nigeria PLC are among the most notable 
fraudulent cases involving non-financial firms in Nigeria (Ajibolade, 2008).  
 
Diversity in the context of corporate governance refers to the board composition 
and combination of qualities, characteristics and expertise of members about 
board processes and decision making (Ingley & Walt, 2003). Therefore, board 
gender is one of the features of diversity which is the most distinct demographic 
features compared to age, nationality, education or cultural background. The 
cultural/traditional and religious settings of African countries place many 
restrictions on women participation in public activities. As a result, women in 
the African continent are now agitating for a more active role in the management 
and governance process. However, Nigeria has over 186 million people with 
approximately 52% female population. This indicates the need to have women 
presence and active participation in all spheres of public activities. 
Nevertheless, the issue of the presence of female directors on the corporate 
boards of Nigerian companies is less explored in Nigeria. Thus,  this study aims 
to consider the impact of gender diversity in the corporate boards of non-
financial listed firms in Nigeria. There is evidence of studies on corporate 
governance and earnings management with mixed findings. The mixed findings 
could be attributed to differences in socio-cultural, economic and political 




developing countries that have peculiarities regarding development and 
compliance with standards. Consequently, Lin and Hwang (2010) argue that 
value relevance of earnings is country specific as different countries have 
different institutional settings. Furthermore, emerging economies are 
characterised by low levels of economic growth, insufficient corporate 
governance structures, financial and capital market development, multiple 
regulations, and timeliness of the financial information and the legal regimes 
sets them apart from other developed countries.  
 
Therefore, generalisations of the findings of previous studies are limited to those 
countries being studied. Hence, there is a need to use Nigerian data for better 
understanding of the relationship in Nigerian firms. Besides, studies on board 
and audit committee characteristics and financial reporting quality in the 
emerging economy (Nigeria) are few. Incorporating other governance variables 
such as board gender diversity, managerial share ownership, audit committee 
share ownership and their interaction with leverage and latest data, this study 
would extend the work of Hassan (2012); Uadiale (2012);  Fodio et al. (2013); 
Musa, Olaruntoba and Oba (2014). It would also provide better insight into the 
relationship between corporate governance and quality of financial reports in 
Nigeria. Again, there is the absence of consensus among the scholars on the 
direction (extent) to which each CG variable relating to board and audit 
committee characteristics influences the financial reporting quality in Nigeria. 




environment, and that can improve the quality of earnings and minimise 
corporate failures, consequently attracting foreign investment to the economy. 
Accordingly, Razali and Arshad (2014) document that board composition helps 
in reducing agency problem, which in turn enhances the financial information 
quality. Previous studies on BIND in Nigeria adopted the SEC Code 2003 with 
the majority of the corporate boards dominated by executive directors, with few 
and in some companies no non-executive directors (NED) on the board, hence 
bringing the independence of these boards into question. However, some studies 
lend support to a greater percentage of outside directors on the board, arguing 
that they help in constraining income increasing EM. Such studies include Klein 
(2002), Peasnell et al. (2005) and Erena and Tehulu (2012) who argue that a 
negative relationship exists between independent/non-executive (outside) 
directors and EM.   
 
On the other hand, He, Piot, Labelle, and Thornton (2009) document that studies 
justifying board independence-enhancing FRQ relates to Anglo-Saxon and 
other European countries, but not in all countries. Following the SEC Code 2011 
regulatory change on the composition of the corporate boards, it appears that 
fewer studies examined the impact of such percentage increase in the NED 
members on the quality and informativeness of the reported earnings. Therefore, 
the impact of board independence on FRQ depends on the cultural values, 
customs and traditions of the researched country. Hence, the need to study the 




context to observe variations or otherwise with that of developed economies. 
One of the change in the SEC CG Code 2011, is a requirement for the disclosure 
of shares owned by all the directors of the company.  Managers who control the 
equity ownership could influence the decision-making of the board. Managerial 
share ownership provides managers equity ownership of their company and 
creates a sense of concern and commitment to achieve corporate objectives.  The 
absence of which may result in self-motivated interest through various means 
of financial misappropriations. It is unclear whether managerial share 
ownership (MSOW) practices in Nigeria motivate managers into reducing self-
interest activities or management entrenchment practices.  
 
Furthermore, none of the previous studies considered the MSOW impact on the 
FRQ. Thus, there is a need to examine the impact of managerial share ownership 
on earnings management practices in Nigerian non-financial listed firms. 
Therefore, this study considers managerial share ownership attribute and aims 
to provide a broader perspective on internal governance mechanisms and their 
impact on FRQ. Furthermore, significant changes on how to strengthen audit 
committee performance were introduced in the new SEC Code.  Moreover, prior 
studies did not examine the effectiveness of the new provisions in Nigeria, 
particularly on the audit committee financial expertise. Further, in strengthening 
the AC’s performance for an enhanced quality of the financial report, such AC 
should comprise of a minimum of three (3) members and the majority of them 




in the Nigerian SEC CCG 2011 requires membership of three (3) non-executive 
directors and three (3) shareholder representatives on the committee to enhance 
the oversight function of the AC which makes it distinct from UK, US, 
Malaysia, and Australia audit committee compositions. In addition, the revised 
SEC Code 2011 uses financial literacy as the requisite financial expertise of 
audit committee member on the AC of public companies in Nigeria. The 
uniqueness of the AC regarding composition and independence attract fewer 
researchers’ attention. Thus, by including independence, share ownership and 
financial expertise after the reviewed SEC CCG 2011, this study extends 
previous studies on the effect of these variables on quality of the financial 
report.  
 
Furthermore, previous studies on CG in Nigeria concentrated on financial 
institutions (banks) which constitute about 20 percent of the total listed firms, 
while some use selected sectors such as Manufacturing, Industrial, and 
Consumer Goods with smaller samples. Therefore, focusing on non-financial 
firms would provide a comprehensive and better understanding of the impact of 
corporate governance mechanisms and FRQ on different sectors and the larger 
scale of the economy. Consequently, the acquisition of debt by managers’ ties 
up firm’s free cash flow, which restricts unnecessary wastages of firm resources. 
Succinctly, Jensen (1987) referred such action as “control hypothesis" for debt 
creation, which suggests that managers issue debt to compel their firms to pay 




bankruptcy if they default on debt service payments. Prior studies  (Dichev & 
Skinner, 2002; Beatty & Weber, 2003) found a positive relationship between 
EM activities and leverage. They argue that an incentive for EM increases with 
leverage where managers use income increasing accruals to reduce the 
likelihood of the firm's debt covenant violations. However, Oino and Ukaegbu 
(2015) argue that majority of companies in developed countries employed long-
term debt, which could be due to the developed capital market and institutional 
settings.  
 
Conversely, Nigerian listed firms employ substantial short-term and less long-
term debt financing in their capital structure. The composition of corporate 
boards in Nigeria excluded debt holders, despite their investment that needs to 
be monitored. However, most of the studies conducted in countries with active 
capital markets documented inconclusive/contradictory results. Studies carried 
out in Nigeria concentrated on studying CS and firm performance (Murphy, 
Trailer, & Hill, 1996; Salawu, 2007; Olokoyo, 2013) rather than how long-term 
debt mitigates earnings manipulations and improve quality of earnings. 
Consequently, introduction of long-term debt (leverage) may affect the 
relationship between the CG and earnings management.  
 
In addition, the Nigerian accounting standards settings, institutional structure, 
and corporate governance are expected to be different from the developed 




unclear whether evidence in the developed or other developing nations would 
be consistent with those in Nigerian firm’s especially non-financial institutions 
in respect of financial information quality. Therefore, so long as the country’s 
governance practice continues to mimic the models in the advanced societies 
especially the US and UK, without due consideration to the socio-cultural 
peculiarities of the Nigerian business environment, differing levels of 
observance of the principles of good governance may appear due to the inherent 
difference in the respective contries’ value systems.  
 
Notwithstanding the existence of ethnic diversity, the Nigeria value system is 
built on the cultural homogeneity where the public value orientation is being 
transferred into the corporate environment. These are some of the factors where 
a majority of multi-country or studies on international settings consider as 
limitations to their studies and controlled for (Filip, Labelle & Rousseau, 2015). 
Therefore, to avoid the effect of correlations of institutional omitted variables, 
this study focuses on board and audit committee characteristics and their 
interaction with debt structure on the Nigerian non-financial listed firms. 
Finally, by focusing on Nigeria, the study would provide an insight and better 
understanding of the uniqueness of CG practices in emerging economies such 
as Nigeria. Thus, this study contributes to the body of knowledge on how the 
interaction of leverage with corporate governance mechanisms could affect 




1.4  Research Questions 
i)  What is the impact of board characteristics on the financial reporting 
quality in the Nigerian listed firms? 
ii)  Do audit committee characteristics affect the quality of financial 
reporting in the Nigerian listed firms?  
iii) Is there a relationship between leverage and financial reporting quality 
in the Nigerian listed firms? 
iv)  Does leverage (long-term debt) moderate the relationship between board 
characteristics (i.e. board independence, board gender diversity, 
managerial share ownership, chief executive duality) and financial 
reporting quality in the Nigerian listed firms? 
v) Does leverage (long-term debt) moderate the relationship between the 
audit committee characteristics (i.e. audit committee share ownership, 
audit committee financial expertise) and financial reporting quality? 
vi) What is the impact of the SEC Code of Corporate Governance (2011) 





1.5  Objectives of the Study 
The broad study objective is to examine the impact of corporate governance 
characteristics on the quality of financial reporting in the  Nigerian non-financial 
listed firms. Thus, the study has the following specific objectives: 
 
i)  To examine the relationship between board characteristics (i.e. board 
size, board independence, managerial ownership of shares, gender, and 
CEO duality), and financial reporting quality in the Nigerian listed 
firms. 
ii)  To examine the effect of the audit committee characteristics on the 
quality of the financial reporting in Nigerian listed firms. 
iii)  To examine the relationship between leverage and financial reporting 
quality of Nigerian listed firms. 
iv)  To examine the moderating effect of leverage on the relationship 
between board characteristics (i.e. board independence, board gender 
diversity, managerial share ownership, chief executive duality) and 
financial reporting quality of Nigerian listed firms. 
v) To examine the moderating effect of leverage on the relationships 
between audit committee characteristics (i.e. audit committee share 
ownership, audit committee financial expertise) and financial reporting 




vi) To determine the effect of the SEC Code of Corporate Governance 
(2011) on the quality of financial reporting of  Nigerian listed firms. 
1.6 Significance of the Study 
Despite the need to conduct a study that investigates the relationships between 
corporate governance and financial reporting quality of Nigerian non-financial 
listed firms, hitherto, there is no evidence of study to have examined the 
managerial share ownership, gender diversity, audit committee financial 
expertise, and audit committee share ownership in the Nigerian non-financial 
listed firms as a whole. The  moderating effect of leverage on the relationship 
between board and audit committee characteristics and earnings management in 
Nigerian non-financial listed firms proved to be the pioneer study. Therefore, 
the study would as well improve the practical and theoretical understanding of 
the moderating effect of leverage on CG mechanisms. 
1.6.1  Theoretical implications 
With regards to corporate governance variables, this study extends existing 
literature that an increase in board size and audit committee independence have 
significant negative effects on earnings management. The result is in support of 
the agency theory perspective that size of the board is crucial in monitoring 
managers’ entrenchment. It argues that a larger board comprising of persons 
with diverse interests, experience, and skills can contribute more to its 




larger boards signify involvement of more resourceful members from 
environmentally diverse settings, that would provide diverse opinions, 
contribute to wider deliberations resulting to a better decision that would 
enhance its performance and monitoring functions. On the other hand, the 
results of MSOW, BGD, and BIND governance variables failed to mitigate 
earnings management practices. Thus, they cannot strongly support agency 
theory of minimising information asymmetry and agency cost. 
 
Consequently, resource dependency theory argues that gender diversity and 
board independence provide the board of directors with more human capital 
sourced from outside. It is therefore anticipated that their rich expertise and 
technical knowledge would be useful as part of their firm monitoring roles, 
thereby contributing towards effective financial reporting process. The result of 
this study provides a different outcome, possibly when tested in different 
settings or outcomes, which would then provide significant results.  
 
Accordingly, the result on MSOW did not support the agency theory that 
managers’ interests would be aligned with shareholders should the managers be 
allowed to own an equity holding of a company. The aim is to minimise the 
moral hazard through alignment of interests. This sound unique and is a 
departure from most of the studies on MSOW that reported a negative 





As a whole, the results of the mentioned governance variables failed to provide 
sufficient support for agency theory in mitigating agency conflict and reducing 
monitoring cost. Further, there is no evidence in Nigerian non-financial listed 
firms suggesting that outside directors have independent opinions, a better sense 
of judgement, skills and knowledge which lead to mitigating earnings 
management advocated by the resource dependency theory. Perhaps, it might 
be related to the definition, proportion and appointment of non-executive 
directors required on the board by the Nigerian Code of Corporate Governance. 
 
Thirdly, agency theory argues that audit committees provide an effective 
monitoring function that improves financial reporting process. Consequently, 
this study found support for agency theory and RD theory on the ability of audit 
committee independence (ACIND) to provide a monitoring role that leads to 
minimising agency cost. As a matter of fact, the board sources its members from 
a pool of experts and industrially experienced people.  
 
Fourthly, there is evidence of mixed findings on the relationship between ACFE 
and ACSOW and earnings management, especially in the Western and 
developed economies. The results of the study indicate that audit committee 
financial expertise and audit committee share ownership do not provide 
sufficient monitoring and control of managers’ opportunistic tendencies as 
suggested by the agency theory. This suggests that, when at least one member 




expertise in monitoring managers’ activities, it would not significantly improve 
the quality of the financial report. Similarly, prior literature suggests that when 
an audit committee member owns a proportional amount of firm equity, it would 
align his interest with the principal’s interest, minimise asymmetric 
information, and motivate him to exert more effort in his monitoring role, which 
leads to decreased moral hazard. This study results could provide evidence of a 
reduction in asymmetric information between the agents and principals 
following the agents’ ownership of the firm’s shares, hence not supporting the 
agency theory perspective.  
 
However, following the moderating role of leverage on CEO duality, it further 
supports and advances the stewardship theory perspective of viewing the CEO 
as an honest and trustworthy agent, who aligns his personal objective with the 
firm’s objectives and values. As such, the CEO would do everything to avoid 
pursuing his personal interest. Hence, the result provides support that allowing 
the CEO to serve as the Chair of the board would help in mitigating earnings 
management practices. Therefore, the outcome of this study suggests that SEC 
Code 2003 requirement for CEO duality can still work on highly levered firms. 
Thus, CEO duality would enhance the earnings quality of those firms, which 




1.6.2  Practical/Policy Implications 
In practice, the findings of this study would be beneficial to shareholders, 
investors, financial analyst, management, and other stakeholders. The Nigeria 
Securities & Exchange Commission will benefit from this research through the 
findings of this study which revealed a number of shortcomings in the provision 
of the SEC Code of CG 2011. Firstly, SEC needs to review the process, 
requirement and qualification of non-executive board members as the present 
mode of appointing NED failed to provide the required monitoring role as 
expected.  
 
The proliferation of industry based Codes of CG should be stopped. Instead, the 
various codes should be harmonised to allow for strict obervance and 
compliance to a standard Code. When that is done, it would enhance the 
observance and compliance level of such codes compared to the present practice 
with conflicting provisions. Furthermore, it would be easier to incorporate more 
professional opinions and consider global best practices in the event of 
subsequent review. 
 
Similarly, the Financial Reporting Council of Nigeria (FRCN) and other 
professional accounting bodies should take advantage of the findings of this 
research, particularly on the need to further provide measures that would 
empower board’s audit committee. The composition of the AC is adequate to 




experience to enhance its oversight monitoring functions on the financial 
reporting process.  
 
Professional accounting bodies like the Institute of Chartered Accountants of 
Nigeria (ICAN) and Association of National Accountants of Nigeria (ANAN) 
among others will find this study relevant and resourceful as it will reveal the 
effect of accounting knowledge of the board members on the financial reporting 
in the non-financial companies which has been neglected, until now. Also, the 
need for preparers of financial reports to have concern for investors and other 
stakeholders when reporting the financial position and result of operations of 
their companies to the capital market. Thus, much is expected from the 
accounting regulatory bodies. 
1.7  Scope of the Study 
This study used data from the non-financial firms listed on the Nigerian SEC. 
The study covered a period of five (5) years, from 2010-2014. The data was 
collected from the annual reports of Nigerian Stock Exchange to ensure 
accuracy and reliability of the data. Furthermore, the annual reports of the non-
financial listed firms for the 5 year period were downloaded from the official 
webpage of NGSEC. There are several corporate bodies with a distinct code of 
corporate governance in Nigeria, like the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), 
National Insurance Commission (NAICOM), Nigerian Telecommunication 




regulation commission. The study adopted the Nigerian SEC Code of CG for 
public companies (2011) and restricted the data collection and analysis to 
Nigerian non-financial listed firms between 2010 and 2014. However, the study 
is underpinned by agency, stewardship, and resource dependency theories that 
explained the variables of the study. 
1.10  Organisation of the Thesis 
This research consists of seven chapters. Chapter One, which is the first chapter 
has the introduction, problem statement and research questions. It also explains 
the objectives, scope and significance of the research. Chapter Two highlights 
the Nigerian financial regulatory framework. The review of related literature 
consists of the concept of financial reporting quality, earnings management, 
value relevance and corporate governance mechanisms. The underpinning 
theories were presented in Chapter Three. Next, Chapter Four discusses the 
conceptual framework, hypotheses formulation, and the methodological 
approach of the research. In Chapter Five, the research design, sources and 
method of data collection, techniques of data analysis and definition and 
measurement of the research variables were discussed. Chapter Six analysed 
and discussed the results of the statistical tests employed, the robustness test as 
well as the findings of the research. Finally, Chapter Seven provides the 






NIGERIAN FINANCIAL REGULATORY BACKGROUND  
2.1  Introduction 
The British colonised Nigeria and had divided it into the North and South 
provinces and Lagos Colony for administrative convenience. The South 
interacted more with the British and accepted Western education, resulting in a 
rapidly developed modern economy compared to the North. Until recently, 
northern Nigeria which is predominantly Muslim rejected western education. 
These regional economic and educational differences persisted in Nigeria’s 
economic and political life as well. Since independence in 1960, the country 
took up the direction and planning of economic growth and development 
(Nwanosike et al., 2016). It was in 1972 that the Indigenisation Decree was 
issued as the first Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree, which barred 
foreigners from investing in specified companies and reserved participation in 
certain trades to Nigerians. Thus, industries sprang up, and the economy 
experienced rapid growth. By 1980, Nigeria became the largest economy in 
Africa.  
 
Nigeria has an estimated population of 186 milliom people (Population Census, 
2006). The country became the 12th largest producer of petroleum products and 
ranked 33 in the world regarding GDP with a per capita GDP of US $2,400. The 




market and has already reached middle-income status, with well-developed 
financial, legal, communications, and transport sectors. At present, Nigeria is 
the second largest economy in Africa and the largest economy in the West 
African region. It is also home to the second largest stock exchange in Africa 
(Austin, 2008).  Nigeria is the eighth largest exporter of oil and twelfth largest 
producer of petroleum in the world. Petroleum export accounts for 40% of GDP 
generating about 80% of Government earnings. Additionally, Nigeria 
developed its financial services sector, with a mixture of national and 
international banks, brokerage houses, insurance companies, private equity 
funds, and investment banks (Nwanesi, 2008).  
 
Nonetheless, Nigeria is worth studying for several reasons. Firstly, Nigeria is 
the most populous African country and one of the world’s oil exporters. 
Secondly, the Nigerian government has been undertaking giant steps aimed at 
improving its investment climate to make it more appealing for domestic and 
foreign investors. Thirdly, Nigeria has the highest market capitalisation in the 
African continent, is the 8th largest emerging market.  
2.2  Develoment of Corporate Governance Code in Nigeria 
The need for quality financial reporting attracted the attention of policy makers, 
regulatory agencies and accounting bodies in Nigeria. Consequently, efforts 
have been made over time at improving corporate governance to enhance 




Matters Act 1990 (CAMA) specifies the duties and responsibilities of the board, 
audit committee and requires companies to be audited by an independent 
auditor. Also, Section 334 subsections 2(a)–(i) of the Act requires the company 
annual reports to be presented at the annual general meeting (CAMA, 1990). 
The Investments and Securities Act (ISA) 1999 (as amended) places the 
responsibility of regulating and developing the capital market on the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC). The Act further states that SEC should 
ensure the orderly conduct of the market and ensure transparency in operations 
of the market for the protection of the investing public.  
 
The Banks and other Financial Institutions Act of 1991 was enacted to give the 
powers to register and regulate commercial banks, mortgage institutions and 
insurance companies in Nigeria to the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN). The 
Nigerian Insurance Act (2003) is applicable for firms operating in the insurance 
sub-sector. These legislations were intended to strengthen corporate governance 
of the companies, but as (Sanda, Mikailu, & Garba, 2005)Sanda, Garba and 
Mikailu (2008) observed that the provisions had gaps and were not 
comprehensive enough to meet the governance challenges. 
2.2.1  The Nigerian SEC Code of CG 2003 
Moreover, before 2003 there was no established corporate governance Code in 
Nigeria. Instead, corporate organisations, particularly banks and insurance 




management and employees of the organisation. It was in 2003 that the 
Securities and Exchange Commission in Nigeria developed recommendations 
for the need of a Committee on the development of corporate governance code. 
The committee was formed in 2003 by SEC under the chairmanship of Atedo 
Peterside Committee, which developed a Code of the Best Practice for Public 
Companies in Nigeria. The Code was made to be voluntary and designed to 
establish good business practices and standards for directors, CEOs, Boards, 
and auditors of listed companies (Wilson, 2006). 
The Code made provisions for improving corporate governance for all listed 
companies in Nigeria by providing suggestions on how to make the board, audit 
committee and external audit function more effective. The provisions among 
others are that the board should be composed of people of integrity and diverse 
experience, and the board size should be between 5-15 persons. Moreover, it is 
suggested that different people should hold the positions of chairman and chief 
executive, but in exceptional cases where the two (2) positions are combined,  a 
non-executive director should be the vice-chairman and the board is to meet on 
quarterly basis. With this provision, the Code did not mandate the need for CEO 
duality. Accordingly, the composition of the board should be a mixture of 
executive directors (ED) and non-executive directors (NED). The service 
contract for the appointed NED should be for a period not exceeding three (3) 
years. Meanwhile, the entire board is responsible for the appointment of NED 





The Code also prescribes that audit committees be established in line with 
CAMA, 1990 but should not have more than one (1) executive director with a 
NED as chairman, thus, rendering the audit committee not fully independent. It 
also requires the audit committee to meet at least three (3) times in a year. The 
Act also provides that shareholders holding more than 20% of the total issued 
share capital should have a  representative on the board and a director should be 
appointed to represent interests of the minority shareholders. The Code was 
criticised on provisions relating to the appointment of a director to represent 
minority shareholders as vague and difficult to implement (Hamid, 2011). 
Given the voluntary application of the Code, its observance significantly 
affected its implementation. The low implementation was confirmed by a 
survey conducted by SEC which reported that less than 40% of the companies 
complied (CBN, 2006).  
 
The Code also failed to take into account the development of the codes of 
corporate governance used by other advanced countries as the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act 2002 in the US, and the New Combined Code of 2003 in the UK (Sanda et 
al., 2005). In response to some of the criticisms and to address some of the 
weaknesses, SEC had set up the Mahmoud Committee to review the 2003 Code 
of Corporate Governance which culminated in the issuance of Code of 
Corporate Governance in 2011 for all publically listed companies. 




changes in respect of the board composition, audit committee, diversity of the 
board, size and formation of the board risk committee. Also, some specific 
disclosure on directors and audit committee shareholdings, risk committee and 
the establishment of whistleblowing units among others are required. 
2.2.2  The Nigerian SEC Code of CG 2011 
The Nigerian Securities and Exchange Commission (NGSEC) Code of CG 
applies to all public entities whose securities are listed under the SEC.  Any 
company seeking to raise funds from the market via the issuance of securities 
or is in the process to be listed, and all other public companies have to register 
with SEC. In Nigeria, observance of  SEC CCG is through both voluntary and 
mandatory mechanisms as is the case in some countries (Wright, 1996).  
 
It was in September 2008 that a committee was established by SEC to review 
the Code of Best Practices in CG in Nigeria (SEC, 2003). This was due to the 
lack of enforcement of the SEC, 2003 rules, making it ineffective and not 
complied with by the companies (World Bank, 2004). Further, the SEC Review 
Committee was mandated to recommend ways of improving the enforcement 
mechanisms required to make it more effective and enforceable. To promote 
CG and financial reporting in public companies, SEC had set up the department 
of financial reporting and CG in public companies. Also, a return form to be 
completed by quoted companies on a  biannual basis was developed by the SEC 




The return covers general corporate information, financial reporting, CG issues, 
the AC and the external auditors. The reliability of the information provided 
must be attested through an undertaking by the chairperson of the company, 
financial controller, the managing director, chief internal auditor, company 
secretary and AC Chairman.  
 
The revised Code, 2011 made provisions covering BODs’ responsibilities, 
composition, duties, and structure, officers of the board comprising the 
Chairman, the Chief Executive Officer/Managing Director, Executive 
Directors, and NED. Other officers are independent directors. The revised Code 
also covers meetings, multiple directorships, family and interlocking 
directorship, appointment, remuneration, tenure and director's re-election. The  
Code prescribed that the board should have at least one (1) “independent 
director” which is defined as a director that has no other business with the 
company other than the remuneration that he receives as a director. It also 
stipulates that the names of the independent directors be disclosed in the 
companies’ annual reports. The CG, (2011, Sec.4.1, p.9) made provisions that 
are considered to be relevant to this study such as:  
 
“The Board of Directors should be of a sufficient size relative to 
the scale and complexity of the company’s operation, in addition 
to ensuring diversity of experience without comprising 
independence, compatibility, integrity and availability to attend 
meetings; (ii) The membership of the Board should not be less 
than five; and (iii) should be a mixture of executive and non-




executive director. The NED should constitute the majority of the 
Board membership. Moreover, at least one (1) of NED should be 
an independent director; (iv) Board members should possess 
relevant core competence and entrepreneurial spirit. Members 
are required to have a record of tangible achievement and 
should be knowledgeable in the Board matters; (v) the members 
should possess a sense of accountability and integrity and be 
committed to the task of good CG; (vi) the board should also be 
independent of management to enable it to carry out its oversight 
function in an objective and effective manner; others include 
(vii) the position of the Chief Executive Officer and Chairman of 
the Board shall be separated and held by different individuals to 
avoid over-concentration of power in one person which may take 
away from the board the required checks and balances in the 
discharge of its duties; (viii) to safeguard the independence of 
the Board and not more than two (2) family members at the same 
time are to sit on the Board”.  
 
Also, the Code made provisions aimed at strengthening internal control 
mechanisms through the AC. Thus, AC should be established by Section 359 
(3) and (4) of Companies and Allied Matters Act (CAMA) Cap. C20 LFN 2004 
which should be constituted in a stipulated manner. Further, at least one 
financially literate board member with knowledge of accounting or financial 
management should be on the audit committee. The minimum meeting 
requirements for AC is four (4) times in one year. The AC is vested with the 
responsibility of assisting the Board in its oversight functions and integrity of 
the company’s financial statements.  
 
The protection of shareholder's rights and interests shall be guaranteed when 
companies ensure transparency and adequate disclosure. In this respect, the SEC 




make it publically available for all stakeholders. Apart from the statutory 
requirements of CAMA, the BODs of each company ought to guarantee that the 
company’s annual report incorporates a CG report that is passed on to 
stakeholders, contains  unambiguous information on the quality of the 
company’s CG structures, practices, and policies. It is also expected of boards 
and management of companies to ensure adherence and compliance with the 
SEC Code of CG. Compliance with the code will strongly assist in ensuring a 
sound management structure that will eventually result in enhancing quality 
financial reporting of the companies.  
 
Consequently, three statutory BoDs are shouldered with the responsibility of 
regulating accounting and financial reporting in Nigeria, which is: Corporate 
Affairs Commission (CAC), Nigeria Stock Exchange (NSE), SEC and Nigerian 
Financial Reporting Council (NFRC). Corporate Affairs Commission (CAC) is 
vested with the responsibility of supervising and registering company 
formation, management, and winding up. On the other hand, SEC handles 
regulating the capital market while the NSE is charged with the responsibility 
of ensuring compliance with the listing rules and reporting requirements for the 
quoted firms. The Financial Reporting Council of Nigeria which replaced the 
Nigerian Accounting Standard Board (NASB) in 2011, is vested with the 
responsibility for developing and publishing financial/accounting reporting 






The general requirements for the preparation of financial statements by firms in 
Nigeria are contained in the provisions of the CAMA Cap. C20 LFN 2004, 
which requires directors of public companies to prepare annual accounts each 
year. Section 334 (2) (a-j) states the mandatory disclosure requirements that 
include a statement of the accounting policies, final accounts, notes on the 
accounts, the auditors' reports, and the directors' report. For this reason, good 
CG requires effective oversight by regulators who should also be the custodians 
and promoters of good CG in Nigeria. The management of public companies 
should also ensure strict compliance with the code of CG for good governance. 
 
The inclusion of one executive director on audit committees by SEC Code 2003 
was removed, and audit committee functions expanded beyond the statutory 
duties. Also provided in the Revised Code is the provision for the rotation of 
audit firm/engagement partner after a period of ten (10) years. Most of these 
new arrangements conform with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002 enacted in the 
USA. Despite the improvements in the current code, some of the criticisms of 
the past have not been rectified. Compliance to the code remains voluntary as 
the code is not a rigid set of rules for companies (SEC, 2011a). While the code 
requires that an audit committee should comprise of at least one financially 
literate member, it is not compulsory for the name of other such member be 
disclosed in annual reports as prescribed in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Similarly, 




the same Board. Membership of two (2) or more companies was discouraged 
by the new Code. Where such cross-membership creates a conflict of interest 
by the competing companies, it must not be allowed. The aim is to safeguard 
the independence and above all the integrity of the boards. 
 
Following the criticisms of the enforcement mechanism of SEC Code, some 
sectors of the economy developed their individual corporate governance codes. 
As a result, similar sections of the SEC Code contradicts related parts of those 
sectoral Codes. It further provides for the observance of a stringent provision of 
corporate governance Code, where a conflict arises from the application of the 
Code and provisions of any other Code about a company covered by the two 
Codes. Thus, the Code that makes stricter provisions shall apply (SEC, 2011). 
The implication is that other codes like the NIC Code of corporate governance 
for insurance companies shall apply. 
2.2.3  The Central Bank of Nigeria Code of CG, 2014 
The Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) is the apex bank that is responsible for the 
fiscal and monetary policies in Nigeria. It also jointly regulates all financial 
institutions in the country. In line with the global trend on the establishment and 
review of corporate governance practices, corporate organisations individually 
made provisions for Codes as a guide for ethical conduct meant for the board, 
management and employees. The multiplicity and application of individual 




a uniform corporate governance Code. Consequently, the CBN issued the code 
of corporate governance for banks in Nigeria in 2006. The aim is to provide a 
unified ethical Code and to correct some of the deficiencies found in the 
operations of banks in past years and establish governance practices for sound 
banking that promotes transparency in financial reporting. The Code covered 
provisions in the following main areas: equity ownership, organisational 
structure, board performance, board composition, audit committee, quality 
management and disclosure requirements and the role of external auditors.  
A revised CBN code of corporate governance was introduced on October 1, 
2014. The Code was made mandatory for banks and other financial institutions 
in Nigeria. It aims to be aligned with current realities and global best practices 
in an effort to eliminate perceived ambiguities and to strengthen good 
governance practices. Specifically, the code provides for a minimum of five (5) 
and a maximum of 20 members in terms of board size, while the board should 
consist of executive and non-executive directors. The majority of the board 
members should be NED with at least two (2) independent NEDs as opposed to 
one INED in SEC Code. The code rejects CEO duality at both the parent and 
subsidiary company levels. It further disregards any arrangement for executive 
vice-chairman on the Board of any bank. Also, the CBN 2014 Code introduced 
whistleblowing unit/protection and emphasised robustness in disclosure and 
transparent conduct of the board and its committees. Board committees are to 




and deliberations. On the diversity of the board, the CBN Code requires the 
board to recognise gender diversity in its composition. 
2.2.4  Industry Based Code of Corporate Governance 
While these changes are to take effect and strengthen corporate governance 
practices, industries within the economy began to set specific corporate 
governance codes. For instance, the banking sector has a Code of Corporate 
Governance issued by the Central Bank of Nigeria in 2006 and amended in 
2014. Also, the National Insurance Commission (NAICOM) issued its Code of 
Corporate Governance guidelines in  2009. The Code is to guide the operators 
in the insurance industry. Besides that, in 2014, the Nigerian Communication 
Commission (NCC) issued its Code of Corporate Governance for operators in 
the ICT sector.  
 
Similarly, in 2004, the federal government of Nigeria enacted the Pension 
Reform Act (2004) that transferred pension administration from public to 
private companies. As a result, in 2008, the licensed pension administrators 
established a Code of Corporate Governance for operators in the sector through 
the National Pension Commission exclusively for pension fund administrators. 
The proliferation of industry Codes within the Nigerian economy coupled with 
poor enforcement mechanisms by the SEC resulted in non-compliance of the 
SEC CCG, which incapacitated its operation. Consequently, in 2011 the 




government that replaced the Nigerian Accounting Standard Board. The scope 
of the Council responsibilities drew the attaention of the financial/capital market 
operators, the professionals and investors to agitate for harmonisation of 
industry based Codes for observance and compliance by all sectors of the 
economy. 
  
Table 2.1  
Summary of Board Attributes in Corpoate Governance Codes in Nigeria 
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Voluntary Compulsory Voluntary Compulsory Voluntary 
 
Table 2.1 indicates the selected board attributes in the industry based on 
corporate governance codes. The SEC 2011 covers all public listed companies 
in Nigeria, the CBN Code 2014 (as amended) covers all money deposit banks, 




the NAICOM Code 2009 only covers the insurance companies operating in 
Nigeria. 
2.2.5  The Financial Reporting Council of Nigeria Act, 2011 
Given the multiplicity of measurements and methods applicable to accounting 
data, some accounting standards are necessary to maintain the integrity of data 
and to facilitate comparisons between business entities. Accounting standards 
are rules or a set of standards that prescribes the methods by which accounts 
should be prepared and presented. These regulations are issued by either 
national or international/professional accounting bodies, one of which is the 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). Financial Reporting 
Council of Nigeria Act, No. 6, 2011, which repeals the Nigerian Accounting 
Standard Board Act. 22. 2003 (NASB) was enacted to develop and publish 
financial reporting standards and accounting standards as a guide in the 
preparation of financial statement of public interest entities. 
 
The FRCN Act, 2011 Section 49 provides for the establishment of the 
Directorate of Corporate Governance. Further, Section 50 of the same Act 
outlines the objectives of the Directorate which is to develop principles and 
practices and to promote the maximum acceptable standards of corporate 
governance. It is also to establish links with other regional and international 
institutions engaged in promoting good governance practices. The FRCN  Act, 




“The FRCN shall adopt and keep up-to-date accounting 
and financial reporting standards, and ensure 
consistency with International Financial Reporting 
Standards. It will receive copies of all qualified reports 
together with detailed explanations for such 
qualifications from auditors of the financial statements 
within the first 30 days from the date of such 
qualification. Also, the Council shall state clearly in the 
financial reporting standards, the minimum 
requirements for recognition, measurement, 
presentation and disclosure of annual financial 
statements, group annual financial statements. Further, 
it should specify other financial reports that every 
company shall comply with in the preparation of 
financial statements and reports”.  
 
Despite the requirements for the development of the CG code, which is targeted 
to harmonise all the operational codes, FRCN is yet to publish its code of CG. 
Presently, SEC Code 2011 remains as the only applicable Code that seeks to 
provide a comprehensive guide for CG practices in Nigeria. However, the 
Financial Reporting Council of Nigeria Act provisions is hoped to assist 
significantly in ensuring quality financial reporting as well as harmonising CG 
practices of firms in Nigeria.  
2.3  Corporate Governance Regulatory Framework in Malaysia 
2.3.1  The Companies Act 1965 
The Companies Act (CA) 1965 plays a major role in ensuring better corporate 
governance for Malaysia. The CA 1965 mimics the United Kingdom (UK) 
Companies Act 1948 and the Australian Uniformed Companies Act 1961. The 




and duties of companies and their directors, as well as the rights and obligations 
of shareholders and directors. The CA 1965 also regulates the registration of 
companies under the Ministry of Domestic Trade, Cooperatives and 
Consumerism. The CA 1965 sets the legal foundation on which companies are 
shaped, activated and administered. Since its enactment in 1965, the CA 1965 
had undergone various amendments, the most recent being the Companies 
(Amendment) Act 2007.  
2.3.2  The Securities Industry Act 1983 
The Securities Industry Act (SIA) 1983 and the Securities Commission Act 
1983 (SCA) also play a vital role in ensuring better corporate governance 
practices in Malaysia. The SIA 1983 and SCA 1983 include provisions such as 
protecting shareholder rights, disclosing substantial shareholding to the Stock 
Exchange of Malaysia, protecting investor’s interests, regulating the operations 
of dealers, and prohibiting artificial trading and market chains. Following the 
Asian financial crisis in 1997, the Malaysian government took some steps in 
reforming the corporate sector. By 1998, the government and private sector 
worked towards improving the corporate law that would enhance good 
corporate governance practices in the country. In 1999, a high-level financial 
committee on corporate governance was formed under the Ministry of Finance.  
 
The committee’s responsibility was to review the corporate framework to 




limitations in the transparency and disclosure requirements, corporate 
monitoring responsibilities, and accountability of the company directors 
including the rights of minority shareholders (Azizah, Abidin, & Ahmad, 2007). 
The Malaysian government and the regulatory bodies have promulgated various 
reforms and notifications to existing laws to ensure good corporate governance 
practices by the public listed companies. These includes the Securities 
Commission Act 1993 (SCA), Securities Commission (Amended) Act 2000, 
Securities Industry Act 1983 (SIA), Securities Industry (Compliance with 
Approved Accounting Standards) Regulations 1999, The Malaysian Code on 
Takeovers and Mergers 1998, and Companies (Amendment) Act 2007 (Tie, 
2003). 
 
A remarkable feature in the Malaysian corporate governance landscape is the 
close links to large publicly-listed firms with the government and politicians 
(Gomez, 2014). The relationship between large companies and government 
often results in politically-linked firms having exclusive arrangements with 
state-owned companies and enjoy preferential access to major government 
contracts and loans (Wahab, How, & Verhoeven, 2007; Gomez, 2014). The rise 
of these politically linked firms is the result of the country’s New Economic 




2.3.3  Bursa Malaysia  
Malaysia has adopted an effective corporate governance mechanism with the 
aim to build a strong corporate environment. In 2001, it established the Bursa 
Malaysia (BM). Bursa Malaysia (BM) listing requirements have also played a 
major role in efforts to enhance corporate governance. These revised listing 
requirements took effect on 30 June 2001 making the Malaysian Code of 
Corporate Governance (MCCG) reporting requirements mandatory. In 
Malaysia, listed companies are obliged to comply with the listing requirements 
of BM which monitor publicly listed companies through monitoring their 
announcements, market trading policy, the media in general and an internal 
review of documents furnished (World Bank, 2005).   
 
Similarly, the publicly listed company (PLC) is required to publish quarterly 
financial statements within two (2) months after the end of each financial 
quarter and its annual audited accounts, auditors and directors report within four 
(4) months after the end of each accounting year including its balance sheet, 
income statement and explanatory notes. Bursa Malaysia Securities Berhad 
(BMSB) had launched the Best Practices in Corporate Disclosure (BPCD) in 
July 2004 with the aim to enhance the standards of corporate governance for 
Malaysian publicly listed companies. The intentions of the BPCD are to aid in 
building and maintaining corporate credibility and investor’s confidence in 
Malaysia’s capital markets (BM, 2006). Under the BM listings requirements, 




that is essential for knowledgeable investing. In this regard, reasonable steps 
should be taken to ensure that every investor has equal access to information.   
2.3.4  The Malaysian Code 2000 
The Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance (MCCG) introduced in 2000, 
contains principles and best practices in corporate governance. The aim of the 
MCCG is to encourage transparency and disclosure through the provision of 
relevant information to investors. It is also a guideline for the board of directors 
on how to discharge their rights and responsibilities (Jaggi & Yee, 2000). The 
MCCG principles for corporate governance consist of four (4) main parts 
including board of directors, the director’s remuneration, shareholders, and 
audit and accountability. All publicly listed firms on the BM are encouraged to 
comply with the corporate governance guidelines issued by the MCCG.  
 
The MCCG sets out principles and best practice on structures and processes to 
achieve the governance framework. MCCG consists of three (3) parts. The first 
part outlines the four (4) factors that listed companies are required to disclose 
in their annual reports. These four factors indicate whether the companies have 
good corporate governance mechanisms in place. Along with the items to be 
disclosed are the size of the board, remuneration of the board and the internal 
control systems. Accordingly, the changes were made to support more 





2.3.5  The Malaysian Code 2007 and 2012 
The revised version of  the Malaysian Code of Corportae Governance (MCCG) 
was released in 2007. The MCCG (2007) represents the continued collaborative 
efforts between the Government and industry. Significant changes to the revised 
Code aims to strengthen the roles of the board of directors and audit committees, 
and to ensure that both the board and audit committees effectively discharge 
their responsibilities. The changes to the Code states the role of the nominating 
committee and criteria for directors’ appointment. On the audit committees, the 
revised Code requires the audit committee to comprise at least three (3) 
members (all must be non-executive directors), a majority of whom are 
independent.  
 
The Code also recommends for all audit committee members to be financially 
literate with at least one (1) member being a member of an accounting 
association or body. Consequently, the Code has been revised in 2012, both aim 
to strengthen the role of audit committees in the financial reporting process to 
assist them in the effective discharge of their duties. The introduction and 
revised version of the Code has a positive impact on corporate governance 
practices in the Malaysian corporate sector. 
  
The MCCG 2012, amended the 2007 Code, it sets out the broader guide and 
principles with explicit recommendations on structures and processes expected 




2012, Code promotes the implementation of standards beyond the minimum set 
regulation. Although, the MCCG 2012 remains voluntary, however, listed 
companies are to report in their annual reports compliance with the Code. The 
focus of the revised code is on explaining the board of directors’ role in 
providing leadership, improving board effectiveness, strengthening its 
composition in addition to reinforcing its independence. Furthermore, the MC 
2012 encourages listed companies to ensure corporate disclosure policies. On 
the whole, Rachagan (2010) documents that Malaysia seems dedicated to 
promoting the development of sound corporate governance systems and 
practices. 
2.4  Corporate Governance Regulatory Framework in Australia 
The corporate governance regulatory framework in Australia consists of 
legislation,  Australian Securities Exchange Listing Rules (ASX), accounting 
standards and Australian Stock Exchange Corporate Governance Council. The 
Australia’s corporate governance regulatory framework aims to ensure greater 
disclosure, accountability of directors and involvement of shareholders. The 
framework is based on a mix of regulations, ‘comply or explain' Guidelines 
issued by the ASX Corporate Governance Council and advisory guidelines. The 
guidance requires all listed companies in Australia to disclose the central 
corporate governance practices the company has in place for the year in its 




of an audit committee in the annual report. Also, companies are required to 
disclose specific information to the market immediately. 
2.4.1  Australian Corporations Act 2001 
Australian firms are regulated under the Australian Corporations Act 2001 
(Corporations Act). The Corporations Act is the principal legislation regulating 
companies. The Act is broader in its coverage and includes the framework 
surrounding the information of companies as well as duties of the directors. The 
Corporations Act 2001 also requires companies to prepare their annual financial 
report using applicable accounting standards. Sanctions for breaches of the 
Corporations Act involve fines and, in some cases, imprisonment. The 
provisions of the Corporations Act relating to disclosure have strengthened over 
time, and in particular, disclosure requirements have increased to develop 
transparency and accountability. The Corporations Act also provides 
shareholders with authority to elect directors. For example, under Section 203D, 
directors may be removed by an ordinary resolution of the company, and this 
resolution needs to be passed by a five percent vote of the shareholders in the 
AGM or one hundred shareholders under Section 249N. The Corporations Act 
provides a statutory basis for the formation of private and public companies, 
corporate regulation and the regulation of the securities and futures industries.  
 
For listed companies, the Corporations Act regulates disclosure through the 




the Corporations Act has provisions relating to the role, responsibilities and 
structure of boards, termination payments, disclosure (through the remuneration 
report) and voting on remuneration. The Corporations Act also requires 
companies to prepare their annual financial report, including the remuneration 
report, using applicable accounting standards. 
2.4.2  Australian Corporate Governance Principles 
Under Section 769 of the Corporations Act, the ASX develops or adopts listing 
rules in the interests of the public thus making the ASX part of the regulatory 
regime within which listed firms discloses required financial information. The 
form and nature of corporate disclosure of ASX are prescribed through listing 
rules with a continuous disclosure regime backed by the Corporations Act. 
Specifically, The ASX Corporate Governance Council developed industry-wide 
corporate governance guidelines for Australian listed companies in March 2003. 
These guidelines were one of the first regulatory attempts to restore investor 
confidence after a series of corporate failures in Australia and overseas. The 
ASX Corporate Governance Council developed ten principles believed to 
constitute good corporate governance (ASX Corporate Governance Council 
2003). In addition to the ten best practice corporate governance principles, the 
ASX Corporate Governance Council had also developed supporting 
recommendations. The best practice recommendations cover corporate 
governance disclosures, director’s expertise, the link between executive pay and 




Corporate Governance Council issued the revised version (i.e. second edition) 
of the corporate governance guideline in 2007.  
 
The ASX recommendations serve as reference points on board and management 
accountability and represent a major enhancement of corporate accountability 
and practice in Australia (Thomson & Jain, 2006). The recommendations are 
consistent with the objective of enhancing accountability, highlighting the 
Council’s drive for greater emphasis on financial reporting disclosure (ASX, 
2003). However, as is the case for Malaysia, compliance with the Code’s 
Principles of CG Recommendations 2003 remain voluntary. Also, the objective 
of ASX CGC Principles focus on the disclosures in the annual reports. For 
example, Principle 1 requires companies to disclose the roles and 
responsibilities of their boards and management. The aim is to enable the board 
to provide strategic guidance, clarify the roles and responsibilities of respective 
members of the board and executives to facilitate accountability to the company 
and its shareholders. In addition, it is to ensure that no single person has 
unlimited powers.  
 
Further, the requirement for board composition, size and commitment to 
adequately discharge its responsibilities and duties are provided in Principle 2. 
From the perspective of the stakeholder theory, Principle 3 requires companies 
to consider legal obligations and the interests of stakeholders (shareholders, 




community of their operation. Timely and equal access to all information 
including its financial position, performance, ownership and governance as well 
as company announcements need to be clearly provided. Furthermore, 
shareholders’ rights and exercise of those rights are required to be respected by 
all listed companies. Australian listed companies are required to establish and 
disclose how they apply the principles in their company. One significant section 
of the ASX rules is the requirement for companies to make available 
information on compliance with all the ten principles. In the event of departures 
from any of the principles, explanations should be provided in the CG section 
of the company’s annual report. Therefore, Australia corporate governance 
initiatives had brought strong disclosure with increased accountability of 
directors as well as the involvement of shareholders. In the context of the above 
discussions, it is clear that there are major differences between the corporate 
governance principles and regulations enacted in Nigeria, Malaysia and 
Australia.  
 
Table 2.2 explains the summary of the main differences of corporate governance 
principles and regulations enacted in Nigeria, Malaysia and Australia. While there are 
similarities in the legal framework, perhaps due to their colonial orientations, 
they however differ in their governance Codes particularly on disclosure 
provisions, and shareholder rights and protection. The difference might also be 
the consequence of their development, socio-political and economic factors 
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2.5  Summary of the Chapter 
This chapter discusses the development of corporate governance in Nigeria, 
Malaysia and Australia and their institutional settings. The discussions are 
based on the comparison between the three (3) different countries which 
indicate that the three (3) countries have different institutional settings under 
which listed firms are regulated. The next chapter will review the previous 







LITERATURE REVIEW  
1.1  Introduction 
This chapter reviews and discusses prior studies in financial reporting, CG, firm 
debt structure and techniques of measuring FRQ. The study also presents 
previous studies on various CG attributes, debt structure, the AC characteristics, 
and FRQ. A review of studies on the AC characteristics and corporate CS 
relationships with FRQ are made. Similarly, the literature on corporate CS 
(leverage) as a moderating variable is discussed and presented. In the end, a 
general review and summary of literature is provided. 
3.2  Financial Reporting Quality  
Published annual reports are found to be the primary source of information for 
investors, particularly the shareholders. The annual reports are regarded as the 
source of corporate information. Investors and stakeholders consider firm’s 
performance through its financial report. The quality of the report depends on 
its reliability that translates into investment decision (Zalewska, 2014). Thus, 
this emphasises the need to provide relevant information, which is crucial for 
efficient markets, the absence of which Zalewska (2014) argued encouraged 
market manipulation. The annual financial report is therefore a process of 
communicating company’s information to stakeholders on the activities of the 




In this regard, the financial information provided should allow users (potential 
investors, creditors) as capital providers make a decision because its quality and 
reliability matter a lot. Therefore, the objective of the financial report has always 
been to offer quality financial information relating to and useful for economic 
decisions (IASB, 2007).  
 
Therefore. financial reporting quality refers to the extent that accounting 
information presented to users are free from misstatements and other unethical 
accounting and managerial practices. In addition, quality financial reports give 
both shareholders and other stakeholders the opportunity of understanding the 
financial statements thereby reducing information asymmetry. Similarly, 
judicious management of earnings became a subject matter for many years that 
affected the perceptions of regulators and financial analysts (Cohen et al., 2004). 
Thus, Gul, Yu, Fung, and Jaggi (2009) posit that maximisation of personal 
interest motivates managers to engage in influencing earnings which in turn 
influences informativeness of the earnings. 
3.3  Measurement of Financial Reporting Quality 
Financial reporting quality refers to the accuracy with which financial reporting 
expresses information about the company’s operations and its expected cash 
flows, which inform equity investors. Thus, financial reporting aims to inform 
both present and potential investors in making rational investment decisions and 




financial reporting quality in the litereture. Earnings quality is one way of 
assessing the concept of financial reporting quality. Other proxies grounded on 
reported earnings include earnings smoothing (Ronen & Sadan, 1975; Leuz, 
Nanda, & Wysocki, 2003; Francis et al., 2004), earnings persistence (Dechow 
& Dichev, 2002; Francis et al., 2005) and value relevance of earnings (Collins, 
Maydew & Weiss, 1997; Francis & Schipper, 1999).  
3.3.1  The Earnings Quality 
Earnings quality is regarded as earnings that correctly represent the proportion 
of earnings related to operating cash flows (McNichols, 2002). However, any 
manipulation of financial record is likely to manifest in discretionary accruals. 
Moreover, Kaplan (1985) argues that accruals following normal business 
transactions perhaps do not indicate any wrongdoing. However, the higher 
portion of discretionary accruals indicates higher earnings management that 
may relate to poor or low quality of earnings. It is believed that the value of a 
company largely depends on its reported earnings. As such, managers consider 
EM as a means to achieve earnings expectations for their company. Scholars 
tried to give meaning to EM as a means of conscious effort provided by GAAP 
to provide reported earnings desired by the reporting entity. It thus means 
managers within the confines of GAAP can manage earnings, perhaps in the 
interest of the shareholders. On the contrary, Schipper (1989) refers to EM as a 
deliberate interference in the process of financial reporting aimed at obtaining 





Reported earnings have been a matter of concern because managers use earnings 
management to hide the true position of the company and as such stakeholders 
are unable to distinguish the true earnings figure from the falsified one 
(Bashiruddin, 2011). Shareholders use reported earnings to estimate future 
returns and earnings has a relationship with stock returns (Lev, 1989; Beaver, 
1998; Easton & Harris, 1991). This association between earnings and returns is 
known to be weak in the face of low-quality information provided about 
earnings (Schipper & Vincent, 2003). 
  
On the other hand, Healy and Wahlen (1999), argue that EM is said to have 
occurred when managers decided to structure transactions that deliberately 
mislead stakeholders as a result of altering the financial reports targeted mainly 
at influencing results of operations that depend on the firm’s reported earnings.  
Mulford and Comiskey (2002) also argue that EM is commonly labelled as 
account manipulation, or fraudulent reporting, abuse of materiality, swap and 
timing of adoption of mandatory accounting standards, voluntary accounting 
changes, and extreme conservative accounting. Despite differences in the exact 
meaning of EM, reported earnings indicated in the financial statements do not 
necessarily reflect the real economic and financial situation of the company. 
Therefore, from the perspective of agency theory, management’s opportunistic 
behaviour could lead to earnings management (Healey & Wahlen, 1999). 




EM implies differences in the interpretations of empirical evidence in studies 
that seek to provide evidence of EM incentives.     
3.3.2  Earnings Management 
The discretionary accruals (DA) are made to identify distortions which are 
represented by earnings management as a result of imperfect measurement or 
application of GAAP rules (Dechow, Ge & Schrand 2010). Accordingly, 
Mulford and Comiskey (1996, p.360) argue that “earnings management is the 
deliberate alteration/manipulation of accounting results for the purpose of 
creating an altered impression of business performance.” Besides, Healy and 
Wahlen (1999, p.368) assert that “when management use discretion in 
fashioning how and what financial reports should reflect, with the aim of 
misguiding stakeholders about the actual performance of the firm, on which 
they place so much reliance on, then earnings management took place”. Thus, 
it is suggested that, in some cases the reported earnings of a firm do not 
necessarily reflect the real financial or economic value of the company.  
 
Consequently, Dichev, Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal (2013) interviewed 
Chief Financial Officers (CFO) and concluded that innate factors constitute 
about half of EQ determinants. Moreover, some firms manage earnings to 
misrepresent performance with sixty percent of EM relates to income-
increasing, whereas the remaining forty percent refers to activities involving 




increasing EM motivations where income-increasing motivations are 
significantly high. The CFOs affirm that observers from outside the firm cannot 
identify well-managed earnings by mere observation.  On the other hand, they 
suggest strict monitoring of strategic managers of the company to uncover such 
managed earnings. Furthermore, Dichev et al. (2013) maintain that despite the 
importance of the EQ concept in finance and accounting, inconsistencies still 
exist on how the measurement is defined.  
 
Most frequently used accruals measurement models are based on a firm’s 
reported earnings starting with Healy (1985) whose model uses the 
discretionary accrual model that looked at working capital accruals as its base. 
Subsequently, other researchers came up with some modifications to the initial 
work of Healy (1985). These modifications focused on decomposing total 
accruals into non-discretionary (NDA) and discretionary accruals (DA) 
components. Among the renowned studies on accruals quality are attributed to 
Jones (1991), Dechow et al. (1996), Dechow and Dichev (2002),  and 
McNichols (2002). Consequently, Kothari, Leone, and Wasley (2005) 
introduced performance matching procedures that require subtracting DA 
estimates from Jones’ (1991) model by matching industry and return on asset 
using control firms for the previous or current periods. This model’s main 





3.3.3  Earnings Management Motivations 
The desire or justifications for managers’ engagement in manipulation of 
earnings are classified into various categories that include: capital 
market/analysts’ expectations, managers’ contracts or compensations, debt 
covenant violations, and equity offerings which are discussed below. 
3.3.3.1 Capital Market Expectation 
Usually, firm managers predict high financial performance and increased 
revenue and earnings from their operations geared towards meeting the 
analysts’ targets or expectations. In an attempt to beat those expectations, 
managers would be under intense pressure to achieve the revenue expectations 
which would lead them to engage in EM activities. Consequently, such practices 
result in fraudulent revenue recognition. Magrath and Weld (2002) documented 
that improper EM and financial malpractices start from the involvement in EM 
techniques tilted principally towards earnings smoothness in order to satisfy 
both internal earnings forecasts and analysts’ expectations. They argue that 
improper revenue recognition originating from either voluntary or forced 
restatements were among the reasons behind restatements cases filed with the 
US SEC between 1977 and 2000. However, if a firm misses the analyst's 
expectations, it is viewed as a failure. Thus, since managers have some EM 
techniques at their disposal, they tend to continue managing the earnings until 




3.2.3.2 Debt Covenant Violations 
Debt contracts allow lenders to use accounting numbers in regulating activities 
of a company, by demanding particular performance achievements or for 
purposes of investment and other financial activities, impose some limitations 
on the firm’s financing. Thus, if firms violate the lender's agreements/debt 
covenants, it may lead to lenders raising interest rates or requesting for 
repayment of the outstanding debt immediately. Therefore, to avoid such 
penalties, EM activity may usher in by increasing the firm’s earnings to avoid 
violating the covenant (Abdelghany, 2005). Hence, in order not to breach debt 
agreements, firms that are highly indebted would resort to engaging into DA 
(income-increasing) which is further linked to financial distress (Messod, 
Daniel, Beneish & Press, 1995). Similarly, Dichev and Skinner (2002) found a 
significantly higher percentage of firms violating debt covenants, providing 
evidence of companies involved in income-increasing EM targeted at avoiding 
a default, which is consistent with avoiding covenant default. 
3.2.3.3 Managerial Contract/Compensation Agreements 
A managerial contract or compensation agreement is an agreement managers 
entered into with the company. According to Jennifer and Gaver (1995), 
managers had engaged in earnings management to increase their bonuses. Also, 
Core, Holthausen, and Larcker (1999) documented that managers engage in 
altering reported earnings specifically to enhance the level of compensation due 




higher agency problems. As a result, CEOs of those firms with higher agency 
problems earn greater compensations. This suggests that firms with higher 
agency problems record poor performance. 
3.2.3.4   Equity Offerings 
Equity offerings relate to equity sale at primary or secondary markets to insiders 
as well as outsiders (investors) to raise additional capital for the firm.  Usually, 
at the time of equity offer to the public particularly at the Initial Public Offer 
(IPO) period, it is accompanied by detailed financial information about the 
status of the firm. The aim is to convince the investing public that the company 
offering its stock for sale is in a sound financial position including the level of 
leverage if otherwise; it should be stated. However, previous studies 
documented that managers tend to increase reported earnings during such 
security offerings. Thus, this had resulted in information asymmetry between 
the investors, owners and managers (Hughes, 1986; Datar, Feltham, & Hughes, 
1991).  
 
Further, Magnan and Cormier (1997), Roosenboom, Goot and Mertens (2003) 
and Aerts, Cormier and Magnan (2007) documented that firms deliberately 
increase their reported earnings during their year of incorporation, geared 
towards achieving IPO forecast. Arguing along the same line, Teoh, Welch and 
Wong (1998) provided evidence that companies which reported positive 




performance in its first year of incorporation. Similarly, relationships between 
EM and post-issuance stock prices provided a more inexplicable behaviour. 
This could be found in previous studies (Teo, Weltch & Rao, 1998; Rangan, 
1998) who examined EM during IPO and seasonal equity offerings. These 
studies provided evidence that the estimates made at initial issue indicate a 
negatively significant relationship between EM and subsequent returns and 
earnings performance. This therefore suggests that deliberate distortion of 
financial information or engagement in EM during security issuance leads to 
misrepresentation of firms’ actual earnings, thereby misleading the investing 
public. 
3.3.4  The Value Relevance of Earnings 
Value relevance refers to the ability to summarise information contained in the 
financial statement that affects share value (Francis & Schipper, 1999). The 
relevant information should be able to influence and help users in evaluating the 
past, present and future events to make informed economic decisions. Thus, 
value relevance represents important attributes of information quality (Francis, 
LaFond, Olsson, & Schipper, 2005). Consequently, the larger the value 
relevance of earnings, the more beneficial it is for market participants when 
making investment decisions (Barth, Beaver, & Landsman, 1996). Hence, 
financial information is considered value relevant only when accounting 
numbers relate to current firm value. Thus, absence of an association between 




relevant, and thus financial reports are not able to fulfil one of its main 
objectives (Beisland, 2009). Accordingly, Francis and Schipper (1999) argue 
that for a financial statement to be value relevant it must contain the valuation 
model variables to help in predicting those variables. In contrast, Nilson (2003) 
views accounting information as value relevant only when financial statement 
becomes useful in equity valuation.  
 
Therefore, the concern of value relevance research is not how accounting 
information is used in the valuation process. Rather, it focuses on how 
accounting information can explain variations in stock prices occurring over 
time and between firms. As such, the concept of value relevance can be seen 
from many perspectives. Barth, Beaver and Landsman (2001) state that value 
relevance research examines the association between accounting amounts and 
equity market values. Accordingly, Beaver (2002) documents that value 
relevance examines the association between a stock price and accounting 
variables. Furthermore, when earnings quality is high, it should equally be more 
value relevant. Previous research that examine the FRQ measure using value 
relevance of earnings (Myring & Shortridge, 2010; Leuz, Nanda, & Wysocki, 
2003) relate earnings to stock prices or market returns. The association between 
earnings and stock market performance indicates that earnings are both relevant 
and reliable to investors (Barth et al., 1996).  Similarly, Bao and Bao (2004), 
argue that if the quality of earnings is improved, the association between firm 




earnings decreases, then the association between firm value and reported 
earnings should also decrease. 
3.3.5  The Disclosure Quality 
Financial statements serve as the major communication link between firms and 
investors. Meanwhile, the capital market requires gradual financial reporting 
processes to increase investors’ confidence (Shaw, 2006). The global financial 
scandals witnessed a few decades ago have resulted in the higher demand for 
more disclosure of financial and non-financial information (Ghofar & 
Saraswati, 2014). The separation of ownership and control that helps in the 
reduction of agency cost and information asymmetry provided a drive for good 
reporting pursuits. Thus, when an agent provides quality information to the 
principal, it decreases information asymmetry which would reduce conflict of 
interest leading to a reduction in managers’ incentives to manage earnings 
(Davidson, Goodwin-Stewart, & Kent, 2005; Klein, 2002; Biao Xie, Davidson, 
DaDalt, Davidson Iii, & DaDalt, 2003). Disclosure quality is a monitoring 
mechanism that bridges the information gap between managers and 
shareholders (Bushman & Smith, 2001). Thus, controlling management 
performance would be difficult when shareholders are deprived of specific firm 
information.  
 
According to Gibbins, Richardson and Waterhouse, (1990), disclosure quality 




financial dispersed through formal or informal processes. Such information 
dissemination could be mandatory or voluntary. Timely, comprehensive, 
accurate and transparent information are necessary to reduce asymmetric 
information and agency costs between agents and principals (Healy & Palepu, 
2001). Therefore, financial statements disclose information about how 
company’s resources have been managed. Nevertheless, an effective financial 
reporting process should not be restricted to financial information only; non-
financial information is also necessary for informed investors’ decisions (Johari, 
Saleh, Jaffar, & Hassan, 2008).  
 
Financial information disclosure is categorised into mandatory and voluntary 
information disclosure. Where a particular rule or governance code requires 
public disclosure of sets of information, such information becomes mandatory 
for all firms to disclose. On the other hand, where managers have discretion on 
the nature and amount of information to be disclosed, such information becomes 
voluntary information disclosure. Consequently, both mandatory and voluntary 
financial information are considered as indicators of financial reporting quality.  
 
Therefore, among the various FRQ measurements, this study adopted accruals 
quality measure proxy by earnings management due to the fact that accrual 
accounting provides better matching of revenues and expenses than cash 
accounting and is therefore expected to generate more value-relevant 




addition to their intended function, accruals provide managers with more 
accounting choices that managers can use to either convey private information 
to investors or opportunistically obtain private benefits (Healy, 1985; Mcnichols 
& Wilson, 1988). Although Jones (1991) and Modified Jones (1995) were 
widely used measures of EQ, critics of the Jones (1991) model (e.g. Xie, 2001) 
argue that the explanatory power of Jones model is low with about 10% 
variations in the accruals. Moreover, it uses an indirect approach to measure 
earnings quality (Wahlen, 1999; Schipper and Vincent, 2003; Francis et al., 
2005). To overcome this, McNichols (2002) uses industry level pooled cross-
sectional regressions with the total current accruals as the dependent variable 
and the cash flows in previous, current, and subsequent years as well as the 
changes in revenue and property, plant and equipment (PPE) values as 
independent variables. This provides a direct measure of firm’s information 
environment generated from critical accounting data in the financial statements 
(Aboody et al., 2005).  
 
Hence, this study uses a measure of accruals quality derived in McNichols 
(2002) as a proxy for FRQ to improve the comparability with previous studies. 
Furthermore, the McNichols (2002) measure of accruals quality was used to 
address limitations in the Jones (1991), modified Jones (1995) and Dechow and 
Dichev (2002) measures. In addition, the measure is based on the fact that 
accruals increase the informativeness of earnings by smoothing out temporary 




literature.  Consequently, non-financial companies deal with sales/receivables, 
and accruals, McNochols (2002) model would be the most appropriate model 
for the study.  
3.4  The Concept of Corporate Governance   
Corporate governance (CG) is about structures and processes for the control and 
direction of companies. It concerns the board of directors, management 
relationships as well as shareholders and other stakeholders relationship, hence 
provides structures that monitor the performance of organisations. For this 
reason, corporate governance is seen as a mechanism that is used to lessen the 
differences between managers and stakeholders interests. Thus, corporate 
governance is used as a mechanism to reduce agency cost caused by the conflict 
of interest between owners and managers.  
 
To guarantee good corporate governance, independent BoDs, an effective audit 
committee and sound internal control mechanism (internal audit) should be in 
place to provide effective monitoring and control of management activities. 
Shareholders and other stakeholders would put high confidence and trust on 
companies with good corporate governance practices. It is expected that good 
corporate governance should be able to motivate board members and managers 
with less monitoring, and pursue interests that are congruent with firms and 





On the other hand, Adegbite (2015) opined that poor corporate governance is a 
major factor that has given rise to the financial distress in the Nigerian banking 
industry, even after the banking sector reform in 2005. Managerial excesses, 
massive corruption in the public and private sectors and disregard for the rule 
of the law, corporate standards and regulations are major challenges hampering 
the successful inculcation of good corporate governance in Nigeria. Besides 
that, company’s executives engage in gross misconduct due to ineffective or 
absence of control. By and large, investors are excluded from the governance 
structure (Usman & Yero, 2012).  
 
Highly respected firms in Nigeria were involved in corporate frauds and other 
financial irregularities involving manipulation of financial statements, 
concealment of debts, insider trading, and overstatement of profit amongst 
others. These cases had  prompted government intervention through the code of 
corporate governance for public listed firms (Lawal, Eweje, & Walton, 2016). 
The code acts as a control measure and to ensure prudence, accountability and 
transparency in the management of public companies. The Nigeria SEC 
mandates all public listed companies to observe and ensure compliance with the 
code of corporate governance. Further, the code is introduced to avoid 
complexity in the application of the code for companies that have industry 
specific CCG as in the case of banks, pension administrators, 




of implementation between different codes exists, the code that provides for 
stricter application should be applied. 
3.5  The Concept of Audit Committee 
Board of directors established Audit Committees to assist in overseeing 
company’s financial reporting process, as well as to ensure proper audit process 
of the company’s annual statements of the account. AC serves as a board 
standing committee and forms part of the governing structure of a corporation. 
Also, it acts as a good projector of company’s financial integrity (Rezaee, 2005). 
Similarly, Brennan and Solomon (2008) documented that the establishment of 
AC, which acts on behalf of the board, could improve the financial reporting 
process through the review of financial statements which enhance 
accountability.  
 
Additionally, Fichtner (2010) documented that AC formation which originated 
from New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) is meant to improve accountability in 
financial reporting. Moreover, US Security and Exchange Commission 
recommends the appointment of external auditors by a special committee 
comprising of non-executive members of the board, as a result of fraud that 
involved Mckesson & Robbins Inc. in the late 1930s. Furthermore, Collier 
(1996) argued that before 1979, ACs were virtually non-existent, until around 
1990s as a result of the Cadbury Committee report on 1992, which 





Consequently, the accounting scandals that engulfed many countries across the 
globe made AC a centre of struggle/ fight against misdemeanour in financial 
reporting. Thus, the United State (US) set up the Blue Ribbon Committee (BRC) 
whose report (Blue Ribbon Report, 1999) led to the promulgation of Sarbanes-
Oxley Act, 2002 (SOX), for the US Securities and Exchange Commission, 
which prescribes a broad range of measures including requirements concerning 
ACs. 
 
Similarly, several other corporate failures in the 1970s, late 1990s and early 
years of 2000s witnessed fraudulent financial practices that motivated 
regulators to focus attention on the formation of an independent AC. 
Subsequently, some countries either adopted or mimicked these rules regarding 
AC oversight functions. For example, Soliman and Ragab (2014) documented 
that in Egypt, mechanisms introduced to enhance transparency in financial 
reporting include Egyptian Accounting Standards and Code of CG (2005 and 
2011). However, in Nigeria, the SEC drafted its CCG (2003, 2011), with 
provisions for the formation of the AC as a control mechanism in the financial 
reporting process. Certainly, many countries across Europe, Asia, and Africa, 
have mandated the establishment of ACs with independent majority members 
discharging their independent oversight functions of ensuring quality financial 
reporting. The AC's composition and functions vary from country to country. In 




at least three members who are all expected to be wholly NED. In addition, at 
least one (1) of such member must have the relevant financial expertise, and the 
Committee should hold not less than three (3) meetings in any fiscal year.  
 
In the US, the SEC recommends that AC should consist of independent 
directors, part of whose responsibility is the nomination of auditor's work. 
Besides that, every member of the AC must be independent and is equipped 
with financial literacy, including one (1) from amongst them who should be a 
financial management or accounting expert. Further, Australian SOX, 2002 
requires that AC should comprise of a minimum of one (1) financial expert. On 
the other hand, in Nigeria, Section 30 of SEC (2011), provides for the 
establishment of the AC for all public listed companies in Nigeria. It thus states 
that: 
“Every company is required under Section 359(3) and (4) of  
Companies and Allied Matters Act (CAMA) 2004 as amended, 
to establish an audit committee. It is the responsibility of the 
board to ensure an audit committee is constituted in the manner 
stipulated and can discharge its statutory duties and 
responsibilities effectively”.  
 
Consequently, Section 359 (3) of CAMA  requires listed company to establish 
an AC that consists of directors and representatives of shareholders on an equal 
basis but should be limited to six (6) members and the committee shall examine, 
make recommendations and present its report in the annual general meeting. 
Also, Section 30.1, 30.2 and 30.3 provide for additional requirements for the 




"At least one member should be financially literate; Members of 
the committee should have basic financial literacy and should be 
able to read financial statements. At least one member should 
have knowledge of accounting or financial management………”. 
 
The issue of the AC has attracted a broad range of academic literature in recent 
times that requires investigating the role of governance on the AC. The primary 
responsibility of the AC is to monitor the financial reporting process and 
constrain any anticipated opportunistic tendencies of managers.  AC is expected 
to provide the desired effects or goals of the affording quality financial report 
which strengthens confidence in the financial markets (BRC, 1999; 
Kryzanowski & Zhang, 2013). Initial studies on the AC focus mainly on the 
agency theory which considers AC as an important measure to mitigate the 
conflict of interest between shareholders and firm managers (agency conflict).  
 
Pioneer studies on the AC concentrated on the determinants and formation of 
AC, and the influence of particular governance characteristics towards the 
formation of the AC (Collier, 1993; Willekens, Bauwhede, & Gaeremynck, 
2004). Other studies tried to investigate and attempted to ascertain whether the 
formation of the AC is of any help towards improving governance and prudent 
accounting process in firms (Wild, 1994).  Aside from the earlier studies, ACs 
are considered as an important mechanism aimed at strengthening the audit 
process. Also, prior studies that seek to understand how ACs perceived audit 




(2014). Studies that examined investors’ perception of the measure of AC 
effectiveness on quality financial reporting and financial markets include Farber 
(2005) who measured stock returns using cost of capital and debt financing. 
Meanwhile, Anderson, Mansi and Reeb (2004) proved a significant association 
between independent ACs and lower cost of debt financing. They all agree that 
the market relies on financial information that depends on the quality financial 
reporting. 
 
Accordingly, the Nigerian SEC provides that AC members should have basic 
financial literacy, and be able to read financial statements with at least a literate 
financial member, having knowledge of accounting or financial management 
(Section 30.2, 2011). Similarly, previous studies argue that financial expertise 
is an attribute that a firm can choose to have for enhancing the effectiveness of 
its AC. Liu and Zhuang (2011) documented the influence of the AC on 
managers’ decision to issue earnings forecast has a significant impact on 
analysts’ forecast accuracy and dispersion. Similarly, Krishnain and 
Visvanathan (2008), Dhaliwal, Naiker and Navissi (2010), and Cheng, 
Dhaliwal, and Zhang, (2013) argue that firms with an accounting expert among 
the AC members promote accounting conservatism and display high accruals 
quality than firms without a financial/ accounting expert (AFEs).  
 
In contrast, Cohen, Hoitash, Krishnamoorthy and Wright (2014) find that 




financial reporting. They maintain that the financial reporting process would be 
adequately monitored by AC members that are both AFEs and industry experts, 
more than AFEs that are not industry experts. Consequently, they concluded 
that the restatement would likely decrease with AFEs and industry experts on 
the AC. Further, AFEs and industry expertise are also associated with lower 
DA, which all signify an effective monitoring process of financial reporting. 
3.6  The Concept of Capital Structure 
Capital Structure (CS) refers to the firm’s financial structures that combine 
equity and debt capital maintained by a company.  A CS may comprise of debt, 
equity or hybrid securities. The comparative ratio between equity and debt is 
referred to as leverage. Therefore, the financing needs of firms depend primarily 
on its financial structure. Specifically, Durand's (1952) study summarised three 
CS theories of net income, net operating income, and traditional compromise 
theory. Then, Modigliani and Miller's (1958) pioneer work on the relevance of 
CS was among the early studies that documented that the CS is irrelevant in 
determining performance and value of the firm. Once the capital market is fully 
active, CS and corporate value will not be associated. Also, the argument of this 
theory is based on the perfect market conditions, with the absence of bankruptcy 
and tax. Also, the theory maintains that debt and equity are substitutes, which 
means, there is no opportunity cost in between debt and equity usage as a source 





However, Modigliani and Miller (MM) (1963) reported the inadequacies of 
their earlier model where tax is considered. This is because the interest payment 
is a tax subsidy on the debt which would lead a firm’s value to increase in the 
event debt is traded with equity.  They further argue that the entire firm’s CS 
should compose of debt to take advantage of the interest payments that is tax 
deductible. The MM theory forms the basis of modern CS theory. Furthermore, 
economists made an extensive study of CS, paying attention to finding out 
factors which influence an optimal CS. They proposed theories including trade-
off theory, agency theory, and signal theory to examine the relationship between 
CS and corporate value from various perspectives.  
 
Lubatkin and Chatterjee (1992) supported the argument that a relationship exists 
between CS and firm performance. Even though Scott (1976) and Brigham and 
Gapenski (1996) agree that the MM model is valid, it should have incorporated 
bankruptcy costs that are proportionate to the level of firm’s debt. Impliedly, 
the increase in the degree of debt will lead to a commensurate increase in 
bankruptcy costs. Additionally, if the debt is overvalued while equity is 
undervalued, the CS optimisation would not be achieved. Consequently, they 
maintain that optimisation of CS could be attained if the benefits enjoyed from 
the tax shelter result in an increase in the level of debt that equates the costs of 
bankruptcy. The advantage is that interest on the debt is an allowable deduction, 
while costs involved are considered as bankruptcy cost (Kim, 1978). 




of public companies in Nigeria contain information about CS of the companies. 
Therefore, the task before managers is identifying the best period of attaining 
the optimal CS and its maintenance. As such, if financing costs and weighted 
average costs of capital could be reduced, a firm’s value and its performance 
would be increased. Also, two more theories evolved after the Modigliani and 
Miller that seek to address the firm’s optimal CS. The first theory is the static 
trade-off theory that was developed by Kraus and Litzenberger (1973). The 
theory postulates that firms choose optimal structure through trading of the 
benefits and costs of the equity and debt respectively. They argue that 
employing either debt or equity to finance companies’ operation each has its 
merits (tax benefits) and demerits (agency costs).  
 
In contrast, Kayhan and Titman (2007) argue that, if achieving firm’s optimal 
CS means trading off costs and debt benefits, there is a tendency for a firm’s 
value and debt ratio to weaken. If it happens, deviating from the optimum will 
cost less. They maintain that CS tends to move along target ratios of debt that 
is consistent with the trade-off theories of CS.  Among the prior studies 
supporting trade-off models and various extensions include Ju, Parrino, 
Poteshman, & Weisbach (2005), Hennessy & Whited (2005), Strebulaev 
(2007), Titman & Tsyplakov (2007), Tserlukevich (2008), Hennessy, Livdan, 





The second theory that suggests a preference in the choice of CS mix is the 
pecking order theory.  Myers (1984) argues that a firm chooses its CS based on 
the order of preference beginning with internal financing first, followed by debt 
and then equity financing without deviation.  Besides that, Mazur (2007) argues 
that a firm's choice of capital lies in the following preference order: internal 
finance, debt, and then equity. Furthermore, most recent studies have shifted 
their research from the trade-off theory to the pecking order theory. Myers 
(1989) proposed a static trade-off theory by MM theory that considers 
bankruptcy costs and agency costs of debt. Accordingly, debt financing can help 
achieve tax avoidance that may contribute to the increase in costs and risks, as 
such if the amount of tax avoidance is larger than the cost of risks, the firms’ 
increase in debt financing helps to achieve an optimal CS. Besides that, firms 
should avoid adding debt. Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Myers (1977) 
proposed the agency costs of debt and equity. They argue that the existence of 
the conflict between debtholders leads to agency costs of debt.  
 
Meanwhile, a conflict between managers and shareholders result in agency 
costs of equity. For this reason, managers interested in achieving their targets 
may be in conflict with the firm’s value. Due to this, shareholders may attempt 
to control managers’ behaviour through monitoring. Hence, both the control and 
monitoring results in agency cost of equity. Similarly, creditors’ investment in 
the firm attracts interest that is based on the firm’s risk. Thus, managers may 




and controlled. This would result in agency cost of debt. Therefore, transaction 
cost becomes necessary in a firm’s CS decision. Mazur (2007b) argues that 
obtaining new external financing is associated with higher transaction cost 
compared with costs of obtaining internal financing.  
 
Accordingly, Harford, Li, & Zhao (2006) using a sample of  1,123 US firms for 
the period 1997 to 2004, found that the association between corporate boards 
and leverage is positive only with stronger boards and negatively associated 
when long-term debts are employed. They further document that short-term 
debt is highly employed by low-growth firms than high-growth firms. 
Additionally, based on a similar study on a sample of six (6) petroleum 
companies in Nigeria, Felicia, Ikpefan, and Oladeji (2013) found a negative 
relationship between firm performance and leverage. The result suggests the use 
of equity financing as a way of financing companies in the petroleum industry.  
 
However, their study of oil companies in Nigeria exhibited a shortcoming of 
sample size. Given the use of only six (6) samples size in an economy, the result 
could not be used to make generalisations and may not be applicable to all 
companies listed in Nigeria. Moreover, the findings corroborated  Isola and 
Akanni (2010) and Olokoyo (2013) who documented that most Nigerian firms 
are financed by equity or a combination of short-term financing and owners’ 
equity. Factors attributed to the choice of short-term rather than long-term 




accessibility to long-term finances from the financial institutions that are marred 
with excessive interest rates and enormous collaterals. 
3.7  Board Characteristics and Earnings Management 
The Board of Directors is constituted and charged with the responsibility of 
overseeing the affairs and governance of a company as stated in its governing 
documents, the Bylaws, and shareholder agreements. Also, the provision of 
efficient CG lies with the BOD’s composition, structure, resources, diligence, 
and authority of the entire board. Also, the working relationships with other 
stakeholders of the company provide an opportunity for monitoring, control, 
and general oversight functions that enable effective and efficient strategic 
policymaking and implementation for the entire company. 
 
 Accordingly, CG is a means of earning creditors’ confidence about the safety 
of their investment and return (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). One of the important 
responsibilities of BODs is providing independent oversight of management 
performance and accountability to shareholders. Effective discharge of those 
responsibilities influences the integrity of the financial accounting process 
(Dichev & Skinner, 2002). The literature on CG issues, specifically BoD’s 
characteristics gain researchers attention more precisely, board composition, 
board size, Chief Executive Officer (CEO) duality, the tenure of the CEO and 




The SEC CCG (2011) provides that membership of the board should consist of 
at least five (5) comprising a mixture of executive and NED. It further provides 
that majority members should be NED, with at least one independent director.  
It therefore places only the minimum number of the board membership to five 
(5) without a maximum number, which allows for an enlarged board. Therefore, 
board composition measured as a proportion of NED to the executive directors; 
indirectly reflect the independent role of monitoring by the NED.  
3.7.1  Board Independence and Earnings Management 
Board independence is the level of presence of NED on the board. In this regard, 
by having a higher proportion of NED to the total number of board members, it 
is expected that lower incidences of EM will occur, which subsequently 
improves EQ. An independent non-executive director is appointed to serve on 
the BoD of a company for reasonable periods on the Board. The tenure of 
directors under the provisions of CAMA, 2004 is three (3) years subject to re-
election at regular intervals of three (3) years.  The nomination for re-election 
is subject to the outcome of the performance evaluation results. As an 
independent person, his appointment is to ensure that he has an independent 
view and is not internally driven.  
 
Nevertheless, SEC (2011), as amended, requires every public company in 
Nigeria to have a majority of non-executive directors on their board. To support 




listed firms in China for the period between 1998 to 2003 using pooled 
regression. The study found that independent directors (ID) improve the EQ. 
Moreover, the study found an inverse relationship between independent NED 
and the extent of absolute DA. However, the study used few variables, and weak 
techniques in comparison to panel regression.  
 
In contrast, Petra (2007) conducted a study on ID and earnings using 203 firms 
randomly selected from 1,120 firms listed on Forbes in the United States for 
four years from 1995 to 1999. The final observations of the study were 812 
samples. The study found a positive and significant relationship between the 
proportion of outside ID on the boards and informativeness of earnings among 
other variables. The study also suffered some weakness as there was no 
framework for the selection of the firms. 
 
On the contrary, Lo, Wang and Firth (2010) examined the percentage of ID and 
transfer price manipulation using 266 sample size obtained from firms listed on 
China's stock exchange, using cross-sectional regression. However, the findings 
showed that companies which have a high proportion of ID on its board has a 
low level of transfer price manipulation. The study suffered from little 
observation and the use of weak techniques of data analysis in arriving at its 
conclusion. Similarly, Rubin and Segal (2014) studied directors’ reputation and 
board monitoring about EQ where the sample was drawn from S&P 1500 from 




financial expertise, industry expertise, managerial experience and work 
experience as a director and officer of the firm. These monitoring skills and 
work experience give the director the required tools necessary for monitoring 
management activities effectively that would ensure high quality of company 
earnings. The study used regression analysis to arrive at the result where it was 
discovered that there is a positive impact of directors’ reputation on monitoring 
quality and in turn FRQ. Also, EQ increases with the level of board monitoring. 
Nonetheless, the study did not disclose the number of observations and how it 
was derived. Also, the study could not display the result obtained against the 
variables for proper explanation.  
 
Moreover, Klein (2002) examined the relationship between independent/non-
executive (outside) directors and EM in the United States using samples from 
S&P 500 from 1992 to 1993. The study arrived at 692 firms as the final sample 
after considerating those firms with missing components that the study needed. 
The study utilised cross-sectional regression analysis, and it was established that 
a significant negative relationship exists between independent/non-executive 
(outside) directors and EM. However, the study lacks justification for the result. 
Also, a weak methodology is adopted simply because the use of panel regression 
is more reliable than OLS as suggested by Gujurati, (2004). However, prior 
studies also supported that a greater percentage of outside directors helps in 
reducing income increasing EM (Peasnell et al., 2005; Lo et al., 2010; Erena &  




Hashim and Susela (2008) studied the relationship between quality of financial 
reported earnings and internal monitoring mechanisms. Using 280 sample size 
of non-financial firms listed on Bursa Malaysia’s Main Board for the year 2004 
where OLS is used as the data analysis technique. The result shows no 
significant evidence on the relationship between the traditional functions of the 
board and EQ measured by quality accrual model. The study used performance 
variables as control variables without transformation that could give a different 
result if used as continuous variable in the model.  
 
Dabor and Adeyemi (2009) examined the relationship between the credibility 
of financial statement and CG in Nigeria using a random sample of 20 firms out 
of the 208 listed firms. The result of the study indicates that the bigger the 
presence of  NEDs on the firm's board as required by CAMA 2004, the higher 
the credibility of financial statements in addition to accountability enhancement. 
The study suffered some weaknesses as the sample size of 20 companies chosen 
from the 208 companies is considered small, making the results obtained 
difficult to generalise. For this reason, the study did not capture other CG 
proxies like board size, the frequency of board meeting, board financial 
expertise, AC size, the AC meeting, and AC financial expertise. Uadiale (2012) 
conducted a study on board composition and EM practices using a questionnaire 
survey. The study used cross-sectional analysis, and the result found that board 
composition with a greater proportion of outside directors reduces EM 




opportunity for effective monitoring and control of managers. The study also 
used primary data which could be biased, misleading and full of subjectivity. 
This is in addition to the fact that the study did not consider time as the time 
could alter the result of the study since the study is based on a one year period. 
 
Kantudu and Samaila (2015) examined the effect of monitoring characteristics 
on FRQ of listed oil marketing firms in Nigeria between 2000 to 2011. The 
study used panel regression analysis to arrive at the result where the findings 
revealed that power separation between CEO and board chair, a greater 
percentage of NED and managerial ownership would lead to higher financial 
reporting quality. Thus, a significant proportion of independent NED’s is a 
necessary control and monitoring mechanism for quality financial information. 
This is becauase NEDs are less tied to managerial influence, which enables them 
to monitor managers more efficiently. It will further enhance the confidence of 
shareholders whom they represent on the quality of the financial report 
presented to them. The study concentrates on two years only, which may not 
alter the result of the cross-sectional analysis. Therefore, there is a need for a 
longer period of at least four years and above.  
 
Hashim and Devi (2010) argued that, unless the Board Chairman is independent, 
separating the role of the CEO with that of the Chairman would not inherently 
lead to the independence of the board. The study is conducted in Malaysia using 




non-executive chairperson and EQ in Malaysian firms. Therefore, the findings 
support prior studies that document the presence of independent non-executive 
chairperson as a mechanism for enhancing the independence of the board as 
well as improving EQ. However, the study considered few variables which 
could have a consequence on the model of the study, as the lower the variables, 
the higher the chance of getting biased parameters. 
 
In a study conducted by Khan and Kotishwar (2011), it was found that the ID 
or NED of the company monitors and controls the chairperson/chief executive. 
They also serve as a link between the external environment and provide an 
international perspective. In this regard, the study argued that NEDs improve 
board processes and considering their specialist knowledge, they ensure 
continuity, and help identify alliance and acquisition. Thus, NEDs help maintain 
an ethical climate in the organisation. The observation is supported by a study 
conducted by Bokpin, Isshaq, and Aboagye-Otchere (2011) in Africa 
specifically in Ghana where they argued that NEDs are  expected to serve as a 
check and balance mechanism to enhance board effectiveness. In the process of 
their investigation to prove their point, their study found that NEDs dominated 
the board and ACs of listed firms on the Ghana Stock Exchange (GSE).  
 
Furthermore, Nugroho and Eko (2012) conducted a study on the effect of board 
characteristics measured based on the independent board of directors, CEO 




the AC, and board interlock on EM in companies listed on the Indonesian Stock 
Exchange. Using data covering five years from 2004 to 2008 using Jones model 
(1991) as modified by Dechow et al., (1996). Regression techniques are used to 
determine the relationship, and it was discovered that EM takes place in 
Indonesian firms. However, independent BOD’s, size, managerial ownership, 
board composition/multiple directorships, board tenure, and AC do not have a 
significant positive effect on EM practices in Indonesia. One of the 
shortcomings of the study is that it excluded AC and variables that are correlated 
and the use of purposive sampling technique in the study render the study un-
scientific since the said sampling techniques are non-probability based, hence 
the result is said to be non-reliable.  
 
Further, Amran and Abdul-Manaf (2014) examined the relationship between 
board independence and accounting conservatism among Malaysian companies 
between 2000 and 2012. The study findings revealed that although board 
independence is a significant component of CG, its higher presence does not 
reflect higher accounting conservatism.  Moreover, the independent NED is a 
constraint in providing effective monitoring and advisory role to the BODs 
despite the independence. Accordingly, Al-Rassas and Kamardin (2015) 
examined the influence of board and audit committee independence. Using a 
sample of 508 listed firms on the Main Market of Bursa Malaysia between 2009 




Model (Yoon et al., 2006) were employed as a measure of DA, the study found 
BIND and ownership concentration to be associated with low earnings quality.  
 
Furthermore, Alzoubi (2014) conducted a cross-sectional study in examining 
the impact of board characteristics on earnings management (DA) using a 
sample of 86 listed firms listed in Amman (ASE) from 2008 to 2010. The 
findings showed that board independence has an adverse relation with EM. It 
therefore reveals that the character of the board can detect EM, thereby 
improving FRQ. This study was limited in scope, and as such limits its general 
application to the role played by board characteristics in EM.  
 
In another study, Karami, (2014) investigated the effects of company’s 
monitoring features on the quality of financial reporting on 120 sampled firms 
listed on Tehran Stock Exchange between 2003 to 2012. The results showed 
that if IDs were evaluated about the independence of the BOD’s, they would 
yield a negatively significant relationship with the quality of financial reports. 
He argues that following no direct involvement of IDs in firm’s management of 
the company, they cannot provide the needed monitoring and regulation to the 
board, and as such, they cannot ensure high-quality financial reports. Further, 
the ID may be serving several other boards (busyness), and in some cases, they 
may be related to the family members of the company or belong to the same 
professional bodies. In such situation, their independence might be 




reports. On the whole, He, Piot, Labelle, and Thornton (2009) argued that 
studies justifying board independence-enhancing FRQ relate to Anglo-Saxon 
and other European countries, but not in all countries. Consequently, the impact 
of BIND on FRQ depends on the cultural values, customs and traditions of the 
researched country.  
3.7.2  Managerial Share Ownership and Earnings Management 
Managerial share ownership refers to managers’ possession of equity 
shareholding in a firm. As suggested by the agency theory, managers’ stock 
holdings encourage managers to align their interests with that of the 
shareholders towards value maximisation of the firm. In this regard, managerial 
share ownership is an important monitoring mechanism in corporate 
governance. Since the managers’ interest is aligned with the owner's interest, 
they need not be monitored to provide the performance and create value for the 
firm (Warfield, Wild & Wild, 1995). Consequently, Warfield et al., (1995) 
found an inverse relationship between managerial share ownership and EM. 
This is in support of agency theory predictions which state that if managers own 
a substantial percentage of firm equity, they need not be monitored (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976).  
  
In line with some findings above, Mustapha and Che-Ahmad (2010) studied the 
effect of the managerial and block holder ownership using agency theory in 




negative relationship between agency theory that demands control and 
monitoring of management activities with demand for monitoring managerial 
share owners in Malaysian firms. They argued that since managers are inside 
owners, they require less monitoring. This further suggests less conflict of 
interest and less information asymmetry that results in decreasing monitoring 
costs. Conversely, the study established a positive relationship between agency 
theory and block holders who demand higher monitoring due to their non-
involvement in the firm’s operations and internal decision making. Some 
limitations have manifested in the study. Firstly, the study is cross-sectional 
with a coverage period of one-year data that is short. Secondly, the two variables 
of ownership structures may not adequately justify and generalise the findings 
of the study for global application.  
 
Subsequently, the result of previous studies on the association between EM and 
managerial shareholding is inconclusive. In this regard, Johari, Saleh, Jaffar, 
and Hassan (2008) conducted a study in Malaysia in 2005 with 224 sampled 
firms listed on the Malaysian Stock Exchange. The findings of the study 
revealed that DA has a positive association with managerial ownership. It 
therefore indicates that the higher the managerial ownership of a firm’s shares, 
the greater the incidence of earnings smoothness that may result in lower quality 
of the financial report. The study suffered some lapses as it considered only one 
year and the use of OLS as a technique of data analysis. Also, Pedro and Emma 




firms between 1999 and 2002 in Europe. The study finds no relationship 
between DA and managerial ownership. This suggests that managerial 
ownership contributes in curtailing EM with a smaller number of managers’ 
share. When managerial share ownership becomes significant, it hurts the 
informativeness of DA and earnings. In contrast, Smith (1990) studied 58 
management buyouts of public companies during the period from 1977 to 1986 
and proved the existence of the positive relationship between firm performance 
and management share ownership, emphasising the significance of manager 
equity ownership in constraining earnings management practices.  
 
Similarly, Mustapha and Ahmad (2011) investigated the effect of managerial 
share ownership on agency theory. The data were sourced from both primary 
and secondary sources to examine 235 Bursa Malaysia listed companies for the 
2006 financial year. Multiple regression was used in the analysis. The result 
revealed the existence of a negatively significant relationship between 
managerial share ownership and monitoring costs. Thus, this signifies that an 
increase in the proportion of managerial share ownership in various segments 
would lead to a decrease in the monitoring costs of the listed firms. On the other 
hand,  Yeo, Tan, Ho, and Chen (2002) examined 490 samples of listed firms 
between 1990 and 1992. They found a reduction in managers’ opportunistic 
behaviour when their equity ownership was less or equal to 25%. Therefore, 
any increase in the managerial ownership to 25% results in a positive increase 




managers needs to be controlled and managed. Otherwise, the substantial 
number of 25% share ownership may increase the opportunistic behaviour of 
managers, leading to a decrease in quality of financial reports. 
 
In contrast, Johari et al.'s (2008) study used 224 sample firms listed on the 
Malaysian Stock Exchange  and adopted various models of accruals estimation. 
The result shows a positive relationship between management ownership and 
DA in the entire models. Thus, the higher the managerial share ownership of a 
firm, the higher the incidences of earnings manipulation. However, in the first 
instance, the study is restricted to listed financial institutions (companies) on 
Bursa Malaysia. Secondly, the study is also limited to firms listed on Bursa 
Malaysia which may lack external validity, particularly companies with 
websites available on the Bursa Malaysia website. For these reasons, the result 
obtained may not be generalised and applicable in other settings or 
circumstances. 
 
 Alves' (2012) study used 34 samples of non-financial Portuguese firms between 
2002 and 2007 and found that DA reduced the level of earnings management, 
due to the presence of managerial ownership, thereby improving the quality of 
annual income. On the contrary, managers may be encouraged in employing 
DA in an attempt to recoup earnings and value of their stock holdings, through 
higher managerial ownership (Cheng & Warfield, 2005; Hashim & Devi, 2008; 




higher managerial ownership are associated with more EM. Board 
characteristics therefore, play a significant role in ensuring high-quality 
financial reporting. As a monitoring variable, its efficiency and effectiveness 
are capable of reducing the level of EM by companies that consequently 
increase the quality of financial reports produced by these companies.  
3.7.3  Board Size and Earnings Management 
Board size relates to the number of directors on the BODs of a company for 
monitoring and control of managers, even though it is not clear on how the 
direction of influence tilted. Board sizes may vary, from a minimum of five (5) 
or six (6) members to a large membership of 20 and above depending on the 
complexity of the firm and shareholding. However, there is yet to be a consensus 
on whether greater or smaller boards perform better considering its contribution 
to company performance or enhancement of FRQ. Board size attracted some 
research and regulatory provisions, emphasising its contribution to financial 
reporting and firm performance. Depending on the economic and environmental 
factors, the results continue to diverge.  
 
From the regulatory standpoint, in Nigeria, the SEC, 2011 did not provide for 
the maximum number of board membership. However, it is provided in Part B 
Section 4.2, that accession to the Board should not be less than five (5). It 
however requires a mixture of executive and NED on the board, with the 




also states in Part B Section 4.1 that the board should be diverse in experience 
and compatibility, while integrity should also be considered. Empirically, 
Schnake and Williams, (2008) studied board sizes and its relations with multiple 
directorships and firm’s unethical behaviour. The study used 181 samples of 
financial service firms between 1999 and 2003. The results revealed that 
companies with smaller board sizes are less vulnerable to fraud cases, and their 
firm’s behaviour is better monitored than boards with a larger size. It thus 
suggests that small board sizes are more manageable than larger boards, in 
relation to control and meeting its demands.  
 
Also, the control and monitoring of board activities, including management 
activities seem to be much more effective with smaller boards. Similarly, 
Sivaramakrishnan and Yu (2008) found that small boards are predisposed to the 
inability to discover the existence of EM. It therefore suggests that smaller 
boards are vulnerable to the influence by block holders on the firm’s board or 
management since bigger boards are better in monitoring and controlling 
management actions.  
 
Also, Rouf (2011) conducted a study on board size, and firms value among 
others using 93 samples of non-financial  listed firms on Dhaka Stock 
Exchanges (DSE) for the year 2006, employing OLS estimation method as a 
technique for data analysis. However, the result failed to establish any 




limitations are manifested first in the sample size that is small and second, the 
study considered only one year, where if more years are included, it might 
provide different results.  
 
In a similar study, Hassan and Bello (2013) examined the association between 
CG, company attributes and voluntary disclosures among listed companies in 
Nigeria using 50 samples. Regression analysis was used to analyse the said data, 
and the study discovered that board size has a positively significant relationship 
with the magnitude of voluntary disclosures of the sampled companies. It 
therefore means that board composition, leverage, company size, profitability, 
and auditor type have statistically positive but insignificant impact on 
disclosure.  
 
The implication of these findings is that board size has a significant effect on 
the quality of financial reporting and that companies with the optimum board 
size are less likely to engage in EM practices. Nevertheless, the study suffered 
some limitations as it considered only one year with a smaller sample of only 
50 firms. Prior studies documented that effective discharge of board’s 
responsibilities lies with its ability to ask essential management questions, assist 
in mapping out corporate strategic plans, contribute towards smooth succession 
plan of CEO, risk management monitoring and ensuring financial and operating 
targets are met.  Achieving the earlier mentioned objectives depends largely on 




responsibility (Barton, Coombes, & Wong, 2004; Hashim & Devi, 2008c; 
Rajagopalan & Zhang, 2008; Hashim & Ibrahim, 2013; Sama'ila, 2014). Hence, 
having a large or small board size is inconsequential. What matters most is the 
expertise and experience in CG and related expertise geared to providing the 
required monitoring and control of self-motivated management activities.  
 
Given the unspecified number or size of the BOD’s of Nigerian listed firms by 
both CAMA and SEC and the relevant literature reviewed, inconsistent results 
marred the outcomes of those studies. It would be pertinent therefore, to study 
from a wider perspective the entire non-financial sectors of the Nigerian firms, 
in an attempt to examine the effect of board size on the FRQ of the firms. 
3.7.4  Chief Executive Duality and Earnings Management 
Chief Executive duality role is another board characteristic associated with 
strong CG. Chief executive officer duality refers to the separation of 
responsibility of chief executive officer and Board Chairman. Some companies 
allow the two roles to be concurrently discharged by one individual. According 
to the Cadbury (1992) report, the ability of the BoDs in separating the roles of 
Chairman and CEO would enhance its monitoring function. Previous research 
on CEO duality equally document significance in separating the two positions 
including their role (Beasley, 1996; Davidson et al., 2005; Kent & Stewart, 
2008). They maintained that assigning the two positions may give concentrated 




of managers. Nevertheless, Jiang, Lee, and Anandarajan (2008) documented 
that separating the two positions of CEO and board chair is associated with a 
greater firm value. Consequently, since capital market recognises the 
significance of separating the two roles, firms receive higher valuation 
following the separation of the two functions.  
 
Further, Abbott, Park, and Parker (2000) relate assigning the two positions to a 
single person may encourage fraud. One of the ways CEO duality employ to 
weaken BODs effectiveness and exercise of their oversight functions is by 
controlling the information given to directors on the board to make decisions. 
Furthermore, proponents of CEO duality rely on the premise that board 
independence would be compromised. Also, the entire governance roles and 
board’s oversight functions will be impaired (Coombs & Wong, 2004; Gul & 
Leung, 2004; Dey, Engel, & Liu, 2011). Moreover, when CEO duality is 
entrenched, strategies aimed at advancing personal interests rather than 
company’s overall interest would vigorously be pursued. Therefore, vesting the 
two demanding responsibilities could undermine the effectiveness of the board 
(Gul & Leung, 2004).  
 
Again, Petra (2007) maintained that the absence of distinct role separation could 
render the board ineffective and suggests a lack of board independence. Thus, 
monitoring and decision-making process would be shouldered on one person, 




Similarly, Bowen, Burgstahler, and Daley's (1986) and Abdul Rahman and 
Haniffa's (2005) findings reveal a significance in preventing EM when the CEO 
and board chairman’s role are separated. Similarly, Chen, Firth, Gao, and Rui 
(2006) found that fraudulent practices are likely to exist in companies that have 
CEOs who doubled as the chairman of the board.  
 
Moreover, firms with CEO duality reported higher earnings smoothing 
practices. Further, companies with CEO duality positively relate to EM and 
reported poor performance. Usually, whenever a company’s CEO also serves as 
the Chairman, the effectiveness of the board tends to reduce. Consequently, the 
combined role may increase agency costs between management and 
shareholders and may obstruct the monitoring role of the board. These 
arguments are well grounded in agency theory, which suggests that in order to 
make the board of directors independent, the two positions should be separated 
(Fama & Jensen, 1983). 
 
Furthermore, Bradbury et al.(2006) found that CEO duality decreases the 
management control that leads to increasing opportunistic, fraudulent and EM 
behaviours. In contrast, Beasely (1996), Kao and Chen (2004), Davidson et al. 
(2005) and Rahman and Ali (2006) found an insignificant association between 
CEO duality with financial statement fraud. Grounded in the stewardship theory 
of the firm, Coombs and Wong (2004) argue that CEO duality actions are 




objectives. Similarly, Ajina, Bouchareb, and Souid (2013) studied on the impact 
of CG mechanisms on IFRS in France after 2005, using a sample of 145 French 
listed firms. The result reveals a positive but insignificant relationship between 
CEDU and EM, indicating that CEO duality has no significant effect in 
curtailing EM. Therefore, the two combined roles will facilitate decision-
making and assist the board towards arriving at informed decisions without the 
mystification of accountability.  
 
Accordingly, Vo and Phan (2013) used the generalised least squares (feasible) 
technique to examine the relationship between CG and firm’s performance in 
77 Vietnam listed firms for the period between 2006 to 2011. The result of the 
study indicates a positive and significant association between CEO duality and 
improvement in firm’s performance. This suggests that combining the two roles 
to an individual impacted positively on the performance of the listed firms in 
Vietnam. However, the study failed to take into consideration the weakness of 
generalised least squares (feasible) which included some companies are greater 
than the number of time, in the case of this study 77 companies and only six 
years. Consequently, Hashim and Devi (2008) used 200 firms as samples 
retrieved from non-financial listed firms in Malaysia.  
 
The study considered data for the year 2004 in the analysis where it examines 
how a higher percentage of independent NED and the CEO duality restrains the 




of independent NED on the board is highly associated with earnings 
manipulations. Furthermore, both board independence and CEO duality were 
significantly found in EM practices in Malaysia. Due to that, the findings of this 
study contradict the perceptions that the independence of directors and CEO 
duality diminishes the occurrences of EM. However, the results of the study 
may be a constraint on the smaller sample size of 200, considering the number 
of listed firms on both Bursa Malaysia’s Main and Second Board. Secondly, a 
single period of one year (2004) is too narrow for general application of the 
results.  
 
On the other hand, Abdul-Manaf, Amran and Ishak (2015) examined board 
composition, board size, board leadership and informativeness of earnings in 
Malaysian listed non-financial firms. The study covers a period of 12 years 
(2001 to 2012), with a sample of 3,761 firms as observations drawn from public 
companies. Regression techniques were used to analyse the data. The study 
establishes a statistically significant relationship between board leadership and 
earnings informativeness. It further documents that CEO duality provides fewer 
earnings informativeness, whilst firms whose board leaderships are separated 
offer better earnings informativeness. Thus, CEO duality is associated with less 
monitoring and oversight function in ensuring quality information to 
stakeholders. Despite the data of the study being a panel in nature, the years 
under consideration is small. On the contrary, CEO duality empowers the 




required in improving the firm’s performance (Harris & Helfat, 1998). In this 
regard, prior studies on the CEO duality’s role in constraining the incidences of 
EM that might lead to enhancing FRQ proved to present inconclusive results. 
This is more prevalent within non-western economies. As such, further studies 
in this area, precisely in the emerging and turbulent economy like Nigeria need 
to be undertaken to provide more robust and additional evidence for generalised 
results. 
3.7.5  Gender Diversity and Earnings Management 
Recently, the issue of board diversity has elicited the interest of CG researchers. 
Advocates of female participation in public affairs suggest that the composition 
of the BoD’s should consist of members without discrimination as to sex, 
religion, ethnicity, race, and colour. Furthermore,  Section 4(1) of the SEC CG 
Code (2011) requires that the boards of public companies should compose of 
members in such a way that ensures diversity of experience without 
compromising integrity, compatibility and independence. Further arguments 
were put forward that gender-diverse boards are associated with higher quality 
deliberations than those composed solely of males, and such boards 
communicate more effectively. Although innate differences exist between 
women and men in the form of ethical behaviour, the risk and apathy to 
fraudulent activities, some scholars argue that gender diversity on corporate 
boards may improve the effectiveness of the board (Hillman, 2015). Similarly, 




performance may be affected negatively by investors’ perceptions which will 
affect the prospect of the firm. He further submits that, given the dominance of 
men in the investment profession, it may be biased against gender-diverse firms.  
 
Several reasons were further advanced on the need for BoD’s to be composed 
of women, one of which includes women’s public attitude of accommodation, 
the establishment of relationships and teamwork that are some of the 
characteristics of boards’ activity (Dargnies, 2012). In a similar study, Ittonen, 
Peni and Vähämaa (2015) and Triana, Miller, and Trzebiatowski (2014) argue 
that women are good monitors and demand more management accountability 
for performance than men. Given women apathy to fraudulent activities, women 
are also less overconfident than men and are likely to complain when they 
discover there is intent to commit fraud (whistleblowing) as it was in Enron and 
WorldCom (Ittonen et al., 2015).Thus, less overconfidence is more likely to 
make them establish higher verification statndards of managers’ reports which 
can lead to richer information environment. 
 
Accordingly, Srinidhi, Gul, and Tsui (2011) argued that board gender diversity 
could improve the quality of board discussions and enhance control of firm’s 
disclosures and reports. Further, prior studies’ arguments on gender 
representations were based on documented evidence in psychology and 
behavioural economics literature that behavioural differences exist between 




highly determined to reach the top echelon of leadership and avoid risk than 
men (Levin et al., 1998; Byrnes, Miller, & Schafer, 1999; Eagly & Carli, 2003). 
Similarly, women have a higher propensity to comply with rules and regulations 
in the financial decision context than men (Bernardi & Arnold, 1997). These 
gender-based differences may have implications for FRQ if females are on 
board to monitor management. 
 
Bart and McQueen (2013) conducted a survey to determine women reliance on 
three reasoning methods of Personal Interest, Normative and Complex Moral 
Reasoning to make decisions. The study finds that the presence of female 
directors on boards is associated with corporate performance, and argue that 
women seem to make better directors than men. Using the Defined Issues Test 
(DIT), 624 board directors (75% male; 25% female) were surveyed to determine 
their reliance on the three reasoning methods. The results indicate that female 
directors achieved significantly higher scores than their male counterparts on 
the complex moral reasoning dimension that necessarily involves making 
consistently fair decisions when competing interests are at stake. This study 
reveals that having a significant proportion of female directors with highly 
developed CMR skills on board would be a valuable resource for decisions 
making and enhance their effectiveness. However, the effectiveness of women 
in the boardroom would be better if they do not mimic men’s behaviour. Thus, 
they should be authentic and use the skills and talents to support their boards 




present a dominant role on corporate boards. The proponents of signalling 
theory argue that appointing a female to corporate leadership position, from 
being a director or member of AC sends a positive signal to capital market 
participants (Huang, Yan, Fornaro, & Elshahat, 2011; Thiruvadi, 2012).  
 
Further, Huang et al. (2011) maintain that proportional increase of female 
directors on corporate boards would increase the market perceptions of the audit 
committee's independence and overall performance of governance roles. The 
results provide additional evidence that appointment of females on the audit 
committee triggered share prices to react favourably with positive increase in 
returns. However, the size of the audit committee, its composition and financial 
expertise including the number of the female members on the AC has not been 
disclosed. Thus, it would be difficult to generalise the application of the result 
in a different institutional settings. And so, whether the presence of women on 
a firm’s AC influences share prices and returns remain an empirical issue that 
requires investigation particularly in developing countries. 
 
 Arute, Bernardi and Bosco (2015) investigated the association between female 
representation on corporate boards with company’s stock prices for the period 
between 2006 to 2012. Using the US Fortune 500 companies consisting of 314 
sample companies, the results indicate that a negative relationship exists 
between the percentage of female board members and performance of firms’ 




number of women directors lowers the capital gains yield. The findings of this 
study did not justify the selection criteria employed in selecting female 
directors. In addition, a single (catalyst) measurement technique cannot provide 
the required result when compared with other techniques such as human capital-
based investment criteria. Moreover, it is not clear whether qualification and 
capital market experience are considered in the selection criteria.  
 
On the other hand, Krishnan and Parsons (2008) found that companies which 
have more female senior managers do better in terms of profitability than those 
with fewer females. All these suggest the importance of women in society and 
leadership roles. On setting a specific percentage of women representation on 
corporate boards, Rose (2007) documented that Norwegian law requires 40%  
membership on boards of a company to be women. Also, Srinidhi, Gul and Tsui 
(2011)  stated that other European countries have also provided legal 
requirements for female members on boards. They posit that Sweden requires 
25% seats for women board members, while Spain stipulates that female 
representation on the corporate boards should be at least 40% by the year 2015. 
However, the study did not consider issues of women motivation to business, 
legitimacy, experience, ability to reach the top echelon and the outcomes of 
quotas. Thus, the study should have examined the effects of quotas and whether 
gradual legislations such as ‘comply or explain’ policies would help to achieve 





In contrast, Carter, D’Souza, Simkins and Simpson (2010) examined a sample 
of US firms for the 1998-2002 financial years. Using multiple regression 
analysis, they found an insignificant relationship between firm performance and 
gender diversity. The results neither show support nor did it provide evidence 
suggesting an adverse effect of the inclusion of women on corporate boards.  
 
Similarly, Amran, Abdul-Manaf and Ishak (2016) examined the association 
between women directors on the corporate boards of Malaysian non-financial 
listed firms and earnings quality between 2001 and 2012. The study used 4,943 
firms as samples and employed multiple regression technique in analysing the 
data. The study could not establish evidence of value creation by the Malaysian 
women directors on the corporate boards of non-financial listed companies in 
Malaysia. Again, significant differences in the quality of earnings of the firms 
with or without women on the board of these companies could not be 
established. Therefore, the study could not establish that presence of women on 
boards enhanced the quality of earnings as well as the board governance.  
 
Furthermore, Capezio and Mavisakalyan (2015) examined the relationship 
between female representation on boards and fraud in Australia, for the period 
from 2002 to 2007. Using probit models of estimation on 128 observations of 
publicly listed companies included in ASX 200, the study found that women 
occupied 5.49% board seats in the sampled companies. The study finds a 




women on corporate boards. Thus, an increase in female representation on 
corporate boards reduces the incidence of fraud. However, apart from the size 
of the sample, it is not clear regarding the type and nature of the fraud, amount, 
and transactions involved in the study that women directors have mitigated 
which would enable general application of the findings, particularly in less 
developed economies. 
 
On the other hand, Barua, Rama, and Sharma (2010) examined the relationship 
between female executives and accruals quality and established that firms with 
female chief financial officers are more conservative in financial reporting 
practices. These studies empirically provided evidence suggesting that female 
executives are more careful and conservative in making decisions on EM. It 
further suggests that gender differences may affect the quality of financial 
reporting. The outcome of this study also supported findings of Ujunwa, 
Okoyeuzu, and Nwakoby (2012). 
 
Srinidhi et al. (2011) examined that firms with gender-diverse boards exhibit 
higher-quality earnings using a sample size of 1045 non-financial companies 
from S&P COMPUSTAT for a period between 2001 to 2007. The findings 
using multiple regression analysis showed the presence of women directors on 
the board reflects a higher EQ. This indicates that quality earnings are higher 
with the presence of female directors. Further, Gul, Srinidhi and Ng (2011) 




stock prices by providing accurate information on share prices. Their samples 
consist of 5,021 firms for the period between 2001 to 2006. Information relating 
to director's gender were obtained from a corporate library database, employing 
logistic regression analysis technique. The results indicated that stock prices of 
boards with gender diversity presented more firm-specific information useful to 
investors. However, these studies are mostly US based, with available and 
accessible data that might not be the same if conducted in a less developed 
economy.  
 
Zhang, Zhu and Ding, (2013) examined the relationship between board 
independence, the presence of female directors and corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) performance in the Post-SOX Era. Using logistic 
regression and stepwise variable selection on 516 largest U.S. stock exchange 
listed companies, the study findings revealed that CSR performance is 
associated with the presence of independent and female directors on the boards. 
It concluded that corporate boards should be carefully structured to enhance 
company’s moral legitimacy. The study’s findings require re-examination in a 
non-U.S. and non-western environment (cross-country) to validate its 
applicability in making generalisation.  
 
Nevertheless, the study did not address the overlap between the outside directors 
and female directors. Also, the study used archival data to examine CSR 




employed to assess the CSR performance on pre and post-SOX. On the other 
hand, Mathisen, Ogaard and Marnburg (2013) investigated female directors’ 
experience on boardroom dynamics in Norwegian firms. Using a sample of 491 
on 149 corporate boards, the result shows no support for a significant difference 
in the perceptions of board dynamics between female directors with non-
traditional education and other female directors. The study concludes that 
female directors are welcomed into boardrooms and perceived to be a 
professional colleagues by the male board members, who has potential to 
benefit from the wealth of experiences and skills. Nonetheless, the study failed 
to investigate subgroup differences of women directors to find the extent of 
vulnerability in becoming outgroup than others. Thus, personality differences 
and varying levels of social competence between female directors could reveal 
different perceptions about boardroom processes. Again, the study could not 
identify strong characteristics of women directors with regards to educational, 
professional background, related experience, or gender. In addition, how 
different forms of social identification affects their insight into the boardroom 
dynamics were not addressed.  
 
However, Abdullah, Ku-Ismail, and Nachum (2016) documented mixed results 
on women participation on corporate boards of directors. The findings reveal 
that the appointment of female directors creates value for some firms while it 
decreases value in others. The result could not provide a direct and positive 




be due to differences regarding ownership, performance indicators, the structure 
of the board, industry and country specifics. 
 
Arun, Almahrog and Aribi (2015) examined the influence of women directors 
on earnings management practices in the UK, between 2005 and 2011, using a 
pooled OLS regression technique and Dechow et al. (1995) model of 
discretionary accruals, in addition to a sample of 1220 companies out of 10 
industries. The study found that companies with a higher proportion of female 
independent directors tend to engage in income-decreasing EM practices than 
companies with a lower percentage of female independent directors. Again, 
female directors on the board of highly levered companies have no impact on 
the levels of EM, while a positive association exists between independent 
female directors on the board of less levered companies and earnings 
management practice. However, the results relate to the UK institutional 
context, perhaps the result may provide a different result if tested on boards with 
less female directors or female directors with lower financial literacy that would 
enable adequate monitoring and control of managerial entrenchments.  
 
Peni and Vähämaa (2010) examined the relationship between gender of the 
firm’s executives and earnings management in the US S&P 500 firms for the 
period from 2003 to 2007. The study uses a sample of 391 and 1,955 firm-year 
observations; the study employed both Dechow and Dechiv (2002) and 




the findings indicate that firms with female chief executive officers have a 
negative association with EM, suggesting that the companies with female chief 
executive officers observe conservative EM strategies. Although the study uses 
a larger sample size, the findings may not apply to non-US companies and in 
different business circles. Also, the study focuses on Chief financial officers 
(CFOs). As such, the study suffers a selection bias with some firm 
characteristics. Thus, the study could have examined the independent female 
board members’ monitoring role, since the board is the overall overseer of the 
company, hence omitting some correlated variables. 
 
Terjesen, Couto and Francisco (2015) investigated the relationships between 
gender diverse boards’ independence and efficiency. Using the generalised 
methods of moments techniques with a sample of 3,876 firms in 47 different 
countries, it was found that the higher the proportion of female directors, the 
higher the performance by market and financial performance. They further 
suggest that the contribution of outside IDs to firm performance is weak unless 
the board is gender diversified. Moreover, the effectiveness of boards of 
directors strongly depends on the presence of female directors. They maintain 
that firms that are more concerned about board independence and effectiveness 
of the board are found to be gender diverse. Besides, the study failed to address 
other gender diverse issues, such as educational status, work background, 
ethnicity, and age. Secondly, the survey focused on developed countries with 




where participation of women in public activities is highly restricted. Thirdly, 
the study measures firm’s financial performance only, neglecting the non-
financial measures, such as social performance and minority managers, or other 
social responsibility practices.  
 
Prior studies recommend setting a quota for female directors on corporates 
boards, citing Norway quota as a reference point to find effects of female 
directors on company performance. Issues such as the timing of the study, 
selection of control variables and sample and mechanisms explaining the results 
may raise concern over the causal evidence on the effects of quotas on 
performance. Therefore, studies on female directors should focus on how setting 
quotas affects the firm's financial performance (e.g. quality of earnings).   
 
Consequently, Adams, Haan, Terjesen and van (2015) report that most board 
diversity studies focused on developed countries. For that reason, analysis of 
data on gender representation on the board for developing countries, where 
issues of gender diversity are gradually growing may contribute more to the 
understanding of the relationship between female directors’ representation on 
corporate boards and quality of the financial reporting. Thus, the present study 
fills the gap by providing evidence of gender diversity from the developing 




3.8  Audit Committee Characteristics and Earnings Management 
The Board Audit Committee is delegated with financial oversight 
responsibilities (Menon & Williams, 1994).  Early studies on the AC focused 
on issues relating to determinants of the AC formation (Bradbury, 1990). 
Besides, these studies tried to ascertain whether improvement in governance 
and accountability was a result of firms’ AC (Wild, 1994). However, there has 
been a development in research findings that continued on substantially from 
the early studies of a new focus on different aspects of research, particularly on 
AC financial expertise, the effectiveness of AC, and its effect on the quality of 
financial reporting.  
3.8.1  Audit Committee Independence and Earnings Management 
Audit committee independence represents the presence of NED on the AC of a 
company. Given the oversight function of the AC, independence is one of the 
essential qualities of AC members. As a CG mechanism, audit committees are 
seen as being responsible for overseeing the reporting process of firms’ finance. 
It is also to ensure external audit objectivity in conduct and reporting (Uzun, 
Szewczyk, & Varma, 2004). The independence of AC is necessary for the 
monitoring process involved in financial reporting  (Koh, Laplante, & Tong, 
2007; Yang & Krishnan, 2005). Therefore, the effective discharge of 
monitoring responsibility lies on the level of AC independence. The absence or 
low level of AC independence would adversely affect the quality and credibility 





Previous studies (Pucheta-Martínez & Fuentes, 2007; Vafeas & Waegelein, 
2007; Mangena & Tauringana, 2008; Rustam, Rashid, & Zaman, 2013) 
evidenced benefits to be accrued when the AC is independent. Furthermore, 
Koh et al. (2007) and Kent, Routledge, and Stewart (2008) observed that higher 
FRQ would be achieved when the AC is highly independent. On the other hand, 
Bronson, Carcello, Hollingsworth, and Neal (2009) documented that AC 
independence would be of great benefit only when the AC is entirely 
independent. There is the possibility that the audit committee characteristic 
which can reduce EM in the developed economies may be ineffective in less 
developed economies. When regulatory or standard definitions of independence 
are met, these studies assume that audit committees are likely to be more 
effective in monitoring management activities. While this argument may hold, 
one shortcoming  is that independence in form may differ with independence in 
substance, hence the probable reasons for the mixed results of previous studies 
on the relationship between AC independence and earnings quality. 
3.8.2  Audit Committee Financial Expertise and Earnings Management 
Accounting or financial expertise are attributes/qualification or experience 
acquired by a person before becoming a board member of a company. Previous 
studies support the existence of relationships between accounting expertise and 
quality financial reporting.  Accordingly, Carcello, Hollingsworth, Klein, and 




increasing accruals when accounting expert is on the AC and when firms have 
at least one general financial expert on their AC (Bedard, Chtourou, & Courteau, 
2004).  Also, Xie, Davidson, and Dadalt (2003) suggest that AC members need 
financial sophistication. Furthermore, the BOD’s and AC members' financial 
sophistication are necessary in curtailing tendency of managers engaging in EM 
practices. Meanwhile, Xie et al. (2003) posit that DA was lower when an 
investment banker is appointed to the AC. Thus, the results indicate that 
appointing at least a member with necessary experience from the finance sector 
supports high-quality financial reporting.  
 
In addition, Krishnan and Visvanathan (2007) argue that there is a positive 
association between accounting expertise and the proportion of AC members. 
Hence, the percentage of financial expertise on the AC reduces the level of 
fraudulent practices and strengthens the internal control process. In their 
assessment of the relevance of financial expertise on the audit committee, 
Zhang, Zhou & Zhou (2007), and Hoitash, Hoitash & Bedard (2009) maintain 
that a proportion of financial experts are unlikely to report weaknesses in the 
internal control of the firm. Their arguments focused on financial experts, and 
not necessarily accounting experts who should be on the AC committee. These 
results agree with the fact that the association between financial experts and 
sound internal control systems over financial reporting relate to the quality of 





Similarly, Krishnan and Lee (2009) examined the determinants for the choice 
of AC financial experts using a sample of 1000 firms. The finding of the study 
reveals that the appointment of accounting/ financial expert is expected with 
companies that have higher litigation risk. Thus, companies with a strong 
governance structure that are facing ligation risk are likely to appoint 
accounting/financial experts than firms with weak governance structures. 
Moreover, the strength of internal controls is associated with financial expertise 
in the AC.  
 
Supporting the significance of financial expertise is the study of Defond, Hann, 
Xuesong, and Engel (2005) who examined market response to the director’s 
appointment with financial expertise on the AC for 702 companies, before the 
implementation of SOX requirements. The findings show no reaction to the 
nomination of non-accounting financial experts. However, a positive market 
reaction was found on the appointment of accounting financial experts on the 
ACs. Similarly, constraining irregularities is a major challenge for ACs due to 
manager’s behaviour of hiding fraudulent practices away from monitors, 
thereby avoiding penalties for deliberate GAAP violations (Larcker, 
Richardson, & Tuna, 2007; Schrand & Zechman, 2012). Therefore, intentional 
mix-ups make reports incomprehensible and prevent ACs from detecting and 
preventing irregularities. Mustafa and Youssef (2010) investigated the 






In a sample of 28 US public companies experiencing misappropriation between 
1987 and 1998, besides 28 control companies based on size, industry, and age, 
a logistic regression model was employed with non-accounting and 
accounting/financial expertise. The findings revealed that an independent AC 
member was only effective in decreasing the incidence of misappropriation in 
public companies if the member is an accounting/financial expert in addition to 
his/her previous experiences. However, the study used only 28 misappropriation 
cases by employees with the connivance of outsiders. As such, the sample size 
is too low for a study of this nature in the USA, which limits its validity, as well 
as generalisation.  
 
However, Badolato, Donelson, and Ege (2014) argue that it is not enough to 
have accounting/financial expert as a member of ACs in restraining EM, but a 
mixture of financial expertise and high status of the AC members. In contrast, 
Hayes (2014) disagrees with Badolato et al.'s (2014) conclusions, and argues 
that the researcher’s conclusion that lower status has rendered ACs less effective 
is irreconcilable with multiple decreases in misreporting. Moreover, until 
Hayes' (2014) argument on the relevance of role status of ACs’ membership, 
several empirical studies supported the accounting/financial expertise as among 
the significant factors in enhancing quality financial reports. However, there are 
inconsistencies with prior findings, particularly with the unexplained effect of 




management. It thus suggests that extensive research needs to be carried out on 
the impact of financial/accounting expertise on the effectiveness of AC.  
 
Similarly, Cohen, Hoitash, Krishnamoorthy and Wright, (2014) argue along 
similar findings of Hayes (2014), having agreed with Hayes’ position of having 
accounting/financial expert on the AC. Additionally, Cohen et al. (2014) 
advocate that AC as a combination of accounting and industry experts perform 
better than those with only accounting expertise. The results suggest that 
accounting/financial expertise is not enough in enhancing FRQ. Rather, a 
combination of industry know-how and accounting expertise can improve the 
effectiveness of the AC and improve monitoring of financial reporting process. 
This suggests that previous studies’ results emphasise the need for AC expertise, 
but Cohen et al. (2014) emphasised that AC industry expertise is equally 
valuable in improving the FRQ. 
 
Accordingly, SEC Code of CG 2011’s requirement to have at least one (1) 
financial literate member in the AC assumes that the presence of such member 
enhances the committee’s monitoring roles. It thus means that the literacy is 
likely to lead the AC to identify and ask well-informed questions that task both 
management and external auditors to a larger extent and thus enhances FRQ. 
The differences in the requirement for having both accounting and financial 
experts’ presence on the AC in developed countries may be consequent upon 




study fills the gap through its findings on the relationship between AC financial 
expertise on a six-member AC and its impact on earnings management. 
3.8.3  Audit Committee Share Ownership and Earnings Management 
Audit committee share ownership represents the AC member’s proportion of 
shareholdings in the company. Previous studies have documented the potential 
effects of AC members’ share ownership in the monitoring of financial 
reporting process of a firm. For instance, Lavelle (2002) argues that the AC 
members with a greater percentage of shareholdings can be questioned, given 
their percentage equity holding that may be used in protecting their investments. 
Similarly, Carcello and Neal (2003) argue that in the event AC shareholdings in 
a firm becomes increasingly large; they may struggle to exercise unnecessary 
influence on the discontinuation of external auditor services subsequent upon 
expressing a going concern opinion (report) to protect their interest. 
 
However, prior studies (Shivasani, 1993; Mangena & Pike, 2005) have argued 
that having AC members with share ownership can lead to higher vigilance that 
may ultimately motivate them to ensure company performance. This is possible 
due to their stake in the company and as NED on the AC, they may be motivated 
and can as well effectively assist in improving the financial reporting process. 
Further, this argument is supported from the agency theory perspective, where 
agents are driven by their interests and would always try to pursue and further 




their stake (shareholding) of the company would encourage higher monitoring 
and control of management activities (Jensen, 1993). Furthermore, Vafeas 
(2005) examined the relationship between BOD’s, audit committee and FRQ. 
The study used 252 samples of U.S. firms using logistics regression for the 
analysis for the period of six years (1994 to 2000). Similarly, Bolton (2014) 
studied the audit committee performance related to stock ownership and 
independence. The study employs OLS and instrumental variables as techniques 
of analysis with the firm-year observation of 14,576, for the period between 
1998 to 2008. The results reveal that audit committee stock ownership has a 
positively significant relationship with firm’s performance. The study maintains 
that the relationship becomes stronger with boards that have greater 
independence than those boards that are less independent.  
 
Nevertheless, one major shortcoming identified with the result is the likelihood 
of EM which might be a factor that determines the firm’s performance and not 
the corporate governance environment. Consistent with agency theory, it was 
found that there is a positive association between the equity holding of AC 
members and FRQ.  
3.9  Underpinning Theories 
There are many governance theories said to have explained many corporate 
governance studies. Therefore, agency theory, Resource dependency theory, 




the appropriateness of each to the study. In particular, theories considered to 
underpin and best explain the relationship between the board, audit committee 
characteristics and financial reporting quality are in the following sections: 
3.9.1  Agency Theory 
Corporate governance (CG) issues have been one of the most topical concepts 
in the governance literature. Spear (2004) documented that the first work on 
governance originates in the work of Berle and Means (1932) which contended 
the dominance of management and the legal function of shareholder control, 
and the ineffectiveness of the board in checking managerial power in the 
interests of shareholders. The manager (agent) is working as a representative of 
the owners/shareholders (principal), and whose actions, and decisions are not 
observed or shareholders may not be aware of the consequences of several of 
the measures taken by the agent. This creates information asymmetry between 
shareholders and the agents that is regarded as the principal and agent problem. 
The asymmetric information could lead to a moral hazard and/or adverse 
selection. Adverse selection occurs as a result of different information provided 
by the agent that caused the principal to incur undesired costs as a consequence 
of the imperfect information. While moral hazard occurs as a result of risk taken 
by the principal that results in costs associated with that risk which the agent is 
insulated from. Thus, information available protects him from the negative 





Furthermore, Mizruchi (2014) documented that works of  Berle and Means's is 
grounded on the separation of ownership and control coupled with the 
manager's lack of accountability to investors and society. Berle and Means were 
concerned on how managers operate as a self-perpetuating oligarchy, who failed 
to be accountable to the stockholders they are supposed to represent, thus 
creating a conflict of interests between managers (agents) and owners 
(principals). However, the fundamental governance issue of how the 
differentiated companies are to be governed could be traced to the studies by 
Fama (1980), and Fama & Jensen (1983). The predominant hypothesis in this 
area is agency theory. Agency theory gives justification on how the present day 
corporations can be governed, mainly on the provisions of two full range of 
external and internal systems, corporate control, and most essential the board of 
directors.  
 
Therefore, the agency theory is used to explain the relationship between the 
principal (owners) and the agent (managers). In this regard, a representative 
(agent) is appointed to represent and oversee the regular operations of the 
corporation while the shareholders provide capital. Therefore,  separation of 
ownership and control leads to information asymmetry and possible conflict of 
interests between managers and shareholders (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Fama 
1980). The apparent conflict of interests between managers and owners 
consequently lead to costs associated with solving these conflicts (Eisenhardt, 




motivated in pursuing their self-interest and would ensure that it is achieved 
instead of pursuing the interest of the shareholders. These self-motivated 
interests lead managers to engage in flamboyant offices, and extravagant 
spending that is borne by the shareholders. Instead, managers are expected to 
ensure they pursue and protect shareholder's interest rather than their self-
interest. Eisenhardt (1989) maintains that conflict arises when the principal is 
unable to monitor and verify what the agent is doing with what was entrusted to 
him.  
 
Therefore, it would cost the principal to ensure adequate monitoring of 
opportunistic behaviour by managers which would ultimately reflect in the 
company earnings. Hence, the opportunity created by management to manage 
the company’s reported earnings is due to the desire to ensure they meet or beat 
earnings targets, and the desire to boost the company stock price. Also, 
managers want to receive bonuses/managerial compensations that may be tied 
to the firm’s earnings. With this object in mind, managers use their 
discretionaary power on accruals to manage earnings, thus enhancing the 
reliability of reported earnings and the entire financial statements.  
 
Xie, Davidson, & Dadalt (2003) argue that when management provides 
inaccurate financial reporting information, it introduces EM in the form of 
agency cost. According to the agency theory, EM is a sign of the agency 




of decreasing EM practices. Chen and Zhang (2014) argue that effective CG 
mechanisms can decrease agency costs and curtail EM practices. Also, the 
governance mechanisms are aimed to ensure agent-principal interest alignment, 
protect the interests of the shareholder thereby reducing agency costs (Davis, 
Schoorman, & Donaldson, 1997). It thus suggests that CG mechanisms can 
mitigate agency costs and ensure shareholder’s interests are protected through 
monitoring management activities by aligning shareholder interests with those 
of the management. Also, issues bordering on board size, board of directors and 
structure of their ownership were developed to bring in line interests of the agent 
and that of the principal. The aims of these mechanisms are geared towards 
improving the overall effectiveness of the oversight function of the board of 
directors.  
3.9.2  Resource Dependence Theory 
The agency, stewardship and stakeholder theories provide the understandings 
to the shareholders, managers and stakeholder perspectives while another 
corporate governance theory which emphasises the need for different resources 
for the success of the business is termed as the resource dependence theory. The 
focus of both stakeholder and agency theory is the managers and groups of 
different peoples respectively, but this theory introduces accessibility to 
resources that is a critical dimension of the corporate governance debate. The 
sources for resource dependence theory were carried from the work of Jeff 




between power and exchange within and around organisation. His work was 
further emphasised by Aldrich and Pfeffer (1976) and Pfeffer and Salancik 
(1978). Though agency theory suggests the importance of boards in monitoring 
the managerial activities, resource dependence theory highlighted another role 
of board directors as the resource providers (Hillman, Withers, & Collins, 
2009).  
 
According to Pfeffer (1972), resource dependence theory argues that a 
company’s success is dependent upon maximising its power over certain 
resources which are necessary for running smooth operations. The theory 
concentrates on the role of the board that helps to secure and acquire the 
essential resources of the organisation by their external linkage to the 
environment. Through these linkages, it brings in different resources, such as 
information, skills, access to supplies of raw material, the buyer of outputs, 
public policy makers, social groups as well as legitimacy (Hillman & Dalziel, 
2003). Consequently, under this theory, the board of directors is the key source 
of various resources, in which different resources provision improves 
organisation operation, firm’s performance and organisational survival (Daily 
& Dalton, 2003). 
 
Similarly, Ulrich and Barney (1984) argue that organisational performance 
highly relies on the power of a company to provide the essential and scarce 




and efficacy of the network and communication between contractual parties of 
firms. Prior studies that provided evidence on the role played by corporate 
boards in accessing the desired resources are Salancik and Pfeffer (1978) and 
Dalton, Daily, Johnson, and Ellstrand (1999) who found that without the help 
of corporate boards, it is hard for organisations to acquire necessary resources. 
In RD theory, diversity of board members is seen as the essential element which 
leads towards the broader business connections (Siciliano, 1996) and firms with 
environmental dependencies are likely to have females on corporate boards as 
directors (Hillman, Shropshire, & Cannella, 2007).   
 
Accordingly, Dalton et al. (1996) argue that independent directors on the boards 
provide more assistance in gaining the desirable resources, as directors have 
more linkages with the outside environment that is necessary for organisation’s 
survival and future growth. They classified directors as business experts, 
support specialists, and community leaders, depending on the types of resources 
they bring to the board. Firstly, inside directors that provide information 
regarding company finance and regulation make strategies and give direction 
for decision making. Business expert directors who are the present, former and 
top analysts of the profit-oriented larger firms, provide guidelines for strategy 
making, problem-solving and give their professional opinion for decision 
making. Amongst the specialists that provide support regarding their specific 
fields are bankers, lawyers, experts in public relations and politicians with 




directors is community influencers that consist of political or social and 
community leaders. Hillman and Dalziel (2003) found the board of directors as 
the main source for the achievement of different resources required by the firms.  
 
Also, Ruigrok, Peck, and Tacheva (2007) considered the boards as the boundary 
guards that shelter the necessary firm’s resources like capital, knowledge, skills 
and projects partnership agreements. Moreover, Aguilera, Filatotchev, Gospel 
and Jackson (2008) argued that the stewardship and stakeholder theories cover 
the restraining assumptions of the agency perspective, but still these theories do 
not provide the broader view of the corporate governance that makes it 
connected with the diverse organisational environments.  Hence, resource 
dependence theory covers that.  
3.9.3  Stewardship Theory 
Stewardship Theory is another theoretical perspective to understanding the 
relationships between ownership and management of the company (Donaldson 
& Davis, 1991). Distinct from agency theory, stewardship considers 
psychological and sociological methodology. It argues that there is an alignment 
between the owner's interest and the interests of corporate managers (Albrecht, 
Conan, & Chad, 2004). The stewardship theorists concentrate on structures that 
enable and encourage as opposed to monitoring and control. They dismiss the 
profoundly individualistic model of agency theory that advances a suspicious 




agents as essentially serving toward oneself and selfish. Along these lines, they 
also dismiss the view that principals need to invigilate the sharp/opportunistic 
managers by observing them and applying sanctions or motivating forces as a 
method for control. 
 
Stewardship theory takes an opposite point of view in proposing that the agents 
are reliable and trusted stewards of the resources that are entrusted to them, 
which makes monitoring unnecessary (Davis, Schoorman, & Donaldson, 1997). 
Since managers are not selfish and act in the finest interest of the shareholders, 
they ought to also be given freedom grounded on conviction and trust, which 
reduces the cost of monitoring their behaviour. It therefore implies that as far as 
the Stewardship theory is concerned, managers are viewed as loyal, and their 
conduct does not have to be monitored. Thus, the attitude of the steward in this 
regard is collective and targeted towards achieving organisational goals 
(profitability). Furthermore, both the principal and the company would benefit 
from that behaviour due to the gains that might accrue from profits on dividend 
and increase in share prices. In this respect, managers’ interests are associated 
with those of the owners.  
 
Accordingly, Stewardship theory asserts that the typical corporate structures are 
those that empower compelling coordination in the organisations. The 
stewardship point of view sees directors, and also managers, as stewards of the 




recommend that stewards gain more fulfilment by attaining towards corporate 
goals rather than pursuing their personal interests. Davis et al. (1997) further 
contend that achieving organisational goals also fulfils the individual needs of 
the stewards. Along these lines, the stewardship theory considers that managers' 
decisions are also affected by non-financial motives, such as the requirement 
for accomplishment and recognition, the characteristic fulfilment of satisfactory 
performance, and admiration for power and the hardworking attitude.  
 
To understand the effect of  Stewardship theory from the board’s perspective, it 
considers the BOD as a mechanism of assistance to a steward (CEO) instead of 
a controlling mechanism (Albrecht et al., 2004). It also considers that 
management is less inclined to practice earnings management. In this regard, 
the issue lies in the degree that the management tries to achieve good corporate 
performance. Thus, the need for supervision of a steward is reduced and indeed, 
would be unnecessary with regards to the overall interests of the company (Tosi, 
Brownlee, Silva, & Katz, 2003). Therefore, the argument advanced for 
stewardship theory is that, with adequate control by managers, it would 
empower them to maximise the firms’ corporate profits and performance. 
However, chief executive officer duality, that is the same individual holding the 
position of chairperson and CEO, is favoured by the stewardship theory, and it 
is contended that it leads to better firm performance because of clear and unified 
leadership (Donaldson & Davis, 1994; Davis et al., 1997). The empirical 




number of outside directors on its board perform bettter than firms with less 
outside directors. Along these lines, some scholars lend support for the 
stewardship view hypothetically (Davis et al., 1997). Managers of family-run 
organisations are more inclined to be concerned with the continuity of the 
organisation than by the success in quarterly earnings (Gallo & Vilaseca, 1996). 
 
Prior studies also examined the influence of the stewardship construct on newly 
incorporated companies. Like family managers, business entrepreneurs have a 
tendency to relate to the organisation they found (Wasserman, 2006), and are 
focused on their organisations (Dobrev & Barnett, 2005). Further, it was argued 
that with such inspiration, entrepreneurs are more inclined to carry on as 
stewards than as agents (Arthurs & Busenitz, 2003). In addition, some 
researchers use stewardship to examine compensation of organisation board 
members (Thorgren, Wincent, & Anokhin, 2010), board structure (Muth & 
Donaldson, 1998) or board effectiveness (Roberts, McNulty, & Stiles, 2005; 
Minichilli, Zattoni, & Zona, 2009).  
 
In most of these studies, the stewardship construct has been utilised either to 
verify board members conduct or to build a research model or both. Therefore, 
Stewardship theory highlights the possibility of harmonious goals of the owners 
and the managers (Davis et al., 1997), extending the goals of agents beyond 
their self-interest and towards the organisation’s goals. In this regard, it argues 




on organisational goals, leadership and execution of operational decisions, 
leading to more successful and effective corporate governance. Moreover, 
managers will not act to align their interest with those of shareholders. Choo 
and Tan (2007) contend that psychologically, the absence of non-executive 
directors may influence managers to commit irregularities.  
 
Albrecht et al. (2004) further assert the way that the relationship between 
principals and agents focused on the stewardship viewpoint may give 
opportunities for management to engage in fraudulent activities. However, 
Donaldson & Davis (1994) maintain that the stewardship theory remains the 
theoretical foundation for better regulation and legislation in corporate 
governance. Further, Muth and Donaldson (1998) contrast the expectations of 
agency theory and those of stewardship theory and support stewardship theory 
as a decent model of reality.  
3.9.4  Stakeholder Theory 
Stakeholder theory is lien to agency theory in the sense that, the interest of all 
the stakeholders is considered or taken into account as against the interest of the 
shareholders alone under the agency theory. Mary Parker Follett is believed to 
have set forth the idea of stakeholder theory over six decades ago, with its re-
emergence in the 1980's (Schilling, 2000).  Distinct from the agency theory, 
where managers are working primarily to serve the interest of the shareholders, 




organisations. As such, managers should work towards serving these networks 
given their importance to the corporate survival of the organisation. Further, 
stakeholder theory supports the view that companies and society are 
interrelated. Hence, their corporation serves general societal goals as opposed 
to its responsibilities to shareholders (Kiel & Nicholson, 2003). 
 
However, Freeman, (1984, pg. 42) looked at stakeholder as “ include those 
group who are vital to the survival or success of the corporation”. Thus, 
statkeholder could be any group or individual who can exert some influence, or 
is concerned with the achievement of the organisation’s objectives. Freeman 
(1984) further argues that the groups of stakeholders include stockholders, 
employees, suppliers, lenders, customers, and management who are so 
important given the contributions they make towards the success and corporate 
survival of businesses. As a result, firms should formulate a corporate strategy 
that ensures the incorporation of stakeholder interests because of the value they 
create.  
 
Furthermore, distinct from the maximisation of firm and shareholders wealth, 
stakeholder corporate governance considers diverse interest groups 
(stakeholders), and therefore, demands to represent the interest of those 
stakeholders on the board (Ayuso & Argandoña, 2007). Stakeholders are 




into different groups of participants. As a consequence, whoever has an interest 
in the firm’s business, constitute a stakeholder.  
 
Again, stakeholder groups may consist of shareholders, employees, investors, 
customers, suppliers, creditors, management, community, government and 
sometimes competitors whose interests are aligned with the company’s function 
(Schilling, 2000). Consequently, Donaldson, Preston, and Preston (1995) refer 
to stakeholders as individuals or group of persons with interests in procedural 
or fundamental aspects of corporate activity. Thus, stakeholder theory stresses 
the need to equip managers well to articulate and adopt the objectives of their 
firm. [Contrary to the agency theory, managers are part and parcel of the 
organisation (stakeholders)]. As such, with the necessary support and resources 
at their disposal, they would align organisational objectives with their personal 
objectives and would ensure meeting those objectives in the best interest of the 
firm.  
 
But, there are scholars that criticise arguments of the stakeholder theory, on the 
ground that it is incompatible with the business reality of long-term 
maximisation of owner’s value. One of the critics of stakeholder theory, 
Sternberg (1997) argues that it is incongruent with the corporate governance 
that requires that the organisation be accountable to everyone. In this regard, 
Sternberg (1997) maintains that when the organisation is accountable to 




stakeholder interests are to be met, the identification, definition and alignment 
of the diverse interests is another challenge to managers (Sternberg,1997; 
Jensen, 2001; Sun, Salama, Hussainey, & Habbash, 2010). Similarly, where 
there are multiple stakeholders, ranging from individuals, groups, government, 
employees, trade unions to local communities, correctly defining,  identifying 
and meeting their divergent interests would pose a challenge to managers. 
Further, Blair (1995) contends that, despite the fact that the theory has a more 
significant authentic foundation, reasonable intellectual applications, and quest 
than agency theory, he maintains that corporations are not just packages of 
physical assets. They are lawful structures whose role is to represent the 
connections between all the relationships that make investments in the wealth-
creation process of the firm. Undoubtedly, this incorporates shareholders, 
suppliers, creditors, customers, and dedicated employees.  
 
Consequently, scholars opposed to managers’ voluntary desire to align their 
interest with owners when given the latitude to operate freely. For this reason, 
Sundaram and Inkpen (2004) contend that emphasis on shareholder value 
becomes necessary given its importance and is the only objective that guides to 
decisions that later leads to enhancing outcomes for all stakeholders. They 
contend that distinguishing countless stakeholders including their needs is not a 
feasible obligation for managers. However, with regards to earnings 
management, Mattingly, Harrast, & Olsen, (2009) find that effective 




are less inclined to participate in discretionary earnings management. Therefore, 
the overall criticisms of stakeholder theory are that there is an unrealistic belief 
that managers should meet the demand of various stakeholders’ interests. It will 
be difficult to treat all stakeholders equally.  
 
Despite the fact that evidence of corporate governance practices exists in 
advanced economies, there is evidence of few and inadequate studies on 
corporate governance in Nigeria as a developing nation (Adeyemi & Fagbemi, 
2010). However, this study seeks to provide evidence that supports the argument 
on corporate governance as a wealth maximisation tool of shareholders, and in 
the same vein it may as well satisfy the needs of the firm’s stakeholders.  
3.10  Summary of the Chapter 
This chapter made a critical review of the related literature of theoretical and 
empirical studies related to board characteristics, the audit committee 
characteristics, debt structure (leverage), earnings management and value 
relevance of earnings. Specifically, the leverage as a moderating variable was 
extensively discussed to justify its moderating role in CG and FRQ. The study 
provides an overview of the agency theory, staewardship theory, resource 
dependency and stakeholder thoeries of corporate governance. The theoretical 
justification that would enable the study establishes relationships between board 
characteristics and financial reporting quality and the characteristics of the AC 





CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES 
DEVELOPMENT 
4.1  Introduction 
Corporate governance is considered to be the basis of the research; as such, this 
chapter aims to explain the conceptual as well as the theoretical framework 
related to the corporate governace variables. The theoretical framework of the 
study will enable understanding of how the findings of the study are related to 
the research questions and hypotheses. However, despite the theoretical 
arguments that the relationships which exist between principal and agents are 
believed to have played a significant role in improving firm performance. 
Factors such as pressure, opportunity and ethics including self-interests may 
lead agents to manipulate financial reports, irrespective of the relationship 
between them (Albrecht et al., 2004).  
4.2  Conceptual Framework 
Figure 4.1 depicts the conceptual framework of the study representing the 













Figure 4.1  
Conceptual framework 
Figure 4.1 above, shows financial reporting quality (proxy with earnings management and value 
relevance) as the dependent variable, and board independence, CEO duality, managerial share 
ownership, board size, board gender diversity, audit committee financial expertise, audit 
committee independence, and audit committee share ownership as independent variables. Firm 
size, firm age, and profitability as control variables. Leverage moderates1 the relationship 
between the CEO duality, board independence, board gender diversity, managerial share 
ownership, audit committee financial expertise, audit committee share ownership and earnings 
management. 
                                                     
1 The moderation was based on earnings management model. 
Managerial share ownership 
Board independence  
Chief executive officer duality 
Board gender diversity  
Profitability  
Firm age  
Firm size 
Audit committee financial 
expertise 
Audit committee share 
ownership 
Audit committee independence  
Board size 
Financial 







The conceptual framework depicted in Figure 4.1 seeks to establish a direct  
relationship between BIND, MSOW, BS, CEO duality, LEV, BGD, ACIND, 
ACFE, ACSOW and FRQ (EM). It also seeks to establish an indirect 
relationship between BIND, MSOW, CEO duality, BGD, ACFE and ACSOW 
and LEV as interacting variables with FRQ (EM). Further, a direct relatioship 
between three control variables of firm size, firm age and profitability are and 
FRQ (EM) are conceptualised. 
 
 Specifically, five hypotheses to test the direct relationship between board 
characteristics and earnings management (H1a, H1b, H1c, H1d, and H1e) were 
developed. Subsequently, a second set of hypotheses that proposes to test the 
relationship between AC characteristics, and earnings management (H2a, H2b, 
and H2c), and between leverage and earnings management (H3a) were 
developed. The third set of hypotheses seeks to ascertain the moderating effect 
of debt structure (leverage) on the relationships between board characteristics 
(H4a, H4b, H4c, H4d), AC characteristics (H5a, H5b), independent t-test (H6) 
and FRQ. Overall, sixteen hypotheses are developed and tested for this study. 
4.3  Theoretical Framework       
Agency theory assumes that agency costs are borne by managers (either in 
diffused ownership or concentrated ownership firms). The manager (agent) is 
working as a representative of the owners/shareholders (principal), and whose 




made aware to the shareholders. This creates information asymmetry between 
shareholders and the agents that are regarded as principal and agent problem. 
The asymmetric information could lead to moral hazard and/or adverse 
selection. Adverse selection occurs as a result of different information provided 
by the agent that caused the principal to incur undesired costs as a consequence 
of the imperfect information. Meanwhile, moral hazard occurs as a result of risk 
taken by the principal that results in costs associated with that risk, which the 
agent is insulated from. Thus, information available to him makes him protected 
from the negative consequences of the risk.  
 
Under agency costs, managers maximise their utility at the expense of investors 
that is known as information asymmetry, which is an example of agency costs 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976). In the context of information asymmetry, the 
accounting information is demanded by investors for the aim of valuation, 
investment decision and ensuring that their investments are not expropriated 
(Fama & Jensen, 1983). This is in support of agency theory which predicts that, 
if managers own a substantial percentage of firm equity they need not be 
monitored (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). In other words, managerial share 
ownership is an important monitoring mechanism in corporate governance. By 
offering part ownership of a firm’s shares, a manager's interest is aligned with 
the owner's interest, as such managers need not be monitored to provide the 






Equally important is the audit committee that is considered as a monitoring 
device to reduce agency costs including the problem of information asymmetry 
(Chau & Leung, 2006; Jaggi & Leung, 2007; Tengamnuay & Stapleton, 2009). 
The audit committee is formed to supervise financial reporting process and 
monitor managers’ behaviour to ensure they disclose more information that 
would minimise asymmetric information and mitigate moral hazard. Also, the 
governance mechanisms are aimed to ensure agent-principal interest alignment, 
protect the interests of the shareholder thereby reducing agency costs (Davis, 
Schoorman, & Donaldson, 1997). It thus suggests that corporate governance 
mechanisms can mitigate agency costs and ensure shareholder’s interests are 
protected through monitoring management activities by aligning shareholder 
interests with those of the management. Also, issues bordering on board size, 
board of directors and structure of their ownership were developed to bring in 
line interests of the agent and that of the principal. Therefore, the aims of these 
mechanisms are geared towards improving the overall effectiveness of the 
oversight function of the board of directors. 
 
Accordingly, resource dependency theory (RDT) recognises the directors as 
resource providers, because it assumes that multiple directorships, a high 
number of directors, specific industry expertise and skills of directors are 
valuable resources to both the firm’s board and directors. These qualities may 




process effectively. In RD theory, diversity of board members is seen as the 
essential element which leads towards the broader business connections 
(Siciliano, 1996) and firms with environmental dependencies are likely to have 
females on corporate boards as directors (Hillman, Shropshire, & Cannella, 
2007). Similarly, board size can be explained by the resource dependence theory 
(RDT). The RDT sugggests that a larger board is associated with improved 
performance as a result of  diversity of expertise, experience and more 
knowledgeable members on the board (Pfeffer, 1972). Also, the stewardship 
theory (ST) provides an explanation that the corporate managers’ (stewards) 
objectives are aligned with those of the company and its owners (Albrecht et al., 
2004). It focuses on structures that empower and facilitate rather than monitor 
and control. Further, ST rejects the individualistic model of agency theory that 
promotes a suspicious attitude, which assumes shareholders and managers have 
diverse interests and sees managers as essentially self-serving and self-centred.  
 
Thus, they also discard the view that shareholders need to monitor the agents 
with sanctions or incentives in the form of control. Thus, stewardship theory 
takes an opposite perspective with agency theory. It suggests that the agents are 
trustworthy and good stewards of the resources entrusted to them, which makes 
monitoring unnecessary (Donaldson & Davis, 1994; Davis et al., 1997). 
Consequently, the ST regards managers’ decisions are prejudiced by non-
financial reasons, which includes the need for achievement, the intrinsic factors 





Similarly, ST considers the board of directors as an instrument of assistance to 
a steward CEO instead of a controlling mechanism (Albrecht et al., 2004). It 
also recognises that the agent is unlikely to manipulate earnings. Besides,  CEO 
duality, that is, the same person holding the position of chair and chief 
executive, is viewed favourably since it is argued that it leads to better firm 
performance as a consequence of strong and unified leadership (Donaldson & 
Davis, 1994; Davis et al., 1997).  Consequently, boards consisting of a higher 
number of outside directors (representing the agency theory perspective) 
perform worse than companies with fewer outside directors (Bhagat & Black, 
1999).  Accordingly, the board audit committee has been defined differently and 
in many contexts. For example, Kallbers and Fogarty (1993, p. 27) define AC 
as “the competency with which the audit committee carries out its specified 
oversight responsibilities”. Thus, an audit committee is the one that can perform 
its roles and duties effectively and add value to the board of directors and firm 
as well.   
 
Therefore, this study viewed AC as a committee with a specific composition, 
expertise, sound board governance attributes, and ownership to safeguard the 
transparency, accountability and oversight of the financial process. The 
responsibilities of AC have evolved for some time following the 
recommendations from several committees such as the Treadway Commission, 




effectiveness of the audit committee (Baxter, 2010; Rahmat et al., 2009; 
Rainsbury et al., 2008). Rezaee and Farmer (1994) identified three important 
developmental roles of AC over time. Before the mid-1970s, the primary 
function of the committee was to enhance external financial reporting process 
by providing the effectiveness and efficiency of the audit function. Since the 
mid-1970s, the potential for the audit committee to play a governance role in a 
full committee has been recognised. Although the roles normally performed by 
audit committee vary based on the BoD charter, such roles can be classified into 
financial reporting process, internal auditors’ responsibilities and the external 
auditors’ activities, and corporate governance responsibilities.  
 
Secondly, eight years after SEC CCG (2003), the Nigerian Securities and 
Exchange Commission revised the code (i.e. SEC CCG, 2011) aimed at 
strengthening the audit committee and ensuring that audit committees are 
discharging their responsibilities effectively. Unlike the previous code (2003), 
the revised code (2011) introduces the best practices for the audit committee 
including the condition that three of the AC members should be non-executive 
with at least one financially literate member. Thus, it is necessary to check the 
extent of the implementation of the revised code (2011) of Nigerian public listed 
firms and to examine whether the revised code (2011) has increased the 
effectiveness of AC monitoring roles. Thirdly, the global high-profile corporate 
failures leading to the investor's loss of confidence in the corporate reporting 




AC because they are the key decision-making body expected to monitor 
financial reporting practices. The recommendations of SEC review committee, 
2010 consider the oversight of financial reporting process and integrity of such 
reporting to be the major function of corporate audit committees.  
 
Fourthly, audit committee share ownership signifies the AC member equity 
holdings in the company. Previous studies have documented the potential 
effects of AC members’ share ownership in the monitoring of financial 
reporting process of a firm. However, Shivasani (1993) and  Mangena and Pike 
(2005) argued that by having AC members with share ownership, it can lead to 
higher vigilance that may ultimately motivate them to ensure company 
performance. This is possible due to their stake in the company and as NED on 
the AC, they may be motivated and effectively assist in improving the financial 
reporting process. Further, this argument is supported from the agency theory 
perspective, where agents are driven by their interests and would always try to 
pursue and further move towards achieving set objectives. Therefore, any 
percentage increase in their stake (shareholding) of the company would 
encourage higher monitoring and control of management activities (Jensen, 
1993). 
 
Fifthly, an independent director is an outside director who does not have strong 
psychological and economic dependence on firm’s management (Baysinger & 




members of the business community who view the directorship as a means to 
develop their reputation as experts in decision control. Also, independent 
directors bear reputational risks and potential monetary losses similar to those 
of non-independent directors but receive lower direct compensation (Romano, 
1989). Independent audit committees are more likely to confront management 
rather than agree with them under all circumstances in the issues relating to 
providing required information. Strong commitment to such matters will help 
ensure high-quality financial reports and ultimately reduce the probability of 
reputational damage and litigation losses for the independent audit committee 
members, which could eventually occur due to any financial failures (Haniffa 
& Cooke, 2002).  
 
As a whole, this study proposes that board independence, managerial share 
ownership, board gender diversity, chief executive officer duality and size of 
the board have direct effects on the firm’s financial reporting quality. It further 
proposes that financial expertise, independence and equity ownership of 
individual audit committee members influence the effectiveness of audit 
committee that affects the level of earnings quality leading to the financial 
reporting quality of the firms. The study also proposes that the leverage 
moderates the relationships between board independence, managerial share 
ownership, CEO duality, board gender diversity, AC share ownership and AC 




4.4  Hypothesis Development 
Board of directors role can be seen from the perspective of reviewing business 
and corporate strategies leading to policy-making, planning, supervision, and 
monitoring. It also makes decision processes that provide the company with 
specialist advice, and establishes core values and procedures for effective 
performamnce of managers. 
4.4.1  Board Independence (BIND) and Earnings Management 
Board independence is the presence of majority independent non-executive 
directors (NED) on the board. Most governance Codes require listed firms to 
have on board a mixture of ED and NEDs. The Nigerian SEC Code 2011 
provides that the board must compose of a mixture of Executive and Non-
Executive directors with majority non-Executive directors. The monitoring role 
of the independent board is aimed to reduce managerial entrenchment at the 
expense of the shareholders. The board monitoring is one of numerous 
mechanisms that assist resolve agency problems involving   managers and 
shareholders and help to minimise agency cost.  
 
However, resource dependency theory (RDT) views the role of the board as one 
that helps to secure and acquire the essential resources of the organisation by 
their external linkage to the environment. Through these linkages, it brings in 
resources, such as information, skills, access to supplies of raw material, the 




(Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). Consequently, under this theory, the board of 
directors is the key source of different resources provision that improves 
organisation operation, firm’s performance and organisational survival (Daily 
& Dalton, 2003). In support of Resource dependency theory (RDT), Khan and 
Kotishwar (2011) document that INED of the company monitor and control the 
chairperson/chief executive and serve as a link between an external environment 
that provides an international perspective. In this regard, NED tries to improve 
board processes and bring in specialist knowledge. They also ensure continuity, 
and help identify alliance and acquisition. Thus, NED help maintain an ethical 
climate in the organisation. 
 
According to Lo, Wong and Firth (2010), firms that have a high proportion of 
INED on the board have a low level of transfer prices manipulation. This study 
is consistent with Firth et al. (2007) and Rubin and Segal (2012) that document 
high proportion of INED’s presence on the board improves the quality of 
earnings. Erena and Tehulu (2012) who found that firms with a greater 
proportion of outside directors have less income-increasing accruals when 
earnings fall below the threshold. In other words, outside directors are more 
concerned with constraining the income increasing accruals.  
 
Similarly, Uadiale (2012) finds that the board composition with a greater 
proportion of outside directors reduces EM practices. In contrast, Sukeecheep 




Besides, their number and corporate experience afford them the opportunity for 
effective monitoring and control of managers.  Kantudu and Samaila (2015) find 
that a high percentage of NED is a necessary control and monitoring mechanism 
for quality financial information. This is so, because IDs are less tied to 
managerial influence, which enables them to monitor managers more 
efficiently. Based on the above results, this study proposes that: 
 
 H1a: There is a negative relationship between board independence and earnings 
management. 
 
4.4.2 Managerial Share Ownership and Earnings Management 
Managerial share ownership represents managers’ interest in the equity of a 
company. The relationship between managerial share ownership can be 
theoretically explained by agency theory. According to Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) and Fama (1980), one way of aligning shareholders and managers’ 
interest is by allowing managers to own  part of company shares. Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) introduced managerial shareholding as an internal control 
mechanism for reducing agency conflicts between principals and agents due to 
alignment of principal and agent interests. Hence, equity ownership of managers 
will assist to align the interest of shareholders and managers. It will further 
minimise agency problems and consequently increase firm value. Furthermore, 
to reduce the level of information asymmetry, managerial share ownership may 




the asymmetric information and increase firm performance. A study by 
Warfield, Wild and Wild (1995) documented that interests of shareholders and 
management start to converge as the management holds a percentage of the 
firm's equity ownership. This suggests that since managers’ interest is aligned 
with the owner's interest, they need not be monitored to provide the performance 
and value of the firm.  
 
Nevertheless, Pedro and Emma (2007) find that managerial ownership 
contributes in curtailing EM with a smaller percentage of shares held by 
managers. When managerial share ownership becomes large, it has an inverse 
effect on the DA and earnings informativeness. Further, Smith (1990) 
established the presence of a positive relationship between managerial share 
ownership and firm performance, and that top-performing companies tend to 
have managers with high ratios of stock ownership, while weak ones do not. 
Thus, the profitability of firms increases significantly when managers own part 
of the shares of the firm.  
 
Consequently, Johari et al. (2008) and Nedal, Bana, and David (2010) 
documented the positive relationship between management ownership and DA. 
In addition, Alves (2012) finds that managerial share ownership positively 
affects the quality of earnings and reduces EM. Based on the above empirical 
relationships between managerial ownership and EM, and also the theoretical 




H1b: There is a positive relationship between managerial share ownership and 
earnings management. 
4.4.3  Board Size and Earnings Management 
Board size relates to the total number of directors on the board of a company. 
Board size may vary in size, from a minimum of five (5) or six (6) members to 
large memberships of 20 and above depending on the institutional settings, 
complexity of the firm and shareholding. From the regulatory standpoint, in 
Nigeria the SEC, CCG, 2011 provides for a minimum of five (5) members 
without a  maximum number of directors on the Nigerian public listed boards.  
Consequently, from the agency theory perspective, effective control of agents 
would be lost in larger firms, as such, the principal needs another party (Board) 
to assist in the control and monitoring of agent’s actions. Jensen (1993) 
documents that quality decision making process and effective control and 
monitoring management behaviour lies with smaller boards. Hence, agency 
conflict would be reduced and costs minimised.  
 
Similarly, board size can be explained by the Resource Dependence Theory 
(RDT). The RDT sugggests that a larger board is associated with improved 
performance as a result of diversity of expertise, experience and more 
knowledgeable members on board (Pfeffer, 1972) . Also, previous empirical 
studies (Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006; Anderson et al., 2004; Williams, Fadil, & 




monitoring as specialised skills are associated with larger boards that are well 
equipped to monitor management. Klein (2002) argues that board monitoring 
has a positive association with the distribution of responsibilities among 
members of the larger boards. To achieve that, it strongly depends on the size 
of the board that has the required expertise to accept and handle such 
responsibility (Barton, Coombes, & Wong, 2004; Hashim & Devi, 2008c; 
Hashim & Ibrahim, 2013; Rajagopalan & Zhang, 2008; Sama'ila, 2014).  
Furthermore, Xie et al. (2003) found that EM is unlikely in firms with larger 
boards.  
 
On the other hand,  Hassan and Bello (2013) revealed that board size has a 
significant positive relationship with the extent of voluntary disclosures. The 
larger the board, the higher the disclosure of financial information. Meanwhile, 
Amran and Ahmad (2009) documented that a smaller board is more favoured 
than the larger board in Malaysian family-controlled businesses. In addition, 
Sivarama, Krishnan and Yu (2008) found that small boards have a predisposed 
inability to detect EM. It therefore suggests that smaller boards are vulnerable 
to influence by block holders on the board or management since bigger boards 
are better able to monitor and control management.  
 
In contrast, Kao and Chen (2004) and Rahman and Ali (2006) found a 
significant positive association between board size and EM. Based on the above 




and EM are established. Following the competing views about the relationship 
between board size and earnings management, subsequent Xie et al.’s (2003)  
study makes no prediction on the direction of the relationship between board 
size and earnings management. In other words, board size can influence 
earnings management either in a positive or a negative direction. Hence, the 
study formulated the following hypothesis: 
 
H1c: There is a relationship between board size and earnings management. 
4.4.4  Chief Executive Officer Duality and Earnings Management 
The issue of role separation between the chairperson and CEO is rooted in 
agency theory and the stewardship theory (Lin, 2005; Kim, Al-Shammari, Kim, 
& Lee, 2009). However, proponents of CEO duality argue that it would 
compromise the independence of the board as well as impairs its oversight 
governance functions (Davidson et al., 2004; Elsayed, 2010). Petra (2005) 
argues that it is unreasonable to believe that the CEO/Chairman will evaluate 
himself objectively if he is allowed to take up the two responsibilities. Thus, 
CEO is grounded in the agency theory, which suggests that splitting the two 
responsibilities is desirable to make the board more independent (Fama & 
Jensen, 1983).  
 
Furthermore, proponents of CEO duality rely on the premise that if allowed, 




will be impaired (Coombs & Wong, 2004; Gul & Leung, 2004; Dey, Engel, & 
Liu, 2011). Moreover, CEO duality may be an entrenched strategy aimed at 
advancing personal interests rather than company’s overall interest. Therefore, 
vesting the two responsibilities could undermine the effectiveness of the board 
(Gul & Leung, 2004). Further, Petra (2007) maintained that the absence of 
distinct role separation could render the board ineffective and suggests a lack of 
board independence. Thus, monitoring and decision-making process would be 
shouldered on one person, which makes it unreasonable to believe for an 
objective evaluation of his actions.   Similarly, Abdul Rahman and Haniffa's 
(2005) findings reveal a significance in preventing EM when the CEO and board 
chairperson’s role are separated. Moreover, firms with CEO duality reported 
higher earnings smoothing practices. Further, firms with CEO duality positively 
relate to EM and reported poor performance.  
 
From the stewardship theory perspective, the stewardship theorists concentrate 
on structures that enable and encourage as opposed to monitoring and control. 
They dismiss the profoundly individualistic model of agency theory that 
advances a suspicious approach, expect that principals and agents have unique 
interests and sees agents as essentially serving toward oneself and selfish. Along 
these lines, they also dismiss the view that principals need to invigilate the 
sharp/opportunistic managers by observing them and applying sanctions or 
motivating forces as a method for control. Stewardship theory takes an opposite 




the resources that are entrusted to them, which makes monitoring unnecessary 
(Davis, Schoorman, & Donaldson, 1997).  
 
Since managers are not selfish and act in the finest interest of the shareholders, 
they ought to also be given freedom grounded on conviction and trust, which 
reduces the cost of monitoring their behaviour. It therefore implies that as far as 
the stewardship theory is concerned, managers are viewed as loyal, and their 
conduct does not have to be monitored. Therefore, the need for supervision is 
reduced and would be unnecessary with regards to the overall interests of the 
company (Tosi et al., 2003). Given the conflicting findings and theoretical 
viewpoint of agency and stewardship theories on CEO duality, this study 
proposes the following hypothesis: 
 
H1d: There is an association between chief executive officer duality and 
earnings management. 
4.4.5  Gender Diversity and Earnings Management 
Advocates of women participation in public affairs suggest that the composition 
of the BODs should consist of members without discrimination as to sex, 
religion, ethnicity, race, and colour. Further arguments were advanced that such 
constituted boards are associated with higher quality deliberations than those 




Beyond participation, studies suggest that membership of women on the BOD 
enhances board performance and improves the quality of the financial report.  
 
From the agency theory perspective, internal control mechanisms of CG center 
on the directors’ monitoing role. Therefore, the presence of women on board 
may improve monitoring, because women have diverse perspectives in the form 
of knowledge, experience, and skills with different values, norms and 
understanding. Accordingly, Terjesen et al. (2009) stated that women directors 
provide knowledge, unique skills and experience to the Board. Therefore, a 
proportional number of women on board will help to improve board’s 
monitoring role. Gul, Srinidhi and Tsui's (2008) findings lend credence to the 
argument that suggests that boards’ female directors demand higher monitoring 
and credible financial reports. Similarly, Krishnan and Parsons (2008) find that 
companies that have more female senior managers do better in terms of 
profitability than companies with fewer females. The results show that gender 
diversity is positively associated with EQ. Thus, women directors are better able 
to provide quality monitoring role, minimise moral hazard following 
asymmetric information (agency problem) and reduce agency costs which will 
improve qualiity of earnings. 
 
From the resource dependency perspective,  diversity of board members is seen 
as the essential element which leads towards the broader business connections 




females on corporate boards as directors (Hillman, Shropshire, & Cannella, 
2007). Further, Hillman, Cannella and Paetzold (2000) document that female 
and African-American directors on US boards bring additional occupational 
resources to the board, in the form of legal expertise, public relations and 
marketing, in addition to being civic-minded community leaders. Subsequently, 
Bart and McQueen (2013) conducted a survey to determine women reliance on 
three reasoning methods of Personal Interest, Normative and Complex Moral 
Reasoning to make decisions. The study finds that the presence of female 
directors on boards is associated with corporate performance, and argue that 
women seem to make better directors than men. Similarly, the proponents of 
signalling theory argue that appointing a female to corporate leadership 
positions from being a director or member of AC sends a positive signal to 
capital market participants (Huang, Yan, Fornaro, & Elshahat, 2011; Thiruvadi, 
2012; Ittonen, Peni, & Vahama, 2015). Therefore, female directors on boards 
would contribute to the firm’s performamnce. Furthermore, Srinidhi, Gul and 
Tsui's (2011) findings indicate that EQ is higher with the presence of women 
directors. Thus, this study hypothesised that: 
 





4.4.6  Audit Committee Financial Expertise and Earnings Management 
Managers maximise their utility at the expense of shareholders, and this is 
recognised as information asymmetry, which is an agency cost (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). In regards to information asymmetry, investors demand 
accounting information for the purpose of valuation and investment decision to 
safeguard their investments (Fama & Jensen, 1983). Therefore, audit 
committees are viewed as a monitoring device to decrease agency costs and 
resolve the information asymmetry (Jaggi & Leung, 2007; Tengamnuay & 
Stapleton, 2009), by way of monitoring managers’ behaviour. On the other 
hand, resource dependency theory views the directors as resource providers. It 
assumes a proportional number of directors and specific industry knowledge 
and experience of directors are valuable resources to the firm and directors. 
These features significantly help the directors to monitor and effectively oversee 
the firm’s financial reporting process. Therefore, this study employed both the 
agency and resource dependency framework theories to assess and explain 
variations in the audit committee characteristics. 
 
Accordingly, the experience and expertise of AC members are recently viewed 
as a critical aspect of the AC effectiveness in overseeing the process of financial 
reporting. It has been argued that AC members with financial/accounting 
expertise are likely to impact positively on financial reporting than members 
without such expertise (Davidson et al., 2004), hence, providing superior 





In  Nigeria, the SEC CCG (2011) mandates firm’s ACs to include at least one 
(1) member with knowledge of accounting or financial management on the ACs. 
It further requires the other members to have basic financial literacy, and also 
to have the ability to read financial statements. The Act avoids a requirement 
for a qualification but demands accounting and finance knowledge. Large scale 
businesses will find members with accounting and finance qualification to be 
essential and easy to get. However, small scale businesses may not require this. 
So far, the absence of an agreed definition of financial expertise suggests 
various measures to operationalise financial expertise. Lo, Wong and Firth 
(2010) observe that the presence of an accounting/financial expert in the AC has 
a significant positive association with FRQ measures. Furthermore, Badolato et 
al. (2014) argue that accounting/financial expertise and status of the committee 
members also make ACs more effective in reducing EM practices.  
 
Consequently, Cohen, Hoitash, Krishnamoorthy, and Wright (2014) contend 
that industry experience together with financial expertise makes the AC highly 
efficient and improves FRQ. Additionally, Yang and Krishnan (2005) and 
Dhaliwal, Naiker, and Navissi (2010) show that financial accounting expertise 
is associated with fewer EM. Similarly, previous studies (Krishnain & 
Visvanathan, 2008; Salleh & Stwart, 2012; Abernathy, Herrmann, Kang & 
Krishnan, 2013) document further proof of a positive association between 




(2010) argue that for ACs to be effective, it needs to have the right people. The 
right people indeed refers to having AC members that are qualified and 
competent to discharge the oversight functions of the committee. It shows that 
ACs play a greater role when AC members possess higher financial and industry 
expertise in enhancing the financial reporting process. Therefore, financial 
literacy is expected to improve the AC’s effectiveness in monitoring earnings 
management (expertise). For these reasons, this study formulates the following 
hypothesis: 
 
H2a: There is a negative relationship between the audit committee member’s 
financial expertise and earnings management.     
4.4.7  Audit Committee Independence and Earnings Management     
From the perspective of  resource dependency theory that views the directors as 
resources providers, it assumes a proportional number of directors and specific 
industry knowledge and experience of directors as valuable resources to the firm 
and directors. These features significantly help the directors to monitor and 
effectively oversee the firm’s financial reporting process.  
 
Thus, to ensure effective monitoring of the financial reporting process, the AC 
needs to be independent (Yang & Krishnan, 2005). In regards to information 
asymmetry, investors demand accounting information for the purpose of 




Jensen, 1983). Hence, audit committees are viewed as a monitoring device to 
decrease agency costs and resolve the information asymmetry (Jaggi & Leung, 
2007; Tengamnuay & Stapleton, 2009), by way of monitoring managers’ 
behaviour. In this regard, INED within the AC is better at monitoring 
management than their insider counterparts (DeFond & Francis, 2005).  
Moreover, they are likely to monitor the financial reporting practices better and 
report a managerial misdemeanour. The independence of the AC is also a 
regulatory issue, where the Nigerian SEC CCG (2011) requires all listed 
companies to establish and maintain an independent AC. 
 
Additionally, a review of previous studies (Vafeas & Waegelein, 2007; 
Mangena & Tauringana, 2008; Zaman, Hudaib, & Haniffa, 2011) provided 
evidence on the derivable advantages associated with highly independent ACs.  
Similarly, Bronson et al. (2009) and Kent et al. (2008) observed that higher AC 
independence is associated with higher accruals quality. Therefore, given the 
above findings from previous studies, the following hypothesis is proposed: 
 
H2b: There is a negative relationship between audit committee independence 
and earnings management. 
4.4.8  Audit Committee Share Ownership and Earnings Management 
Audit committee share ownership represents the AC member’s proportion of 




Vafeas (2005) posits that a negative association exists between the equity 
holding of an audit committee member and earnings management that is 
consistent with agency theory of decreasing information asymmetry, which 
would further reduce agency cost of monitoring. Furthermore, previous studies 
have documented the potential effects of AC members’ share ownership in 
monitoring financial reporting process of a firm. These studies suggest the 
association between share ownership and FRQ effectiveness. In this regard, 
Shivasani (1993) argues that the consequences of having AC members with 
equity ownership can lead to more vigilance and greater monitoring that may 
ultimately motivate them to ensure company performance. Further, Lavelle 
(2002) argues that, AC members with greater percentage of shareholdings can 
be questioned, given their percentage equity holding which might be used to 
protect their investments.  
 
Consequently, the relationship between AC shareholdings and FRQ is well 
supported from the agency theory perspective, where agents are motivated by 
their interests and would always try to pursue and further move towards 
achieving set objectives. Therefore, any percentage increase in their stake 
(shareholding) of the company would create more incentives to monitor and 
control management reporting (Jensen, 1993). Therefore, audit committee 
members with greater stock ownership are expected to be more effective in 
constraining earnings management. Based on the above empirical support that 




the theoretical support of agency theory, this study formulated the following 
hypothesis: 
 
H2c: There is a negative relationship between audit committee share ownership 
and earnings management. 
4.4.9  Debt (Leverage) and Earnings Management 
Debt financing is an alternate means of corporate financing. The other funding 
mixes are equity financing and the combination of both equity and debt 
financing that constitute the firm CS. Therefore, a continuous increase in debt 
financing creates the likelihood of bankruptcy, which involves the risk that may 
force managers’ perquisites to decrease while their efficiency may also be likely 
to increase (Grossman, & Hart, 1982). Further, Chan et al. (2013)  argue that 
the effective increase in leverage reduces firms’ equity capital base. Since the 
leverage constrains management’s ability to spend extravagantly, managers 
may decide to accept employing sub-optimal leverage aimed at reducing 
shareholders' wealth maximisation (Chang, 2013).  
 
However, Jiraporn et al. (2012) argue that opting for sub-optimal leverage 
financing largely depends on the effectiveness and strong corporate governance. 
They further argue that, if a firm’s corporate governance is weak, it is likely to 
employ more leverage in its finance. This is not suggesting that poor governance 




(2007) argues that the increase in leverage reduces earnings management. Thus, 
the level of leverage has an influence on financial reporting quality. Similarly, 
Afza and  Rashid (2014) document that long-term debt reduces EM activities as 
a result of high monitoring role by creditors. 
 
Further, as leverage increases, manager’s ability to manipulate earnings would 
decrease because leverage requires interest payments and debt repayment, 
which would lessen the availability of cash for non-optimal spending. 
Additionally, Rahman and Ali (2006) posit that higher leveraged firms have 
higher bankruptcy risk, which might result in litigation risk. As a result, this 
creates an opportunity for the management to manipulate earnings to mitigate 
those risks.  Further, Klein (2002) finds a positively significant relationship 
between firm’s leverage and the level of abnormal accruals. Furthermore, prior 
studies (Jensen, 1986; Denis & Denis, 1993; Jelinek, 2007) suggest that 
leverage limits EM. Also, Davidson et al. (2005) found a positively significant 
relationship between DA and leverage.  
 
Further, bond holders are not members of the board and do not participate in the 
governance of Nigerian companies, creating information asymetry between 
bondholders, boards and the management. Consequently, this study examined 
the impact of long-term debt (leverage) as a moderating variable between some 




has given enough evidence of using leverage to reduce asymmetric information 
and subsequently decrease agency cost.  
 
Theoretically, agency theory explained the relationship between corporate 
governance, and leverage due to monitoring roles of debt holders. Similar to 
previous literature (Anderson et al., 2004; Efendi, Sirvastara & Swanson, 2007; 
Jiang, Lee & Anandarajan, 2008; Habbash, 2013) suggest that changes in 
leverage may have an impact on EM. Thus, leverage is measured by long-term 
debt to total assets of the firm. The following hypothesis is thus, formulated: 
 
H3a: There is a positive relationship between leverage and earnings 
management in the Nigerian non-financial listed firms. 
4.4.10 Relationship Between Leverage and Earnings Management 
4.4.11 Moderating Effect of Debt structure on the Relationship Between 
Board  Characteristics and Earnings Management 
H4a: Leverage moderates the relationship between board gender diversity and 
earnings management in the Nigerian non-financial listed firms. 
.H4b: Leverage moderates the relationship between board independence and 
earnings management in the Nigerian non-financial listed firms. 
H4c: Leverage moderates the relationship between managerial share ownership 




.H4d: Leverage moderates the relationship between the Chief Executive Officer 
duality and earnings management in the Nigerian non-financial listed 
firms. 
4.4.12 Moderating Effect of Debt Structure on the Relationship Between 
AC Characteristics and Earnings Management 
 
H5a: Leverage moderates the relationship between AC financial expertise and 
earnings management in the Nigerian non-financial listed firms. 
H5b: Leverage moderates the relationship between AC share ownership and 
earnings management in the Nigerian non-financial listed firms. 
4.4.13 Pre and Post NGSEC Code of Corporate Governance 2011 
There are some changes made on SEC code of corporate governance (2003) that 
resulted in the reviewed SEC code of corporate governance for public 
companies in Nigeria (2011). These changes brought about provisions in the 
governance roles of board of directors, audit committees characteristics 
(composition, independence & expertise). Besides that, risk management 
committee, introduction of whistleblowing policy and the rotation of external 
auditors were some of the significant changes provided in the revised SEC Code 
(2011). This implies that the impact of these changes on the financial reporting 
quality of listed firms needs to be empirically tested.  Hence, the following 




H6: SEC Code of Corporate Governance 2011 has positively and significantly 
improved the quality of financial reporting in the Nigerian listed firms. 
4.5  Summary of the Chapter 
This chapter presents the conceptual framework of the study and hypothesised  
relationships between board characteristics, AC characteristics, and earnings 
management. Similarly, the study hypothesised the moderating effect of debt 
structure on the relationship between the board, AC characteristics, and earnings 
management. After that, the hypothesis was developed based on the gap 








This chapter presents the research method employed in the study. It explains the 
research design, population of the study, sources, data collection procedure and 
techniques of data analysis. It also describes the operational definitions of the 
variables used in the study and highlighted sources of measurement. 
5.2  Research Design 
The research design is the action or strategy that involves gathering of data for 
examination in line with the objectives of the study (Toledo-Pereyra, 2012). The 
research design has different dimensions, the choice of which depends on the 
objectives of the study (Stapleton, 2005). Having identified the research 
questions and objectives that form the basis of the research problem and 
developed research hypothesis as a tentative answer to such questions, next is 
to design research in such a manner that would enable data collection and 
analysis to prove the hypothesis empirically.  
 
The dimensions of research design include descriptive research design, survey 
research design, experimental research design, historical research design, and 
case study research design (Mckenney, Akker, Gravemeijer, & Nieveen, 2006). 




and FRQ (DV) as well as the moderating effect of debt structure (DS) on the 
relationships between the IVs above and DV.  The study therefore used archival 
data extracted from the annual financial reports of NGSEC (NSE). An 
examination of the annual report and accounts of the sampled companies 
provided the necessary information required for CG, debt structure, and FRQ. 
The research design proved most appropriate for the measurement of the effect 
of CG that is related to FRQ, which is moderated by debt structure of the listed 
non-financial companies in Nigeria.  
5.3  Population of the Study 
The study population comprised of all the non-financial companies listed on 
NGSEC for five consecutive years (2010-2014). The basis for the determination 
of the study population is based on the firms listed on the Nigeria Stock 
Exchange as at 31st December 2010. At present, there are eleven (11) 
categorised sectors of companies listed and trading on the  NGSEC trading 
floor. Ten out of the eleven sectors are non-financial, with a total of one hundred 
and thirty (130) companies. Moreover, this study excluded financial institutions 
from the population, due mainly to the fact that the sector is regulated by Central 
Bank of Nigeria (CBN) Code of CG (2006), while, SEC Code of CG (2011) 
governs all public listed companies in Nigeria. Further, the financial institution's 
financial reports are presented in a different format with different financial 





Therefore, four-point filters were used in arriving at the working population. 
First, a company must have been listed on the NGSEC, on or before 31 
December 2010. Secondly, it must have been quoted without being delisted 
between 2010 and 2014. Thirdly, any company with missing data is discounted 
and fourthly, all financial and corporate governance variables relating to the 
study must have been published and publicly available for the relevant years.  
In this regard, the research employed all the four filters to arrive at the working 
population. The choice of 2010 as the base year is because it was recorded that 
a substantial number of corporate failure of firms in Nigeria occurred due to 
poor CG practices. Besides that, the measures are set to ensure that all the firms 
within the population of the study have consecutively available published 
annual financial reports for the period of the research. The population of the 
study is one hundred and thirty-one (130) non-financial listed companies. 
5.4  Sample Selection 
This study sets out its sample in longitudinal form.  Therefore, the annual reports 
of all listed non-financial companies in Nigeria were considered from 2010 to 
2014. However, firms not listed by the Nigerian Securities and Exchange 
Commission in any of the years under consideration were excluded. Also, only 
those companies that have all the available data for the relevant consecutive 
five years were considered. In this regard, the study utilised publicly published 
data for the five consecutive years of 2010-2014. Therefore, the sample size of 





The samples’ financial information are obtained from the published annual 
report of the companies and their respective websites. Also, corporate 
governance variables information are collected from NGSEC corporate and its 
Kano state branch offices.  There are 130 non-financial companies out of the 
193 NGSEC listed companies as at 2010. However, out of 130 non-financial 
listed companies, 101 companies constitute the sample of this research. The 
remaining 25 companies failed to meet the filtering requirements of this 
research due to non-disclosure of the corporate governance variables and other 
information needed for this study. Such information includes audit committee 
independent non-executive director (member) share ownership, non-availability 
of a detailed profile of directors on the board that spells out their qualifications 
and managerial experiences, and financial information without the corporate 
governance report that should accompany such financials.  
 
Furthermore, companies whose full five years annual reports could not be 
accessed including those delisted between 2010 and 2014 were excluded from 
this study (Appendix A-D). Similarly, companies from the Construction/Real 
Estate that were hitherto mortgage/building fund companies between 2010 and 
2014 such as Union Homes Loans and Savings were excluded. Thus, the sample 
size of 101 non-financial NGSEC listed companies with complete information 
on financials and corporate governance reports required by this study for the 




101 companies involved in this research emerged from 10 out of the 11 industry 
groups generated over a period of five (5) years (2010 to 2014), which resulted 
in 505 companies-year observations. 
5.5  Sources and Methods of Data Collection 
The main sources of data for the study are the published annual reports and 
accounts of the companies, which were handpicked through the website of the 
sampled companies. Also, the Nigeria Stock Exchange Fact Book for 
2010/2011 was also used. The handpicked data were obtained for the following:  
Board Independence (BIND), Managerial Shares Ownership (MSOW), Board 
Size (BS), Board Gender Diversity (BGD), Chief Executive Officer Duality 
(CEDU), AC Independence (ACIND), AC Financial Expertise (ACFE), and AC 
Share Ownership (ACSOW). Other data obtained from annual reports are the 
proxies of FRQ. 
5.6  Definition and Measurement of Variables 
The definitions as well as the measurements of the dependent and independent 
variables of the study are discussed below:  
5.6.1  The Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable is the financial reporting quality (proxy by earnings 
management) among firms in the Nigerian non-financial listed firms. Besides 




of reported earnings, comprising of accruals quality (earnings management), 
earnings smoothing (e.g., Ronen & Sadan [1975], Leuz, Nanda & Wysocki 
[2003], Francis et al.[2004]), earnings persistence (e.g., Penman [2001], 
Dechow & Dichev [2002], Francis et al., [2004]), and the value relevance 
(Easton & Harris, 1991; Ohlson, 1995; Collins, Maydew &   Weiss,1997; 
Francis & Schipper,1999). Some of these proxies focused on  aspects of firms’ 
reported earnings while others focused on accruals as discussed below:  
5.6.2  The Financial Reporting Quality 
Financial reporting quality is related to the most important aspects of quality of 
the reported earnings. Investors and stakeholders consider firm’s performance 
through its financial report. The quality of the report depends on its reliability 
that translates into investment decision (Zalewska, 2014). Thus, this emphasises 
the need to provide relevant information, which is crucial for efficient markets, 
the absence of which Zalewska (2014) argued encouraged market manipulation. 
Nevertheless, accrual accounting provides relevant and useful information on 
companies’ financial performance, yet the process is based on assumptions, 
such as judgment and accounting discretion. Perhaps, earnings management and 
accrual-quality proxies are frequently used measures for some time on 
company’s reported earnings by Healy (1985), Jones (1991), and the modified 
Jones model presented by Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney (1995). These were 




by McNichols (2002),  and Francis et al. (2005). However, subsequent accrual 
quality models are mostly modifications to the previous AQ models. 
5.6.3  The Accruals Quality Models 
5.6.3.1 The Jones (1991) Model 
Earnings quality proxy developed by Jones (1991) received popular usage as a 
model. The emphasis of the model is calculating the discretionary part of total 
accruals, which used earnings management as a measure. To control for changes 
in the firm's economic circumstances, Jones (1991) used changes in revenue and 
plant and property all over assets. Moreover, to control for changes in non-
discretionay accruals (NDA), revenues and plant property and equipment were 
included in the model using OLS regression. 
 




TACit= total accruals for firm i in year t. 
Ait-1 = total assets for firm i in the previous year. 
∆REVit/Ait-1 = change in revenues from i in year t. 
PPEit/ Ait-1 = gross property and equipment for firm i in year t. 
µit = error term for firm i in year t. 




the difference between total accruals and the non-discretionary component 
of accruals, i.e. normal or expected accruals.  
The model is as follows: 
DAit= TAC/Ait-1 - [α1 (1/Ait-1) + α2 (∆REVit/Ait-1) + α3(PPEit/A it-1)]. 
 
Subsequently, Jones model (1991) was criticised due to its indirect measures of 
accruals quality but was further modified by different scholars who made a 
strong argument against Jones model to lend credence to their model (Schipper 
& Vincent, 2003; Francis, LaFond, Olsson, & Schipper, 2005).  
5.6.3.2 The Dechow, Sloan and Sweney (1995) Model 
The arguments advanced against weaknesses in Jones model preceded the 
modified method, employed to address the measurement of EQ shortcomings 
of Jones (1991) model by adopting the direct approach. DeFond and Jiambalvo 
(1994) brought an improvement in the Jones (1991) Model. DeFond and 
Jiambalvo’s (1994) contribution emphasised on separating regression 
coefficients for every sector, which they argue offer better results. Dechow, 
Sloan, and Sweeney (1995) made a similar effort in improving Jones (1991) 
model by adding receivables which made it the most widely used model by 
scholars. The model is commonly called Modified Jones Model.  
In the estimation period, the normal accruals are:  
 





In the event period, the accruals are: DAit= TAC/Ait-1 - [α1 (1/Ait-1) + α2 
(∆REVit/Ait-1 - ∆RECit/Ait-1) + α3 (PPEit/ Ait-1)].  
 
Where ∆REC= is a change in accruals receivable for firm i in period t, and 
other variables are as previously defined 
5.6.3.3 The Dechow and Dichev (2002) Model 
Dechow and Dichev (2002) suggested another method that became widely 
accepted in assessing the accrual and accruals quality proxies for financial 
reporting quality. 
The equation measuring the accruals quality is as below: 
ΔWCt=b0 + b1CFOt-1 + b2CFOt + b3CFOt+1 + εt  
Where: CFOt-1= cash flow from last year, CFOt = cash flow of the present 
year and CFOt+I = cash flow of the future year. 
 
They specifically introduced a modelled change in working capital accruals, 
changes in accounts receivable added to changes in inventory, fewer changes in 
accounts payable minus tax payable added to changes in cash flow from 
operations and changes in other net assets. The use of working capital accruals 
in the model is restricted to the firm’s main activities to measure accrual quality.  
Accordingly, working capital will be converted into cash within a year. Error 
terms contain estimation error while standard deviations constitute the accrual 




5.6.3.4 The McNichols (2002) Model 
On the other hand, McNichols (2002) criticised Dechow and Dichev (2002) 
Models due to its disregard for distinguishing discretionary from non-
discretionary accruals and argue that this distinction used by Jones (1991) 
Model should be reflected in developing any accrual model.  McNichols (2002) 
further argues that Jones (1991) Model ignored changes in earlier years’ sales 
as well as changes in the following years’ sales. The Model considered changes 
in working capital accrual influenced by the current year change in sales. 
McNichols asserts that the model is not sufficient enough to evaluate accrual 
quality because it ignores changes in working capital accrual for 
the previous and following year periods (Yurt & Ergun, 2015). Moreover, 
McNichols' (2002) measure is aimed at modifying the Jones (1991) model by 
using regression technique with total current accruals, cash flows in previous, 
current, and subsequent years along with revenue, plant, property and 
equipment changes as explanatory variables.  
∆WCit = β0 + β1CFOit-1 + β2CFOit + β3CFOit+1 + β4∆Salesit + β5PPEit + αit   
Where: ∆WCt = ∆Working capital in year t i.e. ∆Accounts receivable + 
∆Inventory - ∆Accounts payable - ∆Taxes payable + ∆Other assets (net);  
CFOt-1 = Cash flows from operations in year t – 1;  
CFOt = Cash flows from operations in year t;  
CFOt+1 = Cash flows from operations in year t + 1; 
∆Salest = Sales in year t less sales in year t – 1;  




5.6.3.5 The Francis et al. (2005) Model 
Francis et al. (2005) divided earnings management measure into discretionary 
and non-discretionary elements and computed accruals based on discretionary 
and non-discretionary, which estimates a regression of firms’ characteristics 
affected by accruals quality. In doing that, the discretionary part of the accruals 
quality, i.e., the regression equation is depicted thus:  
AQ = β0+ β1SIZE + β2ϭCFO + β3OperCycle + β4ϭ (SALES) + β5NegEarn 
(loss) + εt... 
Where:  
SIZE = size of the firm 
ϭ (CFO) = standard deviation of firm cash flow; 
ϭ(Sales) = standard deviation of firm sales, calculated over the years; 
 OperCycle = log of firm operating cycle;  
NegEarn(loss) = number of years, out of the period where firm reported 
NIBE˂0. 
Thus, previous studies on EQ measurement used various alternative methods 
(Jones, 1991; Dechow, Sweeny & Sloan, 2002; Dechow & Dichev, 2002; 
McNichols, 2002; Kothari et al., 2005; Francis et al., 2005)  to estimate EQ 
using proxies such as earnings management.  
 
As a result, McNichols’ (2002) model assumed deterioration of EQ as a result 
of management’s intentional and unintentional errors in accruals estimation. 




suggested that as an alternative test, it better explained earnings management 
(Yurt & Ergun, 2015). However, Dechow, Hutton, Kim and Sloan (2012) 
identified weaknesses of EQ measurements adopted by these researchers. They 
argued that even though procedures for matching performance were adopted by 
the previous models to mitigate misspecification, the result is reducing the test 
power substantially. It is evident that there were improvements made to Jones’ 
1991 model by subsequent researchers on EQ proxied by earnings management 
(Dechow et al., 1995; Dechow, Sweeny and Sloan, 2002; Dechow & Dichev, 
2002; McNichols, 2002; Kothari et al., 2005; Francis et al., 2005).  
 
Thus, Dechow et al. (2012) suggested another approach for earnings 
management detection. They argue that substantial improvement would be 
recorded using the new method, due to its test power and test specification. 
Nevertheless, Dechow et al.’s (2012) model imposes data requirements that are 
impossible to meet in the Nigeria settings. Hence, test of Dechow et al. (2012) 
model will require approximation of the model’s requirements. The 
consequences of such approximations on the model’s predictions are difficult 
to assess. Not that the model is wrong, but it is untestable and is beyond the 
scope of the current study.  
 
In view of the inconsistency stemming from the diverse FRQ proxies used in 
the various studies, and inability to identify a dominant measure for ‘financial 




found the McNichols (2002) model as most appropriate in  explaining accruals 
quality measure for non-financial firms in the relationships between the 
dependent and independent variables of the study. Further, McNichols (2002) 
used previous, current and subsequent years cash flows, changes in revenue, and 
PPE as IVs and as a result, measurement errors could be reduced significantly 
and at the same time increases the explanatory power of the initial Dechow and 
Dichev (2002) model and the Jones (1991) model. Therefore, the following 
regression model was used for each sample company within its industry group 
for the relevant years of interest.  
 
∆WCt = β0 + β1CFOit-1 + β2CFOit + β3CFOit+1 + β4∆Salesit + β5PPEit + αit   
Where: ∆WCt = ∆Working capital in year t i.e. ∆Accounts receivable + 
∆Inventory - ∆Accounts payable - ∆Taxes payable + ∆Other assets (net);  
CFOt-1 = Cash flows from operations in year t – 1;  
CFOt = Cash flows from operations in year t;  
CFOt+1 = Cash flows from operations year in year t + 1; 
∆Salest = Sales in year t less sales in year t – 1;  
PPEt = Gross property, plant and equipment in year t 
 
Nevertheless, the study uses the residuals to measure FRQ proxy by earnings 
management.  Conversely, the residual estimates the discretionary portion of 
the accrual quality. Hence, the lower the quality of earnings, the higher the 




of the results, the study also employed value relevance model using price-
earnings measure. Thus, the robustness test was applied to the sample of the 
study.  
5.6.4  The Value Relevant Models 
Traditional financial theory views value relevance as the value of a firm’s equity 
as a representative of the present value of future dividends or free cash flows to 
equity. Hence, the primary objective of value relevance research is the study of 
the relationship between market values of equity and accounting variables.  
Accordingly, Ohlson (1995) documented that the value of firm’s equity can be 
expressed as a function of its earnings and book value, thus:   MVE = f (AI) (1), 
where: 
MVE = market value of equity 
AI = accounting information 
The value-relevance of earnings and book value is characterised by the 
coefficient of these variables. The coefficient of earnings hinges on how well a 
firm’s earnings can explain stock prices. The ability of earnings to explain stock 
prices can be influenced by its ability to reflect future earnings (Ohlson & 
Zhang, 1998). They further explain that the relative weight of earnings as 
compared to book value may differ subject to the permanence of earnings. 
Nevertheless, the combined weights of earnings and book value should remain 
unchanged for different accounting methods unless the accounting choice has 




5.6.4.1 The Price Model 
One of the value relevance models is the price valuation model that uses price 
regression coefficient to analyse the relationship between the market value of 
equity and the book value of equity. The price regression proposed by Ohlson 
(1995) analyses the relationship between the market value of equity and the 
book value of equity. The regression is typically run on a per share basis: 
P = β0 + β1BVS + α        (1) 
P = stock price 
BVS = book value per share 
The residual income framework (1) shows that stock values can be estimated as 
a function of the book value of equity and earnings. As such, earnings are 
included as a second variable in the price specification: 
P = β0 + β1BVS + β2EPS + α       (2) 
EPS = earnings per share 
 
Equity evaluation is a major exercise for all stock investors. However, once 
funds have been invested in stock or a portfolio of stocks, the stock price is not 
necessarily of much interest. Therefore, the focus is on the investment return. 
The value relevance research devotes much attention to how the change in the 
market value of equity is related to value creation as measured by the accounting 
system. The regression specifications so far have implicitly assumed that 
aggregate accounting numbers like bottom-line earnings and book equity are 




disaggregated into components. Moreover, that value relevance can be analysed 
for financial statement information that is not part of an income statement or 
balance sheet. Such information includes, for instance, information from the 
notes or numbers from cash flow statements. Value relevance research includes 
time-series analysis and cross-sectional analysis as well as panel data analysis. 
The relationship between stock values or returns and accounting numbers can 
be examined from different time perspectives.  
 
Accordingly, in regression analysis, the coefficient of determination (R2) 
measures the proportion of variance in the dependent variable explained by the 
independent variable(s). Recently, the regression of price on the accounting 
variables measure is commonly used on per share basis (price-return). However, 
some researchers employ the R2  to examine changes on the value relevance of 
accounting over time or whether there are differences in the value relevance 
across samples. If stock prices or returns are regressed on accounting variables, 
R2 is a measure of how much variation in stock prices or returns is explained by 
the accounting variables analysed (Brown, Lo, & Lys, 1999). Hence, 
explanatory power is a measure of value relevance. The explanatory power of 
different samples is often compared to study the extent to which value relevance 
differs between samples. Similarly, studies employed comparisons of R2s based 
on samples from different industries, accounting standards, comparing U.S. 
GAAP and other local regimes or across countries (Zeghal & Mhedhbi, 2006; 




are severe problems connected to between-sample comparisons of R2 levels and 
these comparisons may not be valid. They argue specifically, that scale effects 
present in price regressions increase R2 and this effect increases in the scale 
factor’s coefficient of variation. 
 
Thus, differences in R2, for instance, from samples drawn in different time 
periods may in part be motivated by differences in the scale factor’s coefficient 
of variation. Brown, Kin and Lys (1999) controlled for the scale effect by 
running deflated regressions. They acknowledged that several scale proxies 
could have been chosen, but they argue that price at time t-1 is the preferred 
choice. As such, they recommend using a version of the return regression rather 
than R2. 
5.6.4.2 The Return-Earnings Model 
The goal of every investment is the cash flow generated by the investment. 
Thus, the VR of cash flows is used as a measure for assessing the usefulness of 
accounting values for stock investors. Most value relevance research focuses on 
the value relevance of earnings and the determinants of earnings return 
coefficients (ERC). The value relevance of earnings introduced by Easton & 
Harris (1991) employs the return-earnings model. The approach of return 
earnings is to examine the value relevance of earnings which is widely 




Warfield, Wild, & Wild, 1995; Dunstan, Ismail, Keitha, & Zijl, 2013). The 
return earnings model is as follows:  
RETit = β0+β1E/Pit-1 +εit   where: 
RETit is holding returns for a 12-month period before the financial year end for 
firm i in year t,  
E/Pit-1 is the earnings per share at the financial year end divided by the closing 
price 12 months previously for firm i in year t and all other variables are as 
previously defined. 
5.6.4.3 The Disclosure Quality 
The disclosure quality (DQ) is measured by an index aimed to assess the extent 
of compliance with the set parameters that are either weighted or unweighted. 
The disclosure indexes consist of the mandatory disclosure (Arnold & 
Matthews, 2002) and voluntary disclosure (Botosan, 1997), which depends on 
the requirements on the firm’s operating environment, the nature of additional 
voluntary information, besides the researcher’s motivations of the study. 
Further, prior literature mostly used the extent of disclosure quality using 
voluntary disclosure index (Botosan, 1997; Chau & Gray, 2002). The DQ based 
on weighted scores employ analysts' assessments of three magnitudes of 
disclosure: First is the use of published information (annual reports). Secondly 
is the use of quarterly and other published information (quarterly reports, press 
releases and proxy statements). Thirdly is investor relations and related aspects 




analysts' questions (management earnings forecast), hence, a range of scores is 
assigned to each measure (Ahmed, Kilic, & Lobo, 2006). Accordingly, 
unweighted measures are used by dichotomous numbers to each disclosure ‘1’ 
or non-disclosure ‘0’ respectively. The individual weight is subsequently 
summed up to get the overall index score. Some scholars also use volume or 
quantity method. In this case, researchers calculate the number of pages or the 
number of sentences and words in a particular segment of information to access 
the disclosure quality (Katmon & Farooque, 2015). 
5.7  Definition and Measurement of Independent Variables 
This study uses some variables to proxy for the board, as well as an audit 
committee characteristics. This is made possible due to explicit requirements in 
the revised CCG released by the Nigerian SEC in 2011. The requirement 
mandates particular disclosure of CG variables including AC’s variables to be 
disclosed in the firm’s annual report (SEC, 2011).  
5.7.1  The Board Characteristics 
According to Bhagat and Bolton (2008), the board of directors  plays a 
significant role in corporate governance practices. The board characteristics 
examined in the current study include board independence, board size, Chief 
Executive Officer duality, managerial share ownership and gender diversity. 
Meanwhile, the AC characteristics examined are AC independence, AC shares 




5.7.1.1 The Board Independence 
Independence of the board is the level of presence of non-executive directors 
(outside directors) on the board of a company. In this regard, the higher the 
proportion of NED to the total number of board members is expected to lower 
incidences of EM that subsequently improves EQ. From the empirical evidence 
of prior studies, the board composition determines the quality of reported 
earnings (Petra, 2007; Firth et al., 2007; Rubin & Segal, 2012) and found that 
the proportion of outside directors was an important monitoring mechanism. 
Therefore, this study measured Board Independence by the percentage of  non-
executive directors against the total number of directors on the board. 
5.7.1.2 The Board Size 
Board size relates to the composition or number of directors on the BoD of a 
company for monitoring and control of managers, even though it is not clear on 
how the direction of influence is tilted. Board sizes may vary, from a minimum 
of five (5) or six (6) members to a very large membership of 20 and above 
depending on the complexity of the firm and shareholding. Although Section 
4.2 of the Nigerian SEC code of CG (2011) provides for the composition of the 
board of public companies to compose of at least five (5) members, there is yet 
to be a consensus on whether larger or smaller boards impacted positively on 
firm performance or enhances FRQ. Board size attracted some research and 
regulatory provisions, emphasising the effect of board size on firm performance 




the results continue to diverge. It thus suggests that small board sizes are more 
manageable than larger boards, in terms of control and meeting its demands. 
 
 Also, controlling and monitoring of board activities including management 
activities seem to be much more effective with smaller boards (Beasley,1996; 
Jensen, 1993; Lipton & Lorsch,1992; Williams et al., 2005; Schnake & 
Williams, 2008; Guest, 2009), and that larger boards have an adverse impact on 
strategic plans, internal controls, and FRQ. If the board is too large, the effect 
of too many cooks will prevail, and that may affect the effectiveness of the 
internal control system and consequently the FRQ. Therefore, this study 
measured board size according to the number of directors on the board. 
5.7.1.3 The Managerial Share Ownership 
Managerial share ownership refers to the manager's interest in the firm’s equity 
shareholding. Agency theory assumes that equity holdings of managers 
encourage managers to align their interests with that of the shareholders towards 
value maximisation of the firm. In this regard, managerial share ownership is 
an important monitoring mechanism in corporate governance. Prior studies 
(Warfield, Wild & Wild, 1995; Nadal, Bana & David, 2010;  Alves, 2012; 
Cheng et al., 2013) posit that the interests of shareholders and management start 
to converge as the management holds a percentage of the firm's equity 
ownership. This suggests that since manager's interest is aligned with the 




value of the firm, given the empirical support that managers may be encouraged 
in employing DA in an attempt to recoup earnings and value of their stock 
holdings through higher managerial ownership. This study measured 
managerial shares ownership as the proportion of the number of shares owned 
by executive directors divided by the total number of company shares. 
5.7.1.4 The Chief Executive Officer Duality 
Chief Executive duality role is one other board characteristic associated with 
strong CG. The Chief executive officer duality refers to combining the 
responsibilities of CEO and the Chairman of the board to one person. Thus, the 
two roles are concurrently discharged by one individual. However, when CEO 
duality is entrenched, strategies aimed at advancing personal interests rather 
than company’s overall interest would vigorously be pursued. Therefore, 
vesting the two responsibilities of CEO and Chairman of the Board to an 
individual could undermine the board’s effectiveness (Gul & Leung, 2004).  
 
Evidence from previous studies on CEO duality equally document the 
significance of separating the two positions including their role (Beasley, 1996; 
Davidson et al., 2005; Kent & Stewart, 2008). They maintained that the 
appointment of a CEO to the position of the chairperson can give concentrated 
power and may create conflict of interests, which may reduce control and 
monitoring of managers. This was supported by Coombs & Wong (2004), Gul 




Chief Executive Officer duality by assigning one (1) if the CEO also serves as 
the chairperson and 0 if otherwise. 
5.7.1.5 The Board Gender Diversity 
The continued demand for appointing women to the board of companies is 
increasingly drawing researchers as well as regulators’ attention. Despite these 
pressures, there is the absence of a specific provision for female representation 
on the boards of Nigerian public companies by SEC, CCG, 2011. In spite of 
that, proponents of women participation in public affairs suggest that the 
composition of the BoD should consist of female members. Further arguments 
were advanced that such boards when constituted, would provide higher quality 
deliberations than those composed solely of males, and such boards 
communicate more effectively. Beyond participation, studies suggest that 
membership of women on the BoD enhances board performance and 
strengthens the quality of the financial report.  
 
Empirical studies (Krishnan & Parsons, 2008; Adams & Ferreira, 2009) find 
female directors to have a significant impact on board inputs, firm outcomes 
and enhance financial reporting quality. This is further supported by Srinidhi, 
Gul and Tsui (2011) who document that EQ is higher with the presence of 
women directors. Therefore, this study measured gender diversity based on the 





Table 5.1  








Percentage of the non-executive 
director or outside directors by the total 
number of directors on the board 




Board size BS Total the number of directors’ on the 








CEOD Dummy variable indicating “1” if 
CEO is the chairperson of the firm, 
otherwise “0” (Rahman & Ali, 2006; 






BGD Proportion of female directors to the 
total number of board members (Yan, 
Fornaro, & Elshahat, 2011; Ittonen, 






Managerial     
share ownership 
MSOW The proportion of the number of shares 
owned by executive directors divided by 
the total number of company shares 
(Nadal, Bana & David, 2010;  Alves, 
2012; Cheng et al., 2013). 
Agency theory 
5.7.1.6 The Audit Committee Independence 
Given the oversight function of the AC, independence is one of the essential 
qualities of AC members. As one of the CG mechanisms, audit committees is 
seen as being responsible for overseeing the reporting process of firms’ finance 
(Uzun et al., 2004). Thus, the magnitude of independence of the AC’s individual 
non-executive members as a percentage of independent members of the AC is 




independence relates to the absence of the relationship between the company 
and its management. Such relationships may be personal, employment or 
business relationships. Therefore, the effective discharge of AC monitoring 
responsibility lies on the level of AC independence. The absence or low level 
of AC independence would adversely affect the quality, and credibility of 
financial reporting (Lin et al.,2006). Therefore, the measurement of the AC 
independence is one if there is the presence of at least one (1) independent non-
executive director on the AC, and if otherwise, the measurement is 0. 
5.7.1.7 The Audit Committee Financial Expertise  
The term financial expertise may be referred to as the accounting, finance, 
financial management as well as ability to prepare error-free financial 
statements. Prior studies support the existence of relationships between 
accounting expertise and quality financial reporting. Documented empirical 
studies (Xie, Davidson, & DaDalt, 2003;  Bedard et al., 2004; Carcello, 
Hollingsworth, Klein, & Neal, 2006; Mustafa & Youssef, 2010) document that 
there is a reduction in the use of DA and income-increasing accruals when firms 
have a minimum number of financial experts on their AC.  
 
Nevertheless, Badolato, Donelson, and Ege (2014) argue that to constrain 
earnings management, a firm needs a member with a combination of high status 
and financial expertise as an AC member. Status refers to an individual's ability 




attributes (Pollock et al., 2010). Therefore, individuals with higher status are 
seen to have the higher ability, command more authority and obtain better 
information (Badolato et al., 2014).   
 
 In line with the requirement of the Nigerian SEC Code of CG, 2011, where 
public companies are mandated to have at least one member of the AC to be 
financially literate while other committee members should be able only to 
understand financial statements. Therefore, this study considered audit 
committee financial expertise as a categorical variable measured by one if there 
is the presence of at least one AC member with knowledge of accounting or 
financial management, if otherwise, 0. 
5.7.1.8 The Audit Committee Share Ownership 
Audit committee share ownership represents the AC member’s proportion of 
shareholdings in the company. Distinct from other countries code (UK) 
provisions where AC members come entirely from the non-executive members 
of the board. The Nigerian SEC CCG 2011, provide for the composition of the 
AC to compose of six (6) members (CAMA, 593: 3 & 4). Three (3) of the 
members are to be nominated by the board from among the board members 
while the other three (3) members are elected by the shareholders from among 





Additionally, SEC 2011, CCG, requires public companies to have at least one 
(1) of the members representing the Board on the AC to be financially literate. 
Previous studies have documented the potential effects of AC members’ share 
ownership in monitoring financial reporting process of a firm. These studies 
suggest the association between share ownership and FRQ effectiveness, in 
addition to greater vigilance and higher monitoring (Jensen, 1989; Shivasani, 
1993; Carcello & Neal, 2003; Vafeas, 2005). Therefore, AC share ownership 
again is a continuous variable measured by the proportion of shares held by the 
non-executive directors on the AC divided by the company’s total number of 
shares. This information was collected from the director's report section of the 




Table 5.2   
Measurement of Audit Committee Characteristics 
Variables Abbreviation Measurements Theory 
Audit committee 
independence 
ACIND Categorical variable measured by 
“1” with presence of at least one 
independent non-executive 
director on the AC, if otherwise 
“0” (Lin et al., 2006; Fodio et al., 








ACFE The categorical variable measured 
by “1” with the presence of at least 
one member with knowledge of 
accounting or financial 
management, if otherwise, “0” 
(Carcello, Hollingsworth, Klein, & 






ACSOW Continues variable measured by 
the proportion of shares held by 
non-executive directors on the AC 
divided by the company’s total 
number of shares (Carcello & 
Neal, 2003; Vafeas, 2005)). 
Agency theory 
5.7.1.9 The Debt Structure (Leverage) as a Moderator 
Capital Structure refers to the firm’s financial structures that combine equity 
and debt capital maintained by a firm.  A CS may comprise of debt, equity or 
hybrid securities. The comparative ratio between the equity and the debt is 
referred to as leverage. Therefore, the firm’s ability to meet financial needs of 
its shareholders depends primarily on its financial structure. For this reason, 
managers would be interested in achieving their targets that may be in conflict 
with the firm’s value. As such, shareholders may attempt to control managers’ 
behaviour through monitoring. Hence, both the control and monitoring result in 




interest that is based on the firm’s risk. Thus, managers may decide to transfer 
value from creditors to shareholders who need to be monitored and controlled, 
which results in agency cost of debt. Afza and Rashid (2014) document that 
earnings management is enhanced by short-term debt, whereas long-term debt 
and total debt decreases earnings management activities because of high 
monitoring by creditors (outsiders). Furthermore, Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
and Myers (1977) proposed the agency costs of debt and equity. They argue that 
the existence of the conflict between debtholders leads to agency costs of debt. 
 
Debt assists to lessen agency costs. Also, CG is established to alleviate agency 
conflicts. Therefore, debt and governance play a similar role. The need for debt 
to act as an instrument for controlling agency costs may be greater than in 
companies with weak governance. Thus, firms with poor governance quality 
should be more leveraged. Accordingly, for firms to raise external funds from 
capital markets on attractive terms, they must establish good reputation to be 
able to service the debt succesfully. By so doing, the firms would reduce the 
availability of funds for expropriation.  
 
This study introduces leverage to moderate the inconsistency in the relationship 
between CG mechanisms and EM. Therefore, moderator refers to a qualitative 
or quantitative variable that affects the relationship (positive or negative) 
between the predictor (independent) variable and a criterion (dependent) 




moderator in the study is the inconsistency of the result between CG and EM. 
Thus, moderator variable can be introduced where there is inconsistency or 
weak relationship between the dependent and the independent variables 
(Sherman & Fazio, 1983; Zahra & Pearce, 1989). Accordingly, previous studies 
provided support that leverage play a major role in monitoring and mitigating 
management self-motivated behaviour (EM).  Therefore, debt structure 
(leverage) is measured by the proportion of total long-term debt over the total 
asset of a firm. However, to the researcher’s knowledge, this is the first study 
that uses leverage as a moderator variable. 
Table 5.3  
Measurement of Moderator 
Variables Abbreviation  Measurements Theory 
Leverage LEV 
 Is measured by the 
proportion of total 
long-term debt over a 
total asset of a firm 





5.7.2  The Control Variables 
The control variables according to Cowen, Ferari, and Parker (1987) act as 
intervening variables that should be controlled in empirical studies. The model of 
this study includes three control variables, firm size (FS), profitability (PRAT) 





5.7.2.1  Firm Size 
To test the association between a company’s corporate governance attributes 
and its accruals quality, the volatility of business operations was controlled for. 
Also, it is predicted that smaller size companies would have higher cash flow 
and sales volatility, longer operating cycles, and more frequent incidence of 
negative earnings leading to lower accruals quality. Thus, managers of these 
companies may have more opportunity to manipulate earnings. While larger 
companies may have less motivation to indulge in fraudulent financial 
reporting, the increase in sales could mean an increase in receivables. In line 
with prepositions by the agency theory, Jensen and Meckling (1976) disclosed 
the existence of high probability of managers and owners conflict of interest in 
larger size firms compared to smaller firms, the consequences of which leads to 
higher agency costs.  
 
Thus, the prediction of agency theory is, there would be an increase in 
monitoring in larger firms as a means of justifying agency conflict that in turn 
increases agency costs. Consequently, Becker, Defond, Jiambalvo, and 
Subramanyam (1998) argue that larger firms are unlikely to manage earnings. 
Meanwhile, Lobo and Zhou (2006) argue that it is easier for larger firms to 
manipulate earnings due to their operational complexities. A similar study 
conducted by Amran and Che Ahmad (2011) examined board attributes 
relationships with firm’s performance of 189 family companies in Malaysia 




larger firms may be faced with complexities in operations leading to lower firm 
performance. 
 
On the other hand, Habbash (2010), Fodio et al. (2013) and Wen and Hsu (2015) 
show evidence that firm size is negatively associated with DA, suggesting that 
large firms are less likely to engage in EM. In contrast, Uwuigbe, Ranti, 
Uwuigbe and Bernard (2015) found the firm size to have a positive and 
significant relationship with DA. Furthermore, in view of their size, operational 
complexities, and the ability to engage reputable and experienced external audit 
firms,  larger firms are likely to have less DA (Dechow & Dichev, 2002; 
Rahman & Ali, 2006; Srinidhi & Gul, 2006; Yip, Staden, Chris, & Steven, 
2011). Therefore, for the purpose of this study, firm size was measured using the 
natural logarithm of total assets.  
5.7.2.2  Firm Age 
Firm age is considered to be the number of years a company passed since being 
listed on SEC, while others view firm age as the number of years a firm spent 
since incorporation. As time passes, companies discover what they are good at 
and learn how to do things better as they specialise more and new techniques 
are found to standardise, coordinate, and enhance their production processes, as 
well as to minimise costs and improve quality (Ericson & Pakes, 1995). 
Companies incorporated for a longer period tend to have a lower magnitude of 




companies, with a high market value and a reputation to protect (Akhtaruddin, 
2005). Accordingly, prior studies (Adam & Ferreira, 2004; Mínguez-Vera & 
López-Martínez 2010; Julizaerma & Sori, 2012; Kutum, 2015; and Bassiouny 
et al. (2016)) used firm age to represent the number of years of operation as a 
control variable in their studies.  
 
Though, Owusu-ansah (1998) and Amran and Che Ahmad (2011)  used the year 
of incorporation as a proxy for firm age. They argue that it represents the year 
the company is statutorily recognised, and their financial statements are 
subjected to complying with statutory requirements for reporting to regulatory 
agencies. Therefore, old firms are familiar with the governance, listing rules and 
codes of practices within the industry, which might have improved their 
financial reporting practices (Alsaeed, 2006). Consequently, the older firms 
have less tendency to engage in earnings management practices. Therefore, for 
the purpose of this study, firm age was measured by the number of years of a 
firm has been incorporated and listed on the Nigerian SEC.  
4.7.2.3  Profitability 
Profitability is used in measuring a firm’s management performance. Therefore, 
the management of a profitable firm is likely to pursue or adopt measures that 
would provide support for the continuance or retention of such positions and 
performance related activities. As such, profitability is capable of inducing 




attempt to boost performance. Researchers have used the net profit to sales, 
earnings growth, ROA, and ROE as proxies of profitability. Thus, firms’ 
profitability has been argued to have an influence on the quality of financial 
reporting. Alsaeed (2006) documented that a profitable company may feel 
proud of its achievements and so would disclose more information to create 
good impressions about its performance.  
 
Besides that, the level of profit has been argued to have an influence on the 
manipulation of accounting accruals because managers may manage earnings 
to increase their bonus rewards (Yang & Krishnan, 2005). Meanwhile, firms 
which have experienced losses for some years have also been argued to have 
the propensity to engage in lower financial reporting quality (Loebbecke, 
Eining, & Willingham, 1989).  Furthermore,  Fudenberg and Tirole (1995) 
argue that EM firms tend to show a high profitability due to its effect on 
managers’ position and compensation contract which motivates managers to 
manipulate earnings.  Consequently, if current earnings are low and managers 
believe that future earnings will be high, they tend to engage in income-
increasing EM practices. However, if present earnings are high but managers 
expect low future earnings, they tend to participate in income-decreasing EM. 
Prior studies (Adelopo, 2010; Nedal et al., 2010; Mavis, Ibadin, & Izedonmi, 
2012; Usman, 2012) provided evidence for the use of profitability as a control 
variable. In line with previous studies, this study measures profitability as the 




Table 5.4  
Measurement of Control Variables 
Variables Abbreviation Measurements Theory 
Firm Age FA A number of years of firm’s incorporation 





Firm Size FS Continues variable measured by the natural 
logarithm of total assets (Bokpin et al.,2011; 




Profitability PRAT Continues variable measured by the ratio of profit 
after tax, to total assets (Adelopo, 2010; Nedal et 




5.8  Techniques for Data Analysis 
The study employed descriptive analysis of the data generated by the study and 
described the data through the mean, median, maximum, minimum and standard 
deviation, as well as the skewness and kurtosis of the sampled variables. After 
that, Pearson correlation matrix was employed to investigate the bivariate 
relationships amongst the variables. Furthermore, a paired two samples t-test 
was used to measure the extent of financial reporting quality, two years before 
and two years after the commencement date (2011) of the Nigerian revised SEC 
code of CG, 2011 in Nigeria.  
 
The OLS multivariate regression method was also applied in examining the 
relationship between the dependent variable and other explanatory variables. 
The OLS assumptions as suggested by Hair, Black, Babin, and Joseph (2010) 
for the validation of regression analysis was employed. These assumptions are 




studies of Glass and Hopkins (1984) suggest that a slight violation of the five 
assumptions are robust, and as such may not affect the results in many 
situations.  However, the selection of the appropriate method of the many 
multivariate statistical tools available depends on the measurement of the study. 
Given the suitability of multiple regression techniques, when using panel data, 
the study therefore employed it in the analysis of data. 
 
FRQ is measured as a function of accrual quality (AQ). 
Thus, FRQ = f (CG) which is expressed as: 
FRQ=f(BIND, MSOW, BS, CEDU, BGD, ACIND, ACFE, ACSOW, FA, FS, 
PRAT)…………………………………………………………………… (i) 
 
The Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression, fixed effect, and random effect 
models are the models employed to estimate the combined effects of IVs on the 
dependent variables. The OLS provides a consistent estimate of α (intercept) 
and β (slopes) but is biased because it fails to address the problem of 
endogeneity (Hall, 2005) and as a result, both fixed effects and random effects 
were tested, and a random effect was found to be well fitted and as such 
employed. Therefore, the model of the study estimates the impact of leverage 
on CG and the financial reporting quality.  





FRQit= β0 + β1BINDit + β3MSOWit + β2BSit +β4CEDUit+ β5BGDit + 6ACINDit 
+ β7ACFEit + β8ACSOWit+ β9FAit  + β10FSit + β11PRATit + eit……… (ii)  






FRQ = Financial Reporting Quality; BIND = Board Independence; BS= Board 
Size;  
MSOW = Managerial Ownership of Shares; CEDU= Chief Executive Officer 
Duality;  
BGD= Board Gender Diversity; ACIND = Audit Committee Independence; 
ACFE = Audit Committee Financial Expertise; ACSOW = Audit Committee 
share ownership; FS = Firm Size; FA = Firm Age; PRAT= Profitability and 
LEV= Debt Structure (long-term debt);   β0 = Parameters estimated; e = an error 
term assumed to satisfy the standard OLS assumption. β1- β10 = Partial 
derivatives or the gradient of the independent variable. 
5.9  T-test: Paired Two Sample for Means 
The paired two samples for means (t-test) was employed to analyse the data 




means of financial reporting quality of non-financial listed firms for pre and 
post SEC Code of CG 2011 periods. The approach suggests differences between 
the means of the financial reporting quality of Nigerian non-financial listed 
firms for the two periods. It also makes possible to know which side of the pair 
of the time limits is better in quality. The sample mean of the sets of variables 
of the Nigerian non-financial listed firms were compared to ascertain if the 
average differs from zero. A dichotomous variable code  “0 and 1” was used for 
pre and post periods respectively. Hence, it provided a better measurement of 
detecting the existence of differences between the pre and post SEC Code of 
CG periods, to ascertain which period is better. The two sample t-test was 
further used to test hypothesis six of the study. 
5.10  Model Statistical Tests 
The software STATA version 14 was used as a statistical tool in running and 
analysing the data. Furthermore, it was employed in performing the statistical 
analyses for the descriptive statistics, correlations, multiple regressions and 





5.11  Summary of the Chapter 
The chapter primarily focused on the methodology of the study. The researcher 
explained and justified the type of research design for the study. After that, the 
researcher discussed the population, process of sample selection, determination 
of the sample size, and the descriptive research design of the study. The chapter 
also discussed and defined the dependent and IVs including their measurements. 
Also, the techniques for data analysis were presented while OLS multivariate 
regression method was applied in examining the relationship between the DV 





CHAPTER SIX  
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
6.1  Introduction 
This chapter analyses and discusses the results of the statistical tests undertaken 
in this research as explained in Chapter Four. It further provides the findings of 
the relationship between corporate governance, leverage, and financial 
reporting quality. The discussion in this chapter is organised into five sections. 
Thus, Section 6.2 provides details of population and sample classification; 
Section 6.3 provides the descriptive statistics of the research. Next, Section 6.4 
explains the results obtained from the test of relationships between CG 
variables, leverage, and FRQ. While section 6.5 provides the diagnostic tests 
conducted. Finally, section 6.16 provides the final summary of the chapter.  
6.2  Population and Sample Classification 
As explained in Chapter 4, the population of the study is the non-financial  
companies listed on NGSEC which equally constitutes the sample of the 
research. The sample of financial information is obtained from the published 
annual report of the companies and their respective websites. Also, corporate 
governance variables information were collected from the NGSEC corporate 
office and its Kano state regional office.  Therefore, the sample of this research 




during the five-year period from 2010-2014. In line with the listing 
requirements and rules of SEC, violation of one or more of the rules would lead 
to either suspension or outright delisting of a company. Thus, 130 companies 
are found to be trading on the floor of the NGSEC between 2010 and 2014. 
However, out of the 130 non-financial  listed companies, 101 companies 
constituted the sample of this research. The remaining 29 companies failed to 
meet the filtering requirements of non-disclosure of corporate governance 
variables and other information needed for this study. Such information 
includes audit committee independent non-executive member, share ownership, 
non-availability of detailed profile of directors on the board, and financial 
information without the corporate governance report that should have 
accompanied such financials. Furthermore, companies where their full five (5) 
years annual reports could not be accessed were excluded from this study.  
 
As declared in Chapter Three of the study, financial companies are excluded 
because the sector is highly regulated with multiple (banking and insurance) and 
unique corporate governance codes. In particular, the financial sector has 
fundamentally different income measurement rules and various accruals 
working CSs (Sharma & Kuang, 2014). Consequently, working capital has less 
value to financial companies which makes it distinct from other sectors and are 
not captured by the McNichols (2002) modified Dechow and Dechiv (2002) 
model. Similarly, companies from the Construction and Real Estate Industry 




revenue generating between 2010 and 2014 such as Union Homes Loans and 
Savings were excluded. Thus, the sample size of 101 non-financial listed 
companies with complete information on financials and corporate governance 
reports required by this study for the period of 2010-2014 constitute the sample 
size of this study. Moreover, the 101 companies involved in this study emerged 
from 10 out of the 11 industry groups generated over a period of five years 
(2010 to 2014), which resulted in 505 companies-year observations.  
 
Table 6.1  
Breakdown of Companies by Industry Groups for reduced Samples 









1 Agriculture 5 4.0 1 4 3.96 




10 7.7 4 6 5.94 
4 Consumer Goods 28 21.5 8 20 19.80 
5 HealthCare  10 7.7 0 10 9.90 
6 
Information & Comm. 
Technology 
10 7.7 3 7 6.93 
7 Industrial Goods 25 19.2 7 18 17.82 
8 Natural Resources 6 4.6 2 4 3.960 
9 Oil & Gas 10 7.7 0 10 9.900 
10 Services 20 15.3 4 16 15.85 
 Total 130 100 29 101 100 
 
Consequently, Table 6.1 provides the specific industrial group distribution of 
the sampled companies with a broad cross-section of Consumer Goods industry 
that covers 19.80 percent. Subsequently, Industrial Goods industry represents 
17.82 percent of the samples, and Services industry has 15.85 percent while Oil 




However, the contribution from remaining companies is Information and 
Communication Technology at 6.93 percent, Conglomerate and 
Construction/Real Estate Industry at 5.94 percent each, Agriculture (3.96 
percent) and Natural Resources (3.96 percent) respectively.            
6.3  Descriptive Statistics  
Table 5.2 presents the descriptive statistics for the financial reporting quality, 
CG and the moderating variables including the control variables of the research. 
It describes the mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum of data for 
each of the continuous as well as the dummy variables used in the study. 
Subsequently, presentation and analysis of the correlation matrix that explains 
the explanatory variables were carried out. The mean and the standard deviation 
of the financial reporting quality proxy by accrual quality as a dependent 
variable that represent the model of the study is 13 percent and 0.80, 
respectively. The variables with the remarkable results are leverage with an 
average of 49 percent and variability of 48.9 in thousands of Naira (N). This 
indicates the average numbers of firms with long-term debt over total 
shareholdings and its variability. It further shows that 49 per cent of non-
financial firms in Nigeria obtained long-term debt and was expected to service 
these debts within the agreed terms. Firm age has an average of 21 percent with 
a variability of approximately 13.0 and age chronology of between 1 and 49 
years of listing period. Thus, the study suggests relatively higher variability 




as one year before 2010 study period. However, board size is composed of 
between 4 and 16 members on corporate boards of non-financial listed firms, 
with the average board composition of 84.0 percent and variability of 2.2.  The 
range of board composition signifies that on the mean, sample companies are 
well composed in line with the Nigerian Corporate Governance Code’s 
(NGSEC, 2011) minimum requirements for board composition of five for every 
public company.  
 
On the other hand, there are listed companies that failed to implement the 
minimum board size of five for the diversity of experience, compatibility, 
availability for meeting attendance, maintenance of independence, integrity and 
efficient decision making. In comparison, audit committee shares ownership 
ranged between 0 and 31 in thousands of Naira, with an average of 16 percent 
and variability of 1.40. The result indicates that a significant number of boards’ 
AC non-executive members do not own shares in the sample companies while 
other non-executive AC members of the sample boards owned approximately 
16 percent of the entire shareholding of the companies. The independence of the 
Board is an important CG attribute that enhances the credibility and quality of 
the financial report. It ranged from zero and proportionately two INED on the 
corporate board of the sample companies, with an average of 72 percent and 
variability of 0.12. The result indicates the existence of the highly independent 





The size of the companies ranged approximately between 4 and 9, with the 
average of an approximately 69 percent of the mean and standard deviation as 
high as 0.78 companies. The result described how listed companies in Nigeria 
are well composed with 84 percent of the companies having more than five 
members on its board. The composition would enable a diversity of experience, 
professionalism as well as allows the formation of a quorum for the board 
meetings. The proportion of female directors in the board composition of the 
Nigerian listed companies ranged between zero and approximately one, with an 
average of 10 percent. This appears significantly low compared with working 
women population in Nigeria. It further signifies an insignificant number of 
female directors’ participation in the decision making on boards of Nigerian 
listed companies.  
 
On whether Nigerian listed companies consider duality in the board leadership, 
the statistics indicate that only 3 percent of the entire non-financial listed firms 
has a board chairperson serving simultaneously as the chief executive officer of 
the company, with the variability of 0.18. This result is extremely lower in 
comparison with Xie et al. (2003) and Saleh et al. (2005). This further suggests 
that Nigerian non-financial companies observe separation of CEO and chair of 
the board of directors roles. Regarding audit committee independence, the CCG 
NGSEC, and CAMA (2014) require the audit committee to consist of three (3) 





On the average of 99 percent, sample companies have a minimum of two (2) 
independent non-executive members of the board on the audit committee, with 
a variability score of 0.045. This signifies that a greater proportion of Audit 
Committees of Nigerian listed non-financial companies are independent. 
Consequently, the financial expertise of audit committee members has an 
average score of  9 percent, and standard deviation of 0.24 signifies more 
variability with a greater proportion of listed companies which do not appoint 
at least one audit committee member that has basic financial literacy or 
acquired accounting or financial management skills.  Accordingly, a member 
so appointed on the audit committee should be able to read and understand 
financial reports as required by NGSEC, CCG, 2011 (Sec.30.2).   
 
Table 6.2  
Descriptive Statistics of The Variables 
Variables Number Mean St.Dev. Minimum Maximum 
FRQ 505 1.302 0.797 -0.080 15.93 
BIND 505 0.720 0.120 0.286 1.333 
MSOW 505 0.103 0.318 0 3.793 
BS 505 8.392 2.191 4 16 
CEDU 505 0.0317 0.175 0 1 
BGD 505 0.103 0.103 0 0.600 
ACIND 505 0.998 0.0445 0 1 
ACFE 505 0.941 0.237 0 1 
ACSOW 505 0.157 1.401 0 30.52 
LEV 505 4.874 48.86 0 770.2 
FA 505 21.15 12.90 1 49 
FS 505 6.927 0.782 3.640 8.984 
PRAT 505 -0.561 17.58 -369.2 82.98 
Note: FRQ is the proxy for accruals quality, ACSOW is audit committee share ownership, 
BIND is the board independence, CEDU is chief executive officer duality,  MSOW is the 
managerial shares ownership, ACFE is the audit committee financial expertise, ACIND is the 
audit committee independence,  BS is the board size, LEV is the leverage, BGD is the board 





However, the descriptive statistics on leverage indicates a mean of 49 percent 




as 48.9 of the sample companies. This suggests that averagely in Nigeria, non-
financial firms have a debt covenant with creditors.  
6.4  Correlation Matrix 
Table 6.3 presents the relations between dependent and independent variables 
as well as among the independent variables. The table also indicates the strength 
of the relationships amongst the IVs included in this study. The values are 
obtained from the one-way Pearson correlations, with values indicating the 
correlation coefficients between the independent pair variables. The direction 
of the relationship shows a positive and negative pattern. The highest correlation 
of 49 percent is between firm size and FRQ, followed by 39 percent between 
MSOW and LEV. Meanwhile, the least correlation of 0.2 per cent is between 
firm size and firm age. Furthermore, the correlation matrix between IVs 
confiirms non-existence of perfect relationship based on the Pearson correlation 
matrix.  
 
Thus, it indicates no correlation coefficient greater than 0.80 which might pose 
a multicollinearity issue (Gujarati 2003; Hair et al., 2006). However, 
Tabachnick and Fidell (2007) and Hair et al. (2010) argue that existence of 
multicollinearity becomes a problem only when the association between the 
predictor variables are strongly correlated with each other with the associated 
values exceeding 0.9. Hence, there is the absence of multicollinearity between 




small values of the relationships between the majorities of the independent 
variables. Specifically, ACSOW is positively related with FRQ, even though 
the relationship is not significant. The result of the correlation matrix in Table 
4.3 indicates that LEV, ACIND, MSOW, and BGD are not significant but 
negatively correlated with financial reporting quality, which is an indication of 
the likelihood of decreasing earnings management and increasing the quality of 
earnings of Nigerian non-financial  listed companies. On the other hand, 
ACSOW, BIND, and PRAT are positively but not significantly correlated with 
financial reporting quality. It therefore suggests the tendency of ACSOW, 
BIND, and PRAT to increase earnings management thereby reducing the EQ of 
Nigerian non-financial listed firms. However, CEDU, BS, ACFE, and FA are 
positive and significantly correlated with FRQ. The relationship requires putting 
strong monitoring of managers to control management entrenched practice that 










Table 6.3  
Correlation Matrix of Study Variables for 101 Selected Non-financial  Companies Listed between 2010 and 2014 
 FRQ BIND CEDU BS MSOW BGD ACFE ACIND ACSOW LEV         FA            FS       PRAT   
 
FRQ 1.000             
 
BIND 0.027 1.000            
 
CEDU 0.0742* -0.0545 1.000           
 
BS 0.1470*** -0.0774*                0.1065**     1.000          
 
MSOW 0.0548  0.0803* -0.0277         0.0804*    1.000         
 
BGD -0.0460 -0.0218  0.0419          0.0237      0.0333      1.000        
 
ACFE 0.0958** -0.0680 0.0392         -0.0318     -0.0238    -0.0155      1.000       
 
ACIND -0.0433 0.1449***            -0.0243         -0.0064     0.0217    0.1196**   -0.0392   1.000      
 
ACSOW 0.0529  0.0233 -0.2678***   -0.0083    -0.0792*   0.0246       0.0017    0.0147 1.000     
 
LEV -0.0508  0.0370  -0.0222          0.0045      -0.3918*** 0.0766*     -0.0160 0.0114  -0.0289 1.000    
 
FA 0.1774*** -0.0151 -0.0526        0.1643***   0.2059*** -0.0602 -0.0082 0.1421** 0.0564    0.0218       1.000    
 
FS 0.4923* ** -0.0592 0.0790*       0.2819***    0.2884*** 0.0269 -0.0322 -0.0228 -0.0890** 0.0023***-0.3311           1.000    
 
PRAT 0.0132 0.0319 -0.0052       -0.0708       0.4327*** -0.0249 0.0086 0.0602 0.0032      -0.4793       0.0120***      0.1781***   1.000   
 
Note: Significant levels are at ***1% **5% & *10%, respectively. * P-values are one-tailed on predicted direction. Otherwise two-tailed. FRQ is the proxy for earnings quality, ACSOW 
is audit committee share ownership, BIND is the board independence, CEDU is chief executive officer duality,  MSOW is the managerial shares ownership, ACFE is the audit committee 
financial expertise, ACIND is the audit committee independence,  BS is the board size, LEV is the leverage, BGD is the board gender diversity, PRAT is ratio of earnings after tax to 




6.5 Diagnostic Tests  
In line with econometrics process, some diagnostic checks were conducted to 
ascertain the validity of the multiple regression analysis with the support of 
ordinary least square (OLS). These include multicollinearity, model 
specification test, heteroscedasticity, normality, and test for the outlier 
detection.   
6.5.1  Multicollinearity Test  
Multicollinearity was described as an indication of what happens where two or 
more predictor variables, particularly in multiple regression models, are 
exceptionally associated (Sekaran & Bougie, 2010). Furthermore, Tabachnich 
and Fidell (2007) argue that in multivariate regression techniques, no 
explanatory variables have a perfect linear relationship with one another. 
However, correlation matrix serves as the easiest means of detecting 
multicollinearity amongst the independent or explanatory variables. Further, 
scholars provided a guide on the threshold of the presence of multicollinearity 
in multiple regression models. For instance, Sekaran and Bougie (2010) argue 
that a correlation above 0.70 exhibits multicollinearity, while inter-correlation 
of more than 0.8 is regarded as an indication of extreme multicollinearity (Berry 
& Feldman, 1985).  
 
Accordingly, Hair, Black, Babin, and Joseph (2010) maintain that evidence of 




exceedingly correlated at 0.90. Moreover, another method for detecting 
multicollinearity is computing and assessing the tolerance value and variance 
inflated factor (VIF). Hair et al. (2010) argue that the VIF above 10 suggests 
serious collinearity while tolerance value less than 0.10 signifies serious issue 
of multicollinearity.  
 
Table 6.4 presents a test of multicollinearity of explanatory variables of the 
study. The result indicates the absence of multicollinearity. The fact that each 
of the variable values falls within the acceptable threshold of not more than 10 
VIF value, as suggested by Gujarati (2004), signifies that multicollinearity is 
not an issue in the model of the study. Consequently, the variable with the 
highest VIF of 1.51 is Leverage, while ACFE is the least with 1.01 VIF. 
However, the VIF mean is 1.20, further justifying the lack of multicollinearity 
in the entire model. 
 
Table 6.4  
Multicollinearity Test 
Variable VIF        Tolerance Value   
BIND 1.06 0.940 
MSOW 1.48 0.676 
BS 1.17 0.853 
CEDU 1.11 0.902 
BGD 1.04 0.944 
ACIND 1.07 0.938 
ACFE 1.01 0.989 
ACSOW 1.11 0.901 
LEV         1.51 0.663 
FA 1.13 0.882 
FS 1.30 0.768 
PRAT 1.46 0.685 
Maen 1.20  
FRQ is the proxy for earnings quality, ACSOW is audit committee share ownership, BIND is 




shares ownership, ACFE is the audit committee financial expertise, ACIND is the audit 
committee independence,  BS is the board size, LEV is the leverage, BGD is the board gender 
diversity, PRAT is ratio of earnings after tax to total asset, FS  is firm size. While FA is firm 
age. 
 
6.5.2  Model Specification Tests 
Model specification tests are conducted to compare whether the model is 
correctly specified devoid of any specification errors. The model hypothesised 
non-existence of omitted variables. Therefore, Ramsey (1969) test for model 
specification was conducted using the powers of the fitted values of financial 
reporting quality (FRQ). The result of the test (p-value=0.34521) and F-
statistics (1.09) justify that the model is well fitted and correctly specified, 
hence, does not require any additional variable(s). Thus, it is revealed that the 
model does not suffer any misspecification or lack of functional fit.  
 
Table 6.5  
Tests for Model Specification, Selection, and Fitness 
Tests                                                                        χ2 p-value Coefficients 
Ramsey Test  1.09      0.3452 - 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-
Weisberg 
0.10 0.7494 - 
IM Heteroscedasticity Test 29.46      1.0000 - 
6.5.3  Heteroscedasticity Test  
Homoscedasticity of the variance is the uniformity or constancy of the residuals 
that are randomly distributed using various estimations (Hair et al., 2010). On 
the other hand, heteroscedasticity exists with the presence of unequal variance, 




et al., 1998). Once heteroscedasticity is identified, it has to be resolved. 
Otherwise, it will reflect a biased value to have true variance and will not allow 
Best Linear Unbiased Estimator (BLUE) to be realised. Similarly, 
heteroscedasticity issue can be detected using White General Heteroscedasticity 
(Wooldridge, 2003). The rule of thumb is to accept the null hypothesis of p-
value greater than 0.05, signifying that the variance is homoscedastic. This 
study employed STATA statistical package in testing the presence of 
heteroscedasticity and examined the behaviour of the variance. Similarly, to 
reaffirm the result obtained in Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test, an 
additional test of Cameron and Trivedi's decomposition of Information Matrix-
test was carried out.  The result in Table 5.5 indicates IM Heteroscedasticity 
Test of χ2 = 29.46, with p-value=1.0000 which justifies the earlier result and 
further shows evidence of constant variance among the error terms. 
6.5.4  Normality Test 
Normality test is mostly used statistically or graphically to examine the even 
distribution of data. The statistical techniques employed to determine the 
normalities are the skewness and kurtosis. Therefore, distribution is said to be 
normal only when the value of skewness and kurtosis approaches or is close to 
zero. Among the major assumptions of regression analysis is that all linear 
groupings of the variables should be normally distributed (Tabachnick & Fidell, 
2007). Accordingly, the graphical technique of normality is mostly established 




the residuals become normal and independently distributed (Tabachnick & 
Fidell, 2007). Consequently, if the data is not normal, it may lead to wrong 
conclusions in the analysis of the models. Thus, this study conducted normality 
test using Cameron and Trivedi’s decomposition of IM test. The significance of 
the skewness illustrates the balance of the distribution of data compared with 
the normal distribution. If it is unbalanced, it shifts to the left or right. On the 
other hand, Kurtosis refers to the height of the distribution. It shows the 
peakedness or flatness of the distribution in comparison to the normal 
distribution (Hair, Black, Babin, & Anderson, 2014). For the data to be normal, 
the skewness should be within ± 1.96 while standard kurtosis should be ± 2.00 
(Abdul-Rahman & Ali, 2006). Nevertheless, Hair et al. (2014) argue that 
detrimental effects of non-normality be drastically reduced or becomes 
negligible by larger sample sizes.  
 
Table 6.6  
Tests for Normality 















Cameron and Trivedi (1990) decomposition of IM-test for skewness and 
kurtosis was conducted, and the result in Table 6.6 shows skewness χ2 =7.06 
with p-value=0.8538 and kurtosis χ2=1.01 with p-value=0.3143. The 




the data. Additional normality test using Mardia kurtosis test (1970) as in Table 
6.6 proved normal distribution of the data with χ2= 2.492 and a probability value 
of p=0.1145. Similarly, the result of Henze-Zirkler (1990) test in Table 6.6 
confirmed the normal distribution of the residuals through skewness and 
kurtosis jointly with χ2=2.522 and a probability value of p=0.1123. Thus, both 
skewness and kurtosis posed no threat to the dependent and IVs of the study. 
Furthermore, normal probability plot compares the distribution of data values 
cumulatively with the cumulative distribution of a normal distribution. This 
approach is considered to be more reliable in determining normality graphically. 
The normal distribution forms a straight diagonal line, and the plotted data 
values are compared with the diagonal. If a distribution is normal, the line 





Figure 6.1  
Figure Kernel Density Normality Distribution 
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Furthermore, the graphical normal distribution mechanism through the 
histogram (Kernel density normal distribution, Figure 6.2) and standardised 
normal probability P-Plot (Figure 6.3) were used for testing the normality of the 
data distribution. The straight diagonal line in Figure 2 with the plotted data 
values was compared and had indicated that the actual data distribution 
narrowly falls and follows the normal distribution plot. Further, the result in 
Figure 1 proved that our residuals are normally distributed because there is no 
deviation between kernel density estimate and normal density, thereby 
establishing the normality assumption. The results of these tests provided 
evidence that the regression model used in the study is justifiably specified and 
allow for interpretation devoid of issues relating to multicollinearity, 
nonmorality, heteroscedasticity, missing or outlier in the observations that may 
affect the results. 
6.5.5  Outlier Test 
An outlier refers to a substantially unique combination of values that distinctly 
differ in its characteristics from other observations. Similarly, where greater 
differences are identified in observations between the cases or actual values for 
outcome variable and the predicted value constitute outliers. An outlier can lead 
to non-normality of the data or produce biased results. It can also provide robust 
effects in OLS estimation, particularly in smaller samples (Wooldridge, 2003).  




suggest generating profiles of each observed outlier and employing regression 
techniques amongst other techniques to ascertain the differences between the 
observations and outliers.  
 
Nevertheless, depending on the importance of the outlier to the investigation 
that would allow the decision on whether the data is to be eliminated or retained. 
Thus, when an outlier is identified in an observation that constitutes an 
inappropriate sample drawn from the population, it is only proper for the data 
to be eliminated from the analysis as a non-representative of the population 
(Hair et al., 2014). On the other hand, Hair et al. (2014) added that outliers could 
be retained when it is demonstrably established that they pose no threat to the 
representative observations in the population to guarantee generalisation to the 










Figure 6.4 presents the graphical result of the predominant eight identified 
outliers in the observations. Furthermore, after controlling for the outlier, the 
firm-year observations were reduced from 505 to 497.  Comparing the robust 
outlier result (2) and robust normal regression (4) in Table 5.14 provides the 
insignificant difference in all the variables.  ACSOW, MSOW, ACIND, ACFE, 
FA and FS are all significant at 1% level in both tests. Thus, presence or 
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6.6  Comparative Analysis of DA for Pre and Post-CCG 2011 
The review of Nigerian SEC CCG 2003 and its subsequent review to CCG 2011 
is designed to ensure good governance in public companies, through the well-
established board of directors. Corporate governance is a mechanism expected 
to impact positively on the quality of earnings, as a result, discourages 
motivation for earnings manipulation. Moreover, implementation of CCG 2011 
is aimed at turning around the governance structures, boost capital market 
operators’ confidence, and safeguard stakeholders’ interest. It further seeks to 
enhance transparency in reporting, shape business practices and regulates the 
way companies manipulate financial information presented to users (NGSEC, 
2011). Table 6.7 shows the descriptive statistics of financial reporting quality 
for the SEC pre and post-CCG, 2011. The effective date of implementing a Code 
of CG for Nigeria was 2012.  
 
Therefore, the pre-period comprise of two years (2010-2011) as the period from 
the effective date of implementation and post period of equivalent years (2013-
2014) as the period after the effective date of implementation. Hence, the study 
used two sample t-statistics with an equal variance to examine existence of 
difference between the mean of the two groups (period) in enhancing the quality 
of financial report in the Nigerian listed non-financial companies. The post 
implementaion period is expected to have a lower discretionary accruals. Hence, 
the study anticipates the higher quality of earnings during the post-




sample means (pre-period has a mean value of 0.1410, the standard deviation 
value of 0.4263, while the post-period has a mean value of 0.2270, the standard 
deviation value of 0.3954). This indicates that the average of 0.1410 of the pre-
period is lower than the mean of 0.2270 of the post-period, implying that on the 
average, FRQ increases by 9 per cent. Furthermore, the result is supported by 
its significance at 5 percent (t-statistic is -2.1004, p-value = 0.0363) level. Thus, 
the t-statistics of -2.1004 is sufficient to reject the null hypothesis of no 
difference between the mean of the pre and post-CCG 2011.  
 
Table 6.7  
Test of The Differences of DA Between Pre- and Post- CCG, 2011 
Period Mean  SD t-statistics Significance 
Pre-Period 0.1410  0.4263 -2.1004 0.0363** 
Post-Period 0.2270  0.3954   
Difference -0.0859     
 
Consequently, the revised code of corporate governance 2011 brought about 
new regulatory changes that effectively enhanced the quality of financial 
reporting and as a result, decreases managerial self-motivation for earnings 
manipulations.  
 
Subsequently, a robustness test on the value relevance between the pre and post 
SEC CG Code 2011 was conducted,  which provides that, when the sampled 
period was portioned into pre-period (2010 to 2011) and post-period Code (2013 
to 2014), the corporate governance variable exhibits different characteristics 




regression for the pre-period Code period was presented in the third column of 
Model 2 (Table 7.1). The coefficients of the model basic variables (BVPS and 
EPS) are positive and significant at 5% and 1% respectively. Overall, the 
revised SEC Code of corporate governance 2011, implemented in Nigeria is 
more value relevant as compared to the SEC 2003 Code. Given the value 
relevance of the corporate governance variable post review period, the results 
indicates that a new set of corporate governance variables is more value relevant 
during the new Code regime.  
6.7  Chow Test 
A Chow test is a test that is conducted to test if a regression model is appropriate 
to explain the relationship between the dependent and independent variable 
between two groups. Again, if the coefficient of the regression model is the 
same between the two groups, then there is no structural change between them. 
Hence, a Chow test was conducted to analyse whether intercept and slopes 
(parameters) of one group in the regression model are different from other 
groups. A regression model was estimated using interaction method on group 
variables. The null hypothesis for this statistical test stated that the before (pre-
period) and after (post-period) of the revised Nigerian SEC CCG 2011 have 
equal parameters for the selected groups’ variables, ACSOW, CEDU, ACIND, 
BGD and ACFE and their intercepts. As such, deviations of the slopes and 





Conversely , the result of the Chow tests for the selected variable (ACSOW, 
CEDU, ACIND, BGD, and ACFE) provides that χ2= 23.47 with p-
value=0.0000, which is significant at 1 percent level. The result indicates that 
the coefficients of the IV’s are not statistically the same between the two groups. 
It further explains that there is evidence of policy change in the SEC CCG 2011 
that impacted positively on the quality of financial reporting in the non-financial  
listed firms in Nigeria. Therefore, the study did not support the null hypothesis 
and concludes that the coefficients of these variables are statistically different 
across the two different samples.   
6.8  Test for Serial Correlation 
Serial correlation affects the standard errors of the coefficients and as a result, 
decreases its value to differ from actual values with higher R-squared. As a 
result, the interpretation of its impact including fitness of the study model 
becomes distorted, leading to the less efficient result.  Wooldridge (2003) and 
Drukker (2003), implemented and justified a serial correlation test in a linear 
panel-data model. However, Wooldridge serial correlation test was conducted 
and provides χ2=1.615 with non-significant p-value= 0.2067. Thus, it provides 
evidence that, the study data does not have the first-order autocorrelation. As 
such, there is no statistical justification to reject the null hypothesis of no serial 




6.9  Hausman Test for Model Selection  
Hausman test for model selection provides a decision guide to justify the 
selection of a preferred model between fixed and random effect models. The 
aim is to examine whether correlation exists between the regressors and error 
terms in the model. Furthermore, Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier test 
assists in determining appropriate or fit model selection between OLS 
regression and random effects regression.  
 
Table 6.8  
Breusch-Pagan Lagrangian Multiplier Test for Random Effects 
Estimate Results Variable SD (sort) χ2 p=value 
FRQ 0.16163 0.4020 246.66 0.0000 
e 0.0509 0.2256   
u 0.0618 0.2485   
Variable (u) =0, SD = sort (variable)  
Therefore, Table 6.8 presents the result of Breusch-Pagan Lagrange multiplier 
test for random effect and provides χ2 = 246.66 and a probability value of 0.0000 
significance at 1 percent level. This suggests that there are significant 
differences across the sampled companies, which pointed the choice of 
interpreting the regression results using random effect model. Accordingly, 
Table 6.9 presents the outcome of the Hausman test comparing both fixed 
random, robust random and OLS for selection. The test is a product of the basic 
regression and interaction models.  It indicates a systematic difference in the 
coefficients and not correlated due to the χ2= 17.20 and probability value of 





Table 6.9  
Regression Model Selection Criteria Test 
VARIABLES  robust random fixed 
BIND  0.112 0.112 0.0361 
  (0.104) (0.113) (0.120) 
MSOW  0.104** 0.104** 0.107** 
  (0.0551) (0.0495) (0.0527) 
BS  -0.00651* -0.00651 -0.00334 
  (0.00463) (0.00682) (0.00746) 
CEDU  0.130 0.130 0.143 
  (0.107) (0.122) (0.141) 
BGD  0.0209 0.0209 -0.0145 
  (0.0316) (0.0431) (0.0618) 
ACIND  -0.0851** -0.0851 -0.00174 
  (0.0454) (0.110) (0.129) 
ACFE  0.140** 0.140* 0.00299 
  (0.0631) (0.0986) (0.158) 
ACSOW                    0.0462*** 0.0462** 0.0397* 
  (0.0149) (0.0272) (0.0288) 
LEV  0.0136** 0.0136 0.0195** 
  (0.00687) (0.0107) (0.0111) 
FA  0.00628*** 0.00628*** 0.00117 
  (0.00213) (0.00202) (0.00692) 
FS  2.355*** 2.355*** 3.333*** 
  (0.322) (0.226) (0.457) 
PRAT  0.00141*** 0.00141 0.00153 
  (0.000566) (0.00204) (0.00208) 
LEV*ACSOW  -0.00220** -0.00220 -0.00208 
  (0.00110) (0.00208) (0.00220) 
LEV*MSOW  -0.000298** -0.000298 -0.000322 
  (0.000178) (0.000543) (0.000557) 
LEV*BGD  -0.00483** -0.00483 -0.00427 
  (0.00222) (0.00393) (0.00430) 
LEV*BIND  0.00187 0.00187 0.00217 
  (0.00444) (0.0118) (0.0121) 
LEV*ACFE  -0.00305 -0.00305 0.00317 
  (0.00460) (0.0212) (0.0231) 
LEV*CEDU  -0.00935** -0.00935* -0.0156*** 
  (0.00584) (0.00525) (0.00589) 
Constant  -4.603*** -4.603*** -6.431*** 
  (0.677) (0.479) (0.888) 
Observations  505 505 505 
R-squared  0.340 0.340 0.290 
Number of code  101 101 101 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Significant at one-tailed 
The dependent variable is financial reporting quality, BIND is board independence, CEDU is 




size, BGD is the percentage of female directors on the board. ACFE is the audit committee 
financial expertise, ACIND is audit committee independence, ACSOW is audit committee share 
ownership, LEV is the interaction effect of leverage (long-term debt), FS is firm size, FA is firm 
age, PRAT is the profitability, LEV*ACSOW is the interaction effect of leverage in audit 
committee share ownership, LEV*MSOW is the interaction effect of leverage in 
managerial share ownership, LEV*BGD is the interaction effect of leverage in board 
gender diversity, LEV*BIND is the interaction effect of leverage in board 
independence, LEV*ACFE is the interaction effect of leverage in audit committee 




6.10  Results and Discussion  
The results and discussion hereunder are presented to explain the fitness of the 
regression model. Also, the regression model consisting of interaction variables 
and its fitness are equally presented. 
6.10.1 Determinants of Discretionary Accruals   
Table 6.10 presents the result of DA models.  Estimates from Model 1 presents 
the regression result of the study without interaction variables while Model 2 
presents the result of the study with interaction variables.  
6.11  Results and Discussion of the Board Characteristics 
Board characteristics play a significant role in providing high-quality financial 
reporting. As a monitoring variable, its efficiency and effectiveness are capable 
of reducing the level of EM by companies that consequently increases the 




6.11.1 Board Independence and Earnings Management 
The study expects a negative relationship between BIND and discretionary 
accruals. Table 6.10 presents multivariate regression result of the discretionary 
accruals model (Model 1). The coefficients of BIND is positive and statistically 
significant at five percent (β=0.312; t-statistics=2.29; p<0.011). This suggests 
that on the average, an increase in board independence by one unit would lead 
to a corresponding increase in DA by 0.312. Thus, pointing to the fact that BIND 
increases earnings management activities, leading to a decrease in the quality of 
earnings. The motive behind engaging the services of NED is to provide an 
independent opinion leading to unbiased and independent judgements. Broad 
experience, integrity, and credibility of NED reflected on board decisions are 
expected to improve the quality of decision with improved monitoring of self-
serving managerial activities and minimising the extent of erroneous financial 
information. That would lead to enhanced shareholder and other stakeholders’ 
confidence on the financial reporting process and reported earnings.  
 
Moreover, agency theory postulates that the higher proportion of outside 
directors on corporate boards, the higher the quality decisions. Thus, the ability 
to mitigate agency conflict correlates with the existence of independent boards 
(Jensen & Meckling 1976). This is because independent boards are strongly 
concerned about their market reputation and objective in monitoring financial 
reporting process (Fama & Jenson, 1983), as such the board plays a vital role in 





The finding of this study is consistent with the results of Petra (2007), Rahman 
and Ali (2006), and Saleh, Iskandar and Rahmat (2005), Dimitropoulos and 
Asteriou (2010), Abdoli, Maryam, and Rahmani (2011), Usman and Abubakar 
(2012), Sukeecheep et al. (2013), Ajina, Bouchareb, and  Souid (2013), Al-
Rassas and Kamardin (2015) who documented a positive relationship between 
the proportion of NED and EM.  
 
In contrast, prior studies provided proof of a negative relationship between the 
presence of NED and earnings management (Abed et al., 2012; Siagian & 
Tresnaningsih, 2011; Al- Momani & Obeidat, 2013; Clout et al., 2013; Ghafran, 
2013; Habbash, 2010; Iraya, Mwangi, & Muchoki, 2015; Lin & Halzoubi, 2014; 
Lo, Wong & Firth, 2010;  Ghosh, Marra, & Moon, 2010; Miko & Kamardin, 
2015; Osma & Noguer, 2007; Xie et al., 2003; Wang, 2010; Waweru & Riro, 
2013).  
 
Nevertheless, the results in Model 2 of Table 6.10, provides an interesting result. 
The coefficient of BIND appears positive but statistically insignificant (β= 
0.112; t-statistics 1.070;  p<0.141). This  indicates that on average, a unit 
increase in board independence increases DA by 0.112, ceteris paribus. Thus, 
the relationship between board independence and DA is positive but 
insignificant, which is in contrast to the study’s prediction. The result further 




enough monitoring role in curtailing EM practices in the Nigerian non-financial 
firms. Besides, the results in both Model 1 and Model 2 are in contrast with the 
study’s hypothesis (H1a) that the presence of independent NED has a negative 
relationship with earnings management. Therefore, H1a is not supported.  
 
Furthermore, the outcome of the study result is corraborated with the robustness 
result that the coefficient of the board independence was negative (-2.060) and 
significant at 1%. Thus, the board independence has a negative value relevance 
in the Nigerian capital market. This implies that the attention of the regulators 
has to be called to review the definition, appointment and the role of 
independent non-executive directors in managing the affairs of the firms. The 
finding also revealed the existence of black box between the intention of the 
regulators on the board independence and the expectation of the market 
participants. Thus, this issue needs to be addressed. 
 
One possible reason could be the influence of management in appointing non-
executive directors, or non-executive directors are overstaying that leads to 
familiarity in the board to the extent that managers can influence their decisions. 
According to Davidson et al. (2005), the board of directors’ inability to control 
irregularities might be due to non-executive directors' ability to be essentially 
independent of management. Despite the outcome of the study result, the 
resource dependency theory postulates that outsiders on boards have the 




managers from other firms, marketing specialists, and former public servants 
who are argued to facilitate advice and counsel as they bring with them 
necessary expertise, experience and skills (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). 
6.11.2 Managerial Share Ownership and Earnings Management 
Managerial share ownership (MSOW) is measured by the proportion of equity 
held by the ED on the corporate board to total equity shareholding of the firm. 
MSOW is predicted to have a positive and significant relationship with earnings 
management. Agency theory predicts that if managers own a substantial 
percentage of firm equity, they need not be monitored (Jensen & Meckling, 
1976) due to their stake in the ownership of the firm. In Table 6.10 Model 1, the 
result indicates a positive relationship between MSOW and DA. The result 
shows that MSOW has a positive and statistically significant influence over the 
DA of the non-financial  listed firms in Nigeria (β =0.126, t-statistics= 3.070, 
p<0.001) at 1 percent level.  
 
Consequently, the outcome suggests that a unit increase in the proportion of 
equity holding of the executive board directors would lead to an increase in the 
same percentage to abnormal accruals, leading to a decrease in the quality of 
firm’s earnings. Therefore, increasing the MSOW of a firm would lower the 
monitoring and control of manager’s entrenchment effect. It would further 
create more EM practices by the management, leading to declining financial 




However, Table 6.10 Model 2 shows similar results, where the result shows a 
positive and statistically significant relationship between MSOW and DA (β 
=0.104, t-statistics= 1.900, p<0.029) at 5 percent level. Furthermore, the result 
indicates that MSOW increases the use of DA and as such, has weak monitoring 
capability to curtail EM practices in the listed firms. Therefore, Models 1 & 2 
of this study provide further evidence that when long-term debt is introduced 
into the CS of a firm, it creates more opportunities for the use of abnormal 
accruals that pave the way for EM practices thereby decreasing the quality of 
earnings of the firms. The outcome of this study is consistent with prior research 
(Cheng & Warfield, 2005; Johari, Saleh, Jaffar, & Hassan, 2008; Hashim & 
Devi, 2008; Nedal, Bana, & David, 2010) that managers may be encouraged in 
employing DA in an attempt to recoup earnings and value of their stock holdings 
through higher managerial ownership.  
 
Thus, firms with higher managerial ownership are associated with more EM. In 
contrast, Warfield, Wild and Wild (1995), Yeo, Tan, Ho, and Chen (2002), 
Pedro and Emma (2007), Mustapha and Che-Ahmad (2010), Alves (2012), 
Rose, Mazza, Norman, and Rose (2013), Ajina et al. (2013), and Miko and 
Kamardin (2015) found an inverse relationship between MSOW and EM, thus 
improving the financial reporting quality of the firms. Thus, provides support 
for H1b of this study. Consequently, the result corraborate value relevant 
robusts test with the negative reaction of the market when managers own equity 




significant at 5%. This implies that capital market participants are of the view 
that managerial ownership triggers the level of insider dealings in a firm. 
Therefore, they discount the value of those firms with the managerial 
ownership.  
 
One plausible reason for this result is the SEC Code of CG, Section 14.7 and 
34(d) requirements for unrestricted amount  of  shares held by all directors and 
their interest in the company including its subsidiaries whether on the propriety 
or fiduciary basis, including direct and indirect holdings. Thus, it provides no 
limit to the amount/unit of shares to be held by both executive, non-executive 
and ID. Consequently, when managers are allowed to own substantial number 
of equity in the company, Yeo, Tan, Ho, and Chen (2002) argue that managers 
need to be controlled and managed, otherwise share ownership may increase the 
opportunistic behaviour of managers, leading to a decrease in the quality of 
financial reports. As such, managers would serve their personal interest to 
ensure manupulation of earnings to protect their equity holdings in the 
company. In this respect, the privileged information they have as inside 
directors would be used which leads to moral hazard, and higher agency cost. 
This is in line with agency theory’s assumption that minimising directors equity 




6.11.3 Board Size and Earnings Management 
The regression results in Table 6.10 Model 1 highlights the (β=-0.010 t-statistics 
-1.63 with a p<0.052) which present a negative and statistically significant 
relationship between BS and earnings management at 5% level. It further 
indicates that one additional member on the board of directors would lead to a 
corresponding decrease in the earnings management practices. Consequently, a 
decline in EM would improve the EQ of the Nigerian non-financial companies.  
 
Therefore, the result is aligned with prior studies that provided evidence that 
larger boards demonstrate more commitment, devote more time and effort in 
the monitoring and control of top management actions by reducing earnings 
management practices (Rahman & Ali, 2006; Hashim & Devi, 2008; 
Rajagopalan & Zhang, 2008; Monks & Minow, 2011; Hashim & Ibrahim, 2013; 
Sama'ila, 2014). Thus, the larger the size of the board, the lower the earnings 
management and the higher the quality of company earnings.  
 
Accordingly, Model 2 in Table 6.10 presents (β= -0.007, t-statistics=-1.410 and 
p<0.080), that indicates a negative and statistically significant relationship 
between BS and EM at 10 percent level. Although the effect size and the 
probability value have similar magnitudes, with Model 2 providing a level of 
significance at 10 percent, the direction of the relationships signifies that the 
size of the boards matters in monitoring and curtailing levels of EM. The study 




(2007), Coles et al. (2008), Yu (2008), Habbash, (2010), Alves (2011), Rouf 
(2011), Hsu and Wen, (2015) and Iraya et al. (2015) findings, that a negative 
association exists between EM and BS. It thus supports the predicted result of a 
positive relationship between BS and FRQ. In contrast, previous studies (Saleh 
et al., 2005; Rahman & Ali 2006; Jaggi & Leung, 2007; Nugroho & Eko 2012; 
Hassan & Bello 2013) found positive and statistically significant relationship 
between board size and EM. Similarly, Ajina, Bouchareb, and Souid (2013) 
found positive and statistically insignificant association between BS and EM. 
Their findings showed that a larger board exhibits ineffectiveness in monitoring 
function.  
 
The differences in the two findings might be due to differences in sample sizes, 
methodological approach, markets, and differences in corporate governance 
practices. Furthermore, considering the Nigerian SEC Code of CG, 2011 that 
requires a minimum of five (5) board members. Table 5.1 indicates a mean of 
8.392 with a minimum BS of 4 and maximum of a 16-member board, which 
may provide possible reasons for the boards of non-financial listed firms in 
Nigeria effectively to provide strong monitoring ability over the self-motivated 
managerial activities. It further justified the revised Code 2003 that restricted 
board size to the maximum of 15 members. Consequently, the fact that a larger 
board might compose of members with vast industrial and governance 
experience could be enough to form into sub-committees that could provide 




smaller board in handling more challenging responsibilities thereby restricting 
their oversight functions. Thus, the result supported the RDT preposition that 
the larger the size of the board, the higher the number of expert resources it drew 
from the outside environment. It further enables quality deliberations and 
leading to higher performance. In other words, the result supports a negative 
association between board size (BS) and earnings management (H1c).  
 
Accordingly, the value relevance of BS on share price was tested which 
corraborated the accruals quality results. Thus, the relationship between SP and 
the board size was positive (0.1869) and significant at 1%. This indicates that 
the more the number of persons on the board, the more the shared expertise and 
effective monitoring. These encourage the market to respond positively to the 
board size. 
6.11.4 Chief Executive Duality and Earnings Management 
In line with stewardship and Agency theory on CEO duality, Chief Executive 
Officer Duality (CEDU) in this study is expected to have a either negative or 
positive relationship with EM. The result of this study indicates a one unit 
increase in the CEDU leads to 0.197 increase in DA by the Nigerian non-
financial listed firms as shown in Table 6.10 Model 1 (β =0.197, t-statistics = 
2.16, p-value 0.030). This indicates that holding the two positions of the CEO 
and chair of the corporate boards, significantly increase the use of DA leading 




quality of firm’s earnings would reduced. This is in line with the argument that 
combining the two positions of CEO and chair of the board would decrease the 
monitoring function of mitigating EM (Jensen, 1993). Thus, the finding of this 
study is consistent with prior studies that found a positive relationship between 
CEO duality and EM (Xie et al., 2003; Saleh et al., 2005; Rahman & Haniffa, 
2005; Mohamad et al., 2012; Nugroho & Eko, 2012; Ajina et al., 2013; Taktak 
& Mbarki, 2014; Alzoubi, 2014; Zouari, Lakhal, & Nekhili, 2015; Hsu & Wen, 
2015; Iraya et al., 2015). This suggests that the more CEO serves as companies 
board chair, the higher the tendency to manipulate earnings and conceal relevant 
information away from the stakeholders. Thus, it will negatively affect the 
financial reporting quality of the firm.  
 
The fact is that Nigerian SEC Code of CG, 2003 allowed the same individuals 
to hold the two positions of CEO and board chair in public companies. The 
revised Code 2011, disallowed it for purposes of checks and balances and to 
avoid over-concentration of powers in a single person. The  result of this study 
justified the fear of SEC as provided in the SEC Code of CG, 2011, Section 
5.1(b). However, it is in line with agency theory prediction that separating the 
two positions reduces the power of the CEO and as a result, enables better board 
monitoring.  
 
The result in Model 2 Table 6.10 provides similar outcome (β=0.130, t-statistics 




the magnitude of the impact of long-term debt on the CEDU and level of DA 
relationship of the non-financial  listed firms remain the same, suggesting that 
CEDU and EM have a positive relationship that impacted negatively on the EQ 
of the sampled firms. Further, the concentration of power on a single person 
particularly involving executive as well as the board of directors’ decision could 
be manipulated. Again, the CEO whose performance appraisal, assessment and 
compensation is to be made by the board to whom he is the chair, is unlikely to 
be objective. As such, with CEDU, CEO would possibly use it to manipulate 
financial information in his favour, thereby misleading the shareholders and 
capital markets in taking a wrong decision. Subsequently, the quality of 
financial reports would be put to question. Thus, it provides support for H1d. 
 
On the contrary, in support of the stewardship theory perspective of aligning the 
interest of the agent and the principal, prior studies results differ with the 
findings. Kao and Chen (2004), Coombs and Wong (2004), Bradbury et 
al.(2006), Rahman and Ali (2006), and Ajina, Bouchareb, and Souid (2013) 
document that CEO duality actions are unlikely to be self-serving, as such the 








Table 6.10  
Determinant Model of Discretionary Accruals Model 
















BIND                  
- 
0.312 2.29 0.011 
0.112 1.070 0.1
41 
MSOW              - 0.126 3.07 0.001 0.104 1.900 0.029 
BS                    +/- -0.010 -1.63 0.052 -0.007 -1.410 0.080 
CEDU              + 0.197 2.16 0.030 0.130 1.210 0.224 
BGD                 - 0.054 1.72 0.084 0.021 0.660 0.508 
ACIND             - -0.224 -4.22 0.000 -0.085 -1.870 0.035 
ACFE             - 0.203 5.73 0.000 0.140 2.220 0.013 
ACSOW             - 0.031 5.48 0.000 0.046 3.090 0.001 
LEV                   + 0.001 1.59 0.057 0.014 1.970 0.025 
FA                 -/+ 0.007 5.13 0.000 0.006 2.940 0.001 
FS             -/+ 2.007 13.31 0.000 2.355 7.320 0.000 
PRAT              + -0.000 -0.10 0.461 0.001 2.490 0.007 
LEV*ACS
OW  
      - 
  
-0.002 -2.010 0.023 
LEV*MSO
W   
- 
   
-0.000 -1.680 0.047 
LEV*BGD        -    
-0.005 -2.180 0.014 
LEV*BIND      -    
0.002 0.420 0.337 
LEV*ACF
E      
- 
   
-0.003 -0.660 0.254 
LEV*CED
U     
- 
   
-0.009 -1.600 0.054 
_CONS  -3.940 -11.91 0.000 -4.600 -6.800 0.000 
R-Squared                      0.340                       0.340 
F-Value                    27.410                  - 
Wald chi-square                       -                    3189.520 
Sig.                       0.000                              0.000 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Significant at one-tailed 
The dependent variable is financial reporting quality, BIND is board independence, CEDU is 
chief executive officer duality, MSOW is executive directors shares ownership, BS is the board 
size, BGD is the percentage of female directors. ACFE is the audit committee financial 
expertise, ACIND is audit committee independence, ACSOW is audit committee share 
ownership, LEV is the interaction effect of leverage (long-term debt), FS is firm size, FA is firm 
age, PRAT is the profitability, LEV*ACSOW is the interaction effect of leverage in audit 
committee share ownership, LEV*MSOW is the interaction effect of leverage in managerial 
share ownership, LEV*BGD is the interaction effect of leverage in board gender diversity, 
LEV*BIND is the interaction effect of leverage in board independence, LEV*ACFE is the 
interaction effect of leverage in audit committee financial expertise, LEV*CEDU is the 





6.11.5 Board Gender Diversity and Earnings Management 
Gender diversity on the boards of Nigerian non-financial listed firms is expected 
to have either positive or negative and significant relationship with earnings 
management. Table 6.10 Model 1 presents the multivariate regression result of 
BGD relationship with FRQ proxy by DA. It provides (β=0.054, t-
statistics=1.72 and p-value=0.084), which suggests a statistically positive and 
significant relationship between BGD and DA at 10 percent level. It further 
reveals that a percentage increase of one female director would cause an 
increase in the use of DA by a factor of 0.054 leading to more EM practices. 
Thus, an increase in EM practices would lower the quality of the firms’ 
earnings.  
 
However, the relationship between BGD and EM changed with the introduction 
of moderating variable (LEV) into the relationship. In Table 6.10 Model 2, the 
result shows (β=0.021, t-statistics= 0.660, p-value=0.508). Therefore, the result 
provides evidence that a unit increase in the proportion of women on the 
corporate boards of Nigerian listed non-financial companies would lead to an 
increase in EM practices by a factor of 0.021. Accordingly, the presence of 
women on boards is not in any way a contributing factor towards restraining 
earnings manipulations, even when long-term debt facilities are injected into the 




Tsui, 2011; Ittonen, Peni, & Vahama, 2015; Triana, Miller, & Trzebiatowski, 
2014; Barua, Rama, & Sharma, 2010; Obert, 2015) on the financial discipline, 
conservatism in financial reporting practices, and courage in exposing 
fraudulent activities leading to their ability to monitor and prevent earnings 
manipulations could not be supported. Therefore, this study could not prove that 
gender diversity leads to a decrease in earnings management practices 
significantly using accruals quality measure in the Nigerian non-financial  listed 
firms. 
  
On the other hand, the robust test on value relevance of BGD provided mixed 
results. Thus, the coefficient of the board gender was found to be positive 
(0.2961) and significant at 5%. This indicates that the appointment of female 
directors on the board is value relevant. Thus, it lends support to the argument 
that female directors are more dedicated and more trustworthy in discharging 
their corporate responsibilities. From the descriptive statistics, women 
constitute 10 percent of the board composition in gender terms, in the entire 101 
non-financial listed firms in Nigeria. Given this inadequate proportional 
representation, it could serve as a possible reason why the result indicates their 
inability to monitor effectively and restrain EM practices as observed (Lincoln 
& Adedoyin, 2012; Obert, 2015).  
 
Further, the result did not account for other female directors’ characteristics in 




outcomes brought to the board. Nevertheless, the finding of this result did not 
contradict that presence of women on corporate boards has no positive impact, 
rather, the minimal proportion of women on the corporate boards of Nigerian 
non-financial listed firms does not accord them adequate monitoring control in 
reducing EM practices. Thus, this provides support for a relationship between 
BGD and earnings management (H1e). 
6.12  Results and Discussion of the Audit Committee Characteristics 
 The past two decades witnessed significant interest in the governance role of 
audit committee. Much of these interest emerged from the regulators who 
consider AC as a strong governance mechanism that can provide a noticeable 
improvement in the quality of financial reporting. Similary, scholars focus not 
only on AC composition but its effectiveness. Recently, regulators 
acknowledged that AC is quasi-mandatory and shifted from composition to 
expertise, and the relationship with governance constituent within the firms. The 
particular contribution of this study is its focus on specific characteristics of AC 
and the impact of these characteristics on earnings management of Nigerian 
non-financial  listed firms.   
6.12.1 Audit Committee Independence and Earnings Management 
The Nigerian SEC CG Code 2011 requires formation of a six-member audit 
committee with three (3) independent/non-executive board members and three 




committee and to reduce information asymetry between the board and 
shareholders. A significant negative relationship is predicted between the 
ACIND and earnings management. The outcome of the regression result in 
Table 6.10 Model 1 indicates a negative but statistically significant association 
between ACIND and DA (β = -0.224, t-statistics= -4.22, and p<0.000) at 1 
percent level. It suggests that a unit increase in ACIND by 0.224 would lead to 
a corresponding decrease in EM leading to improvement in the firm’s quality of 
earnings. This result further proves that the existence of ACIND would improve 
the monitoring functions of the committee thereby curtailing the opportunistic 
tendency of managers in manipulating earnings. Therefore, the result supports 
the study’s prediction of a negative relationship between ACIND and earnings 
management. Furthermore, the result is supported by prior reported findings of  
Klein (2002), Saleh, Iskandar and Rahmat (2007), Lin and Hwang (2010), 
García et al. (2012), Bassiouny, Ragab, and Soliman, (2016), Mansor et al. 
(2013), and Salleh, and Haat, (2014), Sharma and Kuang (2014), Soliman and 
Ragab (2014) and Al-Rassas & Kamardin (2015) that found a negative 
relationship between ACIND and EM.  
Consequently, the result in Model 2 Table 6.10 provides similar result in Model 
1, Table 6.10, where it provides (β= -0.085, t-statistics= -1.870, p-value= 
0.035). It shows no significant departure from the result in Model 1. Thus, a unit 




EM of the firms. Further, the result suggests a negatively and statistically 
significant relationship between ACIND and EM at 5 percent level.  
Therefore, the result corroborates the agency theory that the more independent 
NED are on the corporate boards, the higher the monitoring role which brings 
along expertise and experience that leads to improved earnings quality. It further 
supports the RDT that independent directors on the boards provide more 
assistance in gaining the desirable resources. This is because directors have 
expertise, experience, independent opinion and more linkages with the outside 
environment that is necessary for organisation’s survival and effective 
monitoring functions.  
In contrast, Agrawal and Chadha (2005), Ahmad Zaluki (2010), Bedard and 
Johnson (2004), Bradbury et al. (2008), Siagian and Tresnaningsih (2011) and 
Miko and Kamardin, (2015) found a positive relationship between ACIND and 
EM. Thus, this suggests that ACIND does not reduce but rather motivates EM. 
In particular, the more ACIND, the higher the EM, which decreases the financial 
reporting quality. In addition, Habbash (2013) and Waweru and Riro (2013) 
found an insignificant relationship between ACIND and EM. As a result of the 
inconsistent findings on AC independence and use of DA/EM, the result of this 
study is aligned with previous studies’ findings on the adverse relationship 
between ACIND and EM  leading to higher accruals quality as a result of which 




consequent upon the Nigerian SEC Code of CG 2011 requirements on the three-
member board of director’s representatives on AC, which comprises of 
independent non-executives directors. Thus, it further supports Klein’s (2002) 
findings that where AC is composed of a significant number of independent 
NED, the ability to restrain DA would be higher. Thus, providing support for 
H2a. 
Additionally, the robustness test using value relevance (price-earnings) model 
corraborated the accruals quality measure, where the coefficient of the audit 
committee independence was found to be positive (0.8883) and significant at 
5%. This indicates that the appointment of independent directors into the audit 
committee is value relevant. This supports the notion that with more 
independent directors on the audit committee, the higher the objectivity in 
preventing and curbing fraudulent activities in a firm. 
6.12.2 Audit Committee Financial Expertise and Earnings Management 
The result of the relationship between ACFE and DA is expected to have a 
negative and significant association. Thus, the result in Table 6.10, Model 1 
presents (β=0.203, t-statistics 5.73, p-value 0.000) that is contrary to the 
expectation of the study. However, the result indicates that one unit increase in 
ACFE leads to 0.203 increase in DA. The result further indicates that, there is a 
positive and statistically significant relationship between ACFE and EM at 1 




committee does not provide enough justification for curbing EM and improving 
the quality of firms’ earnings. Instead, ACFE encourages the use of DA that 
allow managers to engage in earnings manipulation. Similarly, Model 2 in Table 
6.10, provides (β=0.140, t-statistics=2.220, p-value 0.013) that indicates a 
positive and statistically significant relationship between ACFE and EM. It 
shows that a unit increase in ACFE by 0.140 would lead to a corresponding 
increase in EM practices, decreasing EQ by the same magnitude and causes a 
decline in the FRQ of the firms. Furthermore, the relationship between ACFE 
and DA remains the same between Model 1 and Model 2 of the study. However, 
the impact weakened in Model 2 as a result of the moderating (LEV) introduced 
into the relationship.  
 
The study’s findings are consistent with Hoitash, Hoitash, and Bedard (2009) 
and Mustafa and Youssef (2010), Mohamad, Rashid, and Shawtari (2012) that 
could not establish a strong relationship between ACFE and EM. Furthermore, 
firms with a high proportion of financial experts, not necessarily accounting 
experts are unlikely to report weaknesses in the internal control over financial 
reporting. In fact, it is only when an accounting expert is on the AC, pertinent 
and primary accounting related questions would be raised that has an overall 
bearing on the financial report (Scarpati 2003; Lipman 2004, DeZoort 1997, 
1998, Dhaliwali, et al., 2010).  In contrast, prior studies (Saleh et al., 2007; Qin, 
2007; Chen & Zhou, 2007; Kent et al., 2010; Yusof, 2010; Badolato et al., 2014; 




2014) document ACFE to have monitoring power to curtail EM practices in 
addition to high quality earnings reporting. Thus, this provides no support for 
H2b.  
 
Consequently, statistics indicate that 94 percent of the sampled companies have 
at least a member of the AC who can read and understand financial statements. 
Besides that, the size of firms’ operations, sophistication in financial 
transactions and internationalisation of financial reporting process. Financial 
literacy alone without accounting expertise may not provide the required skills 
and technical know-how to monitor and curtail EM practices in the Nigerian 
non-financial listed firms.  
 
Many reasons may lead to this finding. First, SEC Code of CG, 2011 provision 
requires the presence of only one financially literate member of the AC, not 
accounting or financial expert that has the capacity and expertise to detect 
fraudulent activities including managerial entrenchment effects. Secondly, the 
inability of the literate members to equip and update themselves with the latest 
manipulation techniques. Thirdly, different measurement of financial expertise 
may cause the difference in the result. Fourthly, overstay of directors in the audit 
committee can lead to management influencing their decisions and lastly, 
holding multiple responsibilities in another capacity. When the proportion of 




and controlling managerial self-interest in the sampled companies might be 
difficult, particularly in larger and chronological age companies. 
6.12.3 Audit Committee Share Ownership and Earnings Management 
Table 6.10 presents the results of multivariate regression Model 1 and Model 2. 
Regression result of Model 1, highlights ACSOW (β =0.031, t-statistics of 5.48 
and p<0.000). This suggests that there is a positive and statistically significant 
relationship between ACSOW and EM at 1 percent level. As a consequence, 
one unit increase in equity ownership of NED on audit committee will cause a 
corresponding increase in the level of  EM practices by 0.031. This result further 
suggests a decrease in the quality of firms’ earnings which would lead to a 
reduction of the quality of financial report of the listed firms.  
 
Therefore, the result shows that equity ownership in the company that is 
expected to motivate AC members to demonstrate more commitment, vigilance 
(Mangena & Pike, 2005) and effort towards monitoring and controlling could 
not curb opportunistic managers from earnings manipulation. It further signifies 
that ACSOW, which is intended to serve as an incentive to AC members, and 
aligns their interest with shareholders interests, fails to meet the objective. 
Similarly, the Model 2, Table 6.10 result shows that the sign of the coefficient 
remain positive (β=0.046, t-statistics=3.090, p<0.001), and the probability 
values of the two models provide statistically significant relationships between 




increase in equity share owned by the non-executive audit committee members 
would lead to a corresponding increase in the level of EM by 0.046. As a result, 
the EQ of the firms would decrease significantly. The findings of this study is 
in consonance with prior research (Forker, 1992; Lavelle, 2002; Carcello & 
Neal, 2003; Choi et al., 2004; Yang & Krishnan, 2005; Lin & Hwang, 2010b; 
Ghosh, Marra, & Moon, 2010) which argued that AC members with high equity 
holdings may seek to influence firms to protect their investments and provide 
incentives for earnings information of lower quality, which may weaken their 
ability to monitor and control EM practices.  
 
In contrast, prior studies that argued ACSOW reduces agency costs (Jensen, 
1993; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Shivdasani, 1993; Beasley, 1996; Martinez & 
Fuentes, 2007) found a negative association between ACSOW and EM 
practices leading to improved EQ of the firms. The result did not support the 
agency theory of providing a reduction in the asymmetric information and the 
agency cost. Thus, it provides no support for H2c.  
 
One plausible reason for the outcome might be the non-disclosure of the share 
ownership of NED of some companies in the governance report of the 
companies’ annual report. Secondly, the composition of the AC in Nigeria 
consists of three shareholders’ representatives, whose shareholdings are not 




mandatorily required to be disclosed, perhaps the result would have been 
different.  
6.12.4 Leverage and Earnings Management 
Leverage is proxy by long-term debt and expected to have a positive and 
significant association with earnings management. Leverage (LEV) is measured 
by the amount of long-term debt to total assets of the company. In Table 6.10 
Model 1 provides the result, indicating that a positively significant relationship 
exists between LEV and DA at 5 percent level (β =0.001, t-statistics= 1.59, 
p<0.057). It suggests that a unit increase in the proportion of long-term debt 
would lead to a corresponding increase in the level of DA by a factor of 0.001. 
Further, an increase in the degree of the firm’s CS through long-term debt 
acquisition would make funds available at the disposal of the management. 
These funds are unlikely to be fully utilised in the interest of shareholders. 
Instead, it may generate more opportunities for managers entrenchments.  
 
Accordingly, Table 6.10 Model 2, presents similar results as in Model 1, with 
LEV having a positive and statistically significant relationship with DA (β 
=0.014, t-statistics= 1.970, p<0.025) at 5 percent level. In this regard, 
acquisition of additional long-term debt into the CS of the non-financial  
Nigerian listed firms would motivate EM practices due to the available funds. 
The higher the leverage a company has, the higher the likelihood of bankruptcy, 




susceptible to engage in earnings manipulations to forestall debt covenant 
violation. As a result, creating an opportunity for the management to manipulate 
earnings to mitigate those risks.  Therefore, when managers pursue their self-
interests, it would negatively affect shareholders’ wealth maximisation which 
would lead to a reduction in the quality of firm’s earnings. The outcome of this 
result is in consonant with DeFond & Jiambalvo, (1994), Dechow et al., (996), 
Becker et al. (1998), Rahman and Ali (2006), Knechel, Sharma and Sharma 
(2012), Yisau (2013), Ajina, Bouchareb, and Souid (2013) Liu and Wang 
(2015), Miko and Kamardin (2015), and Al-Rassas and Kamardin (2016) which 
document that leverage has a positive and statistically significant association 
with DA.  
 
In contrast, Yang and Krishnan (2005), Jelinek (2007), Dwi et al. (2009), 
Adelopo (2010), Cristini (2010), Jiraporn et al. (2012), Zamri et al. (2013), Chan 
et al. (2013), Usman (2013), Paz and Griffin (2014), Afza and  Rashid (2014), 
Zouari, Lakhal, and Nekhili (2015) document that long-term debt (LEV) 
reduces EM activities and improves EQ as a result of  high monitoring role by 
creditors. Therefore, the outcome of this study is in agreement with the study’s 
hypothesis (H3a) that there is a positive relationship between leverage and 
earnings management in the Nigerian non-financial  listed firms. The results of 
the moderator in Model 1 and Model 2 is similar. Hence, the study’s hypothesis 




6.13  Results and Discussion of the Control Variables 
6.13.1 Firm Size and Earnings Management 
The size of a firm determines its ability to mitigate agency conflict and in turn 
reduces agency costs (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). In measuring firm size, 
natural logarithm of total assets was used. This study predicts to have either 
positive or negative association with DA. Table 6.10 Model 1 of the study 
provides (β=2.007, t-statistics= 13.31, p-value=0.000). It signifies that a unit 
increase in the size of the firm would lead to an increase in the use of DA (EM) 
by a factor of 2.007. It shows a positive and statistical significance in the 
relationship between FS and EM. It further suggests that as the size of a firm 
increases or the larger the size of a firm, the more it engages in EM practices. 
This result is in consonant with Lobo and Zhou (2006) and Uwuigbe, Ranti, 
Uwuigbe, and Bernard's (2015) findings, that opportunities for overstating 
earnings lie with larger firms, due to operational complexities that make it 
difficult for financial statement users to detect. As a result, the studies document 
that there is a significant positive relationship between firm size and DA (EM).  
 
Furthermore, the results in Model 2 Table 6.10 is not different from the results 
in Model 1, Table 6.10, that shows (β=2.355, t-statistics= 7.320, p-
value=0.000). With positive coefficient, the result indicates that a unit increase 
in the size of a firm (FS) would cause a significant increase in EM practices in 




significant relationship exist between FS and EM at 1 percent level. The 
outcome of this study suggests that the bigger the size of the firm, the more it 
engages in earnings manipulations, leading to a decrease in the quality of firm’s 
earnings, which in turn reduces the financial reporting quality of the firm.This 
result is consistent with Rahman & Ali (2006), Lobo & Zhou (2006), Banderlipe 
& Reynald (2010), Chen & Zhou (2007), Habbash (2010), and Jiang et al. 
(2008). Alzoubi (2014) argued that the larger the firms, the more the potential 
for EM, due to their operational complexities,  to retain consistent earnings 
growth and the desire to maintain or beat earnings’ expectations.  
6.13.2 Firm Age and Earnings Management 
Firm Age is considered to be the number of years a company passed since being 
listed on the Nigerian SEC. Firm age is predicted to have either a positive or 
negative association with DA. The result indicates that FA coefficient is positive 
and has a statistically significant value. The results in Table 6.10, Model 1, 
indicate that there is a positive and statistically significant relationship between 
FA and DA at 1 percent level (β =0.007, t-statistics= 5.73, p<0.000). 
Furthermore, the results signify that for every unit increase in the years of listed 
company, there would be a corresponding increase in the use of DA leading to 
EM practices by a factor of 0.007.  
 
Consequently, the findings highlight that the longer a firm serves as a listed 




result, newly listed firms may not have the ability and courage to engage in EM, 
due to fear of violating the SEC rules that they are not conversant with. Also, 
newly listed companies may want to be established and recognised by the 
market participants. Equipped with the operating rules or standards and for fear 
of being sanctioned, may avoid any unethical practices. Similarly, the results in 
Table 6.10, Model 2, show that the coefficient on the FA measure with 
intervening variable (LEV) is positively associated with DA. It further suggests 
that a unit increase in the number of years spent as a listed company would lead 
to an increase in the EM practices. The findings showed that there is a positive 
and statistically significant relationship between FA and EM (β=0.007, t-
statistics= 5.73, p<0.001) at 1 percent level. Therefore, the two Models (1&2) 
indicate that FA is a perfect predictor of EM practices in the Nigerian non-
financial listed firms.  
 
The ability to monitor and control the use of DA is widely based on the 
longevity of companies in the market. However, prior studies (Magnan & 
Cormier, 1997; Roosenboom et al., 2003; Aerts et al., 2007) document that firms 
deliberately increase their reported earnings during their year of incorporation, 
geared towards achieving IPO forecast. Arguing along the same line, Teoh et 
al. (1998) provided evidence that companies recorded poor stock price 
performance in its first year of incorporation when they reported positive 




shows that EM practices are associated with firms which have been listed longer 
than the recently listed firms. 
6.13.3 Profitability and Earnings Management 
Profitability is used in measuring firm management performance. Therefore, the 
management of a profitable firm is expected to pursue or adopt measures that 
would provide support for the continuance or retention of profitable positions 
and performance related activities. As such, profitability is capable of inducing 
managers in manipulating company’s earnings in their annual reports in an 
attempt to meet performance benchmark. In Table 6.10, Model 1 of this study, 
the results indicates that profitability has a negative coefficient of -0.000. 
Further, the result shows that profitability has a negative and statistically 
insignificant relationship with EM (β= -0.000, t-statistics= -0.10, p<0.461). This 
suggests that availability of firm’s annual profits discourages the use of DA 
leading to less EM practices in the Nigerian non-financial  listed firms. 
Although the relationship is not significant, it provides evidence that firms with 
higher profitability are unlikely to engage in EM, thereby enhancing the EQ of 
the firms.  
 
Consequently, Table 6.10 Model 2, presents positive results with profitability 
coefficient of 0.001, signifying that a unit increase in profitability would lead to 
an increase in the use of DA by a factor of 0.001. Further, the results indicate a 




0.001, t-statistics= 2.490, p<0.007) at 10 percent significance level. The 
outcome of this result shows that whenever a non-financial listed company 
acquires long-term debt, it will send a signal of funds availability, and that 
would cause a change in the behaviour of managers by increasing the use of 
DA, through extra spending, resulting in an increase in EM practices. When that 
happens, the quality of firm’s earnings would decrease, leading to a 
corresponding decline in the quality of the financial report. Thus, the findings 
of this study is consistent with prior research like Al-Shammari (2005), Ahmad 
and Mansor (2009) and Kamaruzaman, Mazlifa and Maisarah (2009). Yisau 
(2013) documented a positive association between profitability and EM, leading 
to lower EQ. In contrast Ali et al. (2004), Chen & Yuan (2004), Akhtaruddin 
(2005), Barako (2007),  Dwi et al. (2009), Adelopo (2010), Nedal et al. (2010), 
and Usman (2012) document that a firm’s profitability enhances EQ leading to 
improved financial reporting quality. One of the plausible reasons for this result 
could be that for these companies to continue operating, they have to convince 
potential investors of consistent growth in earnings, which in turn may require 
them to engage in income-increasing EM practices.  
6.14  Results and Discussion of the Moderator 
6.14.1 Moderating Effect of Leverage on the Relationship between Audit 
Committee Share Ownership and Earnings Management 
Table 6.10 presents the results of interaction (Model 2). The results from the 
multivariate regression model show that an interaction between leverage and 




at conventional level (β= -0.002, t-statistics= -2.010, p-value=0.023). This 
shows that on the average, a unit increase in the proportion of equity ownership 
of ED on the audit committee would lead to a decrease in the use of  DA by a 
factor of 0.002. The outcome of this study demonstrates that with the interaction 
between LEV and ACSOW, the magnitude of EM practice would be reduced 
and it can provide effective monitoring of financial reporting process. Hence, 
earnings information would strongly be of higher quality. Consistent with 
agency theory, Martínez and Fuentes (2007) also established that a positive 
relationship exists between the equity holdings of AC member and FRQ.  
 
Moreover, the result signifies that any additional long-term debt to the firm’s 
CS would improve the EQ of the non-financial listed firms in Nigeria. As a 
result, financial reporting quality of the firms would significantly improve. In 
this respect, the findings of this study are supported by (Jensen, 1986; Denis & 
Denis, 1993; Jelinek; 2007; Zamri et al., 2013) who argue that an increase in 
leverage reduces earnings management and that the level of leverage has an 
influence on financial reporting quality. It further suggests that the provision of 
additional financing using long-term debts, provides management with 
additional funds which bring in external monitors that monitor how funds 
generated from external funding are utilised and managed.  
 
Also, the demand for the repayment of the principal and interest associated with 




spending. Besides, the outcome of this study supports the hypothesis (H5b) 
which states that leverage moderates the relationship between AC share 
ownership and FRQ of the Nigerian listed firms. Hence, H5b is supported. 
6.14.2 Moderating Effect of Leverage on the Relationship Between 
Managerial Share Ownership and Earnings Management 
Table 6.10 provides the results of interaction model (Model 2). It turns out from 
the multivariate regression model that an interaction between leverage and 
managerial share ownership appears negative and statistically significant at 
conventional 5 percent level (β= -0.000, t-statistics= -1.680, p-value=0.047). 
The results show that on the average, a unit increase in equity shareholding of 
ED on the board of Nigerian non-financial  listed firms would cause a decline 
in the use of DA and subsequent decrease in EM practices. The subsequent 
decrease in EM practice by the firms would provide quality financial 
information for efficient and effective decision-making. It would further 
enhance confidence in the informativeness of firms’ earnings by investors, 
shareholders as well as the capital market. Furthermore, the results on the 
relationship between MSOW and DA in Model 1, failed to curb EM practices. 
Instead, it causes statistically significant increases.  
 
However, with the interaction of LEV in the relationship, the results show an 
inverse relationship. Therefore, the introduction of long-term debt into the CS 
of the Nigerian non-financial listed firms moderates the relationship 




provide effective monitoring of selfish managerial interest that reduces earnings 
manipulations. This interaction would further provide positive market reactions 
towards the companies on the quality of the financial report. Therefore, the 
outcome of these results is in support of the study’s hypothesis (H4c) that 
leverage moderates the relationship between managerial share ownership and 
FRQ in the Nigerian non-financial listed firms’. Hence, H4c is 
supported/accepted. 
6.14.3 Moderating Effect of Leverage on the Relationship Between Board 
Gender Diversity and Earnings Management 
Table 6.10 presents the results of interaction model (Model 2). It turns out from 
the multivariate regression model that an interaction between leverage and 
board gender diversity appears negative but statistically significant at 
conventional level (β= -0.005, t-statistics= -2.180, p=0.014). This indicates that 
on average, a unit increase in the proportion of women on the board of Nigerian 
listed non-financial companies would lead to a corresponding decrease in the 
use of discretionary accruals by a factor of 0.005. It further suggests that the 
presence of women on Nigerian corporate boards helps in curbing managerial 
self-interest, thereby enhancing the credibility of the financial report (FRQ) of 
the firms.  
Consequently, the relationship between BGD and EM failed to mitigate EM 
practices. The exception occurs when long-term debt facilities are injected into 




would be able to monitor significantly and control the EM practices. Thus, this 
study provides evidence that LEV moderates the relationship between BGD and 
FRQ of the Nigerian non-financial listed firms. Further, suggesting that women 
could be motivated to exercise their monitoring role which may likely reduce 
EM practices especially when long-term debt is introduced into the CS of the 
Nigerian non-financial listed firms. Besides, the outcome of this study is in 
support of hypothesis H4a of the study. As such, H4a is supported.  
6.14.4 Moderating Effect of Leverage on the Relationship between Board 
Independence and Earnings Management 
Table 6.10 shows the results interaction (Model 2) which are provided in the 
multivariate regression model that an interaction between leverage and board 
independence appears positive but statistically insignificant at conventional 
level (β=0.002; t-statistics 0.420; p-value 0.337). It indicates that on the average, 
a percentage increase of NED would lead to a corresponding increase in the use 
of DA by a factor of 0.002. It further indicates that an independent board is not 
sufficient in constraining EM practices even when leverage (long-term debt) is 
injected into the CS of the Nigerian non-financial listed firms. Hence, the 
relationship between BIND and EM practices is positive and statistically not 
significant, which is in contrast to the study’s prediction.  
 
Consequently, the introduction of the moderating variable (LEV) proxy by 
long-term debt weakens the strength of association between BIND and EM in 




vast experience, integrity, credibility and reputation could not provide the 
desired monitoring and control of the entrenched managerial practices. The 
outcome of this study provides evidence of BIND failure to provide such 
monitoring ability in curtailing EM practices. Thus, the result did not support 
the hypothesis (H4b) that leverage moderates the relationship between BIND 
and FRQ in the Nigerian non-financial listed firms between 2010 and 2014. 
Therefore, H4b is not supported. However, the result might be influenced by the 
ratio of NED on the public companies boards in Nigeria, contrary to Section 4.3 
of the NGSEC CCG (2011) that provides for the composition of the boards to 
consist of majority NED with at least one independent director. As a result, the 
result could not provide the required monitoring and control mechanisms in 
minimising earnings management practices. That leads to low-quality earnings 
and a decrease in financial reporting quality.  
 
Furthermore, the expected independence of thought and opinions might also be 
jeopardised due to the involvement of ED in the selection and appointment of 
NED on the board. Furthermore, a lack of specified NED’s tenure (Sec. 19.2, 
SEC, CCG, 2011) on boards creates familiarity with executive and management 
staff that limits their ability to monitor and control self-serving managerial 
interests. As such, creditors’ monitoring ability would contribute little in 
curtailing EM practices, and perhaps that may affect debt repayment schedules 




6.14.5 Moderating Effect of Leverage on the Relationship Between Audit 
Committee Financial Expertise and Earnings Management 
Table 6.10 presents the results of interaction model (Model 2). It shows from 
the multivariate regression model that an interaction between LEV and ACFE 
indicates a negative but statistically insignificant relationship at conventional 
level (β= -0.003, t-statistic = -0.660, p-value 0.254). This shows that an increase 
in the number of financial expertise on the AC would lead to a decrease in EM 
practices, thus increasing EQ by a factor of 0.003. In that respect, the financial 
reporting quality of the firms would be enhanced, although ACFE impact of 
curtailing EM practices is at a lower magnitude. Consequently, the results in 
Model 1 indicates that the relationship between ACFE and EM is positively 
significant at 1 percent level.   
 
On the other hand, the interaction effect of LEV on ACFE and FRQ (Model 2) 
proved otherwise, thus suggesting that ACFE would perform their monitoring 
role in curbing EM practices when long-term debt is added to the CS of the 
firms. Nevertheless, a prior study (Marra et al., 2010) also found a negative 
between ACFE and EM. Conversely, the result is in line with the study’s 
expectation of the moderating effect of LEV on ACFE. Therefore, the study’s 
hypothesis (H5a) that leverage moderates the relationship between ACFE and 




6.14.6 Moderating Effect of Leverage on the Relationship Between Chief        
Executive Duality and Earnings Management 
Table 6.10 provides the result of interaction model (Model 2), from the 
multivariate regression model that an interaction between LEV and CEDU 
appears to be negative but statistically significant at conventional 5 percent 
significance level (β= -0.009; t-statistics= -0.600; p-value 0.054). The result 
suggests that a unit decrease in the joint responsibility of the board chair and 
CEO (CEDU) would lead to a reduction in the quality of accruals by a factor of 
0.009. Further, the result shows the magnitude of the impact of leverage on the 
association between CEDU and DA of the Nigerian non-financial  listed firms. 
On the other hand (Epps & Ismail, 2009; Iqbal & Srong, 2010; Lin & Hwang, 
2010; Mohamad et al., 2012; Abed et al., 2012) supported the findings of this 
study with evidence that the relationship between CEO duality and EM 
activities is negative and statistically significant.  
 
However, this study differs with the above-cited studies with the introduction 
of the moderating variable that provided evidence that with long-term debt, 
CEDU will provide a more efficient monitoring function. As a consequence, the 
quality of earnings would improve with strongly improved financial reporting 
quality of the firms. Furthermore, this study provided additional evidence that 
when long-term debt is introduced into the company’s CS, its impact on the 
relationship between CEDU and EM would significantly change from income-




non-financial listed firms. Thus, financial reporting quality would strongly 
improve with strong and influential CEO on board as the chairperson. His 
experience as the CEO would give him an edge over a part-time chairperson 
who only participates in the company’s activities during board meetings. 
Therefore, firm strategic policies and directions, as well as monitoring and 
control of managers, would be more efficient and easier with CEDU.  Therefore, 
the outcome of this study is in support of hypothesis (H4d) that Leverage 
positively moderates the relationship between the Chief Executive Officer 
duality and FRQ in the Nigerian non-financial listed firms. Thus, H4d is 
supported. 
6.13  Robustness Tests 
In support of the findings of this study, robustness tests were conducted. Firstly, 
the value relevance (price-earnings) model was used to test the informativeness 
of earnings and market reactions on the selected variables. Secondly, the 
substitution test where the firm growth (FGR) and return on assets (ROA) are 
two additional control variables substituted with ACIND and BS variables, in 
two different multivariate regression models. Thirdly, to test the effectiveness 
of the SEC Code of CG mechanisms, a pre and post corporate governance Code, 
2011 was used to verify its effectiveness in mitigating EM practices in the 




6.15.1 Value Relevance (Price-earnings) 
The study employs one of the widely used value relevance models, the price-
earnings model to examine the value relevance of earnings during 2010 to 2014. 
Thus, the study adopts the price-earnings model employed by Ohlson (1995) 
and Burgstahler and Dichev (1997), where prices are regressed on earnings and 
the book value of equity. The test was conducted using the same sets of data 
collected and employed on the accuals quality measure (McNichols, 2002). 
Nevertheless, this study followed prior studies (Kothari, Leone, & Wasley, 
2005; Kraft, Lee, & Lopatta, 2014; Al-Rassas & Kamardin, 2015) that have 
used the winsorised variables distributions to stabilise the outliers. The extreme 
values were normalised from original observations at a minimum level of 1% at 
the top and bottom by winsorising the variables to maintain the original data 
characteristics, which gives a total sample of 465 for the value relevance test. 
The value of firm’s equity can be expressed as a function of its earnings and 
book value, thus:  
SPit=α0+ β0 + β1BVPSit + β2EPSit + eit ………………………………………(i) 
While the regression model is thus: 
SPit= β0 + β1BVPSit + β2EPSit +β3BINDit + β4BSit + β5MSOWit + β6CEDUit+ 
β7BGDit + β8ACINDit + β9ACFEit + β10ACSOWit+ eit……………………(ii) 
 
All other variables as previously defined except for SPit, BVPSit and EPSit, 
where: 





BVPSit = Book value per share of firm i at financial year t. 
 
EPSit = Earnings per share of firm i at financial year t. 
6.15.1.1 Regression Results 
Table 6.11 presents the coefficients of the regression conducted to test the value 
relevance of the corporate governance mechanisms. The results from the 
regression of the research variables for the combined period (2010 to 2014) are 
presented in the second column of the table. The coefficients of the model’s 
basic variables (BVPS and EPS) are positive and significant at 1%. On the 
corporate governance mechanisms, the coefficient of the board independence 
was negative (-2.0599) and significant at 1%. This implies that the board 
independence has a negative value relevance in the Nigerian capital market. The 
possible reason for this might be related to the definition and proportion of 
independent directors required on the board by the Nigerian code of corporate 
governance, 2011. 
 
The coefficient of managerial ownership was negative (-0.4678) and significant 
at 5%. This implies that capital market participants are of the view that 
managerial ownership triggers the level of insider dealings in a firm. Therefore, 
they discount the value of those firms with the managerial ownership. The 
coefficient of the board size was positive (0.0729) and significant at 5%. This 
reveals that capital market values the number of persons on the corporate board 




the size of the board, the experienced, knowledgeable and skillful members it 
composed, thus, it is considered value relevant by the market participant. As 
expected, the coefficient of the audit committee independence was positive 
(0.8883) and significant at 5%. This indicates that the appointment of 
independent director into audit committee is value relevant. This is because, the 
more the independent directors on the audit committee, the higher the 
objectivity in preventing and curbing fraudulent activities in a firm.  
 
The coefficient of the board gender was positive (0.2961) and significant at 5%. 
This indicates that the appointment of female directors on the board is value 
relevant. This finding is consistent with previous studies (Srinidhi, Gul, & Tsui, 
2011; Ittonen, Peni, & Vahama, 2015; Triana, Miller, & Trzebiatowski, 2014; 
Barua, Rama, & Sharma, 2010; Obert, 2015) that female directors are more 







Table 6.11  
Value relevance of corporate governance mechanisms 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Bvps 0.079 0.030 0.092 
 (8.18)*** (2.07)** (7.20)*** 
Eps 0.376 0.629 0.308 
 (11.89)*** (11.25)*** (7.90)*** 
Bind -2.060 -2.601 -1.854 
 (3.45)*** (3.19)*** (2.26)** 
Msow -0.468 -0.234 -1.033 
 (1.81)* (0.90) (1.61) 
Bs 0.073 0.041 0.102 
 (2.14)** (0.94) (2.05)** 
Cedu 0.190 0.198 0.207 
 (0.41) (0.38) (0.28) 
Bgd 0.296 0.086 0.374 
 (2.02)** (0.45) (1.84)* 
Acind 0.888 0.759 0.951 
 (1.99)** (1.53) (1.29) 
Acfe 0.135 0.112 0.059 
 (0.47) (0.32) (0.14) 
Acsow -0.000 -0.120 0.001 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) 
Cons 0.203 1.065 -0.250 
 (0.26) (1.15) (0.21) 
N           465          186           279 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Significant at one-tailed 
The dependent variable SP is share price, independent variables are: BVPS is book value per 
share, EPS is earnings per share, BIND is board independence, CEDU is chief executive officer 
duality, MSOW is executive directors shares ownership, BS is the board size, BGD is the 
percentage of female directors. ACFE is the audit committee financial expertise, ACIND is 
audit committee independence, ACSOW is audit committee share ownership. 
 
 
When the sampled period was portioned into pre-period (2010 to 2011) and 
post-period Code (2013 to 2014) periods, the corporate governance variable 
exhibits different characteristics and is valued differently by the capital market 
participants. The results of the regression for the pre-period Code period was 
presented in the third column of Model 2 (Table 6.11). The coefficients of the 
model basic variables (BVPS and EPS) are positive and significant at 5% and 




the board independence was negative (-2.6017) and significant at 1%. This 
reveals that before the implementation of the new corporate governance code, 
the valuation of the board independence was negative. This indicates that the 
market participants are not comfortable with the degree of independence of non-
executive directors on the corporate boards. None of the other corporate 
governance variables were found to be value relevant before the implementation 
of new SEC Corporate Governance Code. 
 
 The result for the post-period implementation was presented in the fourth 
column of table 4 Model 3. The coefficients of the model basic variables are 
positive and significant at 1%. The coefficient of the board independence was 
negative (-1.8537) and significant at 5%. The result reveals that even after the 
implementation of the new corporate governance Code, capital market 
participants have valued the appointment of an independent non-executive 
director on the board negatively. This implies that there is a call for regulators 
to review the definition, appointment and the role of independent non-executive 
directors in managing the affairs of the firms.  
 
The finding also revealed the existence of black box between the intention of 
the regulators on the board independence and the expectation of the market 
participants. Thus, this issue needs to be addressed. Before the revised SEC 
Code in 2011, female representaion on Nigerian corporate boards does not form 




boards. After the implementation of the new corporate governance code, board 
gender diversity became statistically significant in the post-code 
implementation regime. The coefficient of the board gender diversity was 
positive (0.3742) and significant at 5%. This implies that the market values the 
appointment of females on the corporate board post-revised Code consequent 
upon the requirement for ensuring diversity of the public listed companies. 
Similarly, the coefficient of the board size during the new code era was positive 
(0.1017) and significant at 5%. This indicates that board size is value relevant 
during the post-implementation period.  
 
Perhaps, one of the plausible reason is the non-restriction to the size of the 
boards, that allows injection of new expertise, industry experience and skillful 
board members from across the country. Overall, the revised SEC Code of 
corporate governance 2011, implemented in Nigeria is more value relevant 
compared to the SEC 2003 Code. This was evident by the increase in the number 
of corporate governance mechanisms that are value relevant. In both periods, 
board independence was having a negative value relevance. However, during 
the new Code era, the board gender diversity and board size become value 
relevant. This indicates that the new set of corporate governance variables are 




6.15.2 Variables Substitution  
Table 6.12 presents the regression result of Model 1 and Model 2 using the 
variables substitution test. The multivariate regression Model 1 depicts the 
regression result where the two additional control variables of  FGR and ROA 
were added to the model. The firm’s growth was introduced because of its 
association with sales revenue that is a potential avenue for earnings 
manipulation. Accordingly, it can tempt managers to present financial 
information that portrays good firm performance to the shareholders, contrary 
to the actual performance of the firm. Similarly, ROA gives an idea of exactly 
how profitable a firm is, and the efficiency of its management in employing its 
assets to generate earnings.  Hence, ROA has a strong correlation with the way 
earnings are managed and reported.  
 
Therefore, the study considers the two control variables as relevant and 
important in determining the extent of earnings management practices of the 
Nigerian non-financial listed firms. Subsequently, to test for the robustness of 
the results, board size (BS) and audit committee independence (ACIND) were 
substituted with the two introduced control variables. The results from the 
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) test that compared the differences in the 
samples of the two models and Bayesian information criterion (BIC) that is 
based on the comparison of models from different samples are used to determine 





Table 6.12  
Robust Regression Results 
VARIABLES Frq (1) Frq (2) 
BIND 0.0980 0.112 
 (0.0973) (0.104) 
MSOW 0.108** 0.104* 
 (0.0543) (0.0551) 
CEDU 0.137 0.130 
 (0.103) (0.107) 
BGD -0.0223 -0.0209 
 (0.0314) (0.0316) 
LEV 0.0127** 0.0136** 
 (0.00650) (0.00687) 
ACSOW 0.0429*** 0.0462*** 
 (0.0139) (0.0149) 
ACFE 0.126* 0.140** 
 (0.0668) (0.0631) 
FA 0.00596*** 0.00628*** 
 (0.00214) (0.00213) 
FS 2.389*** 2.355*** 
 (0.341) (0.322) 
PRAT 0.00117* 0.00141** 
 (0.000626) (0.000566) 
FGR -0.00751  
 (0.00692)  
ROA -0.0156  
 (0.0124)  
ACIND  -0.0851* 
  (0.0454) 
BS  -0.00651 
  (0.00463) 
c.lev#c.acsow -0.00195* -0.00220** 
 (0.00103) (0.00110) 
c.lev#c.msow 0.000211 0.000298* 
 (0.000186) (0.000178) 
c.lev#c.bgd -0.00414** -0.00483** 
 (0.00204) (0.00222) 
c.lev#c.bind 0.00296 0.00187 
 (0.00452) (0.00444) 
1.acfe#c.lev -0.00324 -0.00305 
 (0.00579) (0.00460) 
1.cedu#c.lev -0.00980* -0.00935 
 (0.00552) (0.00584) 
Constant -4.681*** -4.582*** 
 (0.677) (0.675) 
Observations 505 505 
Number of code 101 101 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Significant at one-tailed 
The dependent variable is financial reporting quality, BIND is board independence, CEDU is 
chief executive officer duality, MSOW is directors shares ownership, BS is the board size, BGD 
is the board gender diversity. ACFE is the audit committee financial expertise, ACIND is audit 
committee independence, ACSOW is audit committee share ownership, LEV is the interaction 
effect of leverage (long-term debt), FS is firm size, FA is firm age, PRAT is the profitability, 




LEV*MSOW is the interaction effect of leverage in managerial share ownership, LEV*BGD is 
the interaction effect of leverage in board gender diversity, LEV*BIND is the interaction effect 
of leverage in board independence, LEV*ACFE is the interaction effect of leverage in audit 
committee financial expertise, LEV*CEDU is the interaction effect of leverage in chief 
executive officer duality 
 
 
In Table 6.13, Model 1 shows regression model with the additional control 
variables (FGR and ROA) and provides AIC=328.523 and BIC= 408.752. 
Whereas, Model 2 indicates the main model of the study and provides 
AIC=326.27 and BIC= 406.54. Thus, the model that jointly provides the lowest 
AIC and BIC is considered to be the best and most desirable model. Therefore, 
Model 2 has the lowest which is not significantly different from the main 
regression model in Table 6.10. Thus, the test justifies the robustness of the 
results obtained in the main regression model of the study in Table 6.10.  
 
Table 6.13  
Akaike's and Bayesian Information Criterion 
Model Obs Ll (null)         
 Ll 
(model)      
df AIC BIC 
1 505 
-
255.8872    
 -
145.2613      
19 328.5227     408.7516 
2 505 -255.895     -144.135      19 326.270     406.536 
 
Accordingly, Table 6.13 presents the multivariate regression models. Model 1 
presents the model that is composed of control variables FRG and ROA which 
are substituted with ACIND and BS. The results indicate that BGD is negative 
but not statistically significant in both Model 1 and 2. However, the interaction 
effect of LEV on BGD remains negative and statistically significant at 5 percent 




This result appears to be the same as in the main regression model in Table 6.10. 
Moreover, the robustness test provides a positive but statistical insignificant 
association between LEV and MSOW. It signifies a change in the monitoring 
role of ED with equity holdings in the non-financial Nigerian listed firms. The 
result is in contrast with the main findings in Table 6.10 that suggests a negative 
association between LEV and MSOW in monitoring managerial entrenchments.  
 
Although FGR and ROA appear negative but statistically insignificant, it thus 
suggests that they have a positive impact on the firms’ EQ and are effective in 
curtailing EM practices which further contributes to providing quality financial 
reports of the Nigerian non-financial listed firms. Thus, findings from the two 
approaches appear qualitatively similar to the main regression results in Table 
6.10. On the whole, the robustness tests demonstrate that the main regression 
results are robust and not responsive to the variables change technique.  
6.15.3 Corporate Governance Mechanisms Impact on Pre and Post-CG 
Code 2011 
Table 6.14 presents a comparison between the earnings management (proxy) of 
FRQ and IVs of the study in the pre and post-CCG 2011 period. The analytical 
comparison is aimed at examining whether the revised CCG 2011 has a 
significant impact on CG practices in enhancing FRQ of the non-financial  listed 
firms in Nigeria compared with the CG code 2003. Further, the analyses would 




Table 6.14 shows that the pre-period R2 is approximately 32 percent, while the 
post-period R2 is approximately 33 percent, providing evidence of an increase 
in the strength of the model in the CG post code 2011 period that fully explains 
the relationship between IVs and dependent variable in the earnings 
management model. However, both models are well fitted by the significance 
at one percent level. However, the regression results show that ACSOW, 
CEDU, BIND are positively but statistically insignificantly associated with 
earnings management during the pre-NGSEC 2011 CG Code.  
 
Table 6.14  
Regression Result of Pre and Post CCG 2011 
Pre-Code 2011 Post-Code 2011 
Variables  Coeff.    t-stat     p-value  Coeff.    t-stat     p-value 
BIND 0.286 1.11 0.133 0.137    0.62    0.269      
MSOW 0.105 1.88 0.031** 0.127    0.78    0.219     
BS -0.004 -0.42 0.339 -0.018    -1.74    0.041**     
CEDU 0.119 0.87 0.193 0.265    1.74    0.041**     
BGD -0.051 -1.00 0.160 -0.076    -1.19    0.118     
LEV 0.001 1.51 0.067* 0.002    0.73    0.233     
ACIND -0.240 -2.61 0.005*** -0.185    -2.15    0.017** 
ACFE 0.182 3.17 0.001*** 0.231    4.30    0.000***      
ACSOW 0.053 0.76 0.224 0.032    5.34    0.000***     
FA 0.007 3.39 0.000*** 0.005    2.16    0.016**      
FS 1.899 7.37 0.000*** 2.159    9.38    0.000***      
PRAT -0.000 -0.11 0.460 -0.019    -0.31    0.380     
Group observations            202     202 
R-Squared                                            0.32                          0.33 
Sig.                                                       0.000***                  0.000*** 
 ***, ** and * indicate a significant level at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. Significant at one-
tailed. The dependent variable is financial reporting quality, BIND is board independence, 
CEDU is chief executive officer duality, MSOW is directors shares ownership, BS is the board 
size, and BGD is the board gender diversity. ACFE is the audit committee financial expertise, 




is the interaction effect of leverage (long-term debt), FS is firm size, FA is firm age, PRAT is 
the profitability. 
 
Similarly, LEV, MSOW, BIND are positively but statistically insignificantly 
related to EM in the post-period. However, LEV, ACFE, FA, FS, and MSOW 
are positive and significantly related to EM at 10 percent, 1 percent, 1 percent, 
1 percent, and 5 percent respectively, during the pre-CCG 2011 period, thereby 
enhancing EM practices as well reducing the quality of financial reporting of 
the listed firms. 
 
Accordingly, results in Table 5.14 indicate that ACSOW, CEDU and ACFE are 
statistically positive and significant at the conventional level, post-NSEC CG 
Code 2011. Meanwhile, the control variables FA and FS are both positive and 
significantly related with EM. Conversely, ACIND appears negative and 
significant before and after the Revised CCG 2011, signifying an inverse 
association with earnings management. This suggests that the changes in the 
revised code impacted positively on the EQ of the non-financial listed firms in 
Nigeria. Hereafter, earnings management practices in the non-financial  listed 
firms are on the decrease. Therefore, quality of earnings is higher in the post-
period SEC, CCG, 2011 than in the pre-period SEC, CCG, 2011. In line with 
institutional theory, Nigerian SEC Code of CG 2011 impacted positively in 
providing effective mechanisms for monitoring and control of earnings 




6.15.4 Test With and Without Outlier 
In testing the robustness of the study results, the outliers identified are 
considered in checking their sensitivity to the outcome of the main regression 
results. Thus, Table 5.14 presents the comparative analysis between the OLS 
regression results with and without outliers.  
 
Table 6.15  
Comparing Regression Results With and Without Outlier 
     
Variables Outlier Normal Outlierobust Normalrob 
BIND 0.374*** 0.312** 0.374*** 0.312** 
 (0.101) (0.126) (0.0951) (0.136) 
MSOW 0.157*** 0.126** 0.157*** 0.126*** 
 (0.0580) (0.0565) (0.0467) (0.0411) 
BS -0.0120** -0.0101** -0.0120** -0.0101** 
 (0.00584) (0.00729) (0.00569) (0.00619) 
CEDU 0.201** 0.197* 0.201** 0.197** 
 (0.0815) (0.102) (0.0868) (0.0912) 
BGD -0.0209* -0.0538** -0.0209* -0.0538** 
 (0.0248) (0.0311) (0.0239) (0.0312) 
LEV 0.00149* 0.000798** 0.00149* 0.000798** 
 (0.00143) (0.000336) (0.000996) (0.000502) 
ACIND -0.245*** -0.224** -0.245*** -0.224*** 
 (0.0822) (0.0998) (0.0429) (0.0531) 
ACFE 0.203*** 0.203*** 0.203*** 0.203*** 
 (0.0497) (0.0627) (0.0324) (0.0355) 
ACSOW 0.0287*** 0.0311*** 0.0287*** 0.0311*** 
 (0.00880) (0.0111) (0.00461) (0.00566) 
FA 0.00722*** 0.00660*** 0.00722*** 0.00660*** 
 (0.000980) (0.00122) (0.00104) (0.00129) 
FS 2.033*** 2.007*** 2.033*** 2.007*** 
 (0.127) (0.144) (0.130) (0.151) 
PRAT 0.000530 -7.95e-05 0.000530 -7.95e-05 
 (0.00318) (0.00101) (0.000393) (0.000800) 
Constant -4.037*** -3.940*** -4.037*** -3.940*** 
 (0.278) (0.316) (0.287) (0.334) 
Observations 497 505 497 505 
R-squared 0.440 0.338 0.440 0.338 
Note: Significant levels at ***1% **5% & *10% respectively. Significant at one-tailed. The 
dependent variable is financial reporting quality, BIND is board independence, CEDU is chief 
executive officer duality, MSOW is directors shares ownership, BS is the board size, and BGD 
is the board gender diversity. ACFE is the audit committee financial expertise, ACIND is audit 
committee independence, ACSOW is audit committee share ownership, LEV is the interaction 




The result of CEDU both in normal and outlier results provide comparable 
results. The differences examined in BS provides statistical significance at 5% 
level with outlier, while the insignificant result was observed under robust 
normal regression result. However, BGD was significant in the result with 
outlier at 10% level but stronger at 5% in the robust normal result. Therefore, 
the presence of outliers in the observations did not change the overall results of 
the study. Thus, this signifies the robustness of the main regression results of 
this study. 
6.16  Summary of the Chapter 
Chapter Five presents the study’s industrial distribution as well as the 
descriptive statistics, correlation matrix analyses, in addition to the diagnostic 
tests. The diagnostic tests, checked for Multicollinearity, Heteroscedasticity, 
Normality (skewness and kurtosis) using both Kernel density normal 
distribution and standardised normal probability P-Plot distribution. 
Furthermore, the presence of outliers in the data was also tested to identify 
possible distortion in the study observations, which may result to non-normality 
of the data. In doing that, the study used regression technique and outlier plot to 
portray visual identification of the outlier. Moreover, Chow tests, tests for serial 
correlation and Hausman test for model selection were conducted and 
appropriate criterion adopted for the study. The chapter also presented the 




There upon, out of the sixteen hypotheses set for the research, seven are 
supported, while the remaining nine are not supported. Finally, the summary of 





CHAPTER SEVEN  
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 
7.1  Introduction 
This chapter is set to recap the previous chapters one to five and provide a 
summary of the research objectives, hypotheses development, and 
methodological approach towards achieving the research objectives. The 
summary of results, findings, conclusions, contributions of the study and outline 
of the study limitations are presented. Finally, the chapter presents the 
recommendations for future research in broadening the frontiers of knowledge 
in the study area. Consequently, the conclusions of the thesis are presented.  
7.2  Summary  
The main objective of this study is to examine the relationships between 
corporate governance and financial reporting quality (EM) of  Nigerian non-
financial  listed firms. Other objectives include to: (i) examine the relationship 
between board characteristics; (ii) examine the effect of the audit committee 
characteristics in providing a quality financial report in Nigerian non-financial 
listed firms; (iii) examine the relationship between leverage and financial 
reporting quality of Nigerian listed firms; (iv) examine the moderating effect of 
leverage on the relationship between board characteristics and FRQ of Nigerian 
listed firms;  (v) examine the moderating effect of leverage on the relationships 




the effect of SEC Code of corporate governance (2011) on the quality of 
financial reporting of  Nigerian non-financial listed firms. Similar to prior 
studies, a significant evidence emerges from the current study with mixed 
results on the IVs. The summary results for the entire sample is reported in Table 
7.1. Besides, the inconsistent results from prior studies on the relationships 
between managerial share ownership, board independence, board gender 
diversity, chief executive officer duality, audit committee share ownership and 
audit committee financial expertise and earnings management motivated the 
introduction of long-term debt proxy by leverage as an interacting variable. 
Accordingly, the summary results show that the hypothesised relationship 
between MSOW, BS, CEDU, LEV and ACIND and earnings management are 
supported.  
 
Correspondingly, the relationships between board independence, board gender 
diversity, audit committee financial expertise, audit committee share ownership, 
and the moderating effect of leverage on board independence and audit 
committee financial expertise  and  earnings management are not supported in 
the study. Nevertheless, the moderating effect of leverage on the relationship 
between MSOW; ACSOW; CEDU, BGD and the impact on the EM of Nigerian 





Table 7.1  
Summary results of tested hypotheses 






There is a negative relationship between presence of 
independent non-executive directors and earnings 







There is a positive relationship between managerial 
share ownership and earnings management  of 






There is a relationship between board size and 
earnings management  of Nigerian listed firms; 





There is a relationship between chief executive officer 






There is a relationship between board gender diversity 










There is a significant negative relationship between 
audit committee independence and earnings 
management. 
  
There is a negative relationship between AC member 












      
H2c 
 
There is a significant negative relationship between 







There is a significant positive relationship between 






Leverage moderates the relationship between board 






Leverage moderates the relationship between board 







Leverage moderates the relationship between 







Leverage moderates the relationship between the 







Leverage moderates the relationship between 







Leverage moderates the relationship between AC 









Nigerian Security & Exchange Commission code of 
corporate governance 2011 has positive and 
significantly improved the quality of financial 




Besides, robustness checks were conducted using value relevance (price-
earnings) model and variables substitution technique to test the robustness of 
the study’s main multivariate regression results. Similarly, pre and post code of 
corporate governance 2011, were used to check the magnitude of earnings 
management between the periods. Thus, the result indicates that, the quality of 
earnings is greater in the post-period SEC, CCG, 2011 than in the pre-period 
SEC, CCG, 2011. Further, the robustness test reveals that the revised SEC Code 
of corporate governance 2011, implemented in Nigeria is more value relevant 
compared to the SEC 2003 Code. This was evident by the increase in the number 
of corporate governance mechanisms that are value relevant.  
 
Again, a robustness check using the presence of an outlier in the observations 
was equally employed.  Thus, the presence of an outlier in the observations 
posed no threat to the validity of the data and did not distort the outcome of the 
main regression results. On the whole, Table 7.1 presents a summary of the 
sixteen tested hypotheses; with ten supported and six unsupported. 
7.3  Conclusion 
The study investigates the role of the board and audit committee monitoring 
mechanisms and long-term debt (leverage) on earnings management in Nigerian 




the board of directors to enhance the financial reporting quality is affected by 
the leverage, which suggests that these monitoring mechanisms are important 
in the Nigerian environment.  However, not all elements measured in relation 
to the board of directors and audit committee monitoring are significant as the 
study finds no evidence that board gender diversity, CEO duality, audit share 
ownership and audit committee financial expertise are not significantly related 
to mitigating earnings management in the Nigerian non-financial listed firms. 
 
In line with the agency theory of separation of power between principal and 
agent, derived measures on supervision and monitoring of agent activities are 
set to reduce asymmetric information and minimise agency costs. As a result, a 
code of corporate governance emerged to provide a guide to best practices for 
corporate bodies. The significant role of the leverage as a moderator for the 
relationship between the earnings management suggests that corporate 
governance mechanisms acknowledged in the Western World as depicting best 
practice, are not appropriate for the business environment in the emerging 
economy (Nigeria). Moreover, these findings demonstrate that because of the 
different institutional settings, different countries display different governance 
structures. Thus, simply mimicking the styles for corporate governance 
structures from the UK and US in emerging economies like Nigeria should be 
reviewed.  Consequently, the SEC code of CG 2003, was reviewed in 2011 with 
changes aimed at making it more effective. The review also provided for board 




formation of board committees, risk committee, external auditor tenure, 
whistleblowing and the enlarged audit committee size from three to six. Thus, 
the result of two equal sample t-test indicates that SEC Code of CG 2011, has 
significantly improved corporate governance practices in the Nigerian non-
financial  listed firms’.  A significant proportion of literature on AC seems to 
have a consensus that AC with greater independence and accounting/financial 
expertise have significantly positive impact on financial reporting quality. 
Moreover, market reaction to AC issues documents that investors appreciate 
presence of AC and attract positive response when members possess relevant 
accounting or financial expertise.  However, from the findings of this study, AC 
independence is found to be negatively associated with earnings management, 
hence, significantly impacting on financial reporting quality of Nigerian non-
financial listed firms.  
 
The result is in support of the resource dependency theory view, that the skills 
and expertise exhibited by outside directors would improve the monitoring roles 
of the board and sub-committees of the board. Similary, the agency theory view 
that audit committees are viewed as a monitoring device to decrease agency 
costs and resolve the information asymmetry (Tengamnuay & Stapleton, 2009), 
by way of monitoring managers’ behaviour. This is in contrast with the previous 
studies that ACSOW makes members feel obliged and bonded because of their 
equity holdings, to monitor and control managers’ opportunistic behaviour. The 




with EM, as such, has weak monitoring ability in curtailing EM practices. 
Accordingly, agency theory postulates that financial reporting quality is related 
to AC that is composed of accounting or financial experts. Their expertise would 
guide them, provide more robust and higher quality financial information. This 
study's finding reveals that ACFE is not strong enough in providing effective 
monitoring function due to its positive and significant association with EM 
which lowers the eanings quality of the non-financial listed firms in Nigeria. 
However, both ACSOW and ACFE would provide strong oversight role in 
curtailing the use of  DA that might lead to earnings manipulations only when 
they interact with leverage. Debt comes along with monitoring by the creditors. 
Therefore, the findings reveal that the interaction between LEV and ACSOW 
are statistically significant in mitigating EM practices thereby enhancing firms' 
financial reporting quality. 
7.4  Implications of the Study 
This research contributes to the existing literature on the agency theory, 
resource dependence and stewardship theory. In particular, the board of 
directors’ characteristics of board size; board independence; board gender 
diversity; managerial share ownerships and CEO duality. Similarly, the audit 
committee characteristics of audit committee share ownership; audit committee 
financial expertise; and audit committee independence; and the moderation of 
long-term debt (leverage), tested to mitigate earnings management and enhance 




committee shares ownership, managerial share ownership, board gender 
diversity, and CEO duality provided evidence of positive impact on financial 
reporting quality in the Nigerian non-financial  listed companies. However, the 
study has implications for policy makers and regulatory bodies in addition to 
theoretical implications. 
7.4.1  Theoretical Implication  
The conclusion of this study has many theoretical implications. Although some 
literature addressed the issue of corporate governance using agency theory, 
most of these studies concentrated on developed countries, which have different 
environment and regulatory settings from less developed countries. This study 
has added to the understanding of agency theory, stewardship and resource 
dependency theories in a less developed country (Nigeria) where its corporate 
governance framework and practice are developing, hence are associated with 
complex agency relationships.  
 
Thus, the study provides an examination of corporate governance practices in 
the Nigerian non-financial listed firms which were hitherto understudied. First, 
corporate governance including audit committee monitoring and controls is 
predicted by the agency theory to align the interests of managers and 
shareholders, thereby reducing the information asymmetry and minimise 
agency cost of monitoring. The asymmetric information contributes to moral 




be in the form of earnings manipulations aimed at misleading stakeholders about 
the actual company earnings and performance. It might also be aimed at 
influencing the contractual results of the company which is based on the 
financial report or accounting numbers.  
 
With regards to corporate governance variables, this study extends the existing 
literature that an increase in board size and audit committee independence have 
significant negative effect on earnings management. The result is in support of 
agency theory perspective that the size of the board matters in monitoring 
managers entrenchment. It argues that larger boards comprise of persons with 
diverse interests, experience, and skills which can contribute more to its 
effectiveness. In the same vein, resource dependency theory maintains that 
larger boards signify involvement of more resourceful members from 
environmentally diverse settings, that would provide diverse opinions, 
contribute to wider deliberations resulting in a better decision that would 
enhance its performance and monitoring functions.  
 
On the other hand, the results of MSOW, BGD, and BIND governance variables 
failed to mitigate earnings management practices. Thus, they cannot strongly 
support agency theory of minimising information asymmetry and agency cost, 
thereby increasing moral hazard. Consequently, RD theory argues that BDG and 
BIND are expected to provide the board of directors with more human capital 




and technical knowledge would come to bear on the firm’s monitoring roles, 
thereby contributing towards an effective financial reporting process. As such, 
when tested in different settings or outcomes, the results might provide 
significant results. Accordingly, the result on MSOW did not support the agency 
theory that allowing managers to own part of equity holding of a company 
would align their interest as agents with that of the shareholders. The aim is to 
minimise the moral hazard through alignment of interests. This sounds unique 
and is a departure from most of the studies on MSOW that reported a negative 
relationship with earnings management due to their stake in the firm.  
 
On the whole, the results of these governance variables failed to provide 
sufficient support for agency theory in mitigating agency conflict and reduce 
monitoring cost. Further, there is no evidence in Nigerian non-financial listed 
firms suggesting that outside directors’ independent opinion, a better sense of 
judgement, skills and knowledge lead to mitigating earnings management 
advocated by the resource dependency theory. Perhaps,  these might be related 
to the definition, proportion and appointment of non-executive directors 
required on the board by the Nigerian code of corporate governance.  
 
Thirdly, previous literature suggests that some audit committee characteristics 
provide effective monitoring function that improves the financial reporting 
process. Consequently, this study found support for agency theory and RD 




monitoring role that leads to minimising agency cost by curtailing earnings 
management practices. The fact that the board sourced its members from a pool 
of experts and industrially experienced people. The board selects three out of 
the NED on the board with entirely different monitoring responsibilities, 
permitting them to be more focused than their role on the board. Fourthly, there 
is evidence of mixed findings on the relationship between ACFE and ACSOW 
and earnings management, especially in the Western and developed economies.  
 
The results of the study indicate that audit committee financial expertise and 
audit committee share ownership do not provide enough monitoring and control 
of managers’ opportunistic tendencies as suggested by the agency theory. It 
further established that they were not associated with enhanced earnings quality 
significantly. This suggests that, when at least a member who has financial 
literacy on the audit committee is adjudged to provide enough expertise in 
monitoring managers’ activities, it would not significantly improve the quality 
of the financial report. Similarly, the findings that when an audit committee 
member owns a proportional amount of firm’s equity, he will exert more effort 
in his monitoring role, that leads to decreased moral hazard. As a result, it will 
reduce asymmetric information between the agents and principals, which is not 
aligned with the agency theory perspective.  
 
However, this study brings to light, that when some corporate governance 




term debt (leverage), the results provide new insight into the monitoring role of 
leverage in mitigating earnings management practices in the Nigerian non-
financial listed firms. Therefore, the ability of bondholders to provide long-term 
financing to companies, demands for monitoring how the funds are managed 
through the combined efforts of executive directors share ownership; audit 
committee share ownership; female directors on the board; and chief executive 
officer duality. Following moderating role of leverage on CEO duality further 
support and advance the stewardship theory perspective of viewing CEO as an 
honest and trustworthy agent, who align his personal objective with the firm 
objectives and values. As such, would do all things to avoid pursuing his 
personal interest. Hence, the result provides support allowing CEO to serve as 
the Chair of the board would help in mitigating earnings management practices. 
Therefore, the outcome of this study suggests that highly levered firms with 
CEO duality would enhance the earnings quality of those firm which lends 
support to stewardship theory. 
 
Another interesting findings of this study is the ability of the moderating 
variable (LEV) intraction with MSOW, ACSOW, BGD that provide significant 
impact in mitigating earnings management practices and improve quality of 
earnings. It therefore, suggest that BGD would have been a strong monitor if 
more female directors with requisite experience and qualification are on 
corporate boards of the Nigerian non-financial companies. Thus, support the 




to adverse selection particular by bondholders is to allow managers own equity 
holdings through their interaction with leverage. Similarly, ACSOW relates to 
audit committee member shareholdings that is argued to have strong association 
with their performance in ensuring a credible financial reporting process. The 
finding of this study indicates that ACSOW ability to mitigate earnings 
management  strongly depends on its interaction with leverage injected into the 
financial structure of the Nigerian non-financial  listed firms. Thus, the study 
contributes to the agency theory, which mentions that aligning interest between 
audit committee member and the principal through part ownership of a firm’s 
equity alone may not cause a decrease in asymmetric information. For the 
ACSOW to mitigate earnings mangement, there has to be an interaction with 
leverage. 
7.4.2  Policy and Practical Implications 
The findings of the study provides evidence of the significance of corporate 
governance mechanisms in mitigating earnings management practices and 
enhancing financial reporting quality. Thus, the study would be of eminent 
benefit to regulators, shareholders, creditors, potential investors, researchers 
and the general public. It provides a wide perspective in understanding 
techniques that help in mitigating earnings management practice and how 





The Nigerian SEC and Financial Reporting Council through regulatory changes 
should consider making changes in the governance Codes that would 
strenghthen the function of the audit committee. Such provisison should be 
regulated by setting a limit to the amount of member share holdings, since 
allowing audit committee members to possess a proportion of equity holdings 
along with debt holders in the firm would significantly reduce the moral hazard 
and enhance their monitoring role. Similarly, the change should make provision 
for the three shareholders representatives on the audit committee to own and 
disclose their shareholdings in the annual reports of the companies. Presently, 
the regulatory bodies do not make any specific provision for a proportional 
quota of female directors on corporate boards in the Nigerian non-financial 
listed firms. Thus, this limits their monitoring role in mitigating earnings 
management practices.  
 
The findings of this study indicate that female directors are good human capital 
resources that could provide a monitoring role and enhance public confidence 
of listed firms. Insignificant proportion of female directors on boards of non-
financial companies in Nigeria contributed to their limited monitoring 
performance. Hence, there is a need to review the current Code of corporate 
governance that would ensure a quota for females on the board of Nigerian 
companies is set. In setting such quota, factors such as industry experience, 
competency, financial and accounting expertise should be considered. The 




efficient in providing monitoring functions and reducing agency costs. 
However, the regulatory bodies, should revisit and review provisions of 
selection committees of the corporate boards to ensure competent member with 
vast experience, requisite industry skills and sound educational background are 
appointed. By doing so, it would greatly improve their monitoring role, enhance 
the quality of companies’ earnings and improve the financial market confidence 
on the financial information.  
 
Furthermore, considering the value relevance result on BIND, it demands  the 
attention of the regulators to review the definition, appointment and the role of 
independent non-executive directors in managing the affairs of the firms. The 
finding indicates the presence of a black box between the intention of the 
regulators on the BIND and the expectation of the market participants. 
Additionally, there is the need for the regulators to consider a policy that sets 
the maximum amount of equity holdings of executive directors on the corporate 
boards of Nigerian companies.  
 
According to Yeo, Tan, Ho, and Chen (2002), managers’ opportunistic 
behaviour decreases when their equity ownership was less or equal to 25%. 
Thus, any increase in the managerial ownership beyond 25%, results in a 
positive increase in aggressive income-increasing DA. In support of Yeo et al. 
(2002), this study’s findings justify the significant impact of managerial share 




financial listed firms. The result changes only in firms with long-term debt. 
Otherwise, ED’s share ownership contributes to managerial manipulation of 
earnings. The amount or percentage should be provided for executive directors’ 
equity holdings in the company they are serving or nominated to serve. 
Therefore, controlling executive directors’ equity ownership is highly 
recommended. 
 
Consequently, the requirement for at least a member with financial literacy who 
can read and understand financial statements to be on audit committees should 
be revisited. The findings of this study have proven that a financially literate 
member on the audit committee alone is not capable of providing enough 
monitoring control of earnings manipulation. The insignificant association 
between audit committee financial expertise and earnings management is 
perhaps due to the absence of accounting or financial management expert on the 
audit committee. Since the audit committee size is six, regulatory bodies should 
upwardly review the number to three accounting/ financial experts. Doing that 
would provide enough financial experts to scrutinise and provide efficient 
oversight functions that would as well mitigate earnings management practices.  
 
In line with agency theory, this study also provides evidence that long-term debt 
(leverage) is an effective monitoring tool in mitigating earnings management 
practices. The findings indicate that managerial share ownership, audit 




board independence provide effective monitoring function in reducing earnings 
management only with the interaction of long-term debt in the firms’ CS. Thus, 
the study provides policy makers with valuable information on the importance 
of long-term debt in monitoring managerial entrenchment tendencies, as well as 
ensuring an increase in quality earnings and subsequent quality in financial 
reports, Nigeria non-financial  firms need to increase the level of long-term debt 
in their CS. Further, since leverage proved to have provided a significant and 
positive impact on quality of earnings. Board composition of Nigerian non-
financial  listed firms should include bondholders for robust and effective 
monitoring of managerial entrechment practices.  
 
On the whole, this study makes a contribution to policy makers, regulatory 
bodies, present and potential investors, bondholders and other stakeholders so 
that they are well informed on the importance of corporate governance 
mechanisms in monitoring and control of managers. The revised NGSEC Code 
of CG 2011 is inadequate in its guidance and improvement of corporate 
governance as a benchmark for best practices. Hence, there is a need for 
additional reforms to the code of corporate governance in tune with global best 
practices. Specific variables contribution in curtailing the use of DA leading to 
earnings management were found to be inadequate in enhancing quality 
financial reports of Nigerian non-financial  listed firms. Furthermore, the 
outcome of this study surely provides quality information to stakeholders, 




committee characteristics in reducing agency costs and enhancing financial 
reporting quality of the Nigerian non-financial listed firms. 
7.5  Limitations of Study 
Despite considerable strengths of this research, it has some limitations that need 
to be specified before the findings of this research are generalised. Firstly, the 
focus of this research is to the Nigerian non-financial listed firms with about 
130 trading on the floor of the NSE. Hence, the study considered the availability 
of annual reports data for 101 companies. However, the study is constrainted in 
obtaining relevant financial and governance data from all non-financial  listed 
firms due to the late filing of returns.  
 
Additionally, other related offences sanctioned by SEC (SEC Report 2014 & 
2015) limited the number of companies considered for this study. As a result, 
generalising the implications of this study across all firms need to be considered. 
Secondly, the research employed the accruals based measure of financial 
reporting quality which is not the only measure used in other studies. Other 
measures include (1) time-series, using properties of earnings; (2) qualitative 
characteristics of FRQ; and (3) income, cash and accruals relations. Other 
accrual based measurements such as Jones (1991), modified Jones model 
(1995), Dechow and Dichev (2002) and its variants in capturing prior studies 
used earnings manipulations. Thus, this suggests the availability of various EQ 





However, this research employed McNichols (2002) model in measuring the 
FRQ, which was not adjusted to differentiate between estimation errors based 
on intentional and unintentional errors. Hence, the need to consider these issues 
before generalising the outcome of this study. Thirdly, the study relies greatly 
on the information obtained from the SEC websites, companies’ annual reports 
extracted from the SEC branch office (Kano) including sampled companies 
websites, which may not provide the actual inner workings of these firms’ 
boards and audit committees in the sampled firms. Fourthly, the study heavily 
relies on the revised Code of Corporate Governance, 2011 issued by the 
Nigerian SEC for public companies in Nigeria. Although there are other 
industry based governance codes in Nigeria, those were not considered in 
arriving at the findings of this study. Though SEC Code of CG, 2003 was used 
in computing two paired sampled t-test in the analysis, it was specifically used 
for the purpose of achieving objective six (6) of this study. While 
acknowledging these limitations, they provide an opportunity for future 
research in the study area. Therefore, the limitations do not in any way 
undermine the importance of the findings and overall strengths of the research. 
7.6  Further Research  
This study highlighted many issues that require further investigations. As such, 
some suggestions or avenues for further research arising from the limitations 




association between selected corporate governance variables and audit 
committee characteristics. Consequently, further studies could be carried out to 
understand the causation effect of the relationship between board and audit 
committee characteristics and financial reporting quality proxy by AQ which 
could provide a more robust detection technique. Secondly, this study is 
restricted to non-financial listed firms between 2010 to 2014.  
 
However, further studies might extend the data collection to all the Nigerian 
listed firms including the financial institutions, family controlled entities and 
private companies. The outcome would help to understand if the result from this 
study as well holds for family controlled and private companies. Secondly, to 
clearly understand the inner workings of the audit committee in Nigeria, more 
detailed qualitative and case studies could be carried out. It might involve being 
present during audit committee meetings and interviewing members of the audit 
committee individually. Thirdly, leverage measured by long-term debt to total 
assets was used to moderate the relationships between board characteristics of 
managerial share ownership, board gender diversity, board independence and 
CEO duality. Also, leverage moderates the relationships between audit 
committee share ownership, and audit committee member financial expertise. 
As a result, further studies may consider moderation of other board and audit 
committee characteristics. Similarly, the study examined and employed some 
mechanisms for board and audit committee variables, while the remaining 




data. As such, they should be explored by future studies. Fourthly, the 
proportion of female directors on corporate boards of Nigerian non-financial  
listed firms’ positive impact on the financial reporting quality could not be 
established in this study. However, the findings suggest that the insignificant 
percentage of female’s representation on corporate boards might be one of the 
plausible reasons why their significant impact on the financial reporting quality 
could not be established. 
 
 On the other hand, non-financial listed firms in Nigeria with long-term debt in 
the CS could moderate the relationship with female directors on boards and 
provide a positive and significant monitoring impact in mitigating earnings 
management practices. Nevertheless, in the absence of leverage, further studies 
could be carried out to determine whether the proportional increase of female 
directors on board could enhance the quality of financial reports of the Nigerian 
listed non-financial firms. Furthermore, female talent should be developed and 
tilted towards managerial skills from an early stage to achieve better women's 
representation. It will help to realise better gender diversity in the Nigerian non-
financial listed companies. Fifthly, this study is controlled by firm size, firm age 
and profitability variables. There might be other correlated variables of interest 
that might affect the quality of the financial report and not considered by this 
study. Therefore, further studies could examine their effect on the relationship 
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X – Compliance Report 
 




Quoted companies on The Exchange are required to file their financial statements on a timely basis in 
accordance with Appendix 111 of the Listing Rules.  The Exchange has identified the companies listed on 
Schedule One as companies that have exceeded the minimum listing standards in terms of timely 
disclosure of their Audited Annual financial performance.  
The Exchange is extremely proud of these companies and will continue to show case quoted companies 
that imbibe high corporate governance practices.  
 
SCHEDULE ONE 
                                                                         EARLY FILERS 2012 
S/N NAME OF COMPANY YEAR END DUE DATE FILED DATE 
1 Nestle Nigeria Plc. Dec-2011 31 March -2012 21 Feb-2012 
2 Nigeria Breweries Plc. Dec-2011 31 March-2012 6 March-2012 
3 Court Ville Business Solutions Plc. Dec-2011 31 March-2012 7 March-2012 
4 Zenith Bank Plc. Dec-2011 31 March-2012 8 March-2012 
5 Glaxo Smithline Consumer Nigeria Plc. Dec-2011 31 March-2012 14 March-2012 
6 Okomu Oil Palm Plc. Dec-2011 31 March-2012 16 March-2012 
7 Access Bank Plc. Dec-2011 31 March-2012 16 March-2012 
8 Guaranty Trust Bank Plc. Dec-2011 31 March-2012 16 March-2012 
9 First City Monument Plc. Dece-2011 31 March-2012 19 March-2012 
10 First Aluminum  Nigeria Plc. Dec-2011 31 March-2012 20 March-2012 
11 Paints & Coatings Manufacturing Plc. Dec-2011 31 March-2012 20 March-2012 
12 Larfarge Cement Wapco Nigeria Plc. Dec-2011 31 March-2012 22 March-2012 
13 Julius Berger Nigeria Plc. Dec-2011 31 March-2012 23 March-2012 
14 PZ Industries  Plc. May -2012 31 August -2012 31 July-2012 




                                        




DEFAULT FILERS (AUDITED ACCOUNTS) 
Quoted companies on The Exchange are required to file their financial statements on a timely basis in 
accordance with Appendix 111 of the Listing Rules.  The Exchange has identified the companies listed on 
Schedules Two and Three as companies that have not met the minimum listing standards in terms of 
timely disclosure of their Audited Annual financial performance and are thus operating below the listing 
standards (BLS) of The Exchange.  
 
 The Sanctions for non-compliance with periodic financial disclosure obligations are clearly spelt out in 
Appendix 111 of the Listing Rules and The Exchange will protect the integrity of its Rules. 
 
SCHEDULE TWO 
BANKS AND INSURANCE COMPANIES 
S/NO COMPANY YE SYMBOL REMARKS 
1 
Union Homes Savings & Loans Plc Mar BLS Non rendition of Audited Financial 
Statements 2010 
2 
African Alliance Insurance Plc Dec BLS Non rendition of Audited Financial 
Statements 2011 
3 
Equity Assurance Plc Dec  BLS Non rendition of Audited Financial 
Statements 2011  
4 
Goldlink Insurance Plc Dec  BLS Non rendition of Audited Financial 
Statements 2011  
5 
Great Nigeria Insurance Plc Dec BLS Non rendition of Audited Financial 
Statements 2011 
6 
Guinea Insurance Plc Dec  BLS Non rendition of Audited Financial 
Statements 2011  
7 
International Energy Insurance Dec  BLS Non rendition of Audited Financial 
Statements 2011  
8 
Mutual Benefit Assurance Plc Dec BLS Non rendition of Audited Financial 
Statements 2011 
9 
Staco Insurance Plc Dec BLS Non rendition of Audited Financial 
Statements 2011 
10 
Standard Alliance Plc Dec BLS Non rendition of Audited Financial 
Statements 2011 
11 
Unic Insurance Plc Dec BLS Non rendition of Audited Financial 
Statements 2011 
12 
Wema Bank Plc Dec  BLS Non rendition of Audited Financial 





G Cappa Plc  Mar BLS Non rendition of Audited Financial 
Statements 2010 
2 
Golden Guinea Brewery Mar BLS Non rendition of Audited Financial 
Statements 2010 
3 Nigerian German Chemicals Plc                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
Mar 
BLS 
Non rendition of Audited Financial 
Statements 2012
4 Neimeth International Pharm Plc 
Mar (12 
months)  BLS 
Non rendition of Audited Financial 
Statements 2012 
5 Premier Breweries Plc 
Mar 
BLS 
Non rendition of Audited Financial 
Statements 2012 
6 Costain (W.A.) Plc  Mar  BLS 
Non rendition of Audited Financial 
Statements 2012  
7 Adswitch Plc April BLS 
Non rendition of Audited Financial 
Statements 2012 
8  Multi-Trex Integrated Foods Plc April BLS 
Non rendition of Audited Financial 
Statements 2012 
9 Nigerian Enamelware Co.  Plc April BLS 
Non rendition of Audited Financial 
Statements 2012 
10 
West African Aluminium Products 
Plc Sept BLS 
Non rendition of Audited Financial 
Statements 2010  
11 Nigerian Wire & Cable Plc Sept  BLS 
Non rendition of Audited Financial 
Statements 2011  
12 Nigerian Sewing Machine Plc Dec  BLS 
Non rendition of Audited Financial 
Statements 2006  
13 Jos International Breweries Plc Dec  BLS 
Non rendition of Audited Financial 
Statements 2010  
14 Stokvis Nigeria Plc Dec  BLS 
Non rendition of Audited Financial 
Statements 2010  
15 IPWA Plc Dec  BLS 
Non rendition of Audited Financial 
Statements 2011  
16 Abplast Products Plc Dec BLS 
Non rendition of Audited Financial 
Statements 2011 
17 Ikeja Hotel Plc Dec  BLS 
Non rendition of Audited Financial 
Statements 2011  
18 Daar Communications Plc Dec  BLS 
Non rendition of Audited Financial 
Statements 2011  
19 Afrik Pharmaceutical Dec BLS 
Non rendition of Audited Financial 
Statements 2011 
20 Big Treat Plc Dec BLS Regulatory Issue  
21 Mtech Plc Dec  BLS Regulatory Issue  




The Exchange has identified the companies listed on Schedule Four as companies slated for delisting for 
various reasons which are stated. 
SCHEDULE FOUR 
DELISTING IN PROCESS 
1 Pinnacle Point Group Plc Feb DIP Company in liquidation process 
2 Poly Products Plc Mar DIP 
Voluntary delisting due to harsh 
economic climate 
3 Udeofson Garment Factory Plc Sept  DIP 
Regulatory delisting due to non-
compliance to the Post-Listings 
Rules 
4 Lennards Plc Sept DIP 
Regulatory delisting due to non-
compliance with the Post-Listings 
Rules 
5 Nigerian Wire Industries Plc Dec DIP 
Regulatory delisting due to non-
compliance with the Post-Listings 
Rules 
6 
Aluminium Manufacturing Company 
of Nigeria Plc Dec  DIP 
Regulatory delisting due to non-
compliance with the Post-Listings 
Rules 
7 Union Dicon Salt Plc Dec  DIP 
Regulatory delisting due to non-
compliance with the Post-Listings 
Rules 
8 Capital Oil Plc Dec  DIP 
Regulatory delisting due to non-
compliance with the Post-Listings 
Rules 
9 Rokanna Industries Plc Dec  DIP 
Regulatory delisting due to non-
compliance with the Post-Listings 
Rules 
10 West African Glass Industries Plc Dec  DIP 
Regulatory delisting due to 
noncompliance with the Post-
Listings Rules 
11 Hallmark Paper Products Plc Dec DIP 
Regulatory delisting due to non-
compliance with the Post-Listings 
Rules 
12 Afroil Plc Dec  DIP 
Regulatory delisting due to non-






DEFAULT FILERS (QUARTERLY ACCOUNTS) 
Quoted companies on The Exchange are required to file their financial statements on a timely basis in 
accordance with Appendix 111 of the Listing Rules.  The Exchange has identified the companies listed on 
Schedule Five as companies that have not met the minimum listing standards in terms of timely 
disclosure of their quarterly financial performance and are thus operating below the listing standards 
(BLS) of The Exchange.  
 
 The Sanctions for non-compliance with periodic financial disclosure obligations are clearly spelt out in 
Appendix 111 of the Listing Rules and The Exchange will protect the integrity of its Rules. 
SCHEDULE FIVE 
2011 OUTSTANDING QUARTERLY RESULTS AS AT SEPTEMBER 28, 2012 
S/N COMPANY YR END REMARKS 
1 C & I Leasing Plc Jan Non rendition of 2nd Qtr (July 2011)  
2 Pinnacle Point Group Feb Non rendition of 1st Qtr (May 2011), 2nd Qtr (Aug 2011) and 3rd 
Qtr (Nov 2011) 
3 Golden Guinea Brew Mar Non rendition of 1st Qtr (June 2011), 2nd Qtr (Sept 2011) and 3rd 
Qtr (Dec 2011) 
4 Premier Brew. Plc Mar Non rendition of 1st Qtr (June 2011), 2nd Qtr (Sept 2011) and 3rd 
Qtr (Dec 2011) 
5 Thomas Wyatt Nig. Plc Mar Non rendition of  2nd Qtr (Sept 2011) and 3rd Qtr (Dec 2011) 
6 Tripple Gee And Co. Plc Mar Non rendition of 3rd Qtr (Dec 2011) 
7 Cappa & D'alberto Plc Mar Non rendition of 1st Qtr (June 2011), 2nd Qtr (Sept 2011) and 3rd 
Qtr (Dec 2011) 
8 Costain (W.A) Plc Mar Non rendition of 1st Qtr (June 2011), 2nd Qtr (Sept 2011) and 3rd 
Qtr (Dec 2011) 
9 G Cappa Plc Mar Non rendition of 1st Qtr (June 2011), 2nd Qtr (Sept 2011) and 3rd 
Qtr (Dec 2011) 
10 Roads Nigeria Plc Mar Non rendition of 1st Qtr (June 2011), 2nd Qtr (Sept 2011) and 3rd 
Qtr (Dec 2011) 
11 Aso Savings & Loans Plc Mar Non rendition of 1st Qtr (June 2011) and 3rd Qtr (Dec 2011) 
12 Union Homes Savings & Loans Mar Non rendition of 1st Qtr (June 2011), 2nd Qtr (Sept 2011) and 3rd 
Qtr (Dec 2011) 
13 Nigeria Energy Sector Plc Mar Non rendition of 1st Qtr (June 2011), 2nd Qtr (Sept 2011) and 3rd 
Qtr (Dec 2011) 
14 Avon Crowncaps & Container Mar Non rendition of 2nd Qtr (Sept 2011) 
15 Poly Products (Nig) Plc Mar Non rendition of 1st Qtr (June 2011) and 3rd Qtr (Dec 2011) 
16 Academy Press Plc Mar Non rendition of 1st Qtr (June 2011) 
17 Cutix Plc Apr Non rendition of 3rd Qtr (Jan 2011) 
18 Multi-Trex Intergrated Foods Plc Apr Non rendition of 3rd Qtr (Jan 2012) 
19 Nig. Enamelware Comp. Plc Apr Non rendition of 3rd Qtr (Jan 2012) 
20 Adswitch Plc Apr Non rendition of 2nd Qtr (Oct 2011) and 3rd Qtr (Jan 2012) 
21 Rak Unity Petroleum Plc Apr Non rendition of 1st Qtr (July 2011), 2nd Qtr (Oct 2011) and 3rd 
Qtr (Jan 2012) 
22 PZ Industries Plc May Non rendition of 2nd Qtr (Nov 2011)  
23 Interlinked Technologies Plc June Non rendition of 3rd Qtr (Mar 2011) 
24 Tourist Company Of Nigeria June Non rendition of 2nd Qtr (Dec 2011) and 3rd Qtr (Mar 2012) 
25 Beco Petroleum Product July Non rendition of 1st Qtr (Oct 2011), 2nd Qtr (Jan 2012) and 3rd 
Qtr (April 2012) 
26 DN Tyre & Rubber Plc Sept Non rendition of 1st Qtr (Dec 2011), 2nd Qtr (Mar 2012) and 3rd 
Qtr (June 2012) 
27 John Holt Plc Sept Non rendition of 3rd Qtr (June 2011) 
28 Lennards (Nig) Plc Sept Non rendition of 1st Qtr (Dec 2010), 2nd Qtr (Mar 2011) and 3rd 
Qtr (June 2011) 
29 Afromedia Sept Non rendition of 3rd Qtr (June 2012) 
30 Deap Capital Management & 
Trust Plc 
Sept Non rendition of 2nd Qtr (Mar 2012) and 3rd Qtr (June 2012) 
31 Udeofson Garment Fact Sept Non rendition of 1st Qtr (Dec 2011)and 3rd Qtr (June 2012) 
32 W. A. Aluminum Products Plc Sept Non rendition of 1st Qtr (Dec 2011), 2nd Qtr (Mar 2012) and 3rd 
Qtr (June 2012) 
33 ETI Bank Plc Dec Non rendition of  2nd Qtr (June 2011) 
34 Jos Int. Brew. Plc Dec Non rendition of 1st Qtr (Mar 2011), 2nd Qtr (June 2011) and 3rd 
Qtr (Sept 2011) 
35 Cement Co Of North .Plc Dec Non rendition of  2nd Qtr (June 2011)  
36 Nigerian Wire Industry .Plc Dec Non rendition of 1st Qtr (Mar 2011), 2nd Qtr (June 2011) and 3rd 
Qtr (Sept 2011) 
37 African Paints (Nigeria) Plc Dec Non rendition of 1st Qtr (Mar 2011) 
38 DN Meyer Plc Dec Non rendition of 1st Qtr (Mar 2011) 
39 IPWA Plc Dec Non rendition of 1st Qtr (Mar 2011) and 2nd Qtr (June 2011)  
40 Paints And Coatings Manu Plc Dec Non rendition of 1st Qtr (Mar 2011) and 2nd Qtr (June 2011)  
41 Hallmark Paper Products Plc Dec Non rendition of 1st Qtr (Mar 2011), 2nd Qtr (June 2011) and 3rd 
Qtr (Sept 2011) 
42 Arbico Plc Dec Non rendition of 3rd Qtr (Sept 2011) 
43 Nigerian Wire & Cable Plc Dec Non rendition of 1st Qtr (Mar 2011), 2nd Qtr (June 2011) and 3rd 
Qtr (Sept 2011) 
44 Big Treat Plc Dec Non rendition of 1st Qtr (Mar 2011), 2nd Qtr (June 2011) and 3rd 
Qtr (Sept 2011) 
45 Union Dicon Salt Plc Dec Non rendition of 1st Qtr (Mar 2011), 2nd Qtr (June 2011) and 3rd 
Qtr (Sept 2011) 
46 UTC Nigeria Plc Dec Non rendition of 1st Qtr (Mar 2011) and 2nd Qtr (June 2011) 
47 Ekocorp Plc Dec Non rendition of 1st Qtr (Mar 2011) 
48 Fidson Healthcare Plc Dec Non rendition of 1st Qtr (Mar 2011) 
49 Pharma Deko Plc Dec Non rendition of 1st Qtr (Mar 2011) 
50 Union Diagnostic & Clinical 
Services 
Dec Non rendition of 1st Qtr (Mar 2011), 2nd Qtr (June 2011) and 3rd 
Qtr (Sept 2011) 
51 Aluminium Extrusion Nig. Plc Dec Non rendition of 1st Qtr (Mar 2011) 
52 Aluminium Man. Of Nigeria Plc Dec Non rendition of 3rd Qtr (Sept 2011) 
53 First Aluminium Nigeria Plc Dec Non rendition of 1st Qtr (Mar 2011) 
54 Vono Products Plc Dec Non rendition of 1st Qtr (Mar 2011) 
55 E-Tranzact Dec Non rendition of 2nd Qtr (June 2011)  
56 Mtech Communications Plc Dec Non rendition of 1st Qtr (Mar 2011), 2nd Qtr (June 2011) and 3rd 
Qtr (Sept 2011) 
57 Mti Plc Dec Non rendition of 1st Qtr (Mar 2011), 2nd Qtr (June 2011) and 3rd 
Qtr (Sept 2011) 
58 African Alliance Insurance Plc Dec Non rendition of 1st Qtr (Mar 2011), 2nd Qtr (June 2011) and 3rd 
Qtr (Sept 2011) 
59 AIICO Insurance Plc Dec Non rendition of 1st Qtr (Mar 2011) 
60 Continental Reinsurance Plc Dec Non rendition of 2nd Qtr (June 2011)  
61 Cornerstone Insurance Plc Dec Non rendition of 1st Qtr (Mar 2011) 
62 Great Nigeria Insurance Plc Dec Non rendition of 1st Qtr (Mar 2011) 
63 Guinea Insurance Plc Dec Non rendition of 1st Qtr (Mar 2011) 
64 Intercontinental Wapic Insurance 
Plc 
Dec Non rendition of 1st Qtr (Mar 2011) and 2nd Qtr (June 2011)  
65 International Energy Insurance Dec Non rendition of 1st Qtr (Mar 2011) 
66 Investment & Allied Assurance Dec Non rendition of 1st Qtr (Mar 2011), 2nd Qtr (June 2011) and 3rd 
Qtr (Sept 2011) 
67 Mutual Benefit Assurance  Dec Non rendition of 1st Qtr (Mar 2011) 
68 Unity Kapital Assurance Dec Non rendition of 1st Qtr (Mar 2011) 
69 Universal Insurance Co. Dec Non rendition of 1st Qtr (Mar 2011), 2nd Qtr (June 2011) and 3rd 
Qtr (Sept 2011) 
70 Nig. Sewing Mach. Man. Co. Plc Dec Non rendition of 1st Qtr (Mar 2011), 2nd Qtr (June 2011) and 3rd 
Qtr (Sept 2011) 
71 Stockvis Nigeria Plc Dec Non rendition of 1st Qtr (Mar 2011), 2nd Qtr (June 2011) and 3rd 
Qtr (Sept 2011) 
72 Daar Communications Plc Dec Non rendition of 1st Qtr (Mar 2011), 2nd Qtr (June 2011) and 3rd 
Qtr (Sept 2011) 
73 Resort Savings & Loans Dec Non rendition of 1st Qtr (Mar 2011) 
74 Sim Capital  Alliance  Value Dec Non rendition of 1st Qtr (Mar 2011), 2nd Qtr (June 2011) and 3rd 
Qtr (Sept 2011) 
75 Abplast Products Plc Dec Non rendition of 1st Qtr (Mar 2011), 2nd Qtr (June 2011) and 3rd 
Qtr (Sept 2011) 
76 W.A Glass Ind. Plc Dec Non rendition of 1st Qtr (Mar 2011), 2nd Qtr (June 2011) and 3rd 
Qtr (Sept 2011) 
77 Afroil Plc Dec Non rendition of 1st Qtr (Mar 2011), 2nd Qtr (June 2011) and 3rd 
Qtr (Sept 2011) 
78 Forte Oil Plc Dec Non rendition of 2nd Qtr (June 2011) 
79 Mobil Oil Nigeria Plc Dec Non rendition of 1st Qtr (Mar 2011) 
80 MRS Oil Plc Dec Non rendition of 1st Qtr (Mar 2011) 
81 Oando Plc Dec Non rendition of 2nd Qtr (June 2011) 
82 Skye Shelter Fund Plc Dec Non rendition of 1st Qtr (Mar 2011), 2nd Qtr (June 2011) and 3rd 
Qtr (Sept 2011) 
83 Union Homes Real Estate  Plc Dec Non rendition of 1st Qtr (Mar 2011), 2nd Qtr (June 2011) and 3rd 
Qtr (Sept 2011) 
84 Afrik Pharmaceuticals  Dec Non rendition of 2nd Qtr (June 2011)  
85 Anino International Dec Non rendition of  2nd Qtr (June 2011)  
86 Capital Oil Plc Dec Non rendition of 2nd Qtr (June 2011)  
88 McNichols Plc Dec Non rendition of 2nd Qtr (June 2011)  
89 Rokana Industries  Plc Dec Non rendition of 2nd Qtr (June 2011)  




FREE FLOAT DEFICIENCY 
 
Companies listed on The Exchange must maintain a minimum free float for the set standards under 
which they are listed in order to ensure that there is an orderly and liquid market in their securities.  
The free float requirement for companies on the Main Board is 20% and 15% for ASEM companies.  
 
The Exchange has identified five companies that have free float deficiencies. These companies applied 
for waivers from The Quotations Committee and specifically provided compliance plans with tentative 
timelines to support their requests.  
The Quotations Committee considered and approved an extended timeframe for the companies to 
regain compliance to this Listing Requirement. The companies are however required to also provide 
quarterly disclosure reports to The Exchange detailing their level of implementation of the compliance 
plans. 
 
 The names of the companies in this category are contained in Schedule six. 
SCHEDULE SIX 
COMPANIES WITH FREE FLOAT DEFICIENCY 
 ISSUER % OF DEFICIENCY COMPLIANCE DUE DATE  
Tourist Company Of Nigeria Plc 1.31 28-Feb-13 
NPF Microfinance Bank Plc 14.68 31-May-13 
Dangote Cement Plc   5.11 26-Oct-14 
Studio Press Plc 8.46 PENDING COMPLETION OF 
ITS PLACING 





DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION TO THE PRINT AND ELECTRONIC 
MEDIA (UNAUTHORISED PUBLICATION) 
Every company that is listed on The Exchange is required to provide The Exchange with  timely 
information to enable it efficiently perform its function of maintaining an orderly market. In accordance 
with the provisions of Appendix 111 of the Listing Rules, quoted companies are required to obtain prior 
written approval before publications are made in the media.  
The companies listed in Schedules Seven and Eight contravened the provisions of the Listing Rules and 
The Exchange applied the sanctions prescribed by the Rules and the companies discharged their 
financial obligations. 
SCHEDULE SEVEN 
PUBLICATIONS WITHOUT NSE’S WRITTEN  APPROVAL IN  2011 
S/No NAME OF COMPANIES PENALTY (N) NATURE OF PUBLICATION 
1 Mobil Oil Plc 1,016,000.00 Interim Results 
8 Larfarge Wapco  700,000.00 Interim Results 
6 Guinea Insurance Plc 157,172.40 Audited  Account 
3 Transnational Corp 762,800.00 Changes in the Board 
2 Stanbic Ibtc Bank 102,060.00 Appointment of Directors 
4 Wema Bank Plc 352,800.00 Appointment of Directors 
5 Neimeth Int'l Pharm 181,440.00 Appointment of Acting CEO 
7 Honeywell Flour Mills Plc 646,800.00 Appointment of Directors 
9 Diamond Bank Plc 406,000.00 Appointment of Directors 
 
SCHEDULE EIGHT 
PUBLICATION WITHOUT NSE’S WRITTEN  APPROVAL IN  2012 
S/No NAME OF COMPANIES PENALTY (N) NATURE OF PUBLICATION 
1 Multiverse Plc 496,125.00 Appointment of Directors 
2 Unity Bank Plc 1,543,500.00  Notice of Divestment of Holdings of Unity Bank Plc from its 
Non-Banking Subsidiaries 






SANCTIONS FOR LATE FILERS OF FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 
 
 Contained in schedules nine and ten are the list of companies that filed their 2011 and 2012  financial 
statements after due date and The Exchange applied sanctions in accordance with the provisions of  
Section 14 of Appendix 111 of the Listing Rules . 
SCHEDULE NINE 
SANCTIONS FOR LATE FILINGS  
S/No NAME OF COMPANIES PENALTY (N) ACCOUNTS  
1 Nigerian German Chemical 211,428.57 Audited (Mar 2011) and 1st Qtr (June 2011) 
2 Chellarams 30,000.00 3rd Qtr (Dec 2011) 
3 Beco Petroleum Product 210,000.00 2nd Qtr (Jan 2011) and 3rd Qtr (April 2011) 
4 Vitafoam Nigeria Plc 22,857.14 Audited (September 2010) and 1st Qtr (Dec 2010) 
5 Afromedia 24,285.71 1st Qtr (Dec 2011) 
6 Greif Nigeria Plc 112,857.14 Audited (October 2010), 1st Qtr (Jan 2011) and 2nd Qtr (April 
2011) 
7 FTN Cocoa Processors Plc 245,714.29 Audited (Dec 2010), 1st Qtr (Mar 2011) and 2nd Qtr (June 2011) 
8 R.T Briscoe Plc 14,285.71 Audited (Dec 2010 
9 Access Bank (Nig) Plc 4,285.71 2nd Qtr (June 2011) 
10 Fidelity Bank Plc 5,714.29 Audited (Dec 2010) 
11 Sterling Bank Plc 11,428.57 Audited (Dec 2010) 
12 First Bank Of Nig. Plc 15,714.29 Audited (Dec 2010) 
13 UBA Plc 15,714.29 Audited (Dec 2010) 
14 First Inland Bank 35,714.29 Audited (Dec 2010), 1st Qtr (Mar 2011) and 2nd Qtr (June 2011) 
15 Union Bank Plc 167,142.86 Audited (Dec 2010), 1st Qtr (Mar 2011) and 2nd Qtr (June 2011) 
16 Int. Brew. Plc 22,857.14 Audited (Dec 2010) and 1st Qtr (Mar 2011)  
17 Dangote Cement Plc 7,142.86 Audited (Dec 2010) 
18 Cement Co Of North .Plc 12,857.14 Audited (Dec 2010), 1st Qtr (Mar 2011) and 2nd Qtr (June 2011) 
19 Ashaka Cement. Plc 160,000.00 Audited (Dec 2010), 1st Qtr (Mar 2011) and 2nd Qtr (June 2011) 
20 Portland Paint & Product 2,857.14 Audited (Dec 2010) 
21 Berger Paints Plc 22,857.14 Audited (Dec 2010) 
22 Courteville Business Solutions Plc 7,142.86 Audited (Dec 2010) and 1st Qtr (Mar 2011) 
23 NCR (Nigeria) Plc 94,285.71 Audited (Dec 2010) 
24 Unilever Plc 4,285.71 Audited (Dec 2010) 
25 A.G Leventis Nigeria Plc 41,428.57 Audited (Dec 2010) 
26 SCOA Nigeria Plc 152,857.14 Audited (Dec 2010) and 1st Qtr (Mar 2011)  
27 Transnational Corporation 201,428.57 Audited (Dec 2010) and 1st Qtr (Mar 2011)  
28 Multiverse Resources Plc 68,571.43 Audited (Dec 2010) 
29 Julius Berger Nigeria Plc 81,428.57 Audited (Dec 2010) 
30 National Salt Co. Nig. Plc 68,571.43 Audited (Dec 2010) and 1st Qtr (Mar 2011)  
31 UTC Nigeria Plc 98,571.43 Audited (Dec 2010), 1st Qtr (Mar 2011) and 2nd Qtr (June 2011) 
32 Dangote Sugar Plc 152,857.14 Audited (Dec 2010), 1st Qtr (Mar 2011) and 2nd Qtr (June 2011) 
33 Dangote Flour Mills Plc 567,142.86 Audited (Dec 2010), 1st Qtr (Mar 2011), 2nd Qtr (June 2011) and 
3rd Qtr (September 2011) 
34 Evans Medical Plc 8,571.43 Audited (Dec 2010) and 2nd Qtr (June 2011) 
35 Morison Industries Plc 220,000.00 Audited (Dec 2010), and 1st Qtr (Mar 2011)  
36 Ekocorp Plc 275,714.29 Audited (Dec 2010), 1st Qtr (Mar 2011) and 2nd Qtr (June 2011) 
37 Ikeja Hotel Plc 332,857.14 Audited (Dec 2010), 1st Qtr (Mar 2011) and 2nd Qtr (June 2011) 
38 Aluminium Extrusion Nig. Plc 78,571.43 Audited (Dec 2010) and 1st Qtr (Mar 2011)  
39 First Aluminium Nigeria Plc 101,428.57 Audited (Dec 2010) and 1st Qtr (Mar 2011 
40 Vono Products Plc 127,142.86 Audited (Dec 2010) 
41 E-Tranzact  197,142.86 Audited (Dec 2010), 1st Qtr (Mar 2011) and 2nd Qtr (June 2011) 
42 Equity Assurance Plc 514,285.71 Audited (Dec 2010), 1st Qtr (Mar 2011), 2nd Qtr (June 2011) and 
3rd Qtr (September) 
43 Prestige Assurance Co. Plc 15,714.29 Audited (Dec 2010), 1st Qtr (Mar 2011) and 2nd Qtr (June 2011) 
44 Law Union And Rock Ins. Plc 31,428.57 Audited (Dec 2010)  
45 Regency Alliance Insurance 78,571.43 Audited (Dec 2010) 
46 Oasis Insurance Plc 102,857.14 Audited (Dec 2010) 
47 Goldlink Insurance Plc 107,142.86 Audited (Dec 2010) and 1st Qtr (Mar 2011)  
48 Guinea Insurance Plc 147,571.43 Audited (Dec 2010) and 2nd Qtr (June 2011) 
49 Linkage Assurance Plc 182,857.14 Audited (Dec 2010) and 1st Qtr (Mar 2011)  
50 Great Nigeria Insurance Plc 187,142.86 Audited (Dec 2010) and 1st Qtr (Mar 2011)  
51 NEM Insurance Company Plc 206,000.00 Audited (Dec 2010), 1st Qtr (Mar 2011) and 2nd Qtr (June 2011) 
52 AIICO Insurance Plc 211,428.57 Audited (Dec 2010) and 1st Qtr (Mar 2011)  
53 International Energy Insurance 224,285.71 Audited (Dec 2010)  
54 Niger Insurance Co. Plc 258,570.78 Audited (Dec 2010), 1st Qtr (Mar 2011), 2nd Qtr (June 2011) and 
3rd Qtr (September) 
55 Staco Plc 334,285.71 1st Qtr (Mar 2011) and 2nd Qtr (June 2011) 
56 Standard Alliance Plc 464,285.71 Audited (Dec 2010), 1st Qtr (Mar 2011) and 2nd Qtr (June 2011) 
57 Universal Insurance Plc 245,714.29 Audited (Dec 2010)  
58 Japaul Nig Plc 35,714.29 Audited (Dec 2010) and 2nd Qtr (June 2011) 
59 Daar Communications Plc 251,428.57 Audited (Dec 2010)  
60 Abbey Building Society Plc 114,285.71 Audited (Dec 2010) and 1st Qtr (Mar 2011)  
61 Royal Exchange Plc 214,285.71 Audited (Dec 2010), 1st Qtr (Mar 2011) and 2nd Qtr (June 2011) 
62 Oando Plc 5,714.29 Audited (Dec 2010), 1st Qtr (Mar 2011) and 2nd Qtr (June 2011) 
63 Total Nigeria Plc 28,571.43 Audited (Dec 2010) 
64 Conoil Plc 57,142.86 Audited (Dec 2010) and 1st Qtr (Mar 2011)  





SANCTIONS FOR LATE FILINGS  
S/No NAME OF COMPANIES PENALTY (N) ACCOUNTS  
1 C & I Leasing Plc 1,050,000.00 Audited (Jan 2012 ) 
2 Costain (W.A) Plc 2,850,000.00 Audited (Mar 2011) 
3 John Holt Plc 1,700,000.00 Audited (Sept 2011) 
4 Eterna Plc 100,000.00 Audited (Dec 2011) 
5 Ftn Cocoa Plc 200,000.00 Audited (Dec 2011) 
6 Dangote Flour Mills Plc 400,000.00 Audited (Dec 2011) 
7 Regency Alliance Insurance Plc 500,000.00 Audited (Dec 2011) 
8 Oando Plc 500,000.00 Audited (Dec 2011) 
9 Premier Paints Plc 700,000.00 Audited (Dec 2011) 
10 Scoa Nigeria Plc 800,000.00 Audited (Dec 2011) 
11 Universal Insurance Plc 900,000.00 Audited (Dec 2011) 
12 Union Bank Plc 900,000.00 Audited (Dec 2011) 
13 Royal Exchange Plc 900,000.00 Audited (Dec 2011) 
14 Crusader Nigeria Plc 800,000.00 Audited (Dec 2011) 
15 Niger Insurance Plc 900,000.00 Audited (Dec 2011) 
16 Unity Kapital Assurance Plc 900,000.00 Audited (Dec 2011) 
17 Conoil Plc 1,200,000.00 Audited (Dec 2011) 












CRE Offer for Subscription of 













CRE Offer for Subscription of 
N80 billion Series 1 Bond 
due 2019 at N1000 under 
its N167 billion, Debt 












CRE Offer for Subscription of 
N20 billion Series 1 Bond 
due 2018 at N1000 under 






Plc Approval in Principle 
River State 
Government 
CRE Offer for Subscription of 
N100 billion Series 1 
Bond due 2017 at N1000 













Offer for subscription of 




Limited   
Book building in 
process 
C & I Leasing Nigeria 
Plc 
CRE Registration of C & I 
Leasing N8 billion Fixed 
Rate 5 year Bond issue 
being series 1 of the N10 








Book building in 
process 
MERGERS 
Stanbic IBTC Plc 
CRE 
Scheme of Arrangement 




Limited   
Court ordered meeting 
held, yet to list Holdco 
First Bank of Nigeria 
Plc 
CRE Scheme of Arrangement 





  Court ordered meeting 




CRE Scheme of Merger 
between Cornerstone 








by  Quotations 
Committee  






Rak Unity Petroleum 
Plc 





by  Quotations 
Committee  
Ecobank 
Transnational Inc. Plc 
CRE Special Placing on behalf 









by  Quotations 
Committee  









by  Quotations 
Committee  
First City Monument 
Bank Plc  













SCHEDULE TWELVE  
LISTING BY INTRODUCTION 
Spring Mortgage Plc CRE Listing by Introduction 
of Spring Mortgage Bank 
Plc 4,894,269,764 
ordinary shares of 







INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERING 
FBN Money Market 
Fund CRE 
Initial Public Offering of 
15,000,000 units of 





Plc Application received 
Fixed Income Fund 
CRE 
Initial Public Offering of 
1,500,000 units of 
N1,000.00 each at par in 






Plc Application received 
RIGHT ISSUE 
Prestige Assurance Plc 
CRE Rights Issue of 
2,508,315,438 ordinary 
shares of 50k each at 










Limited Application received 
Oando Plc 
CRE 
Rights Issue of 
3,032,157,517 ordinary 
shares of 50k each at 
N12.00 per share on the 






Limited Application received 
3 ordinary shares held 
as at Friday, October 19, 
2012 
RECONSTRUCTION 
United Bank for Africa 
Plc (Holdco)   
     
Application on hold 
at the instance 
Issuer  
ETF/INDEX FUND 
Vetiva NSE Index Fund 
CRE 
Listing of 100,000,000 







Limited Application received  
NOTIFICATIONS 
Flour Mills of Nigeria 
Plc 
CRE 
Scheme of Merger 
between Flour Mills of 
Nigeria Plc, Nigerian Bag 
Manufacturing Co. Plc 
and Northern Bag 
Manufacturing Co. Ltd. 
CSL 
Stockbrokers 
Limited    




   
Fortis Microfinance 
Bank Plc 
CRE  Prospective Capital 
Raising 
     






   
Starcomms Nig. Plc  CRE Proposed share 
reconstruction 
     
Flour Mills of Nigeria 
Plc  
CRE Merger with Nig. Bag 
Manu. Coy Plc and 





   
 Cadbury Nigeria Plc CRE Proposed Merger 







   
Access Bank Plc  CRE Divestment exercise of 
Access Bank Plc from 
Intercontinental Homes 
Savings and Loans Plc 
Greenwich 
Trusted Limited 
   
 
  
APPROVED APPLICATIONS FOR LISTING 
The Quotations Committee of Management considered and approved the applications for listings by the 




APPROVED APPLICATIONS AS AT SEPTEMBER 28, 2012 
ISSUER CAPITAL RAISING 
METHOD 
STOCK BROKER ISSUING HOUSE 
CORPORATE BONDS 
Chellerams Plc Offer for Subscription of  
540,000,000 MPR+5% Series 2 
Unsecured Floating Rate Bonds 
due February 17, 2019 
First Securities Discount House Dunn Loren Merrifield 
FMBN SPV Issuer Limited N6 Billion 17.25% Series 2 Fixed 
Rate Notes (The “Issue”) issued 
under the N100,000,000,000 
Residential Mortgage Backed 
Securities Programme 
ESS Investment and Trust 
Limited 
Dunn Loren Merrifield 
INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERING 
UACN Property 
Development Company 
Plc Real Estate 
Investment Trust (REIT) 
Initial Public Offering of 
3,000,000,000 units of N10.00 
each at par in the UPDC Real 
Estate Investment Company 
(REIT) 
Stanbic IBTC Stockbrokers 
Limited 
Stanbic IBTC Bank Plc 
PLACING 
Premier Paints Plc Placing of 48,000,000 ordinary 
shares of 50k each of the 
company at N1.00 per share 
with Clover Global Resources 
Limited 
Trust Yield Securities Limited Mainstreet Bank Capital 
Limited 
Ecobank Transnational 
Incorporated Plc  
Special Placing of 401,259,881 
ordinary shares at N12.12 per 
share in favour of existing 
shareholders of Ecobank Nigeria 
Plc on a pro-rata basis of their 
shareholding in Ecobank Nigeria 
Plc  
EDC Securities Limited BGL Plc, ICMG Securities 
Ltd & Partnership 
Investment Co. Plc 
Guinea Insurance Plc Special Placing of 740,000,000 
ordinary shares of 50kobo each 
at 50kobo per share 
Capital Asset Limited Capital Asset Limited 
Rak Unity Petroleum Plc: Special Placing of 43,051,159 
ordinary shares of 50kobo each 
at N7.90 per share 




Special Placing of 3,125,000,000 
ordinary shares of 0.25 cent at 
N12.86 per share in favour of 
Public Investment Corporation 
on behalf of Government 
Employee Pension Fund of South 
Africa 
EDC Securities Limited Renaissance Capital 
Limited 
 RIGHTS ISSUES  
Aso Savings and Loans Plc  Rights Issue of 11,046,189,224 
ordinary shares of 50k each at 
60k per share 
Apt Securities and Fund Limited Chapel Hill Advisory 
Partners Limited 
African Paints Nigeria Plc Rights Issue of 130,000,000 
ordinary shares of 50k each at 
N1.25 per share 
Chapel Hill Denham Securities 
Limited 
Chapel Hill Advisory 
Partners Limited 
MERGERS 
  Nigeria 
Breweries Plc  
Scheme of Merger between: 
Nigerian Breweries Plc and Sona 
System Associates Business 
Management Limited and 
between Nigerian Breweries Plc 
and Life Breweries Company 
Limited 
Foresight Securities & 
Investment Limited 
FCMB Capital Market 
Limited and Cordros 
Capital Markets Limited 
Cornerstone Insurance Plc Scheme of Merger between 
Cornerstone Insurance Plc and 
Linkage Insurance Plc 











LISTING BY INTRODUCTION 
Fortis Microfinance Bank 
Plc 
Listing by way of Introduction of 
1,630,091,000 ordinary shares of 
50kobo each at N5.00 per share 
Primera Africa Securities 
Limited 
DEAP Capital 
Management & Trust 
Limited 
Geo-Fluids Plc Application for Listing by 
Introduction of 4,257,667,518 
ordinary shares of 50kobo each 
Chartwell Securities Limited N/A 
TENDER OFFERS  
Guaranty Trust Assurance 
Plc  
Tender Offer for Acquisition of 
Additional 732,405,689 
ordinary shares of 50kobo each 
at N1.76 per share in Guaranty 
Trust Assurance Plc 
Readings Investments Limited N/A 
Assur Africa Holding (AAH)  Tender Offer for Acquisition of 
additional 732,405,689 ordinary 
shares of 50kobo each at N1.76 
per share in Guaranty Trust 
Assurance Plc 
Readings Investments Limited N/A 
BLOCK DIVESTMENT/ACQUISITIONS 
 Skye Bank Plc Bulk Divestment of 
1,785,627,772 ordinary shares 
of 50kobo each of Law Union & 
Rock Insurance Plc by Skye 
Bank Plc 
Skye Stockbrokers Ltd N/A 
Dangote Flour Mills Plc Proposed Acquisition Of 
3,167,716,667 Ordinary Shares 
Of 50 Kobo Each Representing 
63.35% Equity Stake In Dangote 
Flourmills Plc (Held By Dangote 
Industries Limited) By Tiger 
Brands Limited 
Vetiva Securities Limited N/A 
RECONSTRUCTION/DELISTING  
  Stanbic 
IBTC Plc 
Scheme of Arrangement 
Between Stanbic IBTC Bank Plc 
(“Stanbic IBTC” or The Bank”) 
and the holders of its fully paid 
ordinary shares of 50 kobo each 
to culminate in delisting of 
Stanbic IBTC Bank Plc and 
Listing of Stanbic IBTC Group 
Plc (“Holdco”) 
Stanbic IBTC Stockbrokers 
Limited 
Stanbic IBTC Asset 
Management Limited 
FBN Holdco Plc  Scheme of Arrangement 
Between First Bank of Nigeria 
Plc and the Holders of its fully 
paid ordinary shares of 50 kobo 
each in connection with the 
proposed Restructuring of First 
Bank of Nigeria Plc Under 
Financial Services 




                                           
 
  









                                                                                                                                             
 REPORT DATE: 17/05/2013 
                                                                               
X-Compliance report is a transparency initiative of The Exchange which is designed to maintain 
market integrity and protect the investors by providing compliance related information on all 
listed companies. 
 
Companies that are listed on The Exchange are required to adhere to high disclosure standards 
which are prescribed in Appendix 111 of the Listing Rules. Financial information which is 
periodic disclosure and on-going material events disclosure should be released to The Exchange 
in a timely manner to enable it efficiently perform its function of maintaining an orderly market. 
 
THE X-COMPLIANCE REPORT PROVIDES INFORMATION ON:  
 
Released Financials 
Early Filers of Audited Accounts 
Companies that breached Listings Rules 
Delinquent Filers of Audited Accounts 
Delinquent Filers of Quarterly Reports 
Companies that are Operating Below Listing Standards 
Companies with Free-Float Deficiencies 
Enforcement Actions against Companies 
Companies slated for Delisting  
Application for New Listings 
Applications approved by the Quotations Committee of Management 
Meetings of Companies  
                                        









Early filers are companies that file their financial statements at least two weeks before the due 
date. 
Quoted companies on The Exchange are required to file their financial statements on a timely 
basis in accordance with Appendix 111 of the Listing Rules. The Exchange has identified the 
companies listed on Schedule One as companies that have exceeded the minimum listing 
standards in terms of timely disclosure of their Audited Annual and quarterly financial 
performance.  
The Exchange is extremely proud of these companies and will continue to show case quoted 






S/N NAME OF COMPANY QUARTER ENDED DUE DATE FILED DATE 
1 Access Bank Plc March 31, 2013 May 15, 2013 April 5, 2013 
2 Diamond Bank Plc March 31, 2013 May 15, 2013 April 11, 2013 
3 Sterling Bank Plc March 31, 2013 May 15, 2013 April 17, 2013 
4 GT Bank Plc March 31, 2013 May 15, 2013 April 18, 2013 
5 Stanbic IBTC Holdings Plc March 31, 2013 May 15, 2013 April 19, 2013 
6 Berger Paints Plc March 31, 2013 May 15, 2013 April 19, 2013 
7 Unity Bank Plc March 31, 2013 May 15, 2013 April 22, 2013 
8 Ecobank Transnational 
Incorporated Plc 
March 31, 2013 May 15, 2013 
April 23, 2013 
9 Trans Nationwide Express Plc March 31, 2013 May 15, 2013 April 24, 2013 
10 Skye Bank Plc March 31, 2013 May 15, 2013 April 24, 2013 
11 Unilever Plc March 31, 2013 May 15, 2013 April 25, 2013 
12 Forte Oil Plc March 31, 2013 May 15, 2013 April 26, 2013 





S/N NAME OF COMPANY YEAR END DUE DATE FILED DATE 
1 Nestle Nigeria Plc  December 31, 2012 March 31, 2012 February 20, 2013 
2. Nigerian Breweries Plc December 31, 2012 March 31, 2012 February 22, 2013 
3 Pharma Deko Plc. December 31, 2012 March 31, 2012 March 6, 2013 
 
BREACH OF VOLUNTARY DELISTING PROCESS 
CAPPA & D’ALBERTO NIGERIA PLC 
Cappa & D’Alberto Nigeria Plc released itself from compliance with the obligations inherent of a 
listed company as it failed to follow through the entire voluntary delisting process of The 
Exchange, which includes inter alia, paying off dissenting shareholders who opted to exit the 
company following the resolution passed by the majority shareholders on March 24, 2009, to 
delist. The resolution passed by the majority shareholders at the Extra- Ordinary General 
Meeting of March 24, 2009, does not exempt Cappa & D’Alberto Nigeria Plc from complying 
with regulatory obligations. 
The Exchange will take appropriate legal steps to enforce its Rules and protect the interest of 
Investors.  
DEFAULT FILERS (AUDITED ACCOUNTS) 
The Exchange has identified the companies listed on schedules two and three as companies that 
have not met the minimum listing standards in terms of timely disclosure of their audited 
annual financial performance and are thus operating Below the Listing Standards (BLS) of The 
Exchange.  
 
 The sanctions for non-compliance with periodic financial disclosure obligations are clearly spelt 
out in Appendix 111 of the Listing Rules and The Exchange will protect the integrity of its rules. 
 
SCHEDULE ONE 
BANKS AND INSURANCE COMPANIES 
S/NO COMPANY YE SYMBOL REMARKS 
1 
Union Homes Savings & Loans Plc Mar BLS Non Rendition of Audited 
Financial Statements 2010, 
2011 
2 
*Goldlink Insurance Plc   Dec  BLS Non Rendition of Audited 
Financial Statements 2011 
*Goldlink Insurance Plc : The Exchange suspended the trading on the company’s shares with effect from 
November 2, 2012 following the appointment of an interim management by NAICOM  to oversee the 





G. Cappa Plc  Mar BLS Non Rendition of Audited 
Financial Statements 2011/2012 
2 Nigerian German Chemicals Plc                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
Mar 
BLS
Non Rendition of Audited 
Financial Statements 2012
3 
West African Aluminium Products 
Plc Sept BLS 
Non Rendition of Audited 
Financial Statements 2010  
4 Nigerian Wire & Cable Plc Sept  BLS 
Non Rendition of Audited 
Financial Statements 2011  
5 Jos International Breweries Plc Dec  BLS 
Non Rendition of Audited 
Financial Statements 2010  
6 Afrik Pharmaceutical Plc Dec BLS 
Non Rendition of Audited 
Financial Statements 2011 
7 Big Treat Plc Dec BLS Regulatory Issue  
8 Mtech Plc Dec  BLS Regulatory Issue  
9 
Investment & Allied Assurance 
Plc Dec  BLS Regulatory Issue  
 
QUARTERLY ACCOUNTS 
Quoted companies on The Exchange are required to file their quarterly accounts within 45 days 
after the end of the quarter in accordance with +Appendix 111 of the Listing Rules. Details of the 
quarterly filings are listed on schedule five and can be downloaded from the released financials 
on the website.  
 
The sanctions for non-compliance with periodic financial disclosure obligations are clearly spelt 
out in Appendix 111 of the Listing Rules and The Exchange will protect the integrity of its rules. 
 
SCHEDULE THREE:  
UNAUDITED FIRST QUARTER 2012 
S/NO COMPANY  QTR  SYMBOL 
1 Smart Product Nigeria Plc  March  BLS 
2 Afrik Pharmaceuticals Plc  March  BLS 
3 Adswitch Plc  July  BLS 
4 RAK Unity Petroleum Plc  July  BLS 
5 Union Ventures & Petroleum Plc  March  BLS 
6 Juli Plc  March  BLS 
7 Multi-Trex Integrated Foods Plc  July  BLS 
8 Big Treat Plc  March  BLS 
9 Vono Products Plc  March  BLS 
10 Arbico Plc  March  BLS 
11 G. Cappa Plc  June  BLS 
12 Roads Nigeria Plc  June  BLS 
13 Skye Shelter Fund Plc  March  BLS 
14 Wema Bank Plc  March  BLS 
15 African Alliance Insurance Plc  March  BLS 
16 Cornerstone Insurance Plc  March  BLS 
17 Goldlink Insurance Plc  March  BLS 
18 Great Nigeria Insurance Plc  March  BLS 
19 International Energy Insurance Plc  March  BLS 
20 Investment & Allied Assurance Plc  March  BLS 
21 Mutual Benefits Assurance Plc  March  BLS 
22 Unity Kapital Assurance Plc  March  BLS 
23 Universal Insurance Company Plc  March  BLS 
24 Wapic Insurance Plc  March  BLS 
25 Union Homes Savings & Loans Plc  June  BLS 
26 Nigeria Energy Sector Fund  June  BLS 
27 SIM Capital  Alliance  Fund  March  BLS 
28 Ekocorp Plc  March  BLS 
30 











32 Nigerian German Chemical Plc  June  BLS 
33 Evans Medical Plc  March  BLS 
34 Fidson Healthcare Plc  March  BLS 
35 Pharma Deko Plc  March  BLS 
36 MTECH Communications Plc  March  BLS 
37 MTI Plc  March  BLS 
38 African Paints (Nigeria ) Plc  March  BLS 
39 IPWA Plc  March  BLS 
40 Nigerian Wire & Cable Plc  March  BLS 
41 Thomas Wyatt Nigeria  Plc  June  BLS 
42 Academy Press Plc  June  BLS 
43 Ikeja Hotel Plc  March  BLS 
44 DAAR Communications Plc  March  BLS 
45 Interlinked Technologies Plc  September  BLS 
46 Deap Capital Management & Trust Plc  June  BLS 
 
UNAUDITED HALF YEAR 2012 
S/NO COMPANY  QTR  SYMBOL 
1 FTN Cocoa Processors Plc  June  BLS 
2 Smart Product Nigeria Plc  June  BLS 
3 Afrik Pharmaceuticals Plc  June  BLS 
4 Union Ventures & Petroleum Plc  June  BLS 
5 John Holt Plc  March  BLS 
6 DN Tyre & Rubber Plc  March  BLS 
7 P.S Mandrides & Company Plc  June  BLS 
8 Big Treat Plc  June  BLS 
9 Vono Products Plc  June  BLS 
10 Vitafoam Nigeria Plc  March  BLS 
11 Arbico Plc  June  BLS 
12 G. Cappa Plc  September  BLS 
13 Roads Nigeria Plc  September  BLS 
14 Union Homes Real Estate  Plc  May  BLS 
16 Wema Bank Plc  June  BLS 
17 African Alliance Insurance Plc  June  BLS 
18 Cornerstone Insurance Plc  June  BLS 
19 Goldlink Insurance Plc  June  BLS 
20 Great Nigeria Insurance Plc  June  BLS 
21 International Energy Insurance Plc  June  BLS 
22 Investment & Allied Assurance Plc  June  BLS 
23 Mutual Benefits Assurance  Plc  June  BLS 
24 Sovereign Trust Insurance Plc  June  BLS 
25 Unity Kapital Assurance Plc  June  BLS 
26 Universal Insurance Company Plc  June  BLS 
27 Aso Savings & Loans Plc  September  BLS 
28 Union Homes Savings & Loans Plc  September  BLS 
29 Royal Exchange Plc  June  BLS 
30 SIM Capital  Alliance  Fund  June  BLS 
31 Nigeria Energy Sector Fund  September  BLS 
32 Ekocorp Plc  June  BLS 
33 





34 Evans Medical Plc  June  BLS 
35 Nigerian German Chemical Plc  September  BLS 
36 MTECH Communications Plc  June  BLS 
37 MTI Plc  June  BLS 
38 African Paints (Nigeria) Plc  June   
39 IPWA Plc  June  BLS 
40 Premier Paints Plc  June  BLS 
41 Nigerian Wire & Cable Plc  June  BLS 
42 Greif Nigeria Plc  April  BLS 
43 Academy Press Plc  September  BLS 
44 Ikeja Hotel Plc  June  BLS 







UNAUDITED NINE MONTHS 2012 
S/NO COMPANY  QTR  SYMBOL 
1 FTN Cocoa Processors Plc  Sept  BLS 
2 G. Cappa Plc  Dec  BLS 
3 Roads Nigeria Plc  December  BLS 
4 Nigeria Energy Sector Plc  December  BLS 
5 Smart Product Nigeria  Plc  Sept  BLS 
6 Afrik Pharmaceuticals Plc  Sept  BLS 
7 Juli Plc  Sept  BLS 
8 P.S Mandrides & Company Plc  June  BLS 
9 Big Treat Plc  Sept  BLS 
10 Nigerian German Chemical Plc  September  BLS 
11 Dangote Flour Mills Plc  Sept  BLS 
12 UTC Nigeria Plc  Sept  BLS 
13 Vono Products Plc  Sept  BLS 
14 Arbico Plc  Sept  BLS 
15 Union Homes Real Estate  Plc  Aug  BLS 
16 Skye Shelter Fund Plc  Sept  BLS 
17 Fortis Microfinance Bank Plc  Sept  BLS 
18 Wema Bank Plc  Sept  BLS 
19 Goldlink Insurance Plc  Sept  BLS 
20 International Energy Insurance Plc  Sept  BLS 
21 Investment & Allied Assurance Plc  Sept  BLS 
22 Universal Insurance Company Plc  Sept  BLS 
23 





24 SIM Capital  Alliance  Fund  Sept  BLS 
25 MTECH Communications Plc  Sept  BLS 
26 Chams Plc  Sept  BLS 
27 MTI Plc  Sept  BLS 
28 





29 IPWA Plc  Sept  BLS 
30 Portland Paint & Product Plc  Sept  BLS 
31 Nigerian Wire & Cable Plc  Sept  BLS 
32 





33 Ikeja Hotel Plc  Sept  BLS 
34 DAAR Communications Plc  Sept  BLS 
 
 
COMPANIES SLATED FOR DELISTING/RESTRUCTURING 




DELISTING IN PROCESS 
1 Pinnacle Point Group Plc DIP Company in liquidation process 
2 Poly Products Plc DIP 
Voluntary delisting due to harsh economic 
climate 
3 Nigerian Wire Industries Plc DIP 
Regulatory Delisting for reasons of non-
compliance with Listing Rules  
4 West African Aluminium Plc DIP 
Regulatory Delisting for reasons of non-
compliance with Listing Rules 
5 Afroil Plc DIP 
Regulatory Delisting for reasons of non-




1 Lennards Plc RESTRG The company is restructuring to regularize its 
post-listing status on The NSE 
2 Union Dicon Salt Plc RESTRG The company is restructuring to regularize its 
post-listing status on The NSE 
3 Rokanna Industries Plc RESTRG The company is restructuring to regularize its 
post-listing status on The NSE 
4 West African Glass Industries Plc RESTRG The company is restructuring to regularize its 
post-listing status on The NSE 
5 Jos International Breweries Plc RESTRG The company is restructuring to regularize its 
post-listing status on The NSE 
6 Golden Guinea Breweries Plc RESTRG The company is restructuring to regularize its 
post-listing status on The NSE 
7 Stokvis Nigeria Plc RESTRG The company is restructuring to regularize its 
post-listing status on The NSE 
8 Nigerian Sewing Machine Plc RESTRG The company is restructuring to regularize its 
post-listing status on The NSE 
9 
Capital Oil Plc RESTRG 
The company is restructuring to regularize its 
post-listing status on The NSE 
10 Aluminium Manufacturing Company of 
Nigeria Plc RESTRG 
The company is restructuring to regularize its 
post-listing status on The NSE 
11 
Premier Breweries Plc. RESTRG 
The company is restructuring to regularize its 






UNAUTHORISED PUBLICATIONS & NON- DISCLOSURE OF 
MATERIAL INFORMATION   
Every listed company is required to provide The Exchange with timely information to enable it 
efficiently perform its function of maintaining an orderly market. In accordance with the 
provisions of Appendix 111 of the Listing Rules, quoted companies are required to obtain prior 
written approval from The Exchange before publications that affect shareholders’ interest are 
made in the media. In addition, companies are also required to disclose material information to 
The Exchange and publish some of that information in their Annual Reports.  
 
The companies listed in schedules six and seven breached these provisions of the Listing Rules 
and were sanctioned accordingly. The Exchange applied the sanctions prescribed in Rules and 




PUBLICATION WITHOUT NSE’S PRIOR WRITTEN  APPROVAL IN  2013 
 NAME OF COMPANIES PENALTY (N) NATURE OF PUBLICATION 
1 Custodian and Allied Insurance 
Plc  
661,500.00 Notice of Court Ordered  Meeting 
2 Crusader Insurance Plc 472,500.00 Notice of Court Ordered  Meeting 
3 Wapic  Insurance Plc 496,125.00 Appointment of Directors 
4 Honeywell Plc. 1,260,000 Unauthorized Publication of EGM 
NON- DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION 
 NAME OF COMPANIES PENALTY (N) NATURE OF PUBLICATION 
1 Julius Berger Nigeria Plc 1,470,000.00 Non-disclosure of the Substantial shareholding of Oasis 
Petroleum Company Limited in the 2011 Annual Reports and 




PUBLICATION WITHOUT NSE’S PRIOR WRITTEN  APPROVAL IN  2012 
S/NO NAME OF COMPANIES PENALTY (N) NATURE OF PUBLICATION 
1 Multiverse Plc 496,125.00 Appointment of Directors 
2 Unity Bank Plc 1,543,500.00  Notice of Divestment of Holdings of Unity Bank Plc from its non-
banking subsidiaries 
3 First Bank of Nigeria Plc 2,100,000.00 Notice of Extra-Ordinary General Meeting 
4 Costain (W.A) Plc 575,505.00 Appointment of External Auditor 
 
 
SANCTIONS FOR DEFAULT FILINGS OF FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 
The information published in schedules eight and nine are the list of companies that filed their 
2011 and 2012  Financial Statements after the regulatory  due date. The Exchange applied 
sanctions in accordance with the provisions of Section 14 of Appendix 111 of the Listing Rules. 
 
SCHEDULE EIGHT: DEFAULT FILINGS  
   DEFAULT FILINGS IN  2013  
S/NO NAME OF COMPANIES PENALTY (N) ACCOUNTS  FISCAL YEAR  
1 International Energy Insurance Plc 3,800,000.00 Audited  December 2011 
2 Mutual Benefits Assurance Plc 3,000,000.00 Audited  December 2011 
3 Costain (West Africa) Plc 3,600,000.00 Audited March 2012 
 
 
   DEFAULT FILINGS  IN  2012  
S/NO NAME OF COMPANIES PENALTY (N) ACCOUNTS  FISCAL YEAR 
1 C & I Leasing Plc 1,050,000.00 Audited  January 2012 
2 Costain (W.A) Plc 2,850,000.00 Audited  March 2011 
3 John Holt Plc 1,700,000.00 Audited  September 2011  
4 Eterna Plc 100,000.00 Audited  December 2011 
5 FTN Cocoa Plc 200,000.00 Audited  December 2011 
6 Dangote Flour Mills Plc 400,000.00 Audited  December 2011 
7 Regency Alliance Insurance Plc 500,000.00 Audited  December 2011 
8 Oando Plc 500,000.00 Audited  December 2011 
9 Premier Paints Plc 700,000.00 Audited  December 2011 
10 Scoa Nigeria Plc 800,000.00 Audited  December 2011 
11 Universal Insurance Plc 900,000.00 Audited  December 2011 
12 Union Bank Plc 900,000.00 Audited  December 2011 
13 Royal Exchange Plc 900,000.00 Audited  December 2011 
14 Crusader Nigeria Plc 800,000.00 Audited  December 2011 
15 Niger Insurance Plc 900,000.00 Audited  December 2011 
16 Unity Kapital Assurance Plc 900,000.00 Audited  December 2011 
17 Conoil Plc 1,200,000.00 Audited  December 2011 
18 Cornerstone Insurance Plc 1,500,000.00 Audited  December 2011 
19 Linkage Assurance Plc 3,300,000.00 Audited  December 2011 
20 Guinea Insurance Plc  2,700,000.00 Audited  December 2011 
21 The Tourist Company of Nigeria 
Plc 
100,000.00 Audited  December 2011 
22 Wema Bank Plc 2,700,000.00 Audited  December 2011 
23 IPWA Plc 2,700,000.00 Audited  December 2011 
24 Unic Insurance Plc 2,800,000.00 Audited  December 2011 
25 Equity  Assurance Plc 3,000,000.00 Audited  December 2011 
26 Standard Alliance Plc 3,000,000.00 Audited  December 2011 
27 Great Nigeria Insurance  Plc 3,000,000.00 Audited  December 2011 
28 African Alliance Insurance Plc 3,000,000.00 Audited  December 2011 
29 STACO Plc 3,400,000.00 Audited  December 2011 
30 Ikeja Hotel Plc 3,400,000.00 Audited  December 2011 
31 DAAR Communication Plc  3,400,000.00 Audited  December 2011 
 
FREE FLOAT DEFICIENCIES  
Companies listed on The Exchange must maintain a minimum free float for the set standards 
under which they are listed in order to ensure that there is an orderly and liquid market in their 
securities. The free float requirement for companies on the Main Board is 20% and 15% for 
ASEM companies.  
 
The Exchange has identified five companies that have free float deficiencies. These companies 
applied for waivers from the Quotations Committee of Management specifically provided 
compliance plans with tentative timelines to support their requests.  
 
The Quotations Committee of Management considered and approved an extended timeframe 
for the companies to regain compliance with the listing requirement. The companies are 
however required to also provide quarterly disclosure reports to The Exchange detailing their 
level of implementation of the compliance plans. 
 
 The names of the companies in this category are contained in schedule nine. 
 
SCHEDULE NINE 
COMPANIES WITH FREE FLOAT DEFICIENCIES  
 ISSUER % OF FREELOAT COMPLIANCE DUE DATE  
The Tourist Company of Nigeria Plc 1.31 February 28,2013  
Dangote Cement Plc   5.11 October 26, 2014 
Union Bank of Nigeria Plc  14.00 June 30, 2017 
 
  
TRANSPARENCY DISCLOSURES: APPLICATIONS APPROVED  
The Quotations Committee of Management considered and approved the following Applications 






APPLICATIONS APPROVED BY QCM ON MARCH 25, 2013 
ISSUER  CAPITAL RAISING 
METHOD 
STOCK BROKER ISSUING HOUSE 
MERGER AND ACQUISITION 
Flour Mills of Nigeria Plc Scheme of Merger 
between Flour Mills 
of Nigeria Plc and 
Niger Mills Company 
Limited 
Chapel Hill Denham 
Securities Limited 
Chapel Hill Advisory Partners Ltd 
Cadbury Nigeria Plc Scheme of Merger 
between Cadbury 






Stanbic IBTC Bank Plc 
APPLICATIONS APPROVED BY QCM ON APRIL 26, 2013 
ISSUER  CAPITAL RAISING 
METHOD 
STOCK BROKER ISSUING HOUSE 
RIGHTS ISSUE 
Wapic Insurance Plc Rights Offer of 
6,350,518,383 Ordinary 
Shares of 50k Each at 
N0.55 per Share 
Marina Securities 
Stockbroking Services Ltd, 
BGL Securities Ltd 
BGL Plc, Marina Securities Ltd 
HYBRID OFFER 
Resort Savings and Loans 
Plc 
IPO of 3,160,218,169 
Ordinary Shares of 50k 
Each at 51k per Share 
and  a Rights Issue of 
3,776,577,416  Ordinary 
Shares of 50k Each at 
50k per Share 
Greenwich Securities Ltd, 
Capital Assets Ltd,  
Dunbell Securities Ltd, 
Dunn Loren Merrifield 
Securities Ltd, Imperial 
Assets Managers Ltd, 
Resort Securities & Trust 
Ltd, Trust Yields Securities 
Ltd 
Greenwich Trust Ltd 
PLACING 
Wema Bank Plc Special Placing and 
listing of 
23,333,333,334 
ordinary shares of 50 




Ltd; GTI Securities Ltd 
Nigerian Stockbrokers Limited; 
Independent Securities Limited 
 
APPROVED IN 2012 BUT YET TO BE LISTED 
APPLICATIONS APPROVED ON DECEMBER 19, 2012 
ISSUER CAPITAL RAISING 
METHOD 
STOCKBROKERS ISSUING HOUSE 
RESTRUCTURING :HOLDING COMPANY  
First City 
Monument Bank Plc 
Scheme of Arrangement 
Between FCMB Plc and the 
holders of its fully paid ordinary 
shares of 50 kobo each 
CSL Stockbrokers Limited FCMB Capital Markets Limited 
RIGHTS ISSUE  
Oando Plc Rights Issue of 4,548,236,276 
ordinary shares of 50 kobo 
each at N12.00 per share 
Vetiva Securities Limited Vetiva Capital Management 
Limited; FBN Capital Limited; 





APPLICATIONS APPROVED ON NOVEMBER 1, 2012 
ISSUER CAPITAL RAISING 
METHOD 
STOCKBROKERS ISSUING HOUSE 
FUND 
VNSE-30 INDEX SECURITIES Offer for Subscription of 
100,000,000 Units of VNSE-30 
Index Securities 
Cashcraft Asset Management 
Limited 





RIGHTS ISSUE  
Prestige Assurance Plc Rights Issue of 2,508,315,438 
Ordinary Shares of 50k each at 
N0.50 per Share 
Imperial Asset Managers Limited Nigerian Stockbrokers 
Limited, Sterling Capital 
Markets Limited 
APPROVED APPLICATIONS AS AT SEPTEMBER 28, 2012 
ISSUER CAPITAL RAISING 
METHOD 
STOCKBROKERS ISSUING HOUSE 
INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERING 
UACN Property 
Development Company 
Plc Real Estate 
Investment Trust (REIT) 
Initial Public Offering of 
3,000,000,000 units of N10.00 
each at par in the UPDC Real 
Estate Investment Company 
(REIT) 
Stanbic IBTC Stockbrokers 
Limited 




Special Placing of 3,125,000,000 
ordinary shares of 0.25 cent at 
N12.86 per share in favour of 
Public Investment Corporation on 
behalf of Government Employee 
Pension Fund of South Africa 
EDC Securities Limited Renaissance Capital 
Limited 
RIGHTS ISSUES  
Aso Savings  Loans Plc  Rights Issue of 11,046,189,224 
ordinary shares of 50k each at 
60k per share 
Apt Securities  Fund Limited Chapel Hill Advisory 
Partners Limited 
African Paints Nigeria Plc Rights Issue of 130,000,000 
ordinary shares of 50k each at 
N1.25 per share 
Chapel Hill Denham Securities 
Limited 





Cornerstone Insurance Plc 
(aborted) 
Scheme of Merger between 
Cornerstone Insurance Plc  and 
Linkage Insurance Plc 
CSL Stockbrokers Limited FCMB Capital Market 
Limited  
      2013/2012 NEW LISTINGS 














Linkage Insurance 18/01/2013 Not Applicable 2,897,207,843 Placing 
Wapic Insurance Plc 28/01/2013 
Not Applicable 
2,911,954,418 
List of Scheme 
Shares 
Lagos State Government  01/02/2013 80,000,000,000 Not Applicable Government Bond 
Guinness Nigeria Plc 08/02/2013 Not Applicable 30,962,669 Bonus 
Gombe State Bond 11/02/2013 20,000,000,000 Not Applicable Government Bond 
Crusader (Nigeria) Plc Zero Coupon 
Convertible Bond 
15/02/2013 Not Applicable 3,064,686,154 
Conversion of 
Bond 
International Finance Corporation 26/03/2013 12,000,000,000 Not Applicable 
Supranational 
Bond 
Guinea Insurance Plc 28/03/2013  740,000,000 Placing 




C & I Leasing Plc 15/04/2013 940,000,000 Not Applicable Corporate Bond 
Rak Unity Petroluem Company Plc 17/04/2013 Not Applicable 43,051,159 Placing 
Osun State Government 23/04/2013 30,000,000,000 Not Applicable Government Bond 
Livestock Feeds Plc 25/04/2013 Not Applicable 800,000,000 Placing 
Custodian and Allied Insurance Plc 13/05/2013 Not Applicable 781,017,387 Merger 
BOC Gases Nigeria Plc 14/05/2013 Not Applicable 23,124,706 Bonus 
The Okomu Oil Palm Plc 14/05/2013 Not Applicable 476,955,000 Bonus 
UBA Plc 2nd Tranche  01/05/2012 35,000,000,000 Not Applicable Corporate Bond 
Tower Funding Plc Tranche A   09/02/2012 3,630,000,000 Not Applicable Corporate Bond 
Tower Funding Plc Tranche B   09/02/2012 1,000,000,000 Not Applicable Corporate Bond 
Austin Laz & Co. Plc   29/2/2012 Not Applicable 1,079,860,000 
Listing By 
Introduction 
Lafarge Wapco's Plc  5/3/2012 11,880,000,000 Not Applicable Corporate Bond 
IHS Plc Preference Shares Series Ii   8/3/2012 2,791,454,545 Not Applicable Preference Shares 
Ekiti State Government  13/3/2012 20,000,000,000 Not Applicable Government Bond 
Chellarams Plc   20/3/2012 540,000,000 Not Applicable Corporate Bond 
Benue State Government   27/3/2012 13,000,000,000 
Not Applicable Government. 
Bond 
Crusader Nigeria Plc Zero Coupon (Bond)  14/620/12 1,838,811,700 N/A Corporate Bond 






Oasis Insurance Plc   25/01/2012 Not Applicable 1,500,000,000 Special Placing 
Flour Mills of Nigeria Plc  6/3/2012 Not Applicable 455,566,222 Rights 





Neimeth International Pharmaceuticals Plc   16/3/2012 Not Applicable 482,318,637 Rights Issue 
Access Bank Plc   20/3/2012 
Not Applicable             
5,000,000,000  
Merger 
Union Bank of Nigeria Plc   11/4/2012 
Not Applicable           
14,402,681,471  
Placing 
Poly Products Plc   16/4/2012 
Not Applicable                  
10,000,000  
Bonus Issue 
Afromedia Plc   20/4/2012 Not Applicable 403,549,726 Bonus Issue 
FCMB Plc  23/4/2012 Not Applicable 2,440,678,830 Bonus Issue 
UBA Plc   2/5/2012 Not Applicable 646,693,873 Bonus Issue 
Mobil Oil Plc   2/5/2012 Not Applicable 60,099,210 Bonus Issue 
Dangote Cement Plc   14/5/2012 Not Applicable 1,549,137,037 Bonus Issue 
Nahco Plc   14/5/2012 Not Applicable 246,093,750 Bonus Issue 
Rt Briscoe Plc   16/05/2012 Not Applicable 196,059,480 Bonus Issue 
Unity Bank Plc   5/06/2012 Not Applicable 3,495,153,610 Bonus Issue 
International Breweries Plc   11/06/2012 Not Applicable 1,149,611,749 Rights Issue  
Ecobank Transnational Inc   20/07/2012 Not Applicable 401,259,881 Merger  
Unity Kapital Assurance Plc   25/07/2012 Not Applicable 866,666,666 Bonus Issue 
Niger Insurance Plc   27/07/2012 Not Applicable 2,677,079,286 Rights Issue 
Nigerian Breweries Plc   15/08/2012 Not Applicable 142,092 Merger 
Premier Paints Plc   15/08/2012 Not Applicable 48,000,000 Special Placing 
Vono Products Plc   7/09/2012 Not Applicable 263,651,183 Rights Issue 
Studio Press Nigeria  Plc   24/10/2012 Not Applicable 252,104,285 Special Placing 
 
TENDER OFFERS  
Guaranty Trust 
Assurance Plc  
Tender Offer for the Acquisition of Additional 
732,405,689 ordinary shares of 50kobo each at 




Assur Africa Holding 
(AAH)  
Tender Offer for the Acquisition of additional 
732,405,689 ordinary shares of 50kobo each at 





Skye Bank Plc Block Divestment of 1,785,627,772 ordinary 
shares of 50kobo each of Law Union & Rock 
Insurance Plc by Skye Bank Plc 
Skye Stockbrokers Ltd Not Applicable 
Dangote Flour Mills Plc Proposed Acquisition of 3,167,716,667 Ordinary 
Shares of 50 kobo each representing 63.35% 
equity stake in Dangote Flourmills Plc (held by 











FBN Holdings Plc  26/11/2012 Not Applicable 32,632,084,357 Listing 
FBN Money Market Fund   24/12/2012 1,798,440,000 
Not Applicable Memorandum 
Listing 
FBN Fixed Income Fund  
 
24/12/2012 1,752,200,000 
Not Applicable Memorandum 
Listing 
2013/2012 DELISTED ENTITIES/SECURITIES 
NAME OF ENTITY DATE DELISTED 
Crusader (Nigeria) Plc - Zero Coupon 
Convertible Bond. 
15/02/2013 
Northern Bag Manufacturing Company Ltd 11/04/2013 
Finbank Preference Shares  09/02/2012 
Stanbic IBTC Bank Plc 23/11/2012 
Ecobank Nigeria Plc  20/7/2012 
First Bank of Nigeria Plc 26/11/2012 
Hallmark Paper Products Plc 19/12/2012 
Udeofson Garment Factory 19/12/2012 
Abplast Products Plc 19/12/2012 
MEETINGS FOR THE MONTH OF AUGUST 2013 
1 Aluminium Extrusion Protea Hotel, Ikeja August 2, 2013 11.00 a.m. AGM 
2 MRS Oil Nigeria  Federal Palace Hotel, VI August 14, 2013 11.00 a.m. AGM 
 
MEETINGS FOR THE MONTH OF JULY 2013 
1 R.T. Briscoe Lagos Sheraton Hotel, 
Ikeja 
July 1, 2013 
 
10.00 a.m. AGM 
2 A.G. Leventis Mainland Hotel, Ebute-
Meta 
July 2, 2013 
 
12.00 noon AGM 
3 Beta Glass Mainland Hotel, Ebute-
Meta 
July 3, 2013 
 
12.00 noon AGM 
4 Presco  The Dura Club, Obaretin 
Estate, Benin/Sapele Rd 
July 18, 2013 
 
11.00 a.m. AGM 
5 Trans-Nationwide Express Airport Hotel, Ikeja, 
Lagos 
July 25, 2013 
 
11.00 a.m. AGM 
 
MEETINGS FOR THE MONTH OF JUNE 2013 
1 The Okomu Oil Palm  Transcorp Hilton, Abuja   June 5, 2013 9.00 a.m. AGM 
2 International Energy 
Insurance 
LeMeridien Ibom Hotel & 
Golf Resort, Uyo 
June 5, 2013 11.00 a.m. AGM 
3 eTransact Ocean View Restaurants, 
Adetokunbo Ademola VI 
June 6, 2013 11.00 a.m. AGM 
4 NASCON MUSON Centre, Onikan, 
Lagos 
June 6, 2013 12.00 noon AGM 
5 UBA Transcorp Hilton, Abuja   June 7, 2013 10.00 a.m. AGM 
6 BOC Gases Lagos Airport Hotel, Ikeja June 13,2013 11.00 a.m. AGM 
7 Champion Brew (2 years 
AGM) 
National Theatre, Iganmu June 13,2013 12.00 & 
2.00 p.m. 
AGM 
8 Total Nigeria  MUSON Centre, Onikan 
Lagos 
June 14,2013 11.00 a.m. AGM 
9 Adswitch  Conv-Aj Events Ltd June 14,2013 9.30 a.m. AGM 
10 Union Bank Tinapa Lakeside Hotel, 
Calabar 
June 18,2013 11.00 a.m. AGM 
11 FCMB MUSON Centre, Onikan 
Lagos 
June 19,2013  AGM 
12 Julius Berger Shehu Musa Yar’ Adua 
Centre, Abuja  
June 20,2013 11.00 a.m. AGM 
13 ETI Lome, Togo June 20,2013 10.30 a.m AGM 
14 Nigerian Ropes Mainland Hotel, Oyingbo June 21,2013 11.00 a.m. AGM 
15 CAP Golden Tulip Hotel, 
Festac 
June 24,2013 11.00 a.m. AGM 
16 UACN  Golden Tulip Hotel, 
Festac 
June 26,2013  AGM 
17 Tantalizers  Golden Tulip Hotel, 
Festac 
June 26,2013 11.00 a.m. AGM 
18 Airline Services & 
Logistics 
Golden Tulip Hotel, 
Festac 
June 27,2013 12.00 noon AGM 
19 Ashaka Cement  Zaranda Hotel, Bauchi June 27,2013 11.00 a.m. AGM 
20 NPF Microfinance  June 27,2013  AGM 
 
MEETINGS FOR THE MONTH OF MAY 2013 
1 Sterling Bank Eko Hotel, VI May 2, 2013 11.00 a.m. AGM 
2 Cadbury  Civic Centre, Victoria 
Island, Lagos 
May 8, 2013 10.00 a.m. AGM 
3 Nestle Nigeria  MUSON Centre, Onikan May 9, 2013 11.00 a.m. AGM 
4 Dangote Sugar Eko Hotel, VI Lagos May 13, 2013 11.00 a.m. AGM 
5 Berger Paints  Transcorp Hilton, Abuja  May 14, 2013 11.00 a.m. AGM 
6 Costain  Mainland Hotel, Oyingbo May 14, 2013 10.00 a.m. AGM 
7 Nigerian Breweries  MUSON Centre, Onikan, 
Lagos 
May 15, 2013 10.00 a.m. AGM 
8 First Aluminium Airport Hotel, Ikeja May 15, 2013 11.00 a.m. AGM 
9 Unilever  MUSON Centre, Onikan 
Lagos 
May 16, 2013 10.00 a.m. AGM 
10 Fidelity Bank Transcorp Hilton, Abuja  May 21, 2013 11.00 a.m. AGM 
11 Skye Bank Lagos Oriental Hotel, VI May 22, 2013 11.00 a.m. AGM 
12 GSK City Hall, Lagos Island May 23, 2013 11.00 a.m. AGM 
13 Paints & Coatings Aries suites Plot 12, 
Osborne Foreshore 
Estate, Ikoyi, Lagos 
May 23, 2013 11.00 a.m. AGM 
14 Dangote Cement Trancorp Hilton, Abuja  May 23, 2013  AGM 
15 Mansard Plc  Oriental Hotel, Lekki Rd, 
VI 
May 23, 2013 10.00 a.m.   
16 Lafarge Wapco City Hall, Onikan Lagos May 28, 2013 11.00 a.m. AGM 
17 Livestock Feeds Golden Tulip, Amuwo 
Odofin 
May 28, 2013 11.00 a.m. AGM 
18 Mobil Oil  Muson Center May 28, 2013 11.00 a.m. AGM 
19 Learn Africa Lagos Airport, Ikeja 
Lagos 
May 30, 2013 11.00 a.m. AGM 
20 Chams Plc Sheraton Hotels, Ikeja May 30, 2013 11.00 a.m. AGM 
21 FBN Eko Hotel  May 31, 2013 10.00 a.m. AGM 
 
THE FOLLOWING MEETINGS HELD IN JANUARY 2013 
S/N COMPANY VENUE DATE TIME TYPE OF MEETING 
1 Custodian & Allied 
Insurance Plc. 
Golden Gate Restaurant, 
Glover Road, Ikoyi 
January 8, 2013 11:00 A.M. Court Ordered 
Meeting 
2 Crusader Insurance Plc Golden Gate Restaurant, 
Glover Road, Ikoyi 
January 8, 2013 11.00 A.M. Court Ordered 
Meeting 
3 FTN Cocoa Plc Lagos Chamber of 
Commerce Conference & 
Exhibition Centre, Alausa, 
Lagos 
January 10, 2013 11:00 A.M. AGM 
4 Cadbury Nigeria Plc Borno Rivers Room, 
Transcorp Hilton Hotel, 
Abuja 
January 30,2013 12:00 P.M.  Court Ordered 
Meeting 
5 Transcorp Incorporated 
Plc 
Lantana Hall, Eko Hotel & 
Suites, Victoria Island, 
Lagos 
January 30, 2012 11:00 A.M. Court Ordered 
Meeting 
6 Dn Tyre & Rubber 
(Adjourned) 
Plot 23 Oba Akran Avenue, 
Ikeja 
January 31, 2013 11:00 A.M. AGM 
7 Staco Insurance  Plc Grand Inn & Suites, 3 
Stadium Road GRA  Ijebu 
Ode 





THE FOLLOWING MEETINGS HELD IN FEBRUARY 2013 
 1 SIM Capital Alliance Fund Board Room, C&C 
Towers(8th Floor) Plot 
1684 Sanusi Fafunwa 
Street, Victoria Island 
February 5,  2013 11:00 A.M. AGM 
2 UACN Property 
Development Company 
Plc  
Golden Tulip, Festac February 7, 2013 11:00 A.M. Completion Board 
Meeting 
3 FBN Money Market Fund Victoria Crown Plaza 
Hotel, Victoria island 
February 7, 2013 10:00 A.M. EGM 
4 FBN Fixed Income Fund Victoria Crown Plaza 
Hotel, Victoria island 
February 7, 2013 11:00 A.M. EGM 
5 FBN Heritage Fund Victoria Crown Plaza 
Hotel, Victoria island 
February 7, 2013 12:00 P.M. EGM 
6 Flour Mills of Nigeria Plc. Jasmine Hall, Eko Hotel 
& Suite, Victoria  Island 
February 19, 2013    10:00 A.M. Court-Ordered 
Meeting 
7  Bagco  Nigeria Plc Jasmine Hall, Eko Hotel 
& Suite, Victoria  Island 
February 19, 2013  2:00 P.M. Court-Ordered 
Meeting 
8 Flour Mill/Niger Mills of 
Nigeria  Plc 
Zinia Hall, Eko Hotel & 
Suites 
February 20, 2013 10:00 A.M. Court Ordered 
Meeting 
9 Nigerian Breweries Plc Not Applicable February 20, 2013 Not 
Applicable 
Board Meeting 
10 Premier Breweries Plc Office Complex, 
Industrial Layout, Head 
Bridge, Onitsha, 
Anambra State 
February 27 ,2013 2.00 P.M. AGM 
12 Honeywell Plc Lagoon Restaurant, 
Victoria Island 
February 28, 2013 12.00 noon AGM 
 
THE FOLLOWING MEETINGS HELD IN MARCH 2013 
1 Vitafoam Nigeria Plc. Lagos Sheraton Hotel, 
Ikeja 
March 7, 2013 10:00 A.M AGM 
2 New Gold Issuer Limited ABSA Capital, 15 Alice 
Lane, Sandton, 
Johannesburg, 2196 
March 1, 2013 11.00 A.M. EGM 
3 Abbey Building Society 
Plc. 
Not Applicable March 6, 2013 Not 
Applicable 
Board Meeting 
4 Diamond Bank Plc Boardroom at PGDs 
Place, Plot 4, Block 5, BIS 
Way, off Lekki 
Expressway, Lagos 
March 7, 2013   10.00 A.M. Board Meeting 
5 Daar Communications Plc Daar Communication 
Office, Ladi Lawal Drive, 
Off T.Y. Danjuma Street, 
Asokoro, Abuja  
March 21, 2013   12.00 P.M. AGM 
6 Transcorp  Lagos Oriental, Hotel 
Lekki 
March 28, 2013   10.00 a.m. (EGM) 




March 14, 2013   11.00am AGM 
8 I H S Plc Eko Hotel, Victoria Island March 21, 2013   Not yet  
available  
AGM 
9 Ikeja Hotel  Sheraton Lagos Hotel, 
Ikeja 
March 26, 2013   12.00 P.M. AGM 
10 Neimeth International 
Pharmaceuticals Plc 




Corporation of Nigeria Plc 
Lagos Oriental, Hotel 
Lekki 
March 28, 2013   10.00 a.m. EGM 
 
THE FOLLOWING MEETINGS HELD IN APRIL 2013 
1 Capital Oil Plc. Hotel Fidelna, 55 Ezillo 
Street, Independence 
Layout, Enugu State. 
April 4, 2013   10.00 A.M AGM 
2 Greif Nigeria Plc Rockview Hotel, Park 
Lane, Apapa 
April 16, 2013   11.00 a.m. AGM 
3 Zenith Bank Plc Civic Centre,VI April 24, 2013   10.00 a.m. AGM 
4 GT Bank Plc Eko Hotel, VI April 25, 2013   10.00 a.m. AGM 
5 Access Bank Plc Oriental Hotel, Lekki 
Road, VI 
April 25, 2013   10.00 a.m. AGM 
6 Pharma Deko Plc Pharma-Deko Plant, 
Agbara Industrial Estate, 
Agbara 
April 25, 2013   12.00 noon AGM  
7 Interlinked Technologies 
Plc 
Airport Hotel, Ikeja, 
Lagos  
April 30, 2013   11.00 a.m. AGM 






REPORT DATE: March 07, 2014 
 
X-Compliance report is a transparency initiative of The Exchange which is designed to maintain market 
integrity and protect the investors by providing compliance related information on all listed companies. 
 
Companies that are listed on The Exchange are required to adhere to high disclosure standards which are 
prescribed in Appendix 111 of the Listing Rules. Financial information which is periodic disclosure and on-
going material events disclosure should be released to The Exchange in a timely manner to enable it 
efficiently perform its function of maintaining an orderly market. 
 
THE X-COMPLIANCE REPORT PROVIDES INFORMATION ON: 
o Released Financials          
o Early Filers of Audited Accounts 
o Companies that breached Listings Rules 
o Delinquent Filers of Audited Accounts 
o Delinquent Filers of Quarterly Reports 
o Companies that are Operating Below Listing Standards 
o Companies with Free-Float Deficiencies 
o Enforcement Actions against Companies 
o Companies slated for Delisting  
o Application for New Listings 
o Applications approved by the Quotations Committee of Management 












Early filers are companies that file their financial statements at least two weeks before the due date. 
Quoted companies on The Exchange are required to file their financial statements on a timely basis in 
accordance with Appendix 111 of the Listing Rules. The Exchange has identified the companies listed on 
Schedule One as companies that have exceeded the minimum listing standards in terms of timely 
disclosure of their Audited Annual and quarterly financial performance.  
The Exchange is extremely proud of these companies and will continue to show case quoted companies 
that imbibe high corporate governance practices.  
SCHEDULE ONE  
2014 AUDITED ACCOUNTS  
 
AUDITED 
S/N NAME OF COMPANY YEAR END DUE DATE FILED DATE 
1 Forte Oil Plc December 31, 2013 March 31, 2014 January 31, 2014 
2. Nigerian Breweries Plc December 31, 2013 March 31, 2014 February 13, 2014 
3 McNichols Consolidated Plc December 31, 2013 March 31, 2014 February 14, 2014 
4 Africa Prudential Registrars Plc December 31, 2013 March 31, 2014 February 17, 2014 
5 Nestle Nigeria Plc December 31, 2013 March 31, 2014 February 26, 2014 
 
 
DEFAULTERS (AUDITED ACCOUNTS) 
The Exchange has identified the companies listed on Schedules two and three as companies that fell short 
of the minimum listing standards in terms of timely disclosure of their audited annual financial 
performance and are operating or operated Below the Listing Standards (BLS) of The Exchange in the 
course of the year.  
 
 The sanctions for non-compliance with periodic financial disclosure obligations are clearly spelt out in 
Appendix 111 of the Listing Rules and The Exchange will protect the integrity of its rules. 
SCHEDULE TWO 
BANKS AND INSURANCE COMPANIES 
S/NO COMPANY YE SYMBOL REMARKS 
1.  
Union Homes Savings & Loans Plc Mar BLS Non Rendition of Audited Financial 
Statements 2012, 2013 
2.  *Goldlink Insurance Plc   Dec  BLS Regulatory Issue 




Statements  2012 
4.  
UNIC INSURANCE PLC 
Dec BLS 
Non Rendition of Audited Financial 
Statements  2012 
5.  Investment & Allied Assurance Plc Dec  BLS Regulatory Action 
 
*Goldlink Insurance Plc : The Exchange suspended the trading on the company’s shares with effect from 
November 2, 2012 following the appointment of an interim management by NAICOM  to oversee the 





G. Cappa Plc  Mar BLS/Restructuring  Non Rendition of Audited Financial 
Statements 2011, 2012, 2013 
2.  Nigerian German Chemical Plc                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
Mar 
BLS
Non Rendition of Audited Financial 
Statements 2013
3.  Nigerian Wire & Cable Plc Sept  BLS 
Non Rendition of Audited Financial 
Statements 2011, 2012 
4.  
Rokanna Industries Plc Dec  
BLS/ Restructuring 
Non Rendition of Audited Financial 
Statements 2012 
5.  
West African Glass Industries Plc Dec  BLS/ Restructuring Non Rendition of Audited Financial 
Statements 2011 and 2012 
6.  Jos International Breweries Plc Dec  
BLS/ Restructuring Non Rendition of Audited Financial 
Statements 2010, 2011, 2012 
7.  Big Treat Plc Dec BLS Regulatory Action  
8.  Mtech Communications Plc Dec  BLS Regulatory Action 
9.  Afroil Plc Dec  BLS Regulatory Action 
10.  P.S. Mandrides & Company Plc Sep BLS 
Non Rendition of Audited Financial 
Statements  2012 
11.  
FTN Cocoa Processors Plc 
Dec BLS 
Non Rendition of Audited Financial 
Statements  2012 
12.  UTC Nigeria Plc Dec BLS 
Non Rendition of Audited Financial 
Statements  2012 
13.  Starcomms Plc Dec BLS 
Non Rendition of Audited Financial 
Statements  2012 
14.  MTI Plc Dec BLS 
Non Rendition of Audited Financial 
Statements  2012 
15.  IPWA Plc Dec BLS 
Non Rendition of Audited Financial 
Statements  2012 
16.  Beco Petroleum Product Plc Dec BLS 
Non Rendition of Audited Financial 
Statements  2012 
17.  Ikeja Hotel Plc Dec BLS 
Non Rendition of Audited Financial 




18.  DAAR Communications Plc Dec BLS 
Non Rendition of Audited Financial 
Statements  2012 
 
DEFAULTERS (QUARTERLY ACCOUNTS) 
Quoted companies on The Exchange are required to file their quarterly accounts within 45 days after the 
end of the quarter in accordance with Appendix 111 of the Listing Rules. Details of the quarterly filings are 
listed on Schedule five and can be downloaded from the released financials on the website.  
 
The sanctions for non-compliance with periodic financial disclosure obligations are clearly spelt out in 
Appendix 111 of the Listing Rules and The Exchange will protect the integrity of its rules. 
SCHEDULE FOUR  
2013 INTERIM ACCOUNTS (1st QUARTER) 
S/NO COMPANY  QTR  SYMBOL 
1.  Greif Nigeria Plc  January  BLS 
2.  FTN Cocoa Processors Plc  March  BLS 
3.  Rokana Industries  Plc  March  BLS/ Restructuring 
4.  Smart Product Nigeria Plc  March  BLS 
5.  Anino International Plc  March  BLS/ Restructuring 
6.  Capital Oil Plc  March  BLS/ Restructuring 
7.  Champion Breweries Plc  March  BLS 
8.  UTC Nigeria Plc  March  BLS 
9.  Beta Glass Plc  March  BLS 
10.  Arbico Plc  March  BLS 
11.  Cappa & D’alberto Plc  March  BLS/DIP 
12.  Fortis Microfinance Bank Plc  March  BLS 
13.  Cornerstone Insurance Plc  March  BLS 
14.  Great Nigeria Insurance Plc  March  BLS 
15.  International Energy Insurance Plc  March  BLS 
16.  LASACO Assurance Plc  March  BLS 
17.  Mutual Benefit Assurance Plc  March  BLS 
18.  Niger Insurance Company Plc  March  BLS 
19.  STACO Plc  March  BLS 
20.  Unic Insurance Plc  March  BLS 
21.  Universal Insurance Company Plc  March  BLS 
22.  Wapic Insurance Plc  March  BLS 
23.  Ekocorp Plc  March  BLS 
24.  May & Baker Nigeria Plc  March  BLS 




26.  NCR (Nigeria) Plc  March  BLS 
27.  Starcomms Plc  March  BLS 
28.  African Paints (Nigeria) Plc  March  BLS 
29.  IPWA Plc  March  BLS 
30.  Nigerian Wire & Cable Plc  March  BLS 
31.  West Africa Glass Industries Plc  March  BLS/ Restructuring 
32.  Nigerian Ropes Plc  March  BLS 
33.  Aluminium Extrusion Nig. Plc  March  BLS 
34.  Eterna Plc  March  BLS 
35.  Beco Petroleum Product Plc  March  BLS 
36.  Ikeja Hotel Plc  March  BLS 
37.  DAAR Communications Plc  March  BLS 
38.  MTI Plc  March  BLS 
39.  Custodian  & Allied Insurance Plc  March  BLS 
40.  Academy Press Plc  June  BLS 
41.  Aso Savings  & Loans Plc  June  BLS 
42.  Costain (West Africa) Plc  June  BLS 
43.  G. Cappa Plc  June  BLS/ Restructuring 
44.  Honeywell Flour Plc  June  BLS 
45.  Nigerian German Chemical Plc                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   June  BLS 
46.  Premier Breweries Plc  June  BLS 
47.  Roads Nigeria Plc  June  BLS 
48.  Thomas Wyatt Nigeria Plc  June  BLS 
49.  Union Homes Savings & Loans Plc  June  BLS 
50.  Multi-Trex Integrated Foods Plc  July  BLS 
51.  DN Tyre & Rubber Plc  December  BLS 
52.  P.S. Mandrides & Company Plc  December  BLS 
53.  Deap Capital Management & Trust Plc  December  BLS 
54.  Neimeth International Pharm. Plc  December  BLS 

















2013 INTERIM ACCOUNTS (6 MONTHS) 
S/NO COMPANY  QTR  SYMBOL 
1. 1 Rokana Industries  Plc  June  BLS/ Restructuring 
2. 2 Capital Oil Plc  March  BLS 
3. 3 John Holt Plc  March  BLS 
4. 4 DEAP Capital Management  & Trust Plc  March  BLS 
5. 5 Greif Nigeria Plc  April  BLS 
6. 8 West Africa Glass Industries Plc  March  BLS/ Restructuring 
7. 9 FTN Cocoa Processors Plc  June  BLS 
8.  Anino International Plc   June  BLS/ Restructuring 
9.  Smart Products Nigeria Plc  June  BLS 
10.  Juli Plc   June  BLS 
11.  Arbico Plc  June  BLS 
12.  UTC Nigeria Plc   June  BLS 
13.  P.S. Mandrides & Company Plc   June  BLS 
14.  Premier Breweries Plc   June  BLS 
15.  Golden Guinea Breweries Plc   June  BLS/ Restructuring 
16.  Cornerstone Insurance Plc  June  BLS 
17.  Fortis Microfinance Bank Plc  June  BLS 
18.  LASACO Assurance Plc  June  BLS 
19.  Niger Insurance Company Plc  June  BLS 
20.  Unic Insurance Plc  June  BLS 
21.  Wapic Insurance Plc  June  BLS 
22.  International Energy Insurance Plc  June  BLS 
23.  Great Nigeria Insurance Plc  June  BLS 
24.  Mutual Benefit Assurance Plc  June  BLS 
25.  STACO Plc  June  BLS 
26.  Universal Insurance Company Plc  June  BLS 
27.  Ekocorp Plc  June  BLS 
28.  





29.  NCR (Nigeria) Plc  June  BLS 
30.  Omatek Ventures Plc  June  BLS 
31.  MTI Plc  June  BLS 
32.  E-Tranzact International Plc  June  BLS 
33.  African Paints (Nigeria) Plc  June  BLS 




35.  Starcomms Plc  June  BLS 
36.  Nigerian Wire & Cable Plc  June  BLS 
37.  Cappa & D’alberto Plc   June  BLS/DIP 
38.  Ikeja Hotel Plc  June  BLS 
39.  BECO Petroleum Product Plc  June  BLS 
40.  Eterna Oil & Gas Plc  June  BLS 
41.  DAAR Communications Plc  June  BLS 
42.  G. Cappa Plc  June  BLS/ Restructuring 
43.  Guiness Nigeria Plc  December  BLS 
44.  Tourist Company of Nigeria  December  BLS 
45. 4 Interlinked Technologies Plc  December  BLS 
46. 4 Lennards (Nig) Plc  December  BLS 
 
 
2013 INTERIM ACCOUNTS (9 MONTHS) 
1.  MULTI-TREX INTEGRATED FOODS PLC APRIL BLS 
2.  GREIF NIGERIA PLC JULY BLS 
3.  DEAP CAPITAL MGT & TRUST PLC JUNE BLS 
4.  GOLDEN GUINEA BREWERIES PLC JUNE BLS/ Restructuring 
5.  JOHN HOLT PLC JUNE BLS 
6.  P.S MANDRIDES & CO PLC JUNE BLS 
7.  ASO SAVINGS  LOANS PLC MARCH BLS 
8.  G. CAPPA PLC MARCH BLS/ Restructuring 
9.  NIGERIAN GERMAN CHEMICAL PLC                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   MARCH BLS 
10.  THOMAS WYATT NIGERIA PLC MARCH BLS 
11.  UNION HOMES SAVINGS & LOANS PLC MARCH BLS 
12.  AFRICAN PAINTS (NIGERIA ) PLC SEPTEMBER BLS 
13.  ANINO INTERNATIONAL PLC SEPTEMBER BLS/ Restructuring 
14.  ARBICO PLC SEPTEMBER BLS 
15.  BECO PETROLEUM PRODUCT PLC SEPTEMBER BLS 
16.  BIG TREAT PLC SEPTEMBER BLS 
17.  CAPITAL OIL PLC SEPTEMBER BLS 
18.  CAPPA & D’ALBERTO PLC SEPTEMBER BLS 
19.  DAAR COMMUNICATIONS PLC SEPTEMBER BLS 
20.  EKOCORP PLC SEPTEMBER BLS 
21.  ETERNA OIL & GAS PLC SEPTEMBER BLS 
22.  E-TRANZACT INTERNATIONAL PLC SEPTEMBER BLS 
23.  FORTIS MICROFINANCE BANK PLC SEPTEMBER BLS 
24.  FTN COCOA PROCESSORS PLC SEPTEMBER BLS 
25.  GOLDLINK INSURANCE PLC SEPTEMBER BLS 
26.  GREAT NIGERIA INSURANCE PLC SEPTEMBER BLS 




28.  INTERCONTINENTALWAPIC 
INSURANCE PLC SEPTEMBER 
BLS 
29.  INTERNATIONAL ENERGY INSURANCE 
PLC SEPTEMBER 
BLS 
30.  INVESTMENT & ALLIED ASSURANCE 
PLC SEPTEMBER 
BLS 
31.  IPWA PLC SEPTEMBER BLS 
32.  JULI PLC SEPTEMBER BLS 
33.  LASACO ASSURANCE PLC SEPTEMBER BLS 
34.  MTECH COMMUNICATIONS PLC SEPTEMBER BLS 
35.  MTI PLC SEPTEMBER BLS 
36.  MULTIVERSE RESOURCES PLC SEPTEMBER BLS 
37.  MUTUAL BENEFIT ASSURANCE PLC SEPTEMBER BLS 
38.  NIGER INSURANCE COMPANY  PLC SEPTEMBER BLS 
39.  NIGERIAN WIRE & CABLE PLC SEPTEMBER BLS 
40.  NPF MICROFINANCE BANK PLC SEPTEMBER BLS 
41.  OANDO PLC SEPTEMBER BLS 
42.  OMATEK VENTURES PLC SEPTEMBER BLS 
43.  PAINTS AND COATINGS 
MANUFACTURING PLC SEPTEMBER 
BLS 
44.  PREMIER BREWERIES PLC SEPTEMBER BLS 
45.  PREMIER PAINTS PLC SEPTEMBER BLS 
46.  R.T BRISCOE PLC SEPTEMBER BLS 
47.  ROKANA INDUSTRIES  PLC SEPTEMBER BLS/ Restructuring 
48.  SMART PRODUCTS NIGERIA PLC SEPTEMBER BLS 
49.  STACO PLC SEPTEMBER BLS 
50.  STARCOMMS PLC SEPTEMBER BLS 
51.  UNIC INSURANCE PLC SEPTEMBER BLS 
52.  UNIVERSAL INSURANCE COMPANY 
PLC SEPTEMBER 
BLS 
53.  UTC NIGERIA PLC SEPTEMBER BLS 
54.  WEST AFRICA GLASS INDUSTRIES PLC SEPTEMBER BLS/ Restructuring 
55.  COSTAIN (WEST AFRICA) PLC DECEMBER BLS 
56.  ROADS NIGERIA PLC DECEMBER BLS 
57.  HONEYWELL FLOUR MILL PLC DECEMBER BLS 
58.  ASO SAVINGS & LOANS PLC DECEMBER BLS 
59.  UNION HOMES SAVINGS & LOANS PLC DECEMBER BLS 
60.  NIGERIAN GERMAN CHEMICAL PLC DECEMBER BLS 
61.  AVON CROWNCAPS & CONTAINER 
PLC DECEMBER 
BLS 
62.  ACADEMY PRESS PLC DECEMBER BLS 
63.  LENNARDS (NIGERIA) PLC DECEMBER BLS 






S/NO COMPANY  QTR  SYMBOL 
1. 1 Costain (West Africa) Plc  March  BLS 
2. 2 G. Cappa Plc  March  BLS/ Restructuring 
3. 3 Premier Breweries Plc  March  BLS 
4. 4 Aso Savings  Loans Plc  March  BLS 
5. 5 Union Homes Savings & Loans Plc  March  BLS 
6. 8 Nigerian German Chemical Plc                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    March  BLS 
7. 9 Thomas Wyatt Nigeria Plc  March  BLS 
8. 1
0 
Multi-Trex Integrated Foods Plc  April  BLS 
 
COMPANIES SLATED FOR DELISTING/RESTRUCTURING 
 
The companies listed on Schedule five are slated for delisting/Restructuring for various reasons stated. 
SCHEDULE FIVE 
DELISTING IN PROCESS 
1 Pinnacle Point Group Plc DIP Company in liquidation process 
2 Afrik Pharmaceutical Plc DIP 
Regulatory Delisting in progress for non-
compliance with post listing obligation 
3 The Tourist Company of Nigeria Plc DIP Voluntary delisting due to Free Float deficiency 
4. Adswitch Plc DIP 





1 Union Dicon Salt Plc RESTRG The company is Restructuring to regularize its 
post-listing status on The NSE 
2 Jos International Breweries Plc RESTRG The company is Restructuring to regularize its 
post-listing status on The NSE 
3 Stokvis Nigeria Plc RESTRG The company is Restructuring to regularize its 
post-listing status on The NSE 
4 Nigerian Sewing Machine Plc RESTRG The company is Restructuring to regularize its 
post-listing status on The NSE 
5 Aluminium Manufacturing Company of 
Nigeria Plc RESTRG 
The company is Restructuring to regularize its 
post-listing status on The NSE 
6 Rak Unity Petroleum Plc RESTRG 
The company is Restructuring to regularize its 






BREACH OF VOLUNTARY DELISTING PROCESS 
CAPPA & D’ALBERTO NIGERIA PLC 
Cappa & D’Alberto Nigeria Plc released itself from compliance with the obligations inherent of a listed 
company as it failed to follow through the entire voluntary delisting process of The Exchange, which 
includes inter alia, paying off dissenting shareholders who opted to exit the company following the 
resolution passed by the majority shareholders on March 24, 2009, to delist. The resolution passed by the 
majority shareholders at the Extra- Ordinary General Meeting of March 24, 2009, does not exempt Cappa & 
D’Alberto Nigeria Plc from complying with regulatory obligations. 




UNAUTHORISED PUBLICATIONS & NON-DISCLOSURE OF MATERIAL INFORMATION   
Every listed company is required to provide The Exchange with timely information to enable it efficiently 
perform its function of maintaining an orderly market. In accordance with the provisions of Appendix 111 
of the Listing Rules, quoted companies are required to obtain prior written approval from The Exchange 
before publications that affect shareholders’ interest are made in the media. In addition, companies are 
also required to disclose material information to The Exchange and publish some of that information in 
their Annual Reports.  
 
The companies listed in Schedules six and seven breached these provisions of the Listing Rules and were 
sanctioned accordingly. The Exchange applied the sanctions prescribed in Rules and the companies have 
discharged their financial obligations. 
SCHEDULE SIX 
PUBLICATION WITHOUT NSE’S PRIOR WRITTEN  APPROVAL IN  2013 
 NAME OF COMPANIES NATURE OF PUBLICATION 
1 Custodian  & Allied Insurance Plc Notice of Court Ordered  Meeting 
2 Crusader Insurance Plc Notice of Court Ordered  Meeting 
3 Wapic  Insurance Plc Appointment of Directors 
4 Honeywell Flour Plc Unauthorized Publication of EGM  
5 Forte Oil Plc Unauthorized publication of notice of EGM. 
NON- DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION 
 NAME OF COMPANIES NATURE OF PUBLICATION 
1 Julius Berger Nigeria Plc Non-disclosure of the Substantial shareholding of Oasis 
Petroleum Company Limited in the 2011 Annual Reports and 
Account. Oasis Petroleum Company Limited holds 9.8% of 
Julius Berger shares. 
2 Sterling Bank Plc  Non-disclosure of Bond Issuance to The Exchange 




4 Sovereign Trust Insurance Plc Non-compliance with NSE directives 
5 Forte Oil Plc Non-Compliance with NSE rules   
6 Oasis insurance Plc Non-disclosure of the Substantial shareholding of Oasis Group 
and Metrovest Ltd in the 2010, 2011 and 2012 Annual Reports 





SANCTIONS FOR DEFAULT FILINGS OF FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 
The information published in schedules eight and nine are the list of companies that filed their 2011 and 
2012  Financial Statements after the regulatory  due date. The Exchange applied sanctions in accordance 
with the provisions of Section 14 of Appendix 111 of the Listing Rules. 
 
2013 DEFAULT FILINGS  
 
AUDITED ACCOUNTS DEFAULT FILINGS IN 2013  
S/NO NAME OF COMPANIES FISCAL YEAR  PENALTY (N) 
1.  Costain (West Africa) Plc March 2012 3,600,000.00 
2.  Transnational Corporation Plc December 2012 300,000.00 
3.  MRS Oil Plc December 2012 200,000.00 
4.  Multiverse Plc December 2012 300,00.00 
5.  May & Baker Plc December 2012 200,000.00 
6.  Premier Paints Plc December 2012 600,000.00 
7.  Dangote Flour Mills Plc December 2012 500,000.00 
8.  UBA Plc December 2012 200,000.00 
9.  Wapic Insurance Plc December 2012 700,000.00 
10.  Oando Plc December 2012 600,000.00 
11.  Consolidated Hallmark Insurance Plc December 2012 900,000.00 
12.  NCR (Nigeria) Plc December 2012 900,000.00 
PUBLICATION WITHOUT NSE’S PRIOR WRITTEN  APPROVAL IN  2012 
S/NO NAME OF COMPANIES NATURE OF PUBLICATION 
1 Multiverse Plc Appointment of Directors 
2 Unity Bank Plc  Notice of Divestment of Holdings of Unity Bank Plc from its 
non-banking subsidiaries 
3 First Bank of Nigeria Plc Notice of Extra-Ordinary General Meeting 




13.  Studio Press Plc December 2012 900,000.00 
14.  Wema Bank Plc December 2012 1,100,000.00 
15.  Conoil Plc December 2012 1,500,000.00 
16.  Red Star Express Plc March  2013 300,000.00 
17.  AIICO Insurance Plc December 2012 1,500,000.00  
18.  Avon Crowncap & Containers Plc March 2013 300,000.00 
19.  Capital Hotel Plc  December 2012 1,600,000.00 
20.  Fortis Micro Finance Plc December 2012 1,800,000.00 
21.  Unity Kapital Insurance Plc December 2012 2,100,000.00 
22.  Custodian & Allied Insurance Plc December 2012 2,200,000.00 
23.  Royal Exchange Plc December 2012 2,600,000.00 
24.  C & I Leasining Plc December 2012 2,800,000.00 
25.  Cornerstone Insurance Plc December 2012 2,800,000.00 
26.  Sovereign Trust Insurance Plc December 2012 2,400,000.00 
27.  Eterna Plc December 2012 2,600,000.00 
28.  Regency Alliance Insurance Plc December 2012 2,500,000.00 
29.  Nigerian German Chemicals Plc March 2012 6,800,000.00 
30.  Law Union and Rock Plc December 2012 2,700,000.00 
31.  Prestige Assurance Plc December 2012 2,900.000.00 
32.  Omatek Ventures Plc  December 2012 2,900.000.00 
33.  Nigerian Enamelware Plc April  2013 1,300,000.00 
34.  I.H.S. Plc April 2013 1,600,000.00 
35.  Mutual benefit Assurance Plc December 2012 3,400,000.00 
36.  NEM Insurance Plc December 2012 3,500,000.00 
37.  Linkage Assurance Plc December 2012 3,600,000.00 
38.  Standard Alliance Insurance Plc December 2012 3,600,000.00 
39.  NEM Insurance Plc December 2012 3,500,000.00  
40.  Lasaco Assurance Plc December 2012 3,600,000.00  
41.  Staco Insurance Plc December 2012 3,500,000.00  
42.  Equity Assurance Plc December 2012 3,200,000.00  
43.  Niger Insurance Plc December 2012 3,200,000.00  
44.  Great Nigeria Insurance Plc December 2012 3,800,000.00  
45.  Guinea Insurance Plc December 2012 3,800,000.00  
46.  African Alliance Insurance Plc December 2012 4,000,000.00 
47.  Universal Insurance Plc December 2012 4,200,000.00 











2012 DEFAULT FILINGS  
AUDITED ACCOUNTS DEFAULT FILINGS IN 2012  
S/NO NAME OF COMPANIES FISCAL YEAR PENALTY (N) 
1 C & I Leasing Plc January 2012 1,050,000.00 
2 Costain (West Africa) Plc March 2011 2,850,000.00 
3 John Holt Plc September 2011  1,700,000.00 
4 Eterna Plc December 2011 100,000.00 
5 FTN Cocoa Plc December 2011 200,000.00 
6 Dangote Flour Mills Plc December 2011 400,000.00 
7 Regency Alliance Insurance Plc December 2011 500,000.00 
8 Oando Plc December 2011 500,000.00 
9 Premier Paints Plc December 2011 700,000.00 
10 Scoa Nigeria Plc December 2011 800,000.00 
11 Universal Insurance Plc December 2011 900,000.00 
12 Union Bank Plc December 2011 900,000.00 
13 Royal Exchange Plc December 2011 900,000.00 
14 Crusader Nigeria Plc December 2011 800,000.00 
15 Niger Insurance Plc December 2011 900,000.00 
16 Unity Kapital Assurance Plc December 2011 900,000.00 
17 Conoil Plc December 2011 1,200,000.00 
18 Cornerstone Insurance Plc December 2011 1,500,000.00 
19 Linkage Assurance Plc December 2011 3,300,000.00 
20 Guinea Insurance Plc  December 2011 2,700,000.00 
21 The Tourist Company of Nigeria Plc December 2011 100,000.00 
22 Wema Bank Plc December 2011 2,700,000.00 
23 IPWA Plc December 2011 2,700,000.00 
24 Unic Insurance Plc December 2011 2,800,000.00 
25 Equity  Assurance Plc December 2011 3,000,000.00 
26 Standard Alliance Plc December 2011 3,000,000.00 
27 Great Nigeria Insurance  Plc December 2011 3,000,000.00 
28 African Alliance Insurance Plc December 2011 3,000,000.00 
29 STACO Plc December 2011 3,400,000.00 
30 Ikeja Hotel Plc December 2011 3,400,000.00 
31 DAAR Communication Plc  December 2011 3,400,000.00 








FREE FLOAT DEFICIENCIES 
 
Companies listed on The Exchange must maintain a minimum free float for the set standards under which 
they are listed in order to ensure that there is an orderly and liquid market in their securities. The free float 
requirement for companies on the Main Board is 20% and 15% for ASEM companies.  
 
The Exchange has identified three companies that have free float deficiencies. These companies applied for 
waivers from the Quotations Committee of Management specifically provided compliance plans with 
tentative timelines to support their requests.  
 
The Quotations Committee of Management considered and approved an extended timeframe for the 
companies to regain compliance with the listing requirement. The companies are however required to also 
provide quarterly disclosure reports to The Exchange detailing their level of implementation of the 
compliance plans. 
 The names of the companies in this category are contained in schedule nine. 
SCHEDULE EIGHT 
COMPANIES WITH FREE FLOAT DEFICIENCIES  
 ISSUER % OF FREELOAT COMPLIANCE DUE DATE  
Dangote Cement Plc   4.93 October 26, 2014 
Union Bank of Nigeria Plc  14.94 June 30, 2017 
Wema Bank Plc 19.64 April 27, 2014  
 
TRANSPARENCY DISCLOSURE: APPLICATIONS APPROVED 
The Quotations Committee of Management considered and approved the following Applications but the 
instruments are yet to be listed on the Daily Official List.  
SCHEDULE NINE 
APPROVALS IN 2013 BUT YET TO BE LISTED 
 
LIST OF APPLICATIONS APPROVED BY QCM ON FEBRUARY 11, 2014 
 
ISSUER  CAPITAL RAISING 
METHOD 
STOCK BROKER ISSUING HOUSE 
BLOCK DIVESTMENT 
Oasis Insurance Plc Block Divestment of 
4,630,595,326 ordinary 
shares of 50k each of 




Oasis Insurance Plc 
owned by Oasis Group 
Limited  and 
MetroWest 
Investments Limited to 
FBN Assurance Limited 
Great Nigeria Insurance Plc Representation of 
Block Divestment of 
2,870,614,035 ordinary 
shares of 50 Kobo Each 
of Great Nigeria 






I Nigeria Plc Consideration and 
approval of Voluntary 
Delisting of the 
Company and its entire 
Issued Shares from the 




STATE GOVERNMENT BOND 




of N5 Billion 15% Fixed 
Rate Bonds Series 1 
Due 2021 under the 
N20 Billion Medium 
Term Note Programme 
Dun Loren Merrifield 
Securities Ltd and 
NewDevco Investment 
Securities Co. Ltd 
Dunn Loren Merrifield and 
Stanbic IBTC Capital Limited 




of N5 Billion 15% Fixed 
Rate Bonds Series 1 
due 2020 under the 




Securities Ltd; Cowry 
Securities Ltd; 
Springboard Trust & 
Investment Ltd; Resort 
Securities & Trust Ltd 
Afrinvest (West Africa) Limited; 
BGL Plc; Greenwich Trust Ltd and 
Radix Capital Partners Ltd 




of N5 Billion 14.5% 
Fixed Rate Bonds 
Series II due 2020 
under the N25 Billion 
Bonds Issuance 
Programme 




Ltd, Fidelity Securities 
Ltd, Independent 
Securities Ltd, 
Integrated Trust & 
Investment Ltd, Kedari 
Securities Ltd, 
Securities Africa 
Greenwich Trust Ltd; FBN Capital 
Limited, Fidelity Securities Ltd; 
Morgan Capital Securities Ltd; 
Skye Financial Services Ltd; 








LIST OF APPLICATIONS APPROVED BY QCM ON DECEMBER 19, 2013 
 
ISSUER  CAPITAL RAISING 
METHOD 
STOCK BROKER ISSUING HOUSE 
ETF 
VETIVA GRIFFIN 30 ETF 
 
Ratification of changes 
made to the initial 
Application of VNSE 30 
Index Securities for 
100,000,000 units 
already approved by 







Nigerian Aviation Handling 
Company Plc 
Offer for Subscription 
of N2.05 billion 15.25% 
Fixed Rate Senior 
Unsecured Bonds Issue 
(Series 2) due 2020 
under a N5 Billion Debt 
Issuance Programme 
CSL Stockbrokers Ltd; 
Marina Securities Ltd; 
Compass Investment & 
Securities Ltd; Stanwal 
Securities Ltd; Tiddo 
Securities Ltd; Yuderb 
Investments & 
Securities Ltd and PAC 
Securities Limited 
Chapel Hill Advisory Partners Ltd; 
FCMB Capital Markets Ltd; Skye 
Financial Services Ltd; Stanbic 
IBTC Capital Ltd; PanAfrican 
Capital Ltd; UBA Capital Plc 
STATE GOVERNMENT BOND 
Niger State Government Offer for Subscription 
of N12 Billion 14% 
Fixed Rate Bonds, 
Series 1 Due 2018 
Under the N21 Billion 
Medium Term Note 
Programme 
Emerging Capital Ltd; 
Strategy & Arbitrage 
Ltd, Equity Capital 
Solutions, Cowry 
Securities Ltd, Marina 
Securities Ltd and 
Chapel Hill Denham 
Securities Limited 
Planet Capital Limited 
BLOCK DIVESTMENT 
ARBICO PLC Block Divestment of 
105,400,000 ordinary 
shares of 50k each 
representing 70.98% in 













APPLICATIONS APPROVED ON SEPTEMBER 25, 2013 
ISSUER CAPITAL RAISING METHOD STOCK BROKER ISSUING HOUSE 
RIGHTS ISSUE 
Pharma-Deko Plc Application for approval and 
listing of a Rights Issue of 
150,000,000 ordinary shares of 
50k each at N1.80 per share 
Integrated Trust Investment Limited 
and ICMG Securities Limited 
Integrated Trust & 
Investment Limited 
INITIAL PUBLIC OFFER (IPO) 
McNichols Consolidated 
Plc 
Application for approval of IPO 
of 230,000,000 ordinary shares 
of 50k each at N1.55 per share 
and listing of the Company and 
its entire paid up share capital 
Morgan Capital Securities Limited Morgan Capital 
Securities Limited 
and CashCraft Assets 
Management Limited 
Omoluabi Savings & 
Loans Plc 
Application for approval and 
Listing of IPO of 3,000,000,000 
ordinary shares of 50k each at 
N0.55 per share of the Issuer 
and its entire issued shares 





APPLICATIONS APPROVED ON JULY 30, 2013 
ISSUER CAPITAL RAISING METHOD STOCK BROKER ISSUING HOUSE 
PLACING 
Oando Plc Placing of 2,046,706,324 
ordinary shares of 50k each at 
N15.00 per share 
Vetiva Securities Limited; APT 
Securities & Funds Limited; CSL 
Stockbrokers Limited; Cordros Capital 




Limited; FBN Capital 





APPLICATIONS APPROVED ON MAY 27, 2013 






Resort Savings & Loans Plc Rights Issue of 3,776,577,416 
ordinary shares of 50k each at 
par and Initial Public Offering 
(IPO) of 3,160,218,169 ordinary 
shares of 50k each at N0.51 per 
share 
Greenwich Securities Limited, Capital 
Assets Limited, Dunbell Securities 
Limited, Dun Loren Merrifield 
Securities Limited, Imperial Assets 
Managers Limited, Resort Securities & 






APPLICATIONS APPROVED ON MARCH 25, 2013 
ISSUER  CAPITAL RAISING 
METHOD 
STOCK BROKER ISSUING HOUSE 
 
MERGER AND ACQUISITION 
Flour Mills of Nigeria Plc Scheme of Merger 
between Flour Mills of 
Nigeria Plc and Niger 
Mills Company Limited 
Chapel Hill Denham 
Securities Limited 
Chapel Hill Advisory Partners Ltd 
 
 
APPROVED IN 2012 BUT YET TO BE LISTED 
 
APPLICATIONS APPROVED ON NOVEMBER 1, 2012 
ISSUER CAPITAL RAISING METHOD STOCKBROKERS ISSUING HOUSE 
RIGHTS ISSUE 
Prestige Assurance Plc Rights Issue of 2,508,315,438 
Ordinary Shares of 50k each at 
N0.50 per Share 






APPROVED APPLICATIONS AS AT SEPTEMBER 28, 2012 
ISSUER CAPITAL RAISING METHOD STOCKBROKERS ISSUING HOUSE 
 
MERGERS 
Cornerstone Insurance Plc 
(aborted) 
Scheme of Merger between 
Cornerstone Insurance Plc  and 
Linkage Insurance Plc 
CSL Stockbrokers Limited FCMB Capital 









NEW ISSUES SINCE 2012 




Oando Plc 17/02/2014 Not Applicable 2,046,706,324 Placing 
UBA Capital Plc 27/01/2014 Not Applicable 2,000,000,000 Rights 
La Casera Company Plc 22/01/2014 3,000,000,000 Not Applicable Corporate Bond 
Sterling Bank Plc 20/01/2014 Not Application 5,888,949,162 Rights 
FSDH Funding SPV Plc: 09/01/2014 5,530,000,000 Not Applicable Corporate Bond 
Osun State Government of Nigeria 08/01/2014 11,400,000,000 Not Applicable Government Bond 
Lagos State Government of Nigeria 13/12/2013 87,500,000,000 Not Applicable Government Bond 
Berger Paints Nigeria Plc 13/12/2013 Not Applicable 72,455,862 Rights 
Infinity Trust Mortgage Bank Plc 11/12/2013 Not Applicable 4,170,445,720 Introduction 
Cadbury Nigeria Plc 10/12/2013 Not Applicable 1,186,079 Scheme Shares 
Computer Warehouse Group Plc 15/11/2013 Not Applicable 2,524,826,359 Introduction 
Wema Bank Plc 21/10/2013 Not Applicable 26,667,123,333 Placing 
Aso Savings  Loans Plc 11/10/2013 Not Applicable 6,062,585,126 Rights 
Wapic Insurance Plc 18/09/2013 Not Applicable 5,444,590,269 Rights 
Ecobank Transnational Inc Plc 05/09/2013 Not Applicable 3,125,000,000 Placing 
African Paints Nigeria Plc 28/08/2013 Not Applicable 108,461,038 Rights 
Transnational Corporation of 
Nigeria Plc 
27/08/2013 Not Applicable 
12,906,999,142 Rights 
Courteville Business Solutions Plc 10/7/2013 Not Applicable 592,000,000 Bonus 
UACN Property Development 
Company Plc 
01/07/2013 30,000,000,000 
Not Applicable IPO 
FCMB Group Plc 24/06/2013 Not Applicable 19,802,710,754 Introduction 
Oando Plc 10/06/2013 Not Applicable 4,548,236,276 Rights 
First City Monument Bank Plc 5/6/2013 Not Applicable            432,445,720  Bonus 
UAC of Nigeria Plc 27/5/2013 Not Applicable            320,144,064  Bonus 
Cap Plc 24/5/2013 Not Applicable            140,000,000  Bonus 
Okomu Oil Palm Plc 14/05/2013 Not Applicable 476,955,000 Bonus 
BOC Gases Plc 14/05/2013 Not Applicable 23,124,706 Bonus 
Custodian & Allied Insurance Plc 13/05/2013 Not Applicable 781,017,387 Scheme Shares 
Livestock Feeds Plc 25/04/2013 Not Applicable 800,000,000 Placing 
Osun State Government 23/04/2013 30,000,000,000 Not Applicable Government Bond 
Rak Unity Petroluem Company Plc 17/04/2013 Not Applicable 43,051,159 Placing 
C & I Leasing Plc 15/04/2013 940,000,000 Not Applicable Corporate Bond 




Guinea Insurance Plc 28/03/2013 Not Applicable 740,000,000 Placing 
International Finance Corporation 26/03/2013 12,000,000,000 Not Applicable Supranational Bond 
Crusader (Nigeria) Plc  15/02/2013 Not Applicable 3,064,686,154 Conversion of Bond 




Guinness Nigeria Plc 08/02/2013 Not Applicable 30,962,669 Bonus 
Lagos State Government  01/02/2013 80,000,000,000 Not Applicable Government Bond 





Wapic Insurance Plc 28/01/2013 Not Applicable 2,911,954,418 Scheme Shares 
Linkage Insurance 18/01/2013 Not Applicable 2,897,207,843 Placing 










FBN Fixed Income Fund  
 
24/12/2012 1,752,200,000 
Not Applicable Memorandum 
Listing 
FBN Money Market Fund   24/12/2012 1,798,440,000 
Not Applicable Memorandum 
Listing 
FBN Holdings Plc  26/11/2012 Not Applicable 32,632,084,357 Listing 





Studio Press Nigeria  Plc   24/10/2012 Not Applicable 252,104,285 Placing 
Vono Products Plc   7/09/2012 Not Applicable 263,651,183 Rights  
Nigerian Breweries Plc   15/08/2012 Not Applicable 142,092 Scheme Shares 
Premier Paints Plc   15/08/2012 Not Applicable 48,000,000 Placing 
Niger Insurance Plc   27/07/2012 Not Applicable 2,677,079,286 Rights 
Unity Kapital Assurance Plc   25/07/2012 Not Applicable 866,666,666 Bonus  
Ecobank Transnational Inc   20/07/2012 Not Applicable 401,259,881 Scheme Shares 





International Breweries Plc   11/06/2012 Not Applicable 1,149,611,749 Rights  
Crusader Nigeria Plc Zero Coupon 
(Bond) 
 14/6/12 1,838,811,700 N/A 
Corporate Bond 
Unity Bank Plc   5/06/2012 Not Applicable 3,495,153,610 Bonus  
Rt Briscoe Plc   16/05/2012 Not Applicable 196,059,480 Bonus  
Nigerian Aviation Handling Co. Plc  14/5/2012 Not Applicable 246,093,750 Bonus  
Dangote Cement Plc   14/5/2012 Not Applicable 1,549,137,037 Bonus  
UBA Plc   2/5/2012 Not Applicable 646,693,873 Bonus 
Mobil Oil Plc   2/5/2012 Not Applicable 60,099,210 Bonus  
UBA Plc 2nd Tranche  01/05/2012 35,000,000,000 Not Applicable Corporate Bond 
FCMB Group Plc  23/4/2012 Not Applicable 2,440,678,830 Bonus  
Afromedia Plc   20/4/2012 Not Applicable 403,549,726 Bonus 
Poly Products Plc   16/4/2012 
Not Applicable                  
10,000,000  
Bonus 
Union Bank of Nigeria Plc   11/4/2012 
Not Applicable           
14,402,681,471  
Placing 
Benue State Government   27/3/2012 13,000,000,000 Not Applicable Government Bond 
Access Bank Plc   20/3/2012 






Chellarams Plc   20/3/2012 540,000,000 Not Applicable Corporate Bond 
Neimeth International 
Pharmaceuticals Plc  
 16/3/2012 
Not Applicable 
482,318,637 Rights  
Lafarge Wapco Plc  5/03/2012 11,880,000,000 Not Applicable Corporate Bond 





Ekiti State Government  13/3/2012 20,000,000,000 Not Applicable Government Bond 
HIS Plc Preference Shares Series Ii   8/3/2012 2,791,454,545 Not Applicable Preference Shares 
Flour Mills of Nigeria Plc  6/3/2012 Not Applicable 455,566,222 Rights 
Austin Laz & Co. Plc   29/02/2012 Not Applicable 1,079,860,000 
Listing by 
Introduction 
Tower Funding Plc Tranche A   09/02/2012 3,630,000,000 Not Applicable Corporate Bond 
Tower Funding Plc Tranche B   09/02/2012 1,000,000,000 Not Applicable Corporate Bond 
Oasis Insurance Plc   25/01/2012 Not Applicable 1,500,000,000 Placing 
     
 
DELISTED ENTITIES/SECURITIES SINCE 2012 
NAME OF ENTITY DATE DELISTED 
LAGOS STATE FIXED RATE REDEEMABLE BOND, 13.00 
FEB 09/02/2014 
0.00% AMC DEC 2013 (SR.1 TR.1)  03/01/2014 
0.00% AMC DEC 2013 (SR.1 TR.2)  03/01/2014 
0.00% AMC DEC 2013 (SR1 TR3) 03/01/2014 
Poly Product Plc 12/12/2013 
10.50% FGN NOV 2013 02/11/2013 
10.98% FGN NOV 2013 02/11/2013 
12.74% FGN OCT 2013 01/11/2013 
3.75%+NTB RATE FGN SEP 2013 02/10/2013 
16.% FGN JUN 2013 01/07/2013 
First City Monument Bank Plc 24/06/2013 
Nigeria Wire Industries Plc 03/06/2013 
West African Aluminium Products Plc 03/06/2013 
15.% FGN MAY 2013  
Crusader Nigeria Plc 13/05/2013 
Nigerian Bag Manufacturing Company Plc 11/04/2013 
5.5% FGN FEB 2013 01/03/2013 
Crusader (Nigeria) Plc – Zero Coupon Convertible 
Bond. 
15/02/2013 
9.45% FGN Jan 2013 02/01/2013 
Hallmark Paper Products Plc 19/12/2012 
Udeofson Garment Factory Plc 19/12/2012 
Abplast Products Plc 19/12/2012 
First Bank of Nigeria Plc 26/11/2012 
Stanbic IBTC Bank Plc 23/11/2012 








MEETINGS FOR THE MONTH OF MARCH 2014 
S/N COMPANY VENUE DATE TIME TYPE OF 
MEETING 
1 Ecobank Transnational 
Bank Inc. 
The Ecobank Pan African 
Centre, Lome 
March 3, 2014 10.00 a.m. EGM 
2 African Alliance 
Insurance Plc 
Universal Hotel, 
Independence L/Out, Enugu 
March 3, 2014 12.00 noon AGM 
3 Vitafoam  Plc NECA House, Plot A2, 
Hakeem Balogun St. CBD 
Alausa, Ikeja 
March 6, 2014 10.00 a.m. AGM 
4 Great Nigeria Insurance 
Plc 
Orchids Hotels, Lekki Lagos March 26, 2014 11.00 a.m. AGM 
5 Forte Oil Plc Bespoke Event Centre Lekki 
Ajah Expressway 
March 28, 2014 10.00 a.m. AGM 
6 Union Homes REIT 64, Opebi Road, Ikeja 27/03/2014 10.00 a.m. AGM 
7 PZ Cussons  Plc Etal Hotel and Halls, Plot 30, 
Kudirat Abiola Way, Oregun, 
Ikeja 
13/03/2014 11.00 a.m. EGM 
8 Neimeth  Plc Lagos Airport Hotel, Ikeja 17/03/2014 11.00 a.m. EGM 
9 Transnational 
Corporation Plc 
Lagos Oriental Hotel, Lekki 31/03/2014 10.00 a.m. AGM 
 
 
MEETINGS FOR THE MONTH OF FEBRUARY 2014 
S/N COMPANY VENUE DATE TIME TYPE OF 
MEETING 
1 Lasaco Assurance Plc NECA House, Plot A2, 
Hakeem Balogun St. CBD 
Alausa, Ikeja 
February 6, 2014 11.00 a.m. AGM 
2 Oando  Plc The Incubator, Oniru, Lagos February 18, 2014 10.00 a.m. EGM 
3 Staco Insurance Plc Lagos Oriental Hotel, Lekki February 19, 2014 11.00 a.m. AGM 
4 Linkage Assurance Plc MUSON Centre, Onikan, 
Lagos  
February 20, 2014 12.00 noon AGM 
5 Guinea Insurance Plc Coy. Office, 33, Ikorodu Rd, 
Jibowu 











THE FOLLOWING MEETINGS HELD IN JANUARY 2014 
S/N COMPANY VENUE DATE TIME TYPE OF 
MEETING 
1 Niger Insurance Plc ASAA  Pyramid Hotel, 
Kaduna 
January 14, 2014 11.00 a.m. AGM 
2 IHS Plc Eko Hotel, VI January 21, 2014 11.00 a.m. Court Ordered 
3 Mutual Benefits Assurance 
Plc 
Muson Centre Onikan, 
Lagos 
January 30, 2014 11.00 a.m. AGM 
4 Standard Alliance Insurance 
Plc 
Event Hall, Plot 1,  Block 
94, Providence Street, 
Lekki Phase 1, Lekki, 
Lagos 
January 30, 2014 1.00 p.m. AGM 





REPORT DATE: 06 March 2015 
 
X-Compliance report is a transparency initiative of The Exchange which is designed to maintain market 
integrity and protect the investors by providing compliance related information on all listed companies. 
 
Companies that are listed on The Exchange are required to adhere to high disclosure standards which 
are prescribed in Appendix 111 of the Listing Rules. Financial information which is periodic disclosure 
and on-going material events disclosure should be released to The Exchange in a timely manner to 
enable it efficiently perform its function of maintaining an orderly market. 
 
THE X-COMPLIANCE REPORT PROVIDES INFORMATION ON: 
o Released Financials          
o Early Filers of Audited Accounts 
o Delinquent Filers of Audited Accounts 
o Delinquent Filers of Quarterly Reports 
o Companies slated for Delisting/Restructuring  
o Companies that breached the  Listings Rules of The Exchange 
o Enforcement Actions by The Exchange 
o Companies  that have been granted waivers to comply with the Free Float requirements  
o Applications approved by the Quotations Committee of The Exchange  













Early filers are companies that file their financial statements at least two weeks before the due date. 
Quoted companies on The Exchange are required to file their financial statements on a timely basis in 
accordance with Appendix 111 of the Listing Rules. The Exchange has identified the companies listed on 
Schedule One as companies that have exceeded the minimum listing standards in terms of timely 
disclosure of their Audited Annual and quarterly financial performance.  
The Exchange is extremely proud of these companies and will continue to show case quoted companies 
that imbibe high corporate governance practices.  
SCHEDULE ONE  
2014/2015 AUDITED ACCOUNTS  
 
S/N NAME OF COMPANY YEAR END DUE DATE FILED DATE 
1 Nigerian Breweries Plc December 31, 2014 March 31, 2015 February 12, 2015 
2 Forte Oil Plc December 31, 2014 March 31, 2015 February 19, 2015 
3 Guaranty Trust Bank Plc December 31, 2014 March 31, 2015 March 31, 2015 
4 Zenith International Bank Plc December 31, 2014 March 31, 2015 March 31, 2015 
 
 
DEFAULTERS (AUDITED ACCOUNTS) 
The Exchange has identified the companies listed on Schedules two and three as companies that fell 
short of the minimum listing standards in terms of timely disclosure of their audited annual financial 
performance and are operating or operated Below the Listing Standards (BLS) or Awaiting Regulatory 
Approval (ARA) of The Exchange in the course of the year.  
 
 The sanctions for non-compliance with periodic financial disclosure obligations are clearly spelt out in 
Appendix 111 of the Listing Rules and The Exchange will protect the integrity of its rules. 
 
SCHEDULE TWO 
2013/2014 Audited Accounts  
S/NO COMPANY YEAR END SYMBOL REMARKS 
1.  Great Nigeria Insurance Plc Dec ARA Non Rendition of Audited Financial 
Statements  2013 
2.  International Energy Insurance Dec BLS Non Rendition of Audited Financial 
Statements  2013 
3.  Universal Insurance Company Plc Dec BLS Non Rendition of Audited Financial 
Statements  2013 




Statements  2013 
5.  Costain (W.A) Plc March BLS Non Rendition of Audited Financial 
Statements  2013 
6.  Thomas Wyatt Nigeria Plc March BLS Non Rendition of Audited Financial 
Statements  2014 
7.  Lennards (Nigeria) Plc September BLS Non Rendition of Audited Financial 
Statements  2013 
8.  Deap Capital Mgt & Trust Plc September BLS Non Rendition of Audited Financial 
Statements  2013 
9.  Juli Plc December BLS Non Rendition of Audited Financial 
Statements  2013 
10.  Evans Medical Plc December BLS Non Rendition of Audited Financial 
Statements  2013 
11.  Costain (W.A.) Plc March BLS Non Rendition of Audited Financial 
Statements  2014 
12.  
Premier Breweries Plc 
March BLS Non Rendition of Audited Financial 
Statements  2014 
13.  
Aso Savings & Loans Plc 
March BLS Non Rendition of Audited Financial 
Statements  2014 
14.  
Nigerian German Chemical Plc 
March BLS Non Rendition of Audited Financial 




DEFAULTERS (QUARTERLY ACCOUNTS) 
Quoted companies on The Exchange are required to file their quarterly accounts within 45 days after 
the end of the quarter in accordance with Appendix 111 of the Listing Rules. Details of the quarterly 
filings are listed on Schedule five and can be downloaded from the released financials on the website.  
 
The sanctions for non-compliance with periodic financial disclosure obligations are clearly spelt out in 
Appendix 111 of the Listing Rules and The Exchange will protect the integrity of its rules. 
 
SCHEDULE THREE 
2014 1st Qtr Accounts  
 
S/NO COMPANY QTR END SYMBOL REMARKS 
 
1.   Greif Nigeria Plc Jan 
BLS Non Rendition of First Quarter 
Interim Report 2014 
 
2.   Multi-Trex Integrated Foods Plc July 
BLS Non Rendition of First Quarter 
Interim Report 2014 
 
3.   Nigerian Enamelware Company Plc July 
BLS Non Rendition of First Quarter 
Interim Report 2014 
 
4.   Costain (West Africa) Plc June 
BLS Non Rendition of First Quarter 
Interim Report 2014 
 
5.   Roads Nigeria Plc June 
BLS Non Rendition of First Quarter 





6.   Premier Breweries Plc June 
BLS Non Rendition of First Quarter 
Interim Report 2014  
7.   Aso Savings & Loans Plc June 
BLS Non Rendition of First Quarter 
Interim Report 2014 
 
8.   Nigerian German Chemical Plc June 
BLS Non Rendition of First Quarter 
Interim Report 2014 
 
9.   Thomas Wyatt Nigeria Plc June 
BLS Non Rendition of First Quarter 
Interim Report 2014 
 
10.   Smart Product Nigeria Plc March 
BLS Non Rendition of First Quarter 
Interim Report 2014 
 
11.   Capital Oil Plc March 
BLS Non Rendition of First Quarter 
Interim Report 2014 
 
12.   Juli Plc March 
BLS Non Rendition of First Quarter 
Interim Report 2014 
 
13.   Fortis Microfinance Bank Plc March 
BLS Non Rendition of First Quarter 
Interim Report 2014 
 
14.   Cornerstone Insurance Plc March 
BLS Non Rendition of First Quarter 
Interim Report 2014 
 
15.   Great Nigeria Insurance Plc March 
BLS Non Rendition of First Quarter 
Interim Report 2014 
 
16.   International Energy Insurance Plc March 
BLS Non Rendition of First Quarter 
Interim Report 2014 
 
17.   Mutual Benefit Assurance Plc March 
BLS Non Rendition of First Quarter 
Interim Report 2014 
 
18.   Niger Insurance Company Plc March 
BLS Non Rendition of First Quarter 
Interim Report 2014 
 
19.   Unic Insurance Plc March 
BLS Non Rendition of First Quarter 
Interim Report 2014 
 
20.   Unity Kapital Assurance Plc March 
BLS Non Rendition of First Quarter 
Interim Report 2014 
 
21.   Universal Insurance Company Plc March 
BLS Non Rendition of First Quarter 
Interim Report 2014 
 
22.   Wapic Insurance Plc March 
BLS Non Rendition of First Quarter 
Interim Report 2014 
 
23.   Resort Savings & Loans Plc March 
BLS Non Rendition of First Quarter 
Interim Report 2014 
 
24.   Evans Medical Plc March 
BLS Non Rendition of First Quarter 
Interim Report 2014 
 
25.   Omatek Ventures Plc March 
BLS Non Rendition of First Quarter 
Interim Report 2014 
 
26.   Austin Laz & Company Plc March 
BLS Non Rendition of First Quarter 
Interim Report 2014 
 
27.   
Paints And Coatings Manufacturing 
Plc March 
BLS Non Rendition of First Quarter 










2014 2nd Qtr Accounts  
 
S/NO COMPANY QTR END SYMBOL REMARKS 
1 Greif Nigeria Plc April 
BLS Non Rendition of Second Quarter 
Interim Report 2014 
2 Capital Oil Plc June 
BLS Non Rendition of Second Quarter 
Interim Report 2014 
3 Juli Plc June 
BLS Non Rendition of Second Quarter 
Interim Report 2014 
4 Smart Products Nigeria Plc June 
BLS Non Rendition of Second Quarter 
Interim Report 2014 
5 Navitus Energy Plc June 
BLS Non Rendition of Second Quarter 
Interim Report 2014 
6 P.S Mandrides & Company Plc June 
BLS Non Rendition of Second Quarter 
Interim Report 2014 
7 Premier Breweries Plc June 
BLS Non Rendition of Second Quarter 
Interim Report 2014 
8 Fortis Microfinance Bank Plc June 
BLS Non Rendition of Second Quarter 
Interim Report 2014 
9 Great Nigeria Insurance Plc June 
BLS Non Rendition of Second Quarter 
Interim Report 2014 
10 International Energy Insurance Plc June 
BLS Non Rendition of Second Quarter 
Interim Report 2014 
11 Mutual Benefit Assurance Plc June 
BLS Non Rendition of Second Quarter 
Interim Report 2014 
12 Resort Savings & Loans Plc June 
BLS Non Rendition of Second Quarter 
Interim Report 2014 
13 Unity Kapital Assurance Plc June 
BLS Non Rendition of Second Quarter 
Interim Report 2014 
14 Universal Insurance Company Plc June 
BLS Non Rendition of Second Quarter 
Interim Report 2014 
15 Ekocorp Plc June 
BLS Non Rendition of Second Quarter 
Interim Report 2014 
16 Evans Medical Plc June 
BLS Non Rendition of Second Quarter 
Interim Report 2014 
17 Omatek Ventures Plc June 
BLS Non Rendition of Second Quarter 
Interim Report 2014 
18 African Paints (Nigeria) Plc June 
BLS Non Rendition of Second Quarter 
Interim Report 2014 
19 
Paints And Coatings Manufacturing 
Plc June 
BLS Non Rendition of Second Quarter 
Interim Report 2014 




Interim Report 2014 
21 C & I Leasing Plc June 
BLS Non Rendition of Second Quarter 
Interim Report 2014 
22 Deap Capital Mgt & Trust Plc March 
BLS Non Rendition of Second Quarter 
Interim Report 2014 
 
2014 3rd Qtr Accounts  
 
S/NO COMPANY QTR END SYMBOL REMARKS 
1.  
Multi-Trex Integrated Foods Plc 
Jan BLS Non Rendition of Third Quarter 
Interim Report 2014 
2.  
Interlinked Technologies Plc 
Mar BLS Non Rendition of Third Quarter 
Interim Report 2014 
 
COMPANIES SLATED FOR DELISTING/RESTRUCTURING 
 
The companies listed on Schedule four are slated for delisting/restructuring for various reasons stated. 
SCHEDULE FOUR 
DELISTING IN PROCESS 
1 The Tourist Company of Nigeria Plc DIP Voluntary delisting due to free float deficiency 




1.  Aluminium Manufacturing Company of 
Nigeria Plc RESTRG 
The Company has obtained NSE’s approval to 
restructure.  
2.  
Nigerian German Chemical Plc RESTRG 
The Company has obtained NSE’s approval to 
restructure.  
3.  
Mti Plc RESTRG 
The Company has obtained NSE’s approval to 
restructure.  
4.  Beco Petroleum Product Plc RESTRG 
The Company has obtained NSE’s approval to 
restructure.  
5.  Unic Insurance Plc RESTRG 
The Company has obtained NSE’s approval to 
restructure.  
6.  Adswitch Plc RESTRG 
The Company has obtained NSE’s approval to 
restructure.  
7.  
Jos International Breweries Plc 
RESTRG 
The Company has obtained NSE’s approval to 
restructure.  
8.  
Stokvis Nigeria Plc 
RESTRG 
The Company has obtained NSE’s approval to 
restructure.  
9.  
Nigerian Sewing Machine Plc 
RESTRG 
The Company has obtained NSE’s approval to 
restructure.  





11.  Goldlink Insurance Plc RESTRG 
The Company has obtained NSE’s approval to 
restructure.  
12.  Golden Guinea Breweries Plc RESTRG 
The Company has obtained NSE’s approval to 
restructure.  
13.  UTC Nigeria Plc RESTRG 
The Company has obtained NSE’s approval to 
restructure.  
14.  IPWA Plc RESTRG 
The Company has obtained NSE’s approval to 
restructure.  
15.  Nigerian Wire & Cable Plc RESTRG 
The Company has obtained NSE’s approval to 
restructure.  
16.  Daar Communications Plc RESTRG 
The Company has obtained NSE’s approval to 
restructure.  
17.  West Africa Glass Industries Plc RESTRG 
The Company has obtained NSE’s approval to 
restructure.  
18.  Rokana Industries  Plc RESTRG 
The Company has obtained NSE’s approval to 
restructure.  
19.  Mtech Plc RESTRG 
The Company has obtained NSE’s approval to 
restructure.  
20.  Investment and Allied Insurance Plc RESTRG 
The Company has obtained NSE’s approval to 
restructure.  
21.  FTN Cocoa Processors Plc RESTRG 






UNAUTHORISED PUBLICATIONS & NON-DISCLOSURE OF MATERIAL INFORMATION   
Every listed company is required to provide The Exchange with timely information to enable it 
efficiently perform its function of maintaining an orderly market. In accordance with the provisions of 
Appendix 111 of the Listing Rules, quoted companies are required to obtain prior written approval from 
The Exchange before publications that affect shareholders’ interest are made in the media. In addition, 
companies are also required to disclose material information to The Exchange and publish some of that 
information in their Annual Reports.  
 
The companies listed in Schedules five and six breached these provisions of the Listing Rules and were 
sanctioned accordingly. The Exchange applied the sanctions prescribed in Rules and the companies 
have discharged their financial obligations. 
SCHEDULE FIVE 
 
PUBLICATION WITHOUT NSE’S PRIOR WRITTEN  APPROVAL IN  2014 
NAME OF COMPANIES NATURE OF PUBLICATION 
Ecobank Transnational Incorporated Notice of Acquisition 




LASACO Insurance Plc Notice of Court Order Meeting 
 
NON- DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION IN  2014 
NAME OF COMPANIES NATURE OF PUBLICATION 
Oasis insurance Plc Non-disclosure of the Substantial shareholding of Oasis Group and 




SANCTIONS FOR DEFAULT FILINGS OF FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 
The information published in schedules eight and nine are the list of companies that filed their 2011 
and 2012  Financial Statements after the regulatory  due date. The Exchange applied sanctions in 
accordance with the provisions of Section 14 of Appendix 111 of the Listing Rules. 
 
2015 DEFAULT FILINGS                                                                                                    
DEFAULT FILINGS OF AUDITED ACCOUNTS   
S/NO NAME OF COMPANIES FISCAL YEAR  PENALTY (N) 
1.  Aso Savings and Loans Plc December 2013 3,700, 000.00 
 
 
2014 DEFAULT FILINGS                                                                                                    
DEFAULT FILINGS OF AUDITED ACCOUNTS   
S/NO NAME OF COMPANIES FISCAL YEAR  PENALTY (N) 
2.  International Energy Insurance Plc December 2012 5,400, 000.00 
3.  Aso Savings and Loans Plc December 2012 5,000 000.00 
4.  Abbey Building Society Plc December 2013 200,000.00 
5.  Ikeja Hotels Plc December 2012 5,500,000.00 
6.  Interlinked Technologies Plc June 2013 2,900,000.00 
7.  National Salt Co. of Nig. Plc December 2013 300,000.00 
8.  Austin Laz & Co. Plc December 2013 300,000.00 
9.  Studio Press Plc December 2013 400,000.00 
10.  NCR Plc December 2013 500,000.00 
11.  Regency Alliance Insurance Plc December 2013 600,000.00 
12.  WAPIC Insurance Plc December 2013 700,000.00 
13.  Oasis Insurance  December 2013 700,000.00 
14.  AIICO Insurance Plc December 2013 800,000.00 
15.  FTN Cocoa Processing Plc December 2012  6,100,000.00 




17.  Niger Insurance Plc December 2013 1,000,000.00 
18.  Continental Reinsurance Plc December 2013 900,000.00 
19.  Law Union & Rock Insurance Plc December 2013 600,000.00 
20.  Sovereign Trust Insurance Plc December 2013 1,100,000.00 
21.  Fortis Microfinance Bank Plc December 2013 1,100,000.00 
22.  C & I Leasing Plc  December 2013 1,200,000.00 
23.  Linkage Assurance Plc December 2013 1,200,000.00 
24.  Royal Exchange Plc December 2013 1,400,000.00 
25.  Guinea Insurance Plc December 2013 1,500,000.00 
26.  Prestige Assurance Plc December 2013 1,600,000.00 
27.  John Holt Plc September 2013 2,900,000.00 
28.  Conoil Plc December 2013 1,400,000.00 
29.  Daar Communication Plc December 2012 7,100,000.00 
30.  Oando Plc December 2012 2,100,000.00 
31.  Ikeja Hotel Plc December 2012 2,100,000.00 
32.  Lasaco Insurance Plc December 2012 2,100,000.00 
33.  Mutual Benefit Assurance Plc December 2013 2,700,000.00 
34.  Nigerian Enamelware Plc April 2014 1,200,000.00 
35.  Unity Kapital Assurance Plc December 2013 3,000,000.00 
 
 
FREE FLOAT DEFICIENCIES 
Companies listed on The Exchange must maintain a minimum free float for the set standards under 
which they are listed in order to ensure that there is an orderly and liquid market in their securities. 
The free float requirement for companies on the Main Board is 20% and 15% for ASEM companies.  
 
The Exchange has identified three companies that have free float deficiencies. These companies 
applied for waivers from the Quotations Committee of Management specifically provided compliance 
plans with tentative timelines to support their requests.  
 
The Quotations Committee of Management considered and approved an extended timeframe for the 
companies to regain compliance with the listing requirement. The companies are however required to 
also provide quarterly disclosure reports to The Exchange detailing their level of implementation of the 
compliance plans. 
 The names of the companies in this category are contained in schedule nine. 
SCHEDULE SEVEN 
COMPANIES WITH FREE FLOAT DEFICIENCIES  
 ISSUER % OF FREELOAT COMPLIANCE DUE DATE  
Dangote Cement Plc   9.07 October 26, 2016 




Capital Hotel Plc 2.23 April 20, 2016 
Great Nigerian Insurance Plc 16.00 July 8, 2016 
Chellerams Plc 14.87 July 8. 2016 
Nigerian Ropes Plc 13.96 January 7, 2015 
Aluminium Extrusion Industries Plc 17.55 March 4, 2015  
   
 
TRANSPARENCY DISCLOSURE: APPLICATIONS APPROVED 
The Quotations Committee of Management considered and approved the following Applications but 
the instruments are yet to be listed on the Daily Official List.  
SCHEDULE EIGHT 
APPROVALS IN 2015 BUT YET TO BE LISTED 
LIST OF APPLICATIONS APPROVED BY QCN ON 30 JANUARY 2015 
ISSUER  CAPITAL RAISING METHOD STOCK BROKER ISSUING HOUSE 
BONDS 
UBA Plc Offer for Subscription of up 
to N45 Billion Bond (Series 1) 
7-Year 16.45% Fixed Rate 
Subordinated Unsecured 
Notes Due under a N345 
Billion Medium Term Note 
Programme. 
UBA Securities Limited, 
Futureview Securities Limited, 
ARM Securities Limited and 
Cowry Securities Limited 
UBA Capital Plc, FSDH 
Merchant Bank Limited 
and Stanbic IBTC Capital 
Limited 
 
APPROVALS IN 2014 BUT YET TO BE LISTED 
LIST OF APPLICATIONS APPROVED BY QCN ON 15 DECEMBER 2014 
ISSUER  CAPITAL RAISING METHOD STOCK BROKER ISSUING HOUSE 
BONDS 
FCMB Financing SPV Plc Offer for Subscription of 
N26 Billion 14.25% Series 1 
Fixed Unsecured Bonds 
Due 2021 under a N100 
Billion Bonds Programme 
CSL Stockbrokers Limited Chapel Hill Advisory Partners 
Ltd; FCMB Capital Markets Ltd 
and Standard Chartered 
Securities (Nigeria) Ltd 
Bauchi State Government Offer for Subscription of 
N15 Billion  15.5% Series 1 
Fixed Rate Bonds Due 2021 
under the N30 Billion 
Medium Term Note 
Programme 
Strategy & Arbitrage 
Limited, and North Bridge 
Investment & Trust Limited 
Planet Capital Limited and 
Tiddo Securities Ltd 
Oyo State Government Offer for Subscription of 
N5 Billion 15% Fixed Rate 
Development Bonds Series 
1 Due 2021 Under the N55 
BGL Securities Limited, Apel 
Securities Limited, Dunbel 
Securities Limited, DSU 
Brokerage Services Limited, 
FBN Capital Limited, BGL Plc, 
Greenwich Trust Limited, Lead 
Capital Limited, Morgan Capital 




Billion Debt Issuance 
Programme 
Forthright Securities & 
Investment Services 
Limited, Primera Africa 
Securities Limited, Vetiva 
Securities Limited and 
Yuderb Investment & 
Securities Limited 
Securities Ltd, Skye Financial 
Services Ltd, Sterling Capital 
Markets Ltd and Vetiva Capital 
Management Ltd 
RIGHTS ISSUE 
Oando Plc  Rights Issue of 
2,217,265,184 ordinary 
shares of 50k each at 
N22.00 per share 
Vetiva Securities Limited, APT 
Securities and Funds Limited, 
Cardinal Stockbrokers Limited, 
CSL Stockbrokers Limited, 
Partnership Securities Limited, 
Zenith Securities Limited 
Vetiva Capital Management 
Limited, FBN Capital Limited and 
FCMB Capital Markets Limited, 
Marina Securities Limited, 
Stanbic IBTC Capital Limited and 
Zenith Capital Limited 
Prestige Assurance Plc Rights Issue of 
3,009,978,524 ordinary 
shares of 50k each at par 
Imperial Asset Managers 
Limited 
Sterling Capital Markets Limited 
& 
 Nigerian Stockbrokers Limited 
UBA Plc Rights Issue of 
3,298,138,756 ordinary 
shares of 50k each at 
N6.20 per share 




UBA Capital Plc & BGL Capital 
Limited 
Presco Plc Rights Issue of 100,000,000 
ordinary shares of 50k each 
at N30.00 per share 
CSL Stockbrokers Limited 
and BGL Securities Limited 
FCMB Capital Markets Limited & 
CardinalStone Partners Limited 
 
NEW LISTING IN 2015  







Fidson Healthcare Plc 11/02/2015        2,000,000 1,000 2,000,000,000 Corporate Bond 
Sterling Bank Plc 05/02/2015 7,471,698,113 2.45  18,305,660,376.85 Placing  
Allan Gray 30/01/2015              43,024  34,541.45   1,486,111,344.80  Memorandum Listing 
Mansard Insurance Plc 16/01/2015     500,000,000 2.85 1,425,000,000.00 Employee Share Plan 
Evans Medical Plc 09/01/2015     245,874,570 2.28 560,594,019.60 Rights Issue 
Transcorp Hotels Plc 15/01/2015 7,600,403,900                   10       76,004,039,000.00 Listing by IPO 
Union Dicon Salt Plc 14/01/2015       41,000,000 13.92 570,720,000.00 Placing 
 
 
DELISTED ENTITIES/SECURITIES IN 2015 





PRICE VALUE DELISTED REASON FOR 
DELISTING 
      
Cappa D’ Alberto 16/01/2015 196,875,000 95.49 18,799,593,750.00 voluntary 
C & I Leasing Plc Loan 
Stock 2014                                                                                                                                                                                                                               01/01/2015










MEETINGS FOR THE MONTH OF JANUARY 2015 
S/N Company Venue Date Time TYPE OF 
MEETING 
1 Ikeja Hotel (Shareholders’ 
requisitioned EGM) 
Sheraton Hotel, Ikeja Lagos January 6, 2015 10.00 a.m. AGM 
2 Unity Kapital Assurance Ruiz Continental Hotel, Plot 779, 
Cadastral Zone AO, CBD Abuja  
January 14, 2015 11.00 a.m. AGM 
3 FBN Heritage Fund (EGM) Protea Hotel, Ikoyi January 27, 2015 10.00 a.m. EGM 
 
